United States v. Carter

1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
A
LITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES v. DONTE J. CARTER
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 25–885. Decided June 22, 2026
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dis-
senting from the denial of certiorari.
On a September afternoon in 2020, several plain-clothes
police officers approached a group of black men who were
lounging on a sidewalk. The officers were responding to an
“ ‘uptick in shootings and sounds of gunfire’ ” in that area.
341 A. 3d 1067, 1069 (DC 2025). Respondent Donte Carter
was among the group.
An officer approached Carter and asked him if he was
carrying a weapon. When Carter said “no,” the officer
asked, “[d]o you mind hiking your pants for me real quick?”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. As Carter complied, another of-
ficer standing a few feet away saw an L-shaped bulge in the
front of Carter’s pants. The officer pointed out the bulge,
which Carter said was his phone. That officer nonetheless
frisked Carter, and, after a brief struggle, the officers recov-
ered a stolen firearm hidden among Carter’s multiple pairs
of compression shorts.
Carter was charged with firearm and theft offenses. He
moved to suppress the gun and a statement that he had
made after his arrest. He argued that the officer seized him
in asking him to hike his pants and that the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion or probable cause at that time. The
D. C. Superior Court denied the motion.
The D. C. Court of Appeals (DCCA) reversed. After con-
cluding that the officers’ conduct did not enable the court to
“objectively determine” whether Carter was seized, the

2 UNITED STATES v. CARTER
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LITO, J., dissenting
court—relying on its precedent—said that it “must look” to
a further fact: the “defendant’s race.” 341 A. 3d, at 1076
(citing Dozier v. United States, 220 A. 3d 933, 944 (DC
2019)). The proper inquiry, the court stated, was “whether
an objective and reasonable person sharing the defendant’s
generalized lived experiences arising out of their racial sta-
tus”—that is, “sharing Mr. Carter’s racial status as a Black
man”—“would have felt free to terminate the police encoun-
ter.” 341 A. 3d, at 1076. The court then discussed scholar-
ship that in the court’s view suggests that “Black men are
more likely to comply with police demands rather than ex-
ercise their constitutional right to terminate a suspicionless
police encounter.” Id., at 1078. And, the court said, the
officer’s request that Carter hike his pants was a seizure
due to the “elevated effect” that the request “would have
had on an objective and reasonable Black man in Mr.
Carter’s shoes.” Id., at 1080.
Judge McLeese concurred in the judgment. He remarked
that the panel majority had appeared to give “dispositive
weight” to Carter’s race. Id., at 1081. He also expressed
“uncertainty as to whether the race of a suspect can permis-
sibly be considered” in assessing whether a seizure oc-
curred. Ibid.
The Government asks us to grant review. It argues that
the decision below is inconsistent with established prece-
dent on the question whether a person who is approached
and asked questions by a police officer has been “seized” un-
der the Fourth Amendment. Our precedent, the Govern-
ment maintains, asks whether a “‘reasonable person’”
would feel that he or she is not free to end the conversation.
United States v. Drayton, 536 U. S. 194, 201–202 (2002). In
the Government’s view, the injection of an individual’s race
into the “reasonable person” test contravenes our decisions.
The Government also questions the reliability of the studies
on which the DCCA relied, and it argues that the DCCA’s

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
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LITO, J., dissenting
test will hamper legitimate and important police work in
the District of Columbia.
I would grant the petition. The DCCA appears to be com-
mitted to the test that it used in this case, and the lawful-
ness of that test is an important question for both doctrinal
and practical reasons. Under the test, officers will need to
quickly assess a person’s race, and if officers and courts
must craft special rules for black persons, what about dark-
skinned Latinos, other Latinos, and members of other mi-
nority groups?
We have said that our “‘Constitution is color-blind.’” Stu-
dents for Fair Admission, Inc. v. President and Fellows of
Harvard College, 600 U. S. 181, 230 (2023). It “almost
never” allows government actors to treat persons differ-
ently based on their race. Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S.
___, ___ (2026) (slip op., at 17). And we have rejected the
proposition that the Constitution permits an individual to
be treated differently based on a “perception that members
of the same racial group—regardless of their age, educa-
tion, economic status, or the community in which they
live—think alike.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 647 (1993).
It is dangerous to allow an individual to be treated differ-
ently based on statistics, studies, or expert testimony that
purports to show that members of the racial or ethnic group
to which he belongs are more likely to act in a certain way
than are members of other groups. Here, the special treat-
ment helped the individual; in other situations it will not.
See Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 119 (2017).
Perhaps the DCCA’s test has legitimate justifications. In
any event, it is important, and it warrants this Court’s re-
view. I therefore respectfully dissent from the denial of cer-
tiorari.