MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
152 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
certiorari to the supreme court of california
No. 98–7809. Argued November 9, 1999—Decided January 12, 2000
Accused of converting a client’s money to his own use while employed as
a paralegal, petitioner Martinez was charged by California with grand
theft and the fraudulent appropriation of another’s property. He chose
to represent himself at trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft
but convicted him of embezzlement. He then filed a timely notice of
appeal, a motion to represent himself, and a waiver of counsel. The
California Court of Appeal denied his motion to represent himself based
on its prior holding that there is no constitutional right to self-
representation on direct appeal under Faretta v. California, 422 U. S.
806, in which this Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitu-
tional right to conduct his own defense at trial when he voluntarily and
intelligently elects to proceed without counsel, id., at 807, 836. The
state court had explained that the right to counsel on appeal stems from
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment on which Faretta was
based, and held that the denial of self-representation at this level does
not violate due process or equal protection. The California Supreme
Court denied Martinez’ application for a writ of mandate.
Held: Neither Faretta’s holding nor its reasoning requires a State to rec-
ognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from
a criminal conviction. Although some of Faretta’s reasoning is applica-
ble to appellate proceedings as well as to trials, there are significant
distinctions. First, the historical evidence Faretta relied on as identify-
ing a right of self-representation, 422 U. S., at 812–817, is not useful
here because it pertained to times when lawyers were scarce, often mis-
trusted, and not readily available to the average person accused of
crime, whereas it has since been recognized that every indigent defend-
ant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to the assistance of
appointed counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335. Moreover,
unlike the right recognized in Faretta, the historical evidence does not
provide any support for an affirmative constitutional right to appellate
self-representation. Second, Faretta’s reliance on the Sixth Amend-
ment’s structure interpreted in light of its English and colonial back-
ground, 422 U. S., at 818–832, is not relevant here. Because the Amend-

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
153 Cite as: 528 U. S. 152 (2000)
Syllabus
ment deals strictly with trial rights and does not include any right to
appeal, see Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 656, it necessarily
follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding
a right to appellate self-representation. Faretta’s inquiries into histori-
cal English practices, 422 U. S., at 821–824, do not provide a basis for
extending that case to the appellate process because there was no appeal
from a criminal conviction in England until 1907. Third, although Fa-
retta’s conclusion that a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
trial counsel must be honored out of respect for individual autonomy,
id., at 834, is also applicable in the appellate context, this Court has
recognized that the right is not absolute, see id., at 835. Given the
Court’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to appel-
late proceedings, any individual right to self-representation on appeal
based on autonomy principles must be grounded in the Due Process
Clause. Under the practices prevailing in the Nation today, the Court
is entirely unpersuaded that the risk of disloyalty by a court-appointed
attorney, or the suspicion of such disloyalty, that underlies the constitu-
tional right of self-representation at trial, see id., at 834, is a sufficient
concern to conclude that such a right is a necessary component of a fair
appellate proceeding. The States are clearly within their discretion to
conclude that the government’s interests in ensuring the integrity and
efficiency of the appellate process outweigh an invasion of the appellant’s
interest in self-representation, although the Court’s narrow holding does
not preclude the States from recognizing a constitutional right to appel-
late self-representation under their own constitutions. Pp. 156–164.
Affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., post, p. 164, and Breyer, J., post,
p. 164, filed concurring opinions. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, post, p. 165.
Ronald D. Maines, by appointment of the Court, 526 U. S.
1110, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Robert M. Foster, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David
P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W.

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
154 MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL.,
FOURTH APPELLATE DIST.
Opinion of the Court
Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Laura
Whitcomb Halgren, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.*
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitu-
tion guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or
federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of
counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by
imprisonment.1 In Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806
(1975), we decided that the defendant also “has a constitu-
tional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily
and intelligently elects to do so.” Id., at 807. Although
that statement arguably embraces the entire judicial pro-
ceeding, we also phrased the question as whether a State
may “constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts
and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that
he wants to conduct his own defense.” Ibid. Our conclu-
sion in Faretta extended only to a defendant’s “constitutional
right to conduct his own defense.” Id., at 836. Accord-
ingly, our specific holding was confined to the right to defend
oneself at trial. We now address the different question
whether the reasoning in support of that holding also applies
when the defendant becomes an appellant and assumes the
burden of persuading a reviewing court that the conviction
should be reversed. We have concluded that it does not.
I
Martinez describes himself as a self-taught paralegal with
25 years’ experience at 12 different law firms. See App. 13.
*Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson filed a brief for the Crimi-
nal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Barbara E. Bergman and Ephraim Margolin filed a brief for the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae.
1 See, e. g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U. S. 458 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
155 Cite as: 528 U. S. 152 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
While employed as an office assistant at a firm in Santa Ana,
California, Martinez was accused of converting $6,000 of a
client’s money to his own use. He was charged in a two-
count information with grand theft and the fraudulent appro-
priation of the property of another. He chose to represent
himself at trial before a jury, because he claimed “ ‘there
wasn’t an attorney on earth who’d believe me once he saw
my past [criminal record].’ ” Id., at 15. The jury acquitted
him on Count 1, grand theft, but convicted him on Count 2,
embezzlement. The jury also found that he had three prior
convictions; accordingly, under California’s “three strikes”
law, the court imposed a mandatory sentence of 25-years-to-
life in prison. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 667(d) and (e)(2)
(West 1999). Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal as well
as a motion to represent himself and a waiver of counsel.
The California Court of Appeal denied his motion, and the
California Supreme Court denied his application for a writ
of mandate. While the California Supreme Court did not
issue an opinion in this case, the Court of Appeal previously
had explained:
“There is no constitutional right to self-representation
on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on
appeal stems from the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the
Sixth Amendment, which is the foundation on which
Faretta is based. The denial of self-representation at
this level does not violate due process or equal protec-
tion guarantees.” People v. Scott, 64 Cal. App. 4th 550,
554, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 318 (1998).
We granted certiorari because Martinez has raised a ques-
tion on which both state and federal courts have expressed
conflicting views.2 526 U. S. 1064 (1999). We now affirm.
2 Compare Myers v. Collins, 8 F. 3d 249, 252 (CA5 1993) (finding right
of self-representation extends to appeals); Campbell v. Blodgett, 940 F. 2d
549 (CA9 1991) (same); Chamberlain v. Ericksen, 744 F. 2d 628, 630

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
156 MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL.,
FOURTH APPELLATE DIST.
Opinion of the Court
II
The Faretta majority based its conclusion on three inter-
related arguments. First, it examined historical evidence
identifying a right of self-representation that had been pro-
tected by federal and state law since the beginning of our
Nation, 422 U. S., at 812–817. Second, it interpreted the
structure of the Sixth Amendment, in the light of its English
and colonial background, id., at 818–832. Third, it concluded
that even though it “is undeniable that in most criminal
prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s
guidance than by their own unskilled efforts,” a knowing and
intelligent waiver “must be honored out of ‘that respect for
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 350–351 [(1970)].” Id., at 834. Some
of the Court’s reasoning is applicable to appellate proceed-
ings as well as to trials. There are, however, significant
distinctions.
The historical evidence relied upon by Faretta as identify-
ing a right of self-representation is not always useful because
it pertained to times when lawyers were scarce, often mis-
trusted, and not readily available to the average person ac-
cused of crime.3 For one who could not obtain a lawyer,
(CA8 1984) (same); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 537 Pa. 581, 583, 645 A. 2d
223, 224 (1994) (same); State v. Van Pelt, 305 Ark. 125, 127, 810 S. W. 2d
27, 28 (1991) (same); Webb v. State, 274 Ind. 540, 542, 412 N. E. 2d 790, 792
(1980) (same); Webb v. State, 533 S. W. 2d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(same), with United States v. Gillis, 773 F. 2d 549, 560 (CA4 1985) (finding
no right of self-representation on appeal); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F. 2d
239, 246 (CA7 1984) (same); Hill v. State, 656 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1995)
(same); State v. Gillespie, 898 S. W. 2d 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (same).
3 “The colonists brought with them an appreciation of the virtues of self-
reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers. When the Colonies were
first settled, ‘the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing Attorneys-
General and Solicitors-General of the Crown and the arbitrary Justices of
the King’s Court, all bent on the conviction of those who opposed the
King’s prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure convictions.’ This
prejudice gained strength in the Colonies where ‘distrust of lawyers be-
came an institution.’ Several Colonies prohibited pleading for hire in the

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
157 Cite as: 528 U. S. 152 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
self-representation was the only feasible alternative to as-
serting no defense at all. Thus, a government’s recognition
of an indigent defendant’s right to represent himself was
comparable to bestowing upon the homeless beggar a “right”
to take shelter in the sewers of Paris. Not surprisingly,
early precedent demonstrates that this “right” was not al-
ways used to the defendant’s advantage as a shield, but
rather was often employed by the prosecution as a sword.
The principal case cited in Faretta is illustrative. In Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942), the
Cour t rel ied on the existence of the r ight of self-
representation as the basis for finding that an unrepresented
defendant had waived his right to a trial by jury.4
17th century. The prejudice persisted into the 18th century as ‘the lower
classes came to identify lawyers with the upper class.’ The years of Rev-
olution and Confederation saw an upsurge of antilawyer sentiment, a ‘sud-
den revival, after the War of the Revolution, of the old dislike and distrust
of lawyers as a class.’ ” Faretta, 422 U. S., at 826–827 (footnotes omitted).
4 Similarly, in the state cases cited by the Court in Faretta, see 422
U. S., at 813, n. 9, the defendant’s right to represent himself was often
the predicate for upholding the waiver of an important right. See, e. g.,
Mackreth v. Wilson, 31 Ala. App. 191, 193, 15 So. 2d 112, 113 (1943) (failure
of the defendant to request counsel equaled an “election” to proceed pro
se); Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, 822, 451 P. 2d 1014, 1023 (1969) (court
relied on defendant’s right of self-representation to uphold an uncounseled
guilty plea, despite claims that it was coerced); People v. Nelson, 47 Ill. 2d
570, 268 N. E. 2d 2, 3 (1971) (defendant’s pro se status is predicate for
upholding waiver of indictment and jury trial and also to uphold guilty
plea); Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 562–563, 87 N. E. 2d 192,
195 (1949) (life sentence upheld despite fact that indigent defendant was
unable to procure counsel); Westberry v. State, 254 A. 2d 44, 46 (Me. 1969)
(guilty plea upheld because defendant failed to claim indigency or to re-
quest counsel); State v. Hollman, 232 S. C. 489, 499, 102 S. E. 2d 873, 878
(1958) (right of defendant to represent himself used as basis for finding he
had no right to appointed counsel). But see State v. Thomlinson, 78 S. D.
235, 237, 100 N. W. 2d 121, 122 (1960) (vacating conviction based on court’s
failure to allow defendant to represent himself); State v. Penderville, 2
Utah 2d 281, 287, 272 P. 2d 195, 199 (1954) (same); Cappetta v. State, 204
So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. App. 1967) (same), rev’d, State v. Cappetta, 216 So. 2d

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
158 MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL.,
FOURTH APPELLATE DIST.
Opinion of the Court
It has since been recognized, however, that an indigent
defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to the
assistance of appointed counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U. S. 335 (1963). Thus, an individual’s decision to repre-
sent himself is no longer compelled by the necessity of choos-
ing self-representation over incompetent or nonexistent rep-
resentation; rather, it more likely reflects a genuine desire
to “ ‘conduct his own cause in his own words.’ ” Faretta, 422
U. S., at 823 (footnote omitted). Therefore, while Faretta
is correct in concluding that there is abundant support for
the proposition that a right to self-representation has been
recognized for centuries, the original reasons for protecting
that right do not have the same force when the availabil-
ity of competent counsel for every indigent defendant has
displaced the need—although not always the desire—for
self-representation.
The scant historical evidence pertaining to the issue of
self-representation on appeal is even less helpful. The
Court in Faretta relied upon the description of the right in
§ 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92, which states
that “the parties may plead and manage their own causes
personally or by the assistance of such counsel . . . .” 422
U. S., at 812. It is arguable that this language encompasses
appeals as well as trials. Assuming it does apply to appel-
late proceedings, however, the statutory right is expressly
limited by the phrase “as by the rules of the said courts.” 1
Stat. 92. Appellate courts have maintained the discretion
to allow litigants to “manage their own causes”—and some
such litigants have done so effectively.5 That opportunity,
however, has been consistently subject to each court’s own
rules.
749, 750 (Fla. 1968) (finding voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to
proceed pro se).
5 See, e. g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103 (1978) (pro se respondent argued,
briefed, and prevailed in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
this Court).

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
159 Cite as: 528 U. S. 152 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing
a right of self-representation on appeal. We might, nonethe-
less, paraphrase Faretta and assert: No State or Colony ever
forced counsel upon a convicted appellant, and no spokesman
ever suggested that such a practice would be tolerable or
advisable. 422 U. S., at 832. Such negative historical evi-
dence was meaningful to the Faretta Court, because the fact
that the “[dog] had not barked” 6 arguably demonstrated that
early lawmakers intended to preserve the “long-respected
right of self-representation” at trial. Ibid. Historical si-
lence, however, has no probative force in the appellate con-
text because there simply was no long-respected right of
self-representation on appeal. In fact, the right of appeal
itself is of relatively recent origin.
Appeals as of right in federal courts were nonexistent for
the first century of our Nation, and appellate review of any
sort was “rarely allowed.” Abney v. United States, 431 U. S.
651, 656, n. 3 (1977). The States, also, did not generally rec-
ognize an appeal as of right until Washington became the
first to constitutionalize the right explicitly in 1889.7 There
was similarly no right to appeal in criminal cases at common
law, and appellate review of any sort was “limited” and
“rarely used.” 8 Thus, unlike the inquiry in Faretta, the his-
torical evidence does not provide any support for an affirma-
tive constitutional right to appellate self-representation.
The Faretta majority’s reliance on the structure of the
Sixth Amendment is also not relevant. The Sixth Amend-
ment identifies the basic rights that the accused shall enjoy
6 A. Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 383,
400 (1938).
7 See Lobsenz, A Constitutional Right to An Appeal: Guarding Against
Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev.
375, 376 (1985). Although Washington was the first State to constitution-
alize an appeal as of right, almost all of the States historically had some
form of discretionary appellate review. See generally L. Orfield, Criminal
Appeals in America 215–231 (1939).
8 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 308–310 (1883).

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
160 MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL.,
FOURTH APPELLATE DIST.
Opinion of the Court
in “all criminal prosecutions.” They are presented strictly
as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the
trial itself. The Sixth Amendment does not include any
right to appeal. As we have recognized, “[t]he right of ap-
peal, as we presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a
creature of statute.” Abney, 431 U. S., at 656. It necessar-
ily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any
basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal.
The Faretta majority’s nontextual interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment also included an examination of British
criminal jurisprudence and a reference to the opprobrious
trial practices before the Star Chamber. 422 U. S., at 821–
824. These inquiries into historical English practices, how-
ever, again do not provide a basis for extending Faretta to
the appellate process, because there was no appeal from a
criminal conviction in England until 1907. See Griffin v. Il-
linois, 351 U. S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgment); 7 Edw. VII, ch. 23 (1907). Indeed, none of our
many cases safeguarding the rights of an indigent appellant
has placed any reliance on either the Sixth Amendment or
on Faretta. See, e. g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353,
356–358 (1963); Griffin, 351 U. S., at 12.
Finally, the Faretta majority found that the right to self-
representation at trial was grounded in part in a respect for
individual autonomy. See 422 U. S., at 834. This consider-
ation is, of course, also applicable to an appellant seeking to
manage his own case. As we explained in Faretta, at the
trial level “[t]o force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead
him to believe that the law contrives against him.” Ibid.
On appellate review, there is surely a similar risk that the
appellant will be skeptical of whether a lawyer, who is em-
ployed by the same government that is prosecuting him, will
serve his cause with undivided loyalty. Equally true on ap-
peal is the related observation that it is the appellant person-
ally who will bear the consequences of the appeal. See ibid.

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
161 Cite as: 528 U. S. 152 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
In light of our conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does
not apply to appellate proceedings, any individual right to
self-representation on appeal based on autonomy principles
must be grounded in the Due Process Clause. Under the
practices that prevail in the Nation today, however, we are
entirely unpersuaded that the risk of either disloyalty or sus-
picion of disloyalty is a sufficient concern to conclude that
a constitutional right of self-representation is a necessary
component of a fair appellate proceeding. We have no doubt
that instances of disloyal representation are rare. In both
trials and appeals there are, without question, cases in which
counsel’s performance is ineffective. Even in those cases,
however, it is reasonable to assume that counsel’s perform-
ance is more effective than what the unskilled appellant
could have provided for himself.
No one, including Martinez and the Faretta majority, at-
tempts to argue that as a rule pro se representation is wise,
desirable, or efficient.9 Although we found in Faretta that
the right to defend oneself at trial is “fundamental” in na-
ture, id., at 817, it is clear that it is representation by counsel
that is the standard, not the exception. See Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 307 (1988) (noting the “strong pre-
sumption against” waiver of right to counsel). Our experi-
ence has taught us that “a pro se defense is usually a bad
defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided
by an experienced criminal defense attorney.” 10
As the Faretta opinion recognized, the right to self-
representation is not absolute. The defendant must “ ‘volun-
tarily and intelligently’ ” elect to conduct his own defense,
9 Some critics argue that the right to proceed pro se at trial in certain
cases is akin to allowing the defendant to waive his right to a fair trial.
See, e. g., United States v. Farhad, 190 F. 3d 1097, 1106–1107 (CA9 1999)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring specially), cert. pending, No. 99–7127.
10 Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years after
Faretta, 6 Seton Hall Const. L. J. 483, 598 (1996).

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
162 MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL.,
FOURTH APPELLATE DIST.
Opinion of the Court
422 U. S., at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458,
464–465 (1938)), and most courts require him to do so in a
timely manner.11 He must first be “made aware of the dan-
gers and disadvantages of self-representation.” 422 U. S.,
at 835. A trial judge may also terminate self-representation
or appoint “standby counsel”—even over the defendant’s ob-
jection—if necessary. Id., at 834, n. 46. We have further
held that standby counsel may participate in the trial pro-
ceedings, even without the express consent of the defendant,
as long as that participation does not “seriously undermin[e]”
the “appearance before the jury” that the defendant is repre-
senting himself. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 187
(1984). Additionally, the trial judge is under no duty to pro-
vide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or to per-
form any legal “chores” for the defendant that counsel would
normally carry out. Id., at 183–184. Even at the trial level,
therefore, the government’s interest in ensuring the integ-
rity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defend-
ant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.
In the appellate context, the balance between the two com-
peting interests surely tips in favor of the State. The status
of the accused defendant, who retains a presumption of in-
nocence throughout the trial process, changes dramatically
when a jury returns a guilty verdict. We have recognized
this shifting focus and noted:
“[T]here are significant differences between the trial
and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding. The pur-
pose of the trial stage from the State’s point of view is
to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed
innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . .
“By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather
than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seek-
ing not to fend off the efforts of the State’s prosecutor
11 See id., at 544–550 (collecting cases).

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
163 Cite as: 528 U. S. 152 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge
or a jury below.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 610
(1974).
In the words of the Faretta majority, appellate proceedings
are simply not a case of “hal[ing] a person into its criminal
courts.” 422 U. S., at 807.
The requirement of representation by trained counsel im-
plies no disrespect for the individual inasmuch as it tends to
benefit the appellant as well as the court. Courts, of course,
may still exercise their discretion to allow a lay person to
proceed pro se. We already leave to the appellate courts’
discretion, keeping “the best interests of both the prisoner
and the government in mind,” the decision whether to allow
a pro se appellant to participate in, or even to be present at,
oral argument. Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 284 (1948).
Considering the change in position from defendant to appel-
lant, the autonomy interests that survive a felony conviction
are less compelling than those motivating the decision in
Faretta. Yet the overriding state interest in the fair and
efficient administration of justice remains as strong as at the
trial level. Thus, the States are clearly within their discre-
tion to conclude that the government’s interests outweigh an
invasion of the appellant’s interest in self-representation.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither the
holding nor the reasoning in Faretta requires California to
recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on di-
rect appeal from a criminal conviction. Our holding is, of
course, narrow. It does not preclude the States from recog-
nizing such a right under their own constitutions. Its im-
pact on the law will be minimal, because a lay appellant’s
rights to participate in appellate proceedings have long been
limited by the well-established conclusions that he has no
right to be present during appellate proceedings, Schwab v.
Berggren, 143 U. S. 442 (1892), or to present oral argument,

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
164 MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL.,
FOURTH APPELLATE DIST.
Breyer, J., concurring
Price, 334 U. S., at 285–286. Meanwhile the rules governing
appeals in California, and presumably those in other States
as well, seem to protect the ability of indigent litigants to
make pro se filings. See, e. g., People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d
436, 440, 600 P. 2d 1071, 1074 (1979); see also Anders v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). In requiring Martinez, under
these circumstances, to accept against his will a state-
appointed attorney, the California courts have not deprived
him of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the judgment of
the California Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, concurring.
To resolve this case it is unnecessary to cast doubt upon
the rationale of Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975).
Faretta can be accepted as quite sound, yet it does not fol-
low that a convicted person has a similar right of self-
representation on appeal. Different considerations apply in
the appellate system, and the Court explains why this is so.
With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.
Justice Breyer, concurring.
I agree with the Court and join its opinion. Because
Justice Scalia writes separately to underscore the continu-
ing constitutional validity of Faretta v. California, 422 U. S.
806 (1975), I note that judges closer to the firing line have
sometimes expressed dismay about the practical conse-
quences of that holding. See, e. g., United States v. Farhad,
190 F. 3d 1097, 1107 (CA9 1999) (concurring opinion) (right of
self-representation “frequently, though not always, conflicts
squarely and inherently with the right to a fair trial”).
I have found no empirical research, however, that might help
determine whether, in general, the right to represent oneself
furthers, or inhibits, the Constitution’s basic guarantee of
fairness. And without some strong factual basis for believ-
ing that Faretta’s holding has proved counterproductive in

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
165 Cite as: 528 U. S. 152 (2000)
Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
practice, we are not in a position to reconsider the constitu-
tional assumptions that underlie that case.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment.
I do not share the apparent skepticism of today’s opinion
concerning the judgment of the Court (often curiously de-
scribed as merely the judgment of “the majority”) in Faretta
v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). I have no doubt that the
Framers of our Constitution, who were suspicious enough
of governmental power—including judicial power—that they
insisted upon a citizen’s right to be judged by an independ-
ent jury of private citizens, would not have found acceptable
the compulsory assignment of counsel by the government
to plead a criminal defendant’s case. While I might have
rested the decision upon the Due Process Clause rather than
the Sixth Amendment, I believe it was correct.
That asserting the right of self-representation may often,
or even usually, work to the defendant’s disadvantage is no
more remarkable—and no more a basis for withdrawing the
right—than is the fact that proceeding without counsel in
custodial interrogation, or confessing to the crime, usually
works to the defendant’s disadvantage. Our system of laws
generally presumes that the criminal defendant, after being
fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not
need them dictated by the State. Any other approach is
unworthy of a free people. As Justice Frankfurter elo-
quently put it for the Court in Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942), to require the acceptance
of counsel “is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it
the Constitution.” Id., at 280.
In any event, Faretta is relevant to the question before us
only to the limited extent that we must decide whether its
holding applies to self-representation on appeal. It seems
to me that question is readily answered by the fact that there
is no constitutional right to appeal. See McKane v. Dur-
ston, 153 U. S. 684, 687–688 (1894). Since a State could, as

528US1 Unit: $U16 [06-15-01 20:31:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
166 MARTINEZ v. COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL.,
FOURTH APPELLATE DIST.
Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, subject its
trial-court determinations to no review whatever, it could
a fortiori subject them to review which consists of a nonad-
versarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of govern-
ment experts. Adversarial review with counsel appointed
by the State is even less questionable than that.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.