Howell v. Circuit Court of Indiana

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
INDIANA, EX REL. DANNY W. HOWELL v. CIRCUIT
COURT OF INDIANA, WELLS COUNTY,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
No. 25–5557. Decided January 20, 2026
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari
is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeat-
edly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not
to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is
paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
J
USTICE JACKSON, dissenting from denial of motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
To file a petition in this Court, litigants must pay a $300
fee, along with the (much higher) cost of printing 40 bound
copies of their filing. Litigants who cannot afford the filing
fee and the cost of printing can request to proceed in forma
pauperis. The Court largely grants these requests, allowing
those litigants to file for free, but our openness to indigent
litigants has its limits. In fact, the Court sometimes im-
poses blanket filing bars that prohibit litigants from filing
any more in forma pauperis petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters going forward, regardless of the merits of their claims.
Today, the Court bars essentially all future filings from
Danny Howell (an indigent inmate serving a 70-year sen-
tence) because Howell previously submitted a handful of pe-

2 HOWELL v. CIRCUIT COURT OF INDIANA
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
titions we deemed “frivolous.”
1
Even if Howell were to iden-
tify meritorious grounds for habeas relief or wanted to bring
a justifiable challenge to his conditions of confinement, he
will now be prevented from doing so unless he pays the fil-
ing fee—no matter what. A categorical, forward-looking fil-
ing bar is a questionable restriction as to any litigant who
cannot afford to pay a filing fee. For me, it is an intolerable
one as to incarcerated individuals. Accordingly, I respect-
fully dissent.
I
The Court began imposing prospective filing bars on in
forma pauperis litigants in 1989. First was Jessie McDon-
ald. The Court’s decision to bar McDonald made intuitive
sense: He had filed 73 petitions over the preceding 18 years,
several of which were collateral attacks on a state convic-
tion for which he was no longer incarcerated. In re McDon-
ald, 489 U. S. 180, 183 (per curiam). Over the dissent of
four Justices, the Court barred McDonald from proceeding
in forma pauperis when seeking extraordinary writs in the
future.
2
Less than two years later, over the dissent of three Jus-
tices, the Court imposed another filing bar, this time pre-
venting Michael Sindram from proceeding in forma
——————
1
See this Court’s Rule 39.8 (“If satisfied that a petition for a writ of
certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ
is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny leave to proceed in forma
pauperis”).
2
We emphasized that extraordinary writs are “ ‘drastic and extraordi-
nary remedies,’ to be ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’ ” In re
McDonald, 489 U. S., at 185 (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U. S. 258, 259–
260 (1947)). We further noted that the Court had “not granted the sort
of extraordinary writ relentlessly sought by [McDonald] to any litigant—
paid or in forma pauperis—for at least a decade.” 489 U. S., at 184. The
nature of extraordinary writs not only made McDonald’s repeated filings
frivolous, but it also meant that the filing bar—which targeted only fu-
ture requests for that particular form of relief—did not significantly bur-
den McDonald’s access to the Court.

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
pauperis when seeking extraordinary writs in the future.
Sindram had filed 43 separate petitions over the prior three
years, the majority of which related to a speeding ticket he
had received years earlier. In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177,
177–178 (1991) (per curiam).
The following year, the Court significantly expanded the
reach of its filing bar. Over the course of a decade, peti-
tioner James Martin had filed 54 in forma pauperis peti-
tions requesting writs of certiorari in connection with a va-
riety of civil disputes. With two Justices dissenting, the
Court barred Martin from filing any future petitions for cer-
tiorari in noncriminal cases; unlike McDonald and Sin-
dram, this bar was not limited to requests for extraordinary
writs. Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1, 2–3 (1992) (per curiam). Martin’s circumstances
lent this Court a useful shorthand: When we bar indigent
litigants from filing any future in forma pauperis petitions,
we now say that we are “Martinizing” them.
The Court’s exasperation with McDonald, Sindram, and
Martin was understandable. Each of those litigants had
flooded the Court with dozens of frivolous filings, causing
significant administrative burdens. In the Court’s view, a
prospective filing bar was necessary to “curb serious
abuses” of its docket and to ensure that the Court could al-
locate its resources “in a way that promotes the interests of
justice.” McDonald, 489 U. S., at 184.
Even so, its decision to permanently restrict an indigent
litigant’s access to this Court was hotly contested. The dis-
senters in McDonald worried that, in the Court’s “fervor [to]
ensur[e] that rights granted to the poor are not abused,” it
had “embark[ed] on [an] unprecedented and dangerous
course.” Id., at 185–187 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Simi-
larly, to the dissenters in Sindram, even though prolific lit-
igants do cause a “minimal annoyance,” preserving their ac-
cess was “well worth the cost” given the Court’s
“longstanding tradition of leaving [its] door open to all

4 HOWELL v. CIRCUIT COURT OF INDIANA
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
classes of litigants.” 498 U. S., at 182 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). The dissenters feared that in forma pauperis filing
bars abandoned that “proud and decent” tradition. Ibid.
They also predicted that what started as a rare step would
turn out to be “merely the prelude” to a more habitual shut-
ting of the courthouse doors. McDonald, 489 U. S., at 187
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
II
The dissenters were right. The Court has steadily ex-
panded the reach of Martin, transforming what was once
an extraordinary measure into a routine order.
Howell’s case is a prime example. He has filed only six
petitions over the span of 14 years—hardly a flood. Before
this one, Howell’s last petition was in 2018, eight years ago.
Moreover, quite unlike McDonald, Sindram, or Martin,
Howell is in state custody and serving a long prison sen-
tence; all six of his petitions have raised claims challenging
aspects of his conviction.
Howell’s case is not an outlier. By my count, the Court
has now invoked Martin hundreds of times to prospectively
bar indigent litigants from filing in forma pauperis. We no
longer wait for a petitioner to inundate the Court with friv-
olous filings. Instead, we reflexively Martinize petitioners
after only a few petitions. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 607 U. S.
___ (2025) (Martinized after five petitions); Navarro Martin
v. Florida, 607 U. S. ___ (2025) (Martinized after six peti-
tions).
Even more troubling, though the Court did not have oc-
casion to consider in McDonald, Sindram, or Martin
whether filing bars were necessary or appropriate for incar-
cerated litigants, we now routinely impose filing bars on
prisoners. See, e.g., Crosby v. Starr, 607 U. S. ___ (2025)
(Martinized after filing a petition for certiorari arising from
habeas proceedings raising claims under the First Step
Act); Brunson v. Herring, 604 U. S. ___ (2024) (Martinized

5 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
after filing a petition for certiorari arising from habeas pro-
ceedings raising claims of actual innocence); Kaetz v.
United States, 602 U. S. ___ (2024) (Martinized after filing
a petition for certiorari arising from proceedings under 28
U. S. C. §2255 raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims). According to our Clerk’s Office, more than half of
the petitioners whose filings we have categorically rejected
per Martin in the past 22 years were prisoners.
III
Applying Martin routinely to bar the filings of indigent
incarcerated petitioners goes too far. In my view, such a
restriction foolishly trades a pound of values for an ounce of
convenience. That is, the Court now blocks indigent incar-
cerated individuals from ever more accessing our court-
house, just to avoid a minor administrative burden.
To be clear: Martinized petitioners are totally barred
from ever filing in forma pauperis noncriminal petitions in
the future—even to raise new claims based on favorable
changes in the law (which sometimes happen), or to chal-
lenge the ongoing conditions of their confinement (which, in
our society, prisoners are allowed to do). The future is fa-
mously hard to predict. So the justification for a permanent
filing bar—even one related to the Court’s administrative
convenience—is murky at best.
Changes in the law can give rise to meritorious chal-
lenges that a prisoner might be able to raise by filing a civil
habeas petition. Consider, for instance, the pro se peti-
tioner in Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120 (2016), who
filed an in forma pauperis petition raising a collateral chal-
lenge to his sentence in light of our prior decision in John-
son v. United States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015). Welch’s filing
ultimately resulted in the Court applying Johnson retroac-
tively. 578 U. S., at 130. But if Welch had been Martinized,
he would have been unable to seek relief in this Court.

6 HOWELL v. CIRCUIT COURT OF INDIANA
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
Similarly, the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement may
give rise to new constitutional claims. In Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U. S. 34 (2010) (per curiam), for example, we held that
a pro se petitioner proceeding in forma pauperis had stated
an Eighth Amendment claim based on an assault by prison
officials. Had Wilkins been Martinized, he would have been
barred from obtaining the relief to which he was due under
our Constitution. Unfortunately, poor conditions in prisons
across the country continue to pose potential constitutional
problems.
3
Indigent prisoners who are Martinized are un-
able to come to this Court to challenge these unsafe condi-
tions and vindicate their constitutional rights.
In short, because time moves on after a person is impris-
oned and things happen, we simply do not and cannot know
whether indigent prisoners who have filed multiple “frivo-
lous” petitions in the past might have a meritorious claim
in the future. When liberty, bodily integrity, or fundamen-
tal fairness is at stake, preventing such litigants from ever
again accessing our review imperils our ability to provide
equal justice for all.
Meanwhile, the administrative burden involved in re-
viewing repeated (even frivolous) petitions filed by prison-
ers is minimal. It is the rare incarcerated person who has
the wherewithal to flood the Court with filings, at least in
the way that Martin, Sindram, and McDonald had done.
Practicalities ordinarily do not allow for this, since prison-
ers often lack regular access to paper, pens, envelopes, and
stamps. Pro se prisoners also usually handwrite their fil-
ings—a time-intensive process. And, regardless, it is not
——————
3
See, e.g., Dept. of Justice, Investigation of Alabama’s State Prisons
for Men 5–6 (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/
file/1149971/dl?inline= (detailing Alabama’s failure to provide safe con-
ditions for its prisoners); Dept. of Justice, Investigation of Georgia Pris-
ons 3 (Oct. 1, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-09/
findings_report_-_investigation_of_georgia_prisons.pdf (describing
Georgia’s failure to protect incarcerated people from violence).

7 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
difficult for Court staff to sort out in forma pauperis filings
that raise new, potentially meritorious claims from repeti-
tive, meritless petitions.
I believe that when balancing prisoners’ access to judicial
review, on the one hand, and reducing our administrative
burden, on the other, we should err on the side of keeping
our courthouse doors open. For a system designed to ad-
minister justice, reflexively rejecting (potentially meritori-
ous) petitions from incarcerated litigants has a cost that is
much too high when compared to the (meager) administra-
tive efficiency gains. Nor should we forget the role that in-
digent incarcerated litigants have played in the develop-
ment of important constitutional doctrines—and through
habeas proceedings no less. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); see also Sindram, 498 U. S.,
at 181 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, I would not apply the filing bar that the
Court imposes for frequent “frivolous” filers to prisoners
who, like Howell, seek to proceed in forma pauperis.