Burnett v. United States

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JARON BURNETT v. UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25–5442. Decided March 9, 2026
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE GORSUCH, dissenting from the denial of certio-
rari.
Almost two decades ago, Jaron Burnett pleaded guilty to
a federal crime that carried a maximum sentence of 120
months in prison. Initially, the district court sentenced Mr.
Burnett to less than that—105 months in prison, followed
by 15 years of supervised release.
Over six years after his release from prison, the govern-
ment charged Mr. Burnett with violating the terms of his
supervised release. In response, the district court sen-
tenced him to 13 additional months in prison. See 18
U. S. C. §3583(e)(3) (providing that a district court may im-
pose a term of imprisonment if a defendant violates the
terms of his supervised release). That new term brought
Mr. Burnett’s total time in prison to 118 months, just 2
fewer than the maximum Congress authorized for his un-
derlying conviction. Mr. Burnett finished serving his time
in July 2022 and returned to supervised release.
Two years later, the government again charged Mr. Bur-
nett with violating the terms of his supervised release and
again sought to send him to prison. This time, Mr. Burnett
argued, the court needed to proceed differently. His under-
lying conviction subjected him to a maximum lawful term
of 120 months in prison, no more. Should the government
seek prison time beyond that because of his latest alleged
supervised release violations, Mr. Burnett submitted, the

2 BURNETT v. UNITED STATES
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
Sixth Amendment required the government to prove its
case to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court disagreed. Proceeding without a jury
and applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the
court found that Mr. Burnett had committed some of the
alleged supervised release violations. And, based on its fac-
tual findings, the court sentenced him to 14 more months
in prison, bringing his total term of incarceration to 132
months—12 more than the statutory maximum associated
with his crime of conviction. The court of appeals affirmed
that result.
In his petition to us, Mr. Burnett does not ask for much.
He does not object to receiving new prison time for super-
vised release violations. He does not even object to a court
issuing that prison time based on its own factual findings
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, so long as
the punishment issued does not exceed the statutory maxi-
mum for his underlying crime of conviction. All Mr. Bur-
nett claims is the right to have a jury decide any contested
facts under the reasonable doubt standard where, as here,
a court seeks to impose a sentence that will cause a defend-
ant’s total time in prison to exceed the statutory maximum
Congress has authorized for his underlying conviction.
I would have taken this case to consider that argument.
Most federal criminal defendants serve time on supervised
release. Some commit violations. Few face a realistic pro-
spect of spending more time in prison than the maximum
term authorized for their underlying convictions. See
United States v. Henderson, 998 F. 3d 1071, 1086 (CA9
2021) (Rakoff, J., dissenting). But even if the class of cases
like Mr. Burnett’s is small, the stakes are high. Many fed-
eral criminal defendants today serve long terms on super-
vised release (terms that can be further extended after any
new violation). See §§3583(b), (h). Others serve on super-
vised release for life. See §3583(k). And, under the logic of
the decision below, defendants like these can effectively

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
wind up losing for decades (and sometimes forever) the
right to receive a federal jury trial to resolve charges
against them under the reasonable doubt standard. All the
government need do is accuse the defendant of a supervised
release violation and convince a judge to find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that more punishment is war-
ranted. With no more than that, further prison time may
follow—even for periods that exceed the maximum Con-
gress has authorized for the defendant’s only crime of con-
viction.
Bypassing juries, trials, and the reasonable doubt stand-
ard in this way may hold some obvious advantages for pros-
ecutors. But whether this arrangement can be squared
with the Constitution is another thing. Under the Sixth
Amendment, this Court has held, “[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490 (2000) (empha-
sis added); see also Erlinger v. United States, 602 U. S. 821,
833 (2024); United States v. Haymond, 588 U. S. 634, 644
(2019) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases). The Court’s
failure to grant review to address whether what happened
to Mr. Burnett complies with that Sixth Amendment rule is
unfortunate. I can only hope we will take up another case
like his soon—and that, in the meantime, lower courts will
more carefully consider the Sixth Amendment’s application
in this context. Respectfully, I dissent.