NEW YORK v. HILL

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Syllabus
NEW YORK v. HILL
certiorari to the court of appeals of new york
No. 98–1299. Argued November 2, 1999—Decided January 11, 2000
New York lodged a detainer against respondent, an Ohio prisoner, under
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Respondent signed a
request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to IAD Article III and
was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges. Arti-
cle III(a) provides, inter alia, that, upon such a request, the prisoner
must be brought to trial within 180 days, “provided that for good cause
shown . . . , the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court . . .
may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” Although re-
spondent’s counsel initially agreed to a trial date set beyond the 180-
day period, respondent subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment,
arguing that the IAD’s time limit had expired. In denying the motion,
the trial court concluded that defense counsel’s explicit agreement to
the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of respondent’s IAD
rights. After respondent was convicted of both charges, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court’s refusal to
dismiss for lack of a timely trial. The State Court of Appeals, however,
reversed and ordered that the indictment be dismissed; counsel’s agree-
ment to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondent’s IAD speedy
trial rights.
Held: Defense counsel’s agreement to a trial date outside the IAD period
bars the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did
not occur within that period. This Court has articulated a general rule
that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto,
513 U. S. 196, 200–201, and has recognized that the most basic rights
of criminal defendants are subject to waiver, Peretz v. United States,
501 U. S. 923, 936. For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must
personally make an informed waiver, but scheduling matters are plainly
among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. Re-
quiring the defendant’s express assent for routine and often repetitive
scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose.
The text of the IAD, by allowing the court to grant “good-cause con-
tinuances” when either “prisoner or his counsel” is present, contem-
plates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a)
(emphasis added). The Court rejects respondent’s arguments for af-
firmance: (1) that the IAD’s provision for “good-cause continuances” is
the sole means for extending the time period; (2) that the defendant

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should not be allowed to waive the time limits given that they benefit
not only the defendant but society generally; and (3) that waiver of the
IAD’s time limits can be effected only by an affirmative request for
treatment contrary to, or inconsistent with, those limits. Pp. 114–118.
92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542, reversed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Robert Mastrocola argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Howard R. Relin.
Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Robinson, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.
Brian Shiffrin argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Edward John Nowak, by appointment
of the Court, 527 U. S. 1002, and Stephen J. Bird.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether defense counsel’s
agreement to a trial date outside the time period required
by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did
not occur within that period.
I
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a com-
pact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the
District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of
one State’s outstanding charges against a prisoner of another
State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 580.20 (McKinney 1995);
18 U. S. C. App. § 2; 11A U. L. A. 48 (1995) (listing jurisdic-
tions). As “a congressionally sanctioned interstate com-
pact” within the Compact Clause of the United States Con-
stitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, the IAD is a federal law subject
to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716,
719 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981).

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A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in an-
other State’s custody begins the process by filing a detainer,
which is a request by the State’s criminal justice agency that
the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the
prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is
imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U. S. 43, 44 (1993). After
a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file
a “request for a final disposition to be made of the indict-
ment, information, or complaint.” Art. III(a). Upon such
a request, the prisoner “shall be brought to trial within one
hundred eighty days,” “provided that for good cause shown
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any neces-
sary or reasonable continuance.” Ibid. Resolution of the
charges can also be triggered by the charging jurisdiction,
which may request temporary custody of the prisoner for
that purpose. Art. IV(a). In such a case, “trial shall be
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival
of the prisoner in the receiving state,” subject again to con-
tinuances for good cause shown in open court. Art. IV(c).
If a defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable
statutory period, the IAD requires that the indictment be
dismissed with prejudice. Art. V(c).
In this case, New York lodged a detainer against respond-
ent, who was a prisoner in Ohio. Respondent signed a re-
quest for disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III
of the IAD, and was returned to New York to face murder
and robbery charges. Defense counsel filed several motions,
which, it is uncontested, tolled the time limits during their
pendency.
On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel
appeared in court to set a trial date. The following collo-
quy ensued:
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, [the regular attorney] from
our office is engaged in a trial today. He told me that

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the Court was to set a trial date today. I believe the
Court may have preliminarily discussed a May 1st date,
and [the regular attorney] says that would fit in his
calendar.
“The Court: How is that with the defense counsel?
“[Defense Counsel]: That will be fine, Your Honor.”
164 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 627 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 236 (Cty.
Ct., Monroe County 1995).
The court scheduled trial to begin on May 1.
On April 17, 1995, respondent moved to dismiss the in-
dictment, arguing that the IAD’s time limit had expired.
The trial court found that as of January 9, 1995, when the
trial date was set, 167 nonexcludable days had elapsed, so
that if the subsequent time period was chargeable to the
State, the 180-day time period had indeed expired. How-
ever, the trial court concluded that “[d]efense counsel’s ex-
plicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180 day
statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of de-
fendant’s rights under the IAD.” Id., at 1036, 627 N. Y. S.
2d, at 237. Accordingly, the court denied respondent’s mo-
tion to dismiss.
Respondent was subsequently convicted, following a jury
trial, of murder in the second degree and robbery in the
first degree. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial
court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment for lack
of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the trial
court. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (1997). The
New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered
that the indictment against respondent be dismissed; de-
fense counsel’s agreement to a later trial date, it held, did
not waive respondent’s speedy trial rights under the IAD.
92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certio-
rari. 526 U. S. 1111 (1999).

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II
No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defend-
ant’s assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have,
however, “in the context of a broad array of constitutional
and statutory provisions,” articulated a general rule that
presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezza-
natto, 513 U. S. 196, 200–201 (1995), and we have recognized
that “[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are . . .
subject to waiver,” Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923,
936 (1991). In accordance with these principles, courts have
agreed that a defendant may, at least under some circum-
stances, waive his right to object to a given delay under the
IAD, although they have disagreed on what is necessary to
effect a waiver. See, e. g., People v. Jones, 197 Mich. App.
76, 80, 495 N. W. 2d 159, 160 (1992) (waiver if prisoner “either
expressly or impliedly, agrees or requests to be treated in a
manner contrary to the terms of the IAD”); Brown v. Wolff,
706 F. 2d 902, 907 (CA9 1983) (waiver if prisoner “affirma-
tively requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the
procedures prescribed by the IAD”); Drescher v. Superior
Ct., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1990)
(waiver if there is a “showing of record that the defendant
or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the
speedy trial period” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right
at issue. “[W]hether the defendant must participate person-
ally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required
for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be par-
ticularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at
stake.” United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993).
For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must person-
ally make an informed waiver. See, e. g., Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458, 464–465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v.
Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 7–8 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For
other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of
counsel. “Although there are basic rights that the attorney

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cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly ac-
knowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has—and must
have—full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.”
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 417–418 (1988). As to many
decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defend-
ant is “deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and
is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which
can be charged upon the attorney.’ ” Link v. Wabash R. Co.,
370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S.
320, 326 (1880)). Thus, decisions by counsel are generally
given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983), what evidentiary objections
to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451 (1965),
and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission
of evidence, see United States v. McGill, 11 F. 3d 223, 226–
227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness,
counsel’s word on such matters is the last.
Scheduling matters are plainly among those for which
agreement by counsel generally controls. This case does
not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protec-
tion of the IAD’s time limits or of the IAD generally, but
merely agreement to a specified delay in trial. When that
subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position
to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defend-
ant’s case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess
whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any
earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant him-
self for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determi-
nations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The
text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the
matter suggests: In allowing the court to grant “good-cause
continuances” when either “prisoner or his counsel” is pres-
ent, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to
counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added).
Respondent offers two arguments for affirmance, both
of which go primarily to the propriety of allowing waiver of

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any sort, not to the specifics of the waiver here. First, he
argues that by explicitly providing for the grant of “good-
cause continuances,” the IAD seeks to limit the situations
in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other ex-
tensions of the time period would override those limitations.
It is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it
is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought
to be secured. E. g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255,
258–259 (1993); Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9 (1959).
That is not, however, the situation here. To be sure, the
“necessary or reasonable continuance” provision is, by clear
implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can
obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendant’s
objection. But the specification in that provision that the
“prisoner or his counsel” must be present suggests that it
is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecu-
tion requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the
defense. As applied to agreed-upon extensions, we think its
negative implication is dubious—and certainly not clear
enough to constitute the “affirmative indication” required to
overcome the ordinary presumption that waiver is available.
Mezzanatto, supra, at 201. 1
Second, respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only
the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant
may not waive society’s rights. It is true that a “right con-
ferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest,
may not be waived or released if such waiver or release
contravenes the statutory policy.” Brooklyn Savings Bank
v. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) (emphasis added). The
1 It was suggested at oral argument that agreement in open court to a
trial date outside the allowable time period can itself be viewed as a “nec-
essary or reasonable continuance” for “good cause shown in open court.”
Although an agreed-upon trial date might sometimes merit this descrip-
tion, it is far from clear that it always does so, or that it does so here.
Because we find waiver, we do not consider under what circumstances an
agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision.

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conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that
any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived.
In general, “[i]n an adversary system of criminal justice,
the public interest in the administration of justice is pro-
tected by the participants in the litigation.” Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979). We allow waiver of
numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants
that also serve broader social interests. See, e. g., Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942)
(waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464
(waiver of right to counsel).
Society may well enjoy some benefit from the IAD’s time
limits: Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses
become unavailable and memories fade. See, e. g., Sibron v.
New York, 392 U. S. 40, 56–57 (1968). On the other hand,
some social interests served by prompt trial are less relevant
here than elsewhere. For example, because the would-be
defendant is already incarcerated in another jurisdiction,
society’s interests in assuring the defendant’s presence at
trial and in preventing further criminal activity (or avoiding
the costs of pretrial detention) are simply not at issue.
Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972). In any case,
it cannot be argued that society’s interest in the prompt reso-
lution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that
it is part of the unalterable “statutory policy,” Brooklyn
Savings Bank, supra, at 704. In fact, the time limits do
not apply at all unless either the prisoner or the receiving
State files a request.2 Thus, the IAD “contemplate[s] a de-
2 This feature, among others, makes respondent’s analogy to the fed-
eral Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. § 3161 et seq., inapt. The time
limits of the Speedy Trial Act begin to run automatically rather than upon
request, §§ 3161(a), (b); dismissal may sometimes be without prejudice,
§§ 3162(a)(1), (2), United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 332–333 (1988); and
waiver is expressly allowed in certain limited circumstances, 18 U. S. C.
§ 3162(a)(2). In any event, the question of waiver under the Speedy Trial
Act is not before us today, and we express no view on the subject.

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gree of party control that is consonant with the background
presumption of waivability.” Mezzanatto, 513 U. S., at 206.3
Finally, respondent argues that even if waiver of the IAD’s
time limits is possible, it can be effected only by affirmative
conduct not present here. The New York Court of Appeals
adopted a similar view, stating that the speedy trial rights
guaranteed by the IAD may be waived either “explicitly or
by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to
or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights.” 92 N. Y. 2d,
at 411, 704 N. E. 2d, at 545. The court concluded that de-
fense counsel’s agreement to the trial date here was not an
“affirmative request” and therefore did not constitute a
waiver. Id., at 412, 704 N. E. 2d, at 546. We agree with
the State that this makes dismissal of the indictment turn
on a hypertechnical distinction that should play no part. As
illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable de-
fendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment
inconsistent with the IAD’s time limits, and then recanting
later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a
distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to.
In light of its potential for abuse—and given the harsh rem-
edy of dismissal with prejudice—we decline to adopt it.
* * *
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is
reversed.
It is so ordered.
3 In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we are
mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those of
the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any ob-
jection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the
sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and
prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article
V(e) (“At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State”).