Nicholson v. W. L. York, Inc.

1 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CHANEL E. M. NICHOLSON v. W.L. YORK, INC., DBA
COVER GIRLS,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 23–7490. Decided June 2, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
Chanel Nicholson claims that, on numerous occasions be-
tween 2013 and 2021, she was barred from entering her
workplace because of her race. Nicholson filed this lawsuit
in 2021, alleging intentional race discrimination in viola-
tion of 42 U. S. C. §1981. According to Nicholson’s com-
plaint, the most recent instances of race discrimination oc-
curred within the four-year statute of limitations. But the
Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that these claims
were time barred. In the panel’s view, the more recent acts
were merely the “continued effects” of prior instances of
race-based exclusion and thus were not independently ac-
tionable.
That holding flouts this Court’s clear precedents. We
have long held that “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act
starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act,” re-
gardless of whether similar instances of discrimination
have occurred in the past. National Railroad Passenger
Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U. S. 101, 113 (2002). Because
the Fifth Circuit’s contrary ruling was patently erroneous,
this Court should have granted Nicholson’s petition and
summarily reversed the judgment. I respectfully dissent
from the Court’s decision to do otherwise.

2 NICHOLSON v. W.L. YORK, INC.
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
I
A
Chanel Nicholson is an adult entertainer who performed
at a pair of clubs in Houston, Texas, called Splendor and
Cover Girls, during the mid-2010s. Both clubs were owned
and operated by the same individuals. Each club required
dancers like Nicholson to sign a “License and Access Agree-
ment” that guaranteed the performer the right to “se[t] her
own schedule of when and what hours she works” and “ar-
rive and leave the premises at any time without penalty.”
App. B to Third Amended Complaint (TAC) in No. 4:21–cv–
2624 (SD Tex., June 24, 2022), ECF Doc. 47–2, p. 6, ¶3; App.
C to TAC, ECF Doc. 47–3, p. 7, ¶3. Nicholson signed the
agreement with Splendor in 2014 and performed at the es-
tablishment through 2016. She signed the Cover Girls
agreement in 2016 and performed there through 2017.
According to Nicholson, who is African American, race
discrimination pervaded the environments of both clubs.
Splendor and Cover Girls were “well-known” to “severely
limi[t] the total number of Black Dancers on their respec-
tive premises,” TAC, ECF Doc. 47, p. 10, ¶40, because “up-
per management did not want too many Black Dancers”
present on any given night, id., at 7, ¶29. One former Cover
Girls manager confirmed that it was “widely known and
well-accepted that black (African American) girls generally
are not given positions as dancers in these” establishments.
App. D to TAC, ECF Doc. 47–4, p. 1, ¶5 (Decl. of A. Skwera).
This policy was apparently so well established that, when
the clubs’ director of operations discovered that the man-
ager had hired African American dancers at Cover Girls, he
revoked the manager’s hiring privileges. Id., at 2, ¶8.
As relevant here, Nicholson alleges that management-
level employees at Splendor and Cover Girls would bar
Black dancers from entering those establishments if too
many other Black performers were already present. “[O]n

3 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
a number of occasions,” she alleges, “the door girl or an act-
ing manager would send [Nicholson] home after [she] ar-
rived for her shift because there were already ‘too many
black girls’ working.” ECF Doc. 47, at 7, ¶28. Nicholson
estimates that, of the six to seven days per week that she
would try to work at each club, she was turned away on ap-
proximately three of the days due to her race. Nicholson
Deposition Tr. in No. 4:21–cv–2624 (SD Tex., Dec. 5, 2022),
ECF Doc. 61–1, pp. 14, 20–21. In particular, Nicholson al-
leges that, while working at Cover Girls in November 2017,
she was once again “told by a manager that she could not
perform because there were already ‘too many black girls’”
in the club. ECF Doc. 47, at 8, ¶34. Nicholson eventually
got “tired of being treated like that” and stopped performing
at Cover Girls entirely. ECF Doc. 61–1, at 13.
Nicholson took a hiatus from dancing between 2018 and
2021, during which time her License and Access Agree-
ments remained valid. She attempted to return to perform-
ing at Splendor in August 2021. But a manager again re-
fused her entry, telling her they were “not taking any more
black girls.” Id., at 21; see also ECF Doc. 47, at 9, ¶37. Dur-
ing this conversation, Nicholson saw a White dancer enter
the club, seemingly preparing to start her shift. Ibid., ¶38.
B
In August 2021, Nicholson filed a lawsuit against Splen-
dor and Cover Girls. Invoking 42 U. S. C. §1981, she
claimed that the clubs had engaged in intentional race dis-
crimination by barring her entrance and that of other
women of color. Nicholson’s complaint alleged that these
acts had “deprive[d]” her “of the same right to make and
enforce contracts as Caucasian female entertainers.” ECF
Doc. 47, at 16, ¶54.
As relevant to this dispute, two of Nicholson’s §1981
claims survived a motion to dismiss: one against Splendor
for being denied access to the club in August 2021, and one

4 NICHOLSON v. W.L. YORK, INC.
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
against Cover Girls for being denied access in November
2017. Both events allegedly occurred within the four-year
period before Nicholson’s August 2021 filing. The District
Court nevertheless granted summary judgment in favor of
the clubs and against Nicholson, on the ground that her
claims regarding these allegedly discriminatory acts were
untimely. App. C to Pet. for Cert. 10, 14.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. In its view, Nicholson “was
first denied access to Splendor’s premises as early as a week
after signing her [License and Access Agreement] in Sep-
tember 2014,” and that same discriminatory treatment had
merely “continued.” App. A to Pet. for Cert. 8–9. The court
thus concluded that Nicholson’s “claims of unlawful dis-
crimination began to accrue in 2014,” id., at 9, because she
“was first turned away by Splendor for a discriminatory
reason in 2014 and, when she checked back in with Splen-
dor in 2021, nothing had changed,” id., at 8; see also ibid.
(“Splendor’s position [had] remained the same: Nicholson
was refused access to the premises because she was Black”).
According to the Fifth Circuit, “her denial of access to the
club . . . on account of her race” in 2021 was “merely a con-
tinued effect of the first alleged discriminatory act that took
place in 2014.” Id., at 9; see also id., at 7.
The panel reached the same conclusion with respect to
Nicholson’s §1981 claim against Cover Girls. “[A]s early as
her first week after signing the [License and Access Agree-
ment] with Cover Girls in November 2016, she was denied
access to the club on account of her race.” Id., at 10. And
“nothing [had] changed when she returned to Cover Girls
in November 2017—she was again denied access on account
of her race.” Ibid. Thus, Nicholson’s claim against Cover
Girls “began to accrue when she signed the [agreement]
with the club in November 2016,” and this “first act of dis-
crimination . . . merely remained ongoing when she re-
turned in 2017.” Ibid.

5 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
II
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the statute of limitations
is patently erroneous under our longstanding precedents.
A
First enacted after the Civil War, §1981 creates a federal
cause of action for claims of intentional race discrimination
in contracting. The statute specifically guarantees that
“[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts
. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” §1981(a). This Court
has further recognized that §1981 establishes liability for
purposeful discrimination wherever race is a but-for cause
of the relevant injury. See General Building Contractors
Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 391 (1982); Com-
cast Corp. v. National Assn. of African American-Owned
Media, 589 U. S. 327, 341 (2020).
Discrimination claims concerning contract performance
are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. 28 U. S. C.
§1658(a); see also Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541
U. S. 369, 383 (2004). For claims involving discrete acts of
discrimination, that statute of limitations commences on
the date of the alleged discriminatory act. See Chardon v.
Fernandez, 454 U. S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam) (“[T]he proper
focus” of this inquiry is “the time of the discriminatory act,
not the point at which the consequences of the act become
painful”). The statute of limitations for a §1981 claim based
on a “discrete discriminatory ac[t]” thus generally runs
from the day that the act “‘happened.’” Morgan, 536 U. S.,
at 110.
Here, Nicholson’s complaint alleges two discrete in-
stances of discriminatory treatment by the clubs’ managers
and employees. Nicholson claims that Splendor and Cover
Girls prevented Black dancers from working at the clubs if
a sufficient number of other Black dancers were already
present. She alleges, in particular, that she was barred

6 NICHOLSON v. W.L. YORK, INC.
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
from entering the clubs because of her race in November
2017 and August 2021, despite her contractual right to
“se[t] her own schedule” and “arrive and leave the premises
at any time without penalty.” ECF Doc. 47–2, at 6, ¶3; ECF
Doc. 47–3, at 7, ¶3. Thus, as alleged in her complaint, Ni-
cholson suffered two adverse and discriminatory actions—
race-based exclusion from the clubs on two occasions—that
took place within the four-year limitations period. This con-
stitutes a textbook example of actionable conduct under
§1981. See, e.g., Morgan, 536 U. S., at 113.
Contrast this with discrimination claims involving ac-
tions that are not themselves discriminatory, and thus do
not provide independent bases for §1981 liability or restart
the statute-of-limitations clock. Sometimes plaintiffs point
to adverse actions that are race neutral but nonetheless re-
flect the “continued effects” of earlier discriminatory deci-
sions. Consider a professor who is initially denied tenure
because of his race. That denial would be race-based and
actionable under §1981, and the professor’s claim would ac-
crue “at the time the tenure decision was made and commu-
nicated to” him. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S.
250, 258 (1980). But, notably, if the university later decides
(neutrally) to discharge any faculty members who had been
denied tenure, the statute of limitations for the professor’s
race-discrimination claim would still run from the initial
tenure decision. Id., at 253, 258. That is because the race-
based tenure denial was the discriminatory cause of the
professor’s race-neutral termination. In other words, if the
professor’s subsequent termination is merely “a delayed,
but inevitable, consequence” of the earlier discriminatory
tenure decision, the discrimination claim accrues “at the
time the tenure decision was made and communicated to”
the plaintiff, not at the time of his later termination. Id., at
257–258; see also Chardon, 454 U. S., at 8 (“The fact of ter-
mination is not itself an illegal act”).

7 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
The adverse actions that Nicholson identifies are differ-
ent because they exhibit no such neutrality. The clubs’ pol-
icy of excluding Black dancers, if proven true, is discrimi-
natory—but so, too, is each decision to bar a dancer from
the premises because of her race. Nicholson’s allegations—
that, due to her race, she was barred from entering Cover
Girls in November 2017 and Splendor in August 2021—are
claims of unlawful discrimination that are actionable on
their own terms.
The fact that Nicholson allegedly suffered similar acts of
race discrimination in the past has no bearing on whether
those two claims can proceed. As this Court has made
abundantly clear, “[t]he existence of past acts and the em-
ployee’s prior knowledge of their occurrence . . . does not bar
employees from filing [claims] about related discrete acts so
long as the acts are independently discriminatory.” Mor-
gan, 536 U. S., at 113. Rather, “[e]ach discrete discrimina-
tory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that
act.” Ibid.
B
That last point bears repeating plainly, in light of the
Fifth Circuit’s obvious confusion: If the discrete act that is
the subject of the plaintiff ’s discrimination complaint is it-
self discriminatory, and if it allegedly occurred within the
statute of limitations period, then that discrimination claim
is timely—full stop.
To be sure, “discrete acts that fall within the statutory
time period do not make timely acts that fall outside the
time period.” Id., at 112 (emphasis added). But it does not
follow that acts falling outside of the time period can make
untimely those that fall squarely within it.
Nor does the continuing-violations doctrine—which ap-
plies to hostile work environment claims and similar legal
claims that are “based on the cumulative effect of individual

8 NICHOLSON v. W.L. YORK, INC.
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
acts,” id., at 115—play any role in the proper analysis. Hos-
tile work environment claims “are different in kind from
discrete acts” because “[t]heir very nature involves repeated
conduct” that “may not be actionable on its own.” Ibid.
Such claims are therefore based on a “series of separate acts
that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment prac-
tice.’” Id., at 117. Additionally, because of the unique na-
ture of hostile work environment claims, the statute of lim-
itations accrues from the most recent act that contributed
to the claim, enabling suit for harassment that might have
started outside the limitations window. See ibid.
1
For dis-
crete-act claims such as Nicholson’s, however, liability
“does not depend upon proof of repeated conduct extending
over a period of time.” Id., at 120, n. 12.
The Fifth Circuit’s central misstep, then, was to conclude
that past acts of race discrimination that are materially
identical to subsequent discriminatory acts prevent the
later acts from being actionable. In the panel’s view, be-
cause the clubs’ racially discriminatory positions had “re-
mained the same” from the first alleged acts of discrimina-
tion to the last—i.e., because “Nicholson was [persistently]
refused access to the premises because she was Black,” App.
A to Pet. for Cert. 8—Nicholson had four years from the in-
itial manifestation of this club practice to file her lawsuit.
Nicholson’s race-based exclusion in 2017 and 2021 was cer-
tainly not surprising, given the clubs’ history of discrimina-
tion. But that does not make those exclusions nondiscrim-
inatory. All it shows is that Nicholson experienced multiple
acts of discrimination, each occurrence of which, if alleged
within the statute of limitations, states a claim under
§1981.
——————
1
The continuing-violations construct does the work of pulling all of the
relevant conduct within the statute of limitations, even if it occurred out-
side of that timeframe. Thus, even where relevant, that doctrine does
not operate to preclude liability for acts that fall within the statutory
timeframe.

9 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
C
Given the above principles, calculating the statute of lim-
itations for Nicholson’s claims should have been straight-
forward. A discrete discriminatory act “ ‘occur[s]’ on the day
that it ‘happened.’” Morgan, 536 U. S., at 110. Here, Ni-
cholson alleges that she was barred from entering the clubs
due to her race in November 2017 and August 2021.
2
The
four-year statute of limitations for Nicholson’s November
2017 claim against Splendor would lapse in November
2021, and the statute of limitations for her August 2021
claim against Cover Girls would expire in August 2025. Ni-
cholson’s filing—which occurred in August 2021—satisfied
both of these statutory timelines.
To conclude that Nicholson’s claims are time barred be-
cause there were earlier instances of discriminatory treat-
ment, as the Fifth Circuit did, impermissibly inoculates the
clubs’ more recent discriminatory conduct. If sustained dis-
criminatory motivation is all that is required to transform
recent, racially discriminatory acts into the “continued ef-
fects” of earlier discriminatory conduct, then past discrimi-
nation could inexplicably prevent recovery for later, simi-
larly unlawful conduct. Quite to the contrary, §1981’s
statute of limitations plainly authorizes a legal challenge
——————
2
The primary briefs that Nicholson and respondents filed in both the
Fifth Circuit and this Court repeatedly characterized Nicholson’s claims
as alleging “discrete” acts of discrimination. See, e.g., Pet. for Cert. 24
(“Petitioner is only claiming for one discrete event: denial of her access
to Splendor to work, in 2021”); id., at 26 (“Plaintiff ’s denial of access to
Cover Girls in late November 2017 was simply one more discrete, dis-
criminatory act”); Brief in Opposition 9 (adopting Nicholson’s character-
ization); see also Brief for Appellant in No. 23–20440 (CA5), ECF Doc.
21, pp. 18–19 (“[T]his denial of access was a discrete act of discrimination
commencing a new . . . statute of limitations clock”). This opinion thus
eschews construing Nicholson’s allegations as pattern-or-practice claims,
as the reply brief filed in this Court on Nicholson’s behalf now urges.
Reply to Brief in Opposition 1–3.

10 NICHOLSON v. W.L. YORK, INC.
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
that is brought within four years of when the discrimina-
tory acts occurred, regardless of whether the plaintiff was
previously subjected to similar unlawful conduct, too.
* * *
Chanel Nicholson alleges that she was prohibited from
entering her workplace on account of her race. Nicholson
needed to file her §1981 suit within four years of those dis-
criminatory acts—which she did. As such, §1981’s statute
of limitations should have posed no barrier to Nicholson ob-
taining judicial review of her claims. In my view, the Court
should have granted Nicholson’s petition and summarily re-
versed the Fifth Circuit’s patently erroneous conclusions
about the untimeliness of her claims.