Chambers-Smith v. Ayers

1 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of A
LITO, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND
CORRECTION v. KAYLA JEAN AYERS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–5
84. Decided June 6, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of J
USTICE
ALITO, with whom JUSTICE
THOMAS joins, respecting the denial of certiorari.
Kayla Ayers was convicted in 2013 of aggravated arson
and child endangerment after she attempted to burn down
her father’s house. At trial, the State presented testimony
from Ayers’s father and a next-door neighbor, both of whom
testified that Ayers h
ad previously threatened to set the
house ablaze. The State also called an expert who testified
that the fire’s burn pattern revealed two ignition points—
suggesting
arson, not accident. Ayers’s counsel did not pre-
sent or even consult with an expert and instead argued that
Ayers’s 3-year-old son must have started the fire while
playing with a lighter.
In 2020, more than seven years after her conviction,
Ayers filed a federal habeas application claiming, inter alia,
ineffective assistance of counsel. Ayers’s post-conviction
counsel commissioned an expert fire-inspection report in
2019, and Ayers used that report to argue that her trial
counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by “fail[ing] to re-
tain or even consult with an independent fire expert” who
could have “recognize[d] the serious flaws in the [state ex-
pert’s] opinions and qualifications.”
Ayers v. Ohio Dept. of
Rehabilitation and Correction, Director, No. 5:20–cv–01654
(ND Ohio, Dec. 19, 2022), ECF Doc. 14–1, p. 32. The Dis-
trict Cour
t correctly denied the petition as untimely under

2 CHAMBERS-SMITH v. AYERS
Statement of A
LITO, J.
28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A)’s default limitations period, but
the Sixth Circuit nevertheless reversed. The panel rea-
soned that the 2019 expert report reopened the filing win-
dow under §2244(d)(1)(D), which allows prisoners to file a
habeas petition within a year from when “the factual pred-
icate of the claim or claims presented could have been dis-
covered through the exercise of due diligence.” See Ayers v.
Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, 113 F. 4th 665,
670–674 (2024).
The Sixth Circuit erred by treating newly discovered sup-
port for a previously available claim as sufficient to restart
the 1-year limitations period. Here, Ayers claims her trial
counsel should have consulted an independent fire expert
and challenged the State’s fire inspector. But Ayers had
everything she needed to make that argument back in 2013
when her trial counsel failed to take those steps. Cf. Rivas
v. Fischer, 687 F. 3d 514, 536 (CA2 2012) (concluding that
a new expert affidavit could not revive a time-barred ha-
beas petition because the expert’s conclusion was based on
facts that were previously known to and discoverable by the
habeas petitioner). The 2019 expert report certainly bol-
stered Ayers’s argument that her trial counsel’s decisions
harmed her defense, but “[§]2244(d)(1)(D) does not restart
the time when corroborating evidence becomes available; if
it did, then the statute of limitations would fail in its pur-
pose to bring finality to criminal judgments, for any pris-
oner could reopen the judgment by locating any additional
fact.” Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F. 3d 868, 871 (CA7
2005), abrogated on other grounds, McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U. S. 383 (2013).
Ordinarily, we would summarily reverse such a decision
or, at the least, grant certiorari to bring the errant Circuit
back into alignment. But Ayers has now served her prison
sentence and is no longer subject to post-release control.
For this reason, the Court’s unwillingness to summarily re-

3 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of A
LITO, J.
verse is understandable, and it is possible to view the deci-
sion below as an aberrant decision attributable to the par-
ticular facts of this case and not as a precedent that will be
followed in future cases. In any event, lower courts should
not construe the denial of review as approval of the decision
below, and litigants should not hesitate to seek certiorari if
the Sixth Circuit repeats this error.