Allen v. Caster

1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL.
25–243 v.
MARCUS CASTER,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL.
25–273 v.
BOBBY SINGLETON,
ET AL.
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL.
25–274 v.
EVAN MILLIGAN,
ET AL.
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
Nos. 25–243, 25–273 and 25–274. Decided May 11, 2026
The motions to expedite are granted. The petition for a
writ of certiorari before judgment in No. 25–243 is granted.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama in that case is vacated, and
the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit with instructions to remand to the
District Court for further consideration in light of Louisi-
ana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026). The judgments in No.
25–273 and No. 25–274 are vacated, and the cases are re-
manded to the United States District Court for the

2 ALLEN v. CASTER
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Northern District of Alabama for further consideration in
light of Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026). The judg-
ments will be issued forthwith pursuant to Rule 45.3.
J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
J
USTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
Today, the Court vacates a District Court order enjoining
Alabama’s 2023 Redistricting Plan and remands for recon-
sideration in light of the Court’s new interpretation of §2 of
the Voting Rights Act in Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___
(2026). There is no reason to do so. In addition to holding
that Alabama’s 2023 Redistricting Plan violates §2, the Dis-
trict Court held, in one of the three cases before this Court,
that Alabama violated the Fourteenth Amendment by in-
tentionally diluting the votes of Black voters in Alabama.
That constitutional finding of intentional discrimination is
independent of, and unaffected by, any of the legal issues
discussed in Callais. Vacatur is thus inappropriate and will
cause only confusion as Alabamians begin to vote in the
elections scheduled for next week. I respectfully dissent.
This is not the first time that this litigation has come be-
fore the Court. Following the 2020 census, Alabama redrew
its congressional districts. Plaintiffs then filed these three
cases, and a three-judge District Court preliminary en-
joined Alabama’s first plan. This Court affirmed that in-
junction in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U. S. 1 (2023), holding
that Alabama violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52
U. S. C. §10301, when it adopted a congressional districting
plan that unlawfully diluted Black Alabamians’ votes by
splitting them across multiple congressional districts. Id.,
at 9–10. In doing so, this Court also affirmed the District
Court’s order instructing Alabama to remedy this identified
racial discrimination by drawing a new map containing two
districts in which Black voters would have an opportunity
to elect a representative of their choice, commonly referred

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
to as “opportunity districts.” See 782 F. Supp. 3d 1092,
1126 (ND Ala. 2025) (quoting the preliminary injunction).
Then came round two, which is now before this Court.
Rather than draw a map with two opportunity districts, Al-
abama adopted the 2023 Redistricting Plan, which con-
tained just one. The District Court then held an 11-day
trial on a renewed challenge to the legality of this new map.
It heard testimony from 51 witnesses, received nearly 800
exhibits, and considered volume upon volume of written
submissions. At the end of that trial, the District Court
concluded “with great reluctance and dismay and even
greater restraint” that Alabama had not merely spurned
the opportunity to remedy past discrimination, but in fact
had intentionally violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.,
at 1118.
In a 268-page opinion, the District Court explained that
the enormous record was “replete with sharp departures
from (and some outright conflicts with) Alabama’s tradi-
tional districting guidelines,” as the State fashioned redis-
tricting criteria from whole cloth that it had never previ-
ously employed. Id., at 1343; see id., at 1343–1344. The
State, the District Court said, had also conjured legislative
findings out of “thin air,” id., at 1345, in “the dead of night,”
id., at 1117, that “exalt[ed]” certain White communities
while “remaining silent on the heritage of all other commu-
nities of interest in Alabama (including the Black Belt),” id.,
at 1344. The District Court observed that the result of this
tortured legislative process was a precisely engineered set
of redistricting rules and criteria that made it “mathemati-
cally impossible to create a second opportunity district.”
Id., at 1340; see id., at 1356–1357. In short, the record
showed that Alabama made an intentional choice to perpet-
uate and entrench, rather than remedy and uproot, the ra-
cial discrimination that the District Court had previously
found and that this Court had affirmed. The District Court
thus permanently enjoined Alabama’s 2023 Redistricting

4 ALLEN v. CASTER
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Plan and instituted a remedial map drawn without any ref-
erence to race.
Nothing in the District Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
analysis is affected by this Court’s opinion in Callais. Most
obviously, Callais changed the legal standard for vote-dilu-
tion claims under §2. See 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 19)
(“[W]e must understand exactly what §2 of the Voting
Rights Act demands”). It said not a word about the stand-
ard for Fourteenth Amendment intentional-discrimination
claims like the one that the District Court decided on re-
mand in round two.
Callais also insisted that this Court’s prior decision in Al-
len remains good law. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 36) (“[W]e
have not overruled Allen”). These cases are, of course, Al-
len. So if Allen is good law anywhere, then it must be good
law here. This Court’s finding of racially discriminatory
vote dilution is an inextricable, permanent feature of this
case, and Alabama’s willful decision to respond by en-
trenching rather than remedying that dilution is, as the
District Court correctly recognized, evidence of discrimina-
tory intent.
Even if Callais had something to say about the evidence
necessary to establish discriminatory intent, it still would
not be appropriate to vacate the decision below at this time.
That is because Alabama’s congressional primary election
is next week, and vacating the District Court’s injunction
will immediately replace the current map with Alabama’s
2023 Redistricting Plan until the District Court acts, even
though voting has already begun. Vacatur is an equitable
remedy, and the Court should not lightly wield it to unleash
chaos and to confuse voters. See U. S. Bancorp Mortgage
Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 26 (1994)
(“[W]hen federal courts contemplate equitable relief ” like
vacatur, they “must also take account of the public inter-
est”).

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
If the Court must act now, it should at least affirm the
District Court’s order as to the finding of intentional dis-
crimination in Allen v. Milligan. Factual findings like dis-
criminatory intent are reviewed for clear error, meaning
that if a district court’s factual determination is “‘plausible’
in light of the full record,” then that determination “must
govern.” Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 293 (2017) (quot-
ing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574 (1985)).
On this record, the District Court’s finding of discrimina-
tory intent, resulting from a comprehensive examination of
Alabama’s transparent, intentional attempt to limit Black
voting power despite this Court’s earlier decision in Allen,
is more than plausible. It is further bolstered by the Dis-
trict Court’s thoughtful consideration of the role partisan
interests may have played in the redistricting process and
extensive discussion of the presumption of legislative good
faith. See, e.g., 782 F. Supp. 3d, at 1117, 1346 (considering
the record in “extreme service of the presumption of legis-
lative good faith” but ultimately concluding that, if “this
record is insufficient to rebut the strong presumption of leg-
islative good faith,” then it is unlikely that “the presump-
tion is ever rebuttable”).
***
The Court today unceremoniously discards the District
Court’s meticulously documented and supported discrimi-
natory-intent finding and careful remedial order without
any sound basis for doing so and without regard for the con-
fusion that will surely ensue. As with all vacaturs of this
kind from this Court, the District Court remains free on re-
mand to decide for itself whether Callais has any bearing
on its Fourteenth Amendment analysis or if its prior rea-
soning is unaffected by that decision.