Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water

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P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T — O R D E R S
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1
Pages 901–1001
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 5 Through May 21, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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Reporter’s Note
The next page is purposely numbered 901. The numbers between 309
and 901 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the offcial cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.

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ORDERS
FOR APRIL 5 THROUGH
MAY 21, 2021
April 5, 2021
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 20 –197. Biden, President of the United States,
et al. v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded with instructions to dismiss the case
as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36
(1950). Reported below: 928 F. 3d 226.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
When a person publishes a message on the social media plat-
form Twitter, the platform by default enables others to republish
(retweet) the message or respond (reply) to it or other replies in
a designated comment thread. The user who generates the origi-
nal message can manually “block” others from republishing or
responding.
Donald Trump, then President of the United States, blocked
several users from interacting with his Twitter account. They
sued. The Second Circuit held that the comment threads were a
“public forum” and that then-President Trump violated the First
Amendment by using his control of the Twitter account to block
the plaintiffs from accessing the comment threads. Knight First
Amdt. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F. 3d 226 (2019).
But Mr. Trump, it turned out, had only limited control of the
account; Twitter has permanently removed the account from the
platform.
Because of the change in Presidential administration, the Court
correctly vacates the Second Circuit's decisi on. See Un i ted
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). I write sepa-
rately to note that this petition highlights the principal legal
diffculty that surrounds digital platforms—namely, that applying
old doctrines to new digital platforms is rarely straightforward.
Respondents have a point, for example, that some aspects of
901

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Mr. Trump's account resemble a constitutionally protected public
for
um. But it seems rather odd to say that something is a gov-
ernment forum when a private company has unrestricted author-
ity to do away with it.
The disparity between Twitter's control and Mr. Trump's con-
trol is stark, to say the least. Mr. Trump blocked several people
from interacting with his messages. Twitter barred Mr. Trump
not only from interacting with a few users, but removed him from
the entire platform, thus barring all Twitter users from interact-
ing with his messages.
1
Under its terms of service, Twitter can
remove any person from the platform—including the President of
the United States—“at any time for any or no reason.” Twitter
Inc., User Agreement (effective June 18, 2020).
This is not the frst or only case to raise issues about digital
platforms. While this case involves a suit against a public offcial,
the Court properly rejects today a separate petition alleging that
digital platforms, not individuals on those platforms, violated pub-
lic accommodations laws, the First Amendment, and antitrust
laws. Pet. for Cert., O. T. 2020, No. 20–969. The petitions high-
light two important facts. Today's digital platforms provide ave-
nues for historically unprecedented amounts of speech, including
speech by government actors. Also unprecedented, however, is
the concentrated control of so much speech in the hands of a few
private parties. We will soon have no choice but to address how
our legal doctrines apply to highly concentrated, privately owned
information infrastructure such as digital platforms.
I
On the surface, some aspects of Mr. Trump's Twitter account
resembled a public forum. A designated public forum is “prop-
erty that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or
all of the public.” International Soc. for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U. S. 672, 678 (1992). Mr. Trump often used
the account to speak in his offcial capacity. And, as a govern-
mental offcial, he chose to make the comment threads on his
account publicly accessible, allowing any Twitter user—other than
those whom he blocked—to respond to his posts.
Yet, the Second Circuit's conclusion that Mr. Trump's Twitter
account was a public forum is in tension with, among other things,
1
At the time, Mr. Trump's Twitter account had 89 million followers.

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our frequent descr ipti on of publ ic for ums as “gover nment-
control
led spaces.” Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 585
U. S. 1, 11 (2018); accord, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U. S. 460, 469 (2009) (“government property and . . . government
programs”); Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U. S.
666, 677 (1998) (“gover nment proper ties”). Any control
Mr. Trump exercised over the account greatly paled in comparison
to Twitter's authority, dictated in its terms of service, to remove
the account “at any time for any or no reason.” Twitter exer-
cised its authority to do exactly that.
Because unbridled control of the account resided in the hands
of a private party, First Amendment doctrine may not have ap-
plied to respondents' complaint of stifed speech. See Manhattan
Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U. S. 802, 812 (2019) (a
“private entity is not ordinarily constrained by the First Amend-
ment”). Whether governmental use of private space implicates
the First Amendment often depends on the government's control
over that space. For example, a government agency that leases
a conference room in a hotel to hold a public hearing about a
proposed regulation cannot kick participants out of the hotel sim-
ply because they express concerns about the new regulation. See
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 547, 555
(1975). But government offcials who informally gather with con-
stituents in a hotel bar can ask the hotel to remove a pesky patron
who elbows into the gathering to loudly voice his views. The
difference is that the government controls the space in the frst
scenario, the hotel, in the latter. Where, as here, private parties
control the avenues for speech, our law has typically addressed
concerns about stifed speech through other legal doctrines, which
may have a secondary effect on the application of the First
Amendment.
A
If part of the problem is private, concentrated control over
online content and platforms available to the public, then part of
the solution may be found in doctrines that limit the right of a
private company to exclude. Historically, at least two legal doc-
trines limited a company's right to exclude.
First, our legal system and its British predecessor have long
subjected certain businesses, known as common carriers, to spe-
cial regulations, including a general requirement to serve all com-

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ers. Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: Common Carriage,
N
etwork Neutrality, and Section 230, 22 Yale J. L. & Tech. 391,
398–403 (2020) (Candeub); see also Burdick, The Origin of the
Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, Pt. 1, 11 Colum.
L. Rev. 514 (1911). Justifcations for these regulations have var-
ied. Some scholars have argued that common-carrier regulations
are justifed only when a carrier possesses substantial market
power. Candeub 404. Others have said that no substantial mar-
ket power is needed so long as the company holds itself out as
open to the public. Ibid.; see also Ingate v. Christie, 3 Car. &
K. 61, 63, 175 Eng. Rep. 463, 464 (N. P. 1850) (“[A] person [who]
holds himself out to carry goods for everyone as a business . . .
is a common carrier”). And this Court long ago suggested that
regulations like those placed on common carriers may be justifed,
even for industries not historically recognized as common carriers,
when “a business, by circumstances and its nature, . . . rise[s]
from private to be of public concern.” See German Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 411 (1914) (affrming state regulation
of fre insurance rates). At that point, a company's “property is
but its instrument, the means of rendering the service which has
become of public interest.” Id., at 408.
This latter defnition of course is hardly helpful, for most things
can be described as “of public interest.” But whatever may be
said of other industries, there is clear historical precedent for
regulating transportation and communications networks in a simi-
lar manner as traditional common carriers. Candeub 398–405.
Telegraphs, for example, because they “resemble[d] railroad com-
panies and other common carriers,” were “bound to serve all
customers alike, without discrimination.” Primrose v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 154 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).
2
In exchange for regulating transportation and communication
industries, governments—both State and Federal—have some-
times given common carriers special government favors. Can-
deub 402–407. For example, governments have tied restrictions
on a carrier's ability to reject clients to “immunity from certain
2
This Court has been inconsistent about whether telegraphs were common
carriers. Compare Primrose, 154 U. S., at 14, with Moore v. New York Cot-
ton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 605 (1926). But the Court has consistently
recognized that telegraphs were at least analogous enough to common carri-
ers to be regulated similarly. Primrose, 154 U. S., at 14.

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types of suits”
3
or
to regulations that make it more diffcult for
other companies to compete with the carrier (such as franchise
licenses). Ibid. By giving these companies special privileges,
governments place them into a category distinct from other com-
panies and closer to some functions, like the postal service, that
the State has traditionally undertaken.
Second, governments have limited a company's right to exclude
when that company is a public accommodation. This concept—
related to common-carrier law—applies to companies that hold
themselves out to the public but do not “carry” freight, passen-
gers, or communications. See, e. g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S.
3, 41–43 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing places of public
amusement). It also applies regardless of the company's market
power. See, e. g., 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a(a).
B
Internet platforms of course have their own First Amendment
interests, but regulations that might affect speech are valid if
they would have been permissible at the time of the founding.
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468 (2010). The long
history in this country and in England of restricting the exclusion
right of common carriers and places of public accommodation
may save similar regulations today from triggering heightened
scrutiny—especially where a restriction would not prohibit the
company from speaking or force the company to endorse the
speech. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S.
622, 684 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 88
(1980). There is a fair argument that some digital platforms are
suffciently akin to common carriers or places of accommodation
to be regulated in this manner.
1
In many ways, digital platforms that hold themselves out to
the public resemble traditional common carriers. Though digital
3
Telegraphs, for example, historically received some protection from defa-
mation suits. Unlike other entities that might retransmit defamatory con-
tent, they were liable only if they knew or had reason to know that a mes-
sage they distributed was defamatory. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581
(1976); see also O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F. 2d 539, 542 (CA1
1940).

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instead of physical, they are at bottom communications networks,
and
they “carry” information from one user to another. A tradi-
tional telephone company laid physical wires to create a network
connecting people. Digital platforms lay information infrastruc-
ture that can be controlled in much the same way. And unlike
newspapers, digital platforms hold themselves out as organiza-
tions that focus on distributing the speech of the broader public.
Federal law dictates that companies cannot “be treated as the
publisher or speaker” of information that they merely distribute.
110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C. § 230(c).
The analogy to common carriers is even clearer for digital plat-
forms that have dominant market share. Similar to utilities, to-
day's dominant digital platforms derive much of their value from
network size. The Internet, of course, is a network. But these
digital platforms are networks within that network. The Face-
book suite of apps is valuable largely because 3 billion people
use it. Google search—at 90% of the market share—is valuable
relative to other search engines because more people use it, creat-
ing data that Google's algorithm uses to refne and improve search
results. These network effects entrench these companies. Ordi-
narily, the astronomical proft margins of these platforms—last
year, Google brought in $182.5 billion total, $40.3 billion in net
income—would induce new entrants into the market. That these
companies have no comparable competitors highlights that the
industries may have substantial barriers to entry.
To be sure, much activity on the Internet derives value from
network effects. But dominant digital platforms are different.
Unlike decentralized digital spheres, such as the e-mail protocol,
control of these networks is highly concentrated. Although both
companies are public, one person controls Facebook (Mark Zuck-
erberg), and just two control Google (Larry Page and Sergey
Brin). No small group of people controls e-mail.
Much like with a communications utility, this concentration
g ives some dig ita l platfor ms enor mous control over speech.
When a user does not already know exactly where to fnd some-
thing on the Internet—and users rarely do—Google is the gate-
keeper between that user and the speech of others 90% of the
time. It can suppress content by deindexing or downlisting a
search result or by steering users away from certain content by
manually altering autocomplete results. Grind, Schechner, Mc-
Millan, & West, How Google Interferes With Its Search Algo-

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rithms and Changes Your Results, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15,
2019.
Facebook and Twitter can greatly narrow a person's infor-
mation fow through similar means. And, as the distributor of
the clear majority of e-books and about half of all physical books,
4
Amazon can impose cataclysmic consequences on authors by,
among other things, blocking a listing.
It changes nothing that these platforms are not the sole means
for distributing speech or information. A person always could
choose to avoid the toll bridge or train and instead swim the
Char les River or h ike the Oregon Trai l. But i n assessi ng
whether a company exercises substantial market power, what
matters is whether the alternatives are comparable. For many
of today's digital platforms, nothing is.
If the analogy between common carriers and digital platforms
is correct, then an answer may arise for dissatisfed platform users
who would appreciate not being blocked: laws that restrict the
platform's right to exclude. When a platform's unilateral control
is reduced, a government offcial's account begins to better resem-
ble a “government-controlled spac[e].” Mansky, 585 U. S., at 11;
see also Southeastern Promotions, 420 U. S., at 547, 555 (recog-
nizing that a private space can become a public forum when leased
to the government). Common-carrier regulations, although they
directly restrain private companies, thus may have an indirect
effect of subjecting government offcials to suits that would not
otherwise be cognizable under our public-forum jurisprudence.
This analysis may help explain the Second Circuit's intuition
that part of Mr. Trump's Twitter account was a public forum.
But that intuition has problems. First, if market power is a pred-
icate for common carriers (as some scholars suggest), nothing in
the record evaluates Twitter's market power. Second, and more
problematic, neither the Second Circuit nor respondents have
identifed any regulation that restricts Twitter from removing an
account that would otherwise be a “government-controlled space.”
2
Even if digital platforms are not close enough to common carri-
ers, legislatures might still be able to treat digital platforms like
4
As of 2018, Amazon had 42% of the physical book market and 89% of the
e-book market. Day & Gu, The Enormous Numbers Behind Amazon's Mar-
ket Reach, Bloomberg, Mar. 27, 2019.

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places of public accommodation. Although defnitions between ju-
r
isdictions vary, a company ordinarily is a place of public accom-
modation if it provides “lodging, food, entertainment, or other
services to the public . . . in general.” Black's Law Dictionary
20 (11th ed. 2019) (defning “public accommodation”); accord, 42
U. S. C. § 2000a(b)(3) (covering places of “entertainment”). Twit-
ter and other digital platforms bear resemblance to that defni-
ti on. Th is, too, may explain the Second Circuit's intuiti on.
Courts are split, however, about whether federal accommodations
laws apply to anything other than “physical” locations. Compare,
e. g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F. 3d 557, 559 (CA7
1999) (Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
covers websites), with Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121
F. 3d 1006, 1010–1011 (CA6 1997) (en banc) (Title III of the ADA
covers only physical places); see also 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000a(b)–(c)
(discussing “physica[l] locat[ions]”).
Once again, a doctrine, such as public accommodation, that re-
duces the power of a platform to unilaterally remove a govern-
ment account might strengthen the argument that an account
is truly government controlled and creates a public forum. See
Southeastern Promotions, 420 U. S., at 547, 555. But no party
has identifed any public accommodation restriction that applies
here.
II
The similarities between some digital platforms and common
carriers or places of public accommodation may give legislators
strong arguments for similarly regulating digital platforms. “[I]t
stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone
companies operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of ”
digital platforms. Turner, 512 U. S., at 684 (opinion of O'Connor,
J.). That is especially true because the space constraints on digi-
tal platforms are practically nonexistent (unlike on cable compa-
nies), so a regulation restricting a digital platform's right to ex-
clude might not appreciably impede the platform from speaking.
See id., at 675, 684 (noting restrictions on one-third of a cable
company's channels but recognizing that regulation may still be
justifed); PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 88. Yet Congress does not
appear to have passed these kinds of regulations. To the con-
trary, it has given digital platforms “immunity from certain types

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of suits,” Candeub 403, with respect to content they distribute,
47
U. S. C. § 230, but it has not imposed corresponding responsibil-
ities, like nondiscrimination, that would matter here.
None of this analysis means, however, that the First Amend-
ment is irrelevant until a legislature imposes common carrier or
public accommodation restrictions—only that the principal means
for regulating digital platforms is through those methods. Some
speech doctrines might still apply in limited circumstances, as this
Court has recognized in the past.
For example, although a “private entity is not ordinarily con-
strained by the First Amendment,” Halleck, 587 U. S., at 809, 812,
it is if the government coerces or induces it to take action the
government itself would not be permitted to do, such as censor
expression of a lawful viewpoint. Ibid. Consider government
threats. “People do not lightly disregard public offcers' thinly
veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them if
they do not come around.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U. S. 58, 68 (1963). The government cannot accomplish through
threats of adverse government action what the Constitution pro-
hibits it from doing directly. See ibid.; Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U. S. 991, 1004–1005 (1982). Under this doctrine, plaintiffs might
have colorable claims against a digital platform if it took adverse
action against them in response to government threats.
But no threat is alleged here. What threats would cause a
private choice by a digital platform to “be deemed . . . that of
the State” remains unclear. Id., at 1004.
5
And no party has
5
Threats directed at digital platforms can be especially problematic in the
light of 47 U. S. C. § 230, which some courts have misconstr ued to g ive
digital platforms immunity for bad-faith removal of third-party content.
Ma lw areby tes, Inc. v. En i gma So f tw are G ro up USA, LLC, 592 U. S.
1013, 1018–1019 (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certio-
rari). This immunity eliminates the biggest deterrent—a private lawsuit—
against caving to an unconstitutional government threat.
For similar reasons, some commentators have suggested that immunity
provisions like § 230 could potentially violate the First Amendment to the
extent those provisions pre-empt state laws that protect speech from private
censorship. See Volokh, Might Federal Preemption of Speech-Protective
State Laws Violate the First Amendment? The Volokh Conspiracy, Reason,
Jan. 23, 2021. According to that argument, when a State creates a private
right and a federal statute pre-empts that state law, “the federal statute is
the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost

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April 5, 2021 593 U. S.
sued Twitter. The question facing the courts below involved only
whether
a government actor violated the First Amendment by
blocking another Twitter user. That issue turns, at least to some
degree, on ownership and the right to exclude.
***
The Second Circuit feared that then-President Trump cut off
speech by using the features that Twitter made available to him.
But if the aim is to ensure that speech is not smothered, then
the more glaring concern must perforce be the dominant digital
platforms themselves. As Twitter made clear, the right to cut
off speech lies most powerfully in the hands of private digital
platforms. The extent to which that power matters for purposes
of the First Amendment and the extent to which that power could
lawfully be modifed raise interesting and important questions.
This petition, unfortunately, affords us no opportunity to con-
front them.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–7266. Martin v. Capron et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice
Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this
motion and this petition.
No. 20–7267. Martin v. Capron et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice
Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this
motion and this petition.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. D–3074. In re Discipline of Morgan. Charles L. Mor-
gan, Jr., of Charlotte, N. C., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
or sacrifced.” Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 232 (1956);
accord, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 614–
615 (1989).

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il 5, 2021
No. D–3075. In re Discipline of Hoffman. Mark A. Hoff-
man,
of Lederach, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re-
quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3076. In re Discipline of Sardella. Albert Michael
Sardella, of Coatesville, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3077. In re Discipline of Adges. Michael Charles
Adges, of Garden City, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3078. In re Discipline of Caro. Richard P. Caro, of
Santa Rosa Beach, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re-
quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3079. In re Discipline of Fasanaro. Michael F. Fa-
sanaro, of Virginia Beach, Va., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3080. In re Discipline of Kaufman. Kenneth Ste-
ven Kaufman, of Potomac, Md., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. 20M67. Lynn v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Secu-
rity. Motion for leave to fle petition for writ of certiorari under
seal denied.
No. 19–251. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Ro-
driquez, Acting Attorney General of California; and
No. 19–255. Thomas More Law Center v. Rodriquez, Act-
ing Attorney General of California. C. A. 9th Cir. [Cer-

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tiorari granted sub nom. in No. 19–251, Americans for Prosperity
F
oundation v. Becerra; in No. 19–255, Thomas More Law Center
v. Becerra, 592 U. S. 1162.] Motion of petitioners for divided ar-
gument denied. Motion of petitioners for enlargement of time
for oral argument, and motion of the Acting Solicitor General for
leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for
divided argument granted, and the time is allotted as follows: 30
minutes for petitioners, 10 minutes for the Acting Solicitor Gen-
eral, and 30 minutes for respondent.
No. 20–37. Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, et al. v. Gresham et al.; and Becerra, Secretary
of Health and Human Services, et al. v. Philbrick et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Azar v. Gresham;
Azar v. Philbrick, 592 U. S. 1121.]; and
No. 20–38. Arkansas v. Gresham et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1121.] Upon consideration of the
motion of petitioners to vacate the judgments of the Court of
Appeals and remand, to remove the cases from the March 2021
argument calendar, and to hold further briefng in abeyance, these
cases are held in abeyance pending further order of the Court.
No. 20–255. Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L., a
Minor, By and Through Her Father, Levy, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1162.] Motion of the Acting
Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami-
cus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 20–334. City of San Antonio, Texas, on Behalf of
Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Munici-
palities v. Hotels.com, L. P., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 592 U. S. 1162.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General
for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and
for divided argument denied.
No. 20–440. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1162.] Motion of
the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu-
ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 20– 472. HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC,
et al. v. Renewable Fuels Assn. et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1163.] Motion of the Acting Solici-
tor General for divided argument granted.

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No. 20–772. Waterfront Commission of New York Har-
bor
v. Murphy, Governor of New Jersey, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir.; and
No. 20–1034. Golan v. Saada. C. A. 2d Cir. The Acting So-
licitor General is invited to fle briefs in these cases expressing
the views of the United States.
No. 20 – 5904. Terry v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1163.] Motions of the Acting Solici-
tor General for leave to fle a brief out of time and for divided
argument granted.
No. 20–1052. In re Baylor;
No. 20–7013. In re Windsor; and
No. 20–7346. In re Diehl. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–826. Brown, Acting Warden v. Davenport. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 448.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1461. Dalberiste v. GLE Associates, Inc. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–83. Jones et al. v. Kalbaugh. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 826.
No. 20–551. Voris v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 864.
No. 20 –753. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakama Nation v. Yakima County, Washington, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 982.
No. 20–872. Davis v. Carroll et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 958.
No. 20–952. Construction Cost Data, L. L. C., et al. v.
Gordian Group, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 860.
No. 20–969. Freedom Watch, Inc., et al. v. Google Inc.
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
816 Fed. Appx. 497.

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No. 20–1015. Ortiz v. Walsh. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari
denied.
Reported below: 246 Md. App. 779 and 790.
No. 20–1020. Okoro v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1024. Young v. Edelen et al. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–1025. Francisco Vega v. Moody, Attorney Gen-
eral of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1037. Bowling v. Roach. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 901.
No. 20–1064. Jones v. U. S. Bank N. A., as Trustee for
Residential Asset Securities Corp., et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 127.
No. 20–1068. Shophar v. Johnson County, Kansas, et al.
Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1073. Doe et al. v. Haaland et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 973 F. 3d 591.
No. 20–1108. Pontiler S. A. v. OPI Products Inc. et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed.
Appx. 523.
No. 20–1135. Jones et al. v. Lafferty et al. Sup. Ct.
Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 Conn. 332, 246
A. 3d 429.
No. 20–1139. Jones v. McDonough, Secretary of Veter-
ans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 964 F. 3d 1374.
No. 20–1153. Devine v. Absolute Activist Value Master
Fund Ltd. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 876.
No. 20–1164. Boyd v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jersey
State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 111.
No. 20–1189. Hardin v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 148 N. E. 3d 932.

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593 U. S.
Apr
il 5, 2021
No. 20–1191. Singletary v. Nelsen, Warden, et al. C. A.
4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 195.
No. 20–1211. SynKloud Technologies, LLC v. Adobe, Inc.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed.
Appx. 929.
No. 20–1222. Dalessio v. University of Washington et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed.
Appx. 121.
No. 20–1228. Jaye v. United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–1232. IBSA Institut Biochimique, S. A., et al. v.
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 1374.
No. 20–1249. Dubin v. Ofce of Disciplinary Counsel.
Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6294. Sealey v. Ford, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 1338.
No. 20–6507. Berry et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6604. Grant v. City of Roanoke, Virginia. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 236.
No. 20–6891. Knight v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 958 F. 3d 1035.
No. 20–6899. Hudson v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6965. Miller v. Dunn. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6970. Maxwell v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App.
Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2020-Ohio-3027.
No. 20–6990. Smith v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 250 Ariz. 69, 475 P. 3d 558.

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No. 20–7003. Kudla v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Certio-
rar
i denied.
No. 20–7011. Saisi v. Murray et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 47.
No. 20–7014. Bruzzone v. Intel Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 –7016. Bruins v. Whitman, As sociate Warden,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7017. Beyer v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7022. Reyes Trujillo v. Houston, Acting Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7023. Parker v. Apple Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7027. Kynast v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 308 So. 3d 109.
No. 20 –7074. Nave v. Vanihel, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7097. Sweat v. City of Las Cruces, New Mexico,
et al. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7098. Nicolas Reyes v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 309 Ga. 660, 847 S. E. 2d 194.
No. 20–7105. Harris v. University of Arizona Police De-
partment et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 815 Fed. Appx. 196.
No. 20–7127. Pontefract v. United States et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7133. Reed v. Payne, Director, Arkansas Division
of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7134. Shuhaiber v. Illinois Department of Cor-
rections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
980 F. 3d 1167.

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ORDERS 917
593 U. S.
Apr
il 5, 2021
No. 20–7136. Stanford v. Paramo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7152. Hook v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 150 N. E. 3d 1102.
No. 20–7169. Nunley v. Brown. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–7172. Constantin v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 301 So. 3d 449.
No. 20–7173. Depaula v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 302 So. 3d 835.
No. 20–7175. Elkins v. Guinn et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7257. Knox v. Magera et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 111.
No. 20–7265. Lindsey v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 IL 124289, 181 N. E. 3d 1.
No. 20 –7288. Cam v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–7306. Madrid v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 282.
No. 20–7319. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 199.
No. 20–7322. Coffee v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7324. Traywicks v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed. Appx. 889.
No. 20–7325. Todd v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 313.
No. 20–7333. Martinez v. Warden, Federal Correctional
Institution Coleman-Low. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7336. Tillman v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 247 So. 3d 523.

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April 5, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7340. Welshans v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 626.
No. 20–7362. Braye v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 653.
No. 20–7363. Butler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 602.
No. 20–7365. Brount, aka Brunt v. Frosh, Attorney Gen-
eral of Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 239.
No. 20–7369. Hickmon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 302.
No. 20–7381. Wilkerson v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 828.
No. 20 –7383. Zamora-Suarez, aka Moncada v. United
States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7385. Kaetz v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7388. De La Torre v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 306.
No. 20–7389. Udoh v. Dooley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7390. Udoh v. Knutson, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7393. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 –7398. Jokhoo v. Velaquez-Aguilu, As sistant
United States Attorney. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 187.
No. 20–7399. Clancy v. Austin, Secretary of Defense.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 837 Fed.
Appx. 630.
No. 20–7402. Brownridge v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

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ORDERS 919
593 U. S.
Apr
il 5, 2021
No. 20–7412. Gardner v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7416. Herman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 894.
No. 20–7422. Little v. Cromwell. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7423. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 977 F. 3d 998.
No. 20–7425. Craig v. Matevousian, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7430. Torres v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 834 Fed. Appx. 382.
No. 19–1388. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 821.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Alito joins, dissenting.
For over a decade, Jason Small worked as an electrician at
Memphis Light, Gas & Water. Then an on-the-job injury forced
him into a new role as a dispatcher. This job came with a differ-
ent schedule and mandatory overtime duties. Sometimes the
new hours conficted with Mr. Small's religious obligations, like
worship services on Sunday mornings. So Mr. Small asked his
employer to place him on reduced pay temporarily while he
sought reassignment to a different position with a more conducive
schedule. The company had a history of offering this same ac-
commodation to other employees, including those removed from
their positions for unsatisfactory job performance. But when it
came to Mr. Small, the company balked.
That left Mr. Small to make the dispatcher role work as best he
could. For a period, things went smoothly enough. Mr. Small
even used his vacation days when necessary to attend church.
Eventually, though, a problem arose. Mr. Small asked to use
some of his vacation time on Good Friday. At frst, the company
agreed. Then it backtracked, canceling his vacation request.
When Mr. Small went to church anyway, the company suspended
him for two days without pay.
In response, Mr. Small fled suit seeking a ruling that the com-
pany's conduct violated Title VII. That federal statute prohibits

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Gorsuch, J., dissenting 593 U. S.
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and na-
ti
onal origin, and requires employers to afford requested religious
accommodations unless doing so would impose an “undue hard-
ship” on them. 78 Stat. 253, 255, as amended, 86 Stat. 103, 42
U. S. C. §§ 2000e( j), 2000e–2(a). At no point in the litigation did
anyone suggest that Mr. Small's requested accommodation—re-
duced pay while he sought reassignment—would have imposed a
signifcant hardship on his employer. Yet both the district court
and Sixth Circuit rejected Mr. Small's claim all the same.
The courts explained that Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardi-
son, 432 U. S. 63 (1977), tied their hands. There, this Court dra-
matically revised—really, undid—Title VII's undue hardship test.
Hardison held that an employer does not need to provide a reli-
gious accommodation that involves “more than a de minimis
cost.” Id., at 84. So Mr. Small's requested accommodation might
not have imposed a signifcant hardship on his employer. The
company may extend poorly performing employees the very same
relief Mr. Small sought. But the company had no obligation to
provide Mr. Small his requested accommodation because doing so
would have cost the company something (anything) more than a
trivial amount. See Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water,
952 F. 3d 821, 825 (CA6 2020) (per curiam).
Now, Mr. Small asks us to hear his case and I would grant his
petition for review. Hardison's de minimis cost test does not
appear in the statute. The Court announced that standard in
a single sentence with little explanation or supporting analysis.
Neither party before the Court had even argued for the rule.
Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 589 U. S. 1229 (2020) (Alito, J., concur-
ring in denial of certiorari). Justice Marshall highlighted all these
problems at the time, noting in dissent that the de minimis cost
test cannot be reconciled with the “plain words” of Title VII,
defes “simple English usage,” and “effectively nullif[ies]” the
statute's promise. Hardison, 432 U. S., at 88, 89, 93, n. 6 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
Nor has time been kind to Hardison. In the intervening years,
Congress has adopted additional civil rights laws using the “undue
hardship” standard. And when applying each of those laws,
courts are far more demanding. The Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) requires a covered employer to accommodate
an employee's “known physical or mental limitations” unless doing
so would impose an “undue hardship.” 104 Stat. 332, 42 U. S. C.

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ORDERS 921
919
Gorsuch,
J., dissenting
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). The Uniformed Services Employment and Re-
employment
Rights Act (USERRA) obliges an employer to re-
store a returning United States service member to his prior role
unless doing so would cause an “undue hardship.” 38 U. S. C.
§§ 4303(10), 4313(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B). And the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) provides that a covered employer must provide a nursing
mother with work breaks unless doing so would impose an “undue
hardship.” 124 Stat. 577, 29 U. S. C. § 207(r)(3). Under all three
statutes, an employer must provide an accommodation unless
doing so would impose “signifcant diffculty or expense” in light
of the employer's fnancial resources, the number of individuals it
employs, and the nature of its operations and facilities. See
ADA, 42 U. S. C. § 12111(10)(A) (added 1990); USERRA, 38
U. S. C. § 4303(15) (added 1994); ACA, 29 U. S. C. § 207(r)(3) (added
2010); cf. 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(8); 28 U. S. C. § 1869( j).
With these developments, Title VII's right to religious exercise
has become the odd man out. Alone among comparable statuto-
rily protected civil rights, an employer may dispense with it
nearly at whim. As this case illustrates, even subpar employees
may wind up receiving more favorable treatment than highly per-
forming employees who seek only to attend church. And the
anomalies do not end there. Under the ADA, an employer may
be required to alter the snack break schedule for a diabetic em-
ployee because doing so would not pose an undue hardship. Spit-
eri v. AT & T Holdings, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d 869, 878 (ED Mich.
2014). Yet, thanks to Hardison, at least one court has held that
it would be an undue hardship to require an employer to shift a
meal break for Muslim employees during Ramadan. EEOC v.
JBS USA, LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1135, 1181 (Colo. 2018). With
Hardison, uneven results like these have become increasingly
commonplace. See Brief for Muslim Advocates et al. as Amici
Curiae 21–22 (collecting examples).
Not even Mr. Small's employer tries to defend this state of
affairs. The company candidly acknowledges that Hard ison
“very likely is not the best possible gloss” on Title VII's language.
Brief in Opposition 23. Two of the three judges on the panel
below agreed, writing separately to explain their view that Hardi-
son “rewr[o]te [the] statute.” Small, 952 F. 3d, at 826–829 (Tha-
par, J., joined by Kethledge, J., concurring). Yet, today, this
Court refuses even to entertain the question. It's a struggle to
see why.

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April 5, 2021 593 U. S.
Maybe the most charitable explanation for the Court's inaction
has
to do with issue preservation. But if that's the worry, there
is no reason for it. Both the district court and the court of
appeals expressly passed on the question whether Mr. Small's
employer violated Title VII by denying his requested accommoda-
tion. That is all our precedent demands. United States v. Wil-
liams, 504 U. S. 36, 41–43 (1992). The district court ruled that
“placing Mr. Small back in the reassignment pool on reduced pay
to wait for a job with hours more in line with [his] religious
obligations would . . . place more than a de minimis burden on”
the company. App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. For that reason, the
court said, the company “suffciently satisfed its obligation to
demonstrate [an] undue hardship.” Ibid. While two members
of the Sixth Circuit panel assigned to Mr. Small's case doubt-
ed Hardison, none doubted what it required. Because his re-
quested accommodation involved “more than [a] de minimis” cost,
the court held, the company didn't have to provide it. Small,
952 F. 3d, at 825 (per curiam) (citing circuit precedent following
Hardison).
I cannot see what more we cou ld reasonably require.
Mr. Small insisted that his requested accommodation would not
cause an undue hardship under Title VII. Both the district court
and court of appeals rejected the argument relying expressly on
Hardison. There is no barrier to our review and no one else to
blame. The only mistake here is of the Court's own making—
and it is past time for the Court to correct it.
No. 20–733. Rickmon v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 952 F. 3d
876.
No. 20–1018. Louisiana Real Estate Appraisers Board v.
Federal Trade Commission. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Federa-
tion of State Medical Boards for leave to fle brief as amicus
curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 976 F. 3d
597.
No. 20 –1067. Rosas v. Advocate Health & Hospitals
Corp., dba Advocate Christ Medical Center, et al. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
803 Fed. Appx. 952.

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ORDERS 923
593 U. S.
Apr
il 5, 8, 14, 16, 2021
No. 20–1134. Myers v. Neal, Superintendent, Indiana
S
tate Prison. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Justice
Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition. Reported below: 975 F. 3d 611.
No. 20–7015. Burton v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin System et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 564.
Rehearing Denied
No. 20–6263. Abdulrazzak v. Fluke, Warden, et al., 592
U. S. 1185. Petition for rehearing denied.
April 8, 2021
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A126. Reeves, Governor of Mississippi, et al. v.
Williams, on Behalf of Her Minor Child J. E., et al. Ap-
plication to recall and stay the mandate of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, presented to Justice
Alito, and by him referred to the Court, denied without preju-
dice to a renewed application after the remaining grounds for
dismissal currently on remand to the District Court have been
fully resolved.
April 14, 2021
M iscell aneo us O rde rs. (For the Cour t's orders prescr ibi ng
amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
see 593 U. S. 1055; and amendments to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, see 593 U. S. 1065.
April 16, 2021
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 19–1039. PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC v. New Jersey
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1243.] Mo-
tion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral
argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 20–543. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Mnuchin v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, 592 U. S. 1163]; and

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April 16, 19, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20– 544. Alaska Native Village Corp. Assn., Inc.,
et
al. v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reserva-
tion et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S.
1163.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argu-
ment granted. Motion of Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation for divided argument denied.
April 19, 2021
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 20–308. La Boom Disco, Inc. v. Duran. C. A. 2d Cir.
Reported below: 955 F. 3d 279; and
No. 20–723. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency v. Allan et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Reported below: 968
F. 3d 567. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases re-
manded for further consideration in light of Facebook, Inc. v.
Duguid, 592 U. S. 395 (2021).
No. 20–740. Bognet et al. v. Degraffenreid, Acting Sec-
retary of Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded with instructions
to dismiss the case as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear,
Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). Reported below: 980 F. 3d 336.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–7025. Allen v. Hudson. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See th is Cour t's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 832 Fed. Appx. 234.
No. 20 –7067. Pennington-Thurman v. Sansone Group
DDR LLC. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeat-
edly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to
accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from peti-
tioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Mar-
tin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)
(per curiam). Reported below: 613 S. W. 3d 424.
No. 20–7092. Watford v. Pster et al. (Reported below:
811 Fed. Appx. 374); and Watford v. Jeffreys et al. (829 Fed.

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ORDERS 925
593 U. S.
Apr
il 19, 2021
Appx. 132). C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this
Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further
petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the dock-
eting fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submit-
ted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision
of this motion and this petition.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20M68. Hutchinson v. United States. Motion for
leave to fle petition for writ of certiorari under seal with re-
dacted copies for the public record granted.
No. 20–609. Gannett Co., Inc., et al. v. Quatrone. C. A.
4th Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to fle a brief in
this case expressing the views of the United States.
No. 20–6366. Riley v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Motion of
petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 1165] denied. Justice Alito took
no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
No. 20–7116. Del Pino Allen v. Board of Trustees of
Miami Dade College. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.;
No. 20–7162. Aguilar et al. v. Specialized Loan Servic-
ing, LLC, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.; and
No. 20–7234. Barrett v. PAE Government Services, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until May 10,
2021, within which to pay the docketing fees required by this
Court's Rule 38(a).
No. 20–1282. In re Dery;
No. 20–1304. In re Tweed;
No. 20–1342. In re Radcliff;
No. 20–7575. In re Robinson; and
No. 20–7584. In re Graham. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 20–7517. In re Smith. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of habeas
corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.

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No. 20–1230. In re Sydnor;
N
o. 20–1290. In re Ogunjobi;
No. 20–7045. In re Brooks; and
No. 20–7510. In re English. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus denied.
No. 20–1112. In re Arunachalam. Petition for writ of man-
damus denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.
No. 20–7170. In re Prasad. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition.
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–637. Hemphill v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-
tiorari granted. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 3d 1035, 150 N. E.
3d 356.
Certiorari Denied
No. 20–418. Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., LLC.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d
1301.
No. 20–479. Shinn v. Baker. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 137.
No. 20–674. Uzodinma v. Garland, Attorney General.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 960.
No. 20–768. Serrano v. United States Customs and Bor-
der Protection et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 975 F. 3d 488.
No. 20–782. Holloway v. Garland, Attorney General,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948
F. 3d 164.
No. 20– 812. Folajtar v. Garland, Attorney General,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 980
F. 3d 897.
No. 20–877. King v. Pridmore et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 1135.
No. 20–941. Atkins et al. v. Williams, Medical Director,
Tennessee Department of Correction. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 972 S. W. 3d 734.

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No. 20–948. Kobe v. Buscemi et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rar
i denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 180.
No. 20–963. Walton v. Virginia International Termi-
nals, LLC. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–975. Owens v. Stirling, Director, South Carolina
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 396.
No. 20–1054. Valambhia et al. v. United Republic of Tan-
zania et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 964 F. 3d 1135.
No. 20–1071. West Virginia ex rel. Yurish et al. v. Fair-
cloth, Judge, Circuit Court of West Virginia, 23d Judicial
Circuit, et al. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 243 W. Va. 537, 847 S. E. 2d 810.
No. 20–1072. Thompson et al. v. DeWine, Governor of
Ohio, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted
below: 976 F. 3d 610.
No. 20–1074. Linsangan v. Taijeron et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 527.
No. 20 –1075. Reichard et al. v. Brown, Chapter 13
Trustee. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
829 Fed. Appx. 812.
No. 20–1076. SE Property Holdings, LLC, as Successor
by Merger to Vision Bank v. Gaddy. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 977 F. 3d 1051.
No. 20–1082. Gardner v. Mglej. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 974 F. 3d 1151.
No. 20–1085. Stafne v. Zilly, Judge, United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820
Fed. Appx. 594.
No. 20 –1091. Schulz v. Town Board of the Town of
Queensbury et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 24 N. Y. 3d 1177, 146 N. E. 3d 528.
No. 20–1096. Fetner v. Hotel Street Capital, LLC, et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed.
Appx. 866.

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No. 20–1097. Han v. Yangrai Cho. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rar
i denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 864.
No. 20 –1098. Houthoofd v. Parish, Warden. Ct. App.
Mich. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1102. Hanna v. Little League Baseball, Inc. Ct.
App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 53 Cal. App. 5th 871, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845.
No. 20–1104. Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp., dba Carnival
Cruise Line. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 965 F. 3d 1170.
No. 20 –1115. Granton v. Washington State Lot tery.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1117. Fetner v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society
et al. (Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 188); and Fetner v.
Hotel Street Capital, LLC, et al. (801 Fed. Appx. 189).
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1118. Grundstein v. Lamoille Superior Docket
Entries/Orders et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 46.
No. 20–1122. Fleury v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 Mass. App. 1123, 147 N. E.
3d 1113.
No. 20–1124. Leatherwood v. Braggs, Warden. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 363.
No. 20–1126. Santos Martillo et al. v. Unknown Defend-
ants. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97
Mass. App. 1120, 145 N. E. 3d 918.
No. 20–1133. Triantos v. Deutsche Bank National Trust
Co., as Trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc.
Trust 2004–HE4, Mortgage Pass-Through Certicates, Se-
ries 2004–HE4, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1136. Capote v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20 –1140. DeBose v. University of South Florida
Board of Trustees et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 547.

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il 19, 2021
No. 20–1155. Nelson v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certio-
rar
i denied. Reported below: 947 N. W. 2d 31.
No. 20 –1160. West Ventures L. P., fka Sleiman Ven-
tures, L. P., et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed.
Appx. 428.
No. 20–1166. Shophar et ux. v. United States et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 838 Fed.
Appx. 328.
No. 20–1178. Pacic Choice Seafood Co. et al. v. Rai-
mondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 976 F. 3d 932.
No. 20–1182. Tapia-Felix v. Garland, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed.
Appx. 691.
No. 20–1225. Winston et al. v. Walsh. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 448.
No. 20–1237. Brown v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 97.
No. 20–1239. Smith v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 1st App. Dist.,
Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1260. Castillo, aka Moreno Velasquez v. Gar-
land, Attorney General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 795.
No. 20–1269. Renfroe et al. v. Parker et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 974 F. 3d 594.
No. 20–1270. Stafne v. Bank of New York Mellon. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 536.
No. 20–1274. Wern v. South Carolina Commission on Law-
yer Conduct. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 431 S. C. 643, 849 S. E. 2d 898.
No. 20–1280. Cotropia v. Chapman. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 978 F. 3d 282.
No. 20–1281. Dredd v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 833 Fed. Appx. 79.

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No. 20–1283. Temponeras v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 320.
No. 20–1289. NetScout Systems, Inc., et al. v. Packet
Intelligence LLC. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 965 F. 3d 1299.
No. 20–1300. Torres Luque, et al. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 395.
No. 20–1301. McNeil v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 515.
No. 20–1314. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 225.
No. 20–1319. Manuel Solorzano v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 832 Fed. Appx. 276.
No. 20–1321. Lee v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6054. Tribue v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 F. 3d 1326.
No. 20–6260. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 1106.
No. 20–6498. Barksdale v. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama
Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 20–6563. Stallworth v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 179.
No. 20–6599. Dominguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 244.
No. 20–6640. Perryman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 424.
No. 20–6754. Tarpley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 976.
No. 20–6773. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 981.

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il 19, 2021
No. 20 – 6780. Aguilar v. Specialized Loan Servicing,
LLC,
et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6791. Penn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 450.
No. 20–6871. Green v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 179 App.
Div. 3d 1516, 118 N. Y. S. 3d 853.
No. 20–7038. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 396.
No. 20 –7051. Zavalidroga v. United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7053. Manuel Torres v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7056. Mehdipour v. Coyle, Judge, et al. Sup. Ct.
Okla. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7060. Mosier v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7061. Tomlin v. Ishee. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 830 Fed. Appx. 111.
No. 20–7075. Parnell v. Chen et al. (Reported below: 824
Fed. Appx. 891); and Parnell v. Martinez et al. (821 Fed.
Appx. 866). C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7084. Hill v. Google LLC et al. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 244 A. 3d 211.
No. 20–7093. Turner v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7104. Badkin v. Lockheed Corp. et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 617.
No. 20–7111. Lopez-Vanegas v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct.
Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 227 A. 3d 413.
No. 20–7117. Troy-McKoy v. Mount Sinai Beth Israel.
App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 182 App. Div. 3d 524, 123 N. Y. S. 3d 111.

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April 19, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7123. Heddlesten v. Crow, Director, Oklahoma
Dep
artment of Corrections. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 663.
No. 20–7131. Elkins v. Shoop, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7139. Anderson v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7143. Heyangjing Shi et al. v. Mash. Ct. App.
N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 3d 949, 147
N. E. 3d 1154.
No. 20–7144. Xue Jie He v. Hairong Xue. Ct. App. N. Y.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 3d 967, 147 N. E.
3d 1165.
No. 20–7145. Harris v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 718.
No. 20–7147. Angel Acosta v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institu-
tions Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7149. Gaddy v. Ducart, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 300.
No. 20–7151. Hejazi v. Harrold, Sheriff, Lane County,
Oregon. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7153. Forbes v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816
Fed. Appx. 847.
No. 20–7155. Scott v. Robinson, Warden (two judgments).
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7158. Ramirez v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7159. Smith v. Alabama et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7161. Artis v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 3d App. Dist.,
Logan County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020-Ohio-
4018.

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ORDERS 933
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Apr
il 19, 2021
No. 20–7165. Jackson v. Josiah, as Trustee. Ct. App. Cal.,
3d
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7176. Davis v. Shinn, Director, Arizona Depart-
ment of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed.
Appx. 711.
No. 20–7178. Turner v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020–00047 (La. 9/29/20), 301 So. 3d
1158.
No. 20–7179. Viera v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817
Fed. Appx. 810.
No. 20–7192. Smith v. Stein et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 982 F. 3d 229.
No. 20–7193. Stuart v. Brnovich, Attorney General of
Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7203. Francis v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7221. Cannon v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 276.
No. 20–7241. Gosselin v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 486 Mass. 256, 158
N. E. 3d 8.
No. 20–7260. Hopkins v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 277 So. 3d 112.
No. 20–7262. Stills v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 229 A. 3d 388.
No. 20–7274. Grifs v. Parish, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7275. Herron v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7289. Campbell v. Bottling Group, LLC. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 630.

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TERM, 2020
April 19, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7295. Sauceda v. Shinn, Director, Arizona De-
p
artment of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7310. Johnson v. Johnson, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7320. Laskowski v. Washington State Department
of Labor and Industries. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 12 Wash. App. 2d 806, 460 P. 3d 697.
No. 20–7343. Williams v. Utah. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 UT App 67, 462 P. 3d 832.
No. 20–7345. Lewis v. Legrand, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7361. Ayers v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–7364. Baldwin v. Clark, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Albion, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7367. Bostic v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 20–7370. Bradford v. Perry, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7372. Ockert v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 338.
No. 20–7380. Wyatt v. Sutton, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 838 Fed. Appx. 266.
No. 20–7384. Toliver v. Adner. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 836 Fed. Appx. 68.
No. 20–7395. Wills v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7400. Bartlett v. Valentine, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7404. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 1196.

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ORDERS 935
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il 19, 2021
No. 20–7408. Napper v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 978 F. 3d 118.
No. 20–7409. Pena-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 222.
No. 20–7415. Grifn v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188
App. Div. 3d 1701, 136 N. Y. S. 3d 619.
No. 20–7417. Pace v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7418. Jennings v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 252.
No. 20–7419. Johnson v. Mackelburg, Warden. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 293.
No. 20–7421. Levine v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 909.
No. 20–7428. Marones v. Ford, Attorney General of Ne-
vada, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7438. Stegawski v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7439. Luis Suarez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 830 Fed. Appx. 612.
No. 20–7441. Rudenko v. Shanley, Superintendent, Cox-
sackie Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 20–7444. Bruce v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 977 F. 3d 1112.
No. 20–7446. Rivera Arreola v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 690.
No. 20–7448. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 837 Fed. Appx. 373.
No. 20–7449. Nunez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7451. Jenner v. Colorado Department of Correc-
tions et al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.

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TERM, 2020
April 19, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7452. Lucas v. Social Security Administration.
C
. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed.
Appx. 176.
No. 20–7453. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 833 Fed. Appx. 23.
No. 20–7456. Ayala-Solorio v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 227.
No. 20–7457. Morris v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20 –7458. Rajput v. Terrell et al.; and Rajput v.
Fogg. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7459. Rosario v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 837 Fed. Appx. 117.
No. 20–7461. Kendrick v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 77.
No. 20–7465. Asuncion v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 974 F. 3d 929 and 819 Fed.
Appx. 571..
No. 20–7468. Feazell v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7469. Hernandez-Ayala v. Baker, Warden, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7471. Perez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7472. Milner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7473. Obregon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 834 Fed. Appx. 117.
No. 20–7475. Jessie v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 410.
No. 20–7476. Ramos Cabrera v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 837 Fed. Appx. 981.

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ORDERS 937
593 U. S.
Apr
il 19, 2021
No. 20–7477. Jabbar v. Graham, Judge, United States Dis-
trict
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7483. Medel-Guadalupe v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 987 F. 3d 424.
No. 20–7486. Guzman-Merced v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 984 F. 3d 18.
No. 20–7488. Hampton v. Williams, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 243.
No. 20–7489. Formica v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 178.
No. 20–7493. Luis Sanchez v. Holbrook et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 342.
No. 20–7494. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7496. Spriggs v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 125.
No. 20–7498. Almeida-Olivas v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7501. Arroyo-Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 396.
No. 20–7503. Jones v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 833 Fed. Appx. 528.
No. 20–7507. Faella v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 844.
No. 20–7508. Campbell v. Brown, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 142.
No. 20–7509. Leon Del Angel v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 837 Fed. Appx. 475.
No. 20–7516. Portillo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 981 F. 3d 181.

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April 19, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7519. Salwan v. Hirshfeld, Acting Under Secre-
t
ary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Direc-
tor of the United States Patent and Trademark Ofce.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed.
Appx. 862.
No. 20–7521. Lewis v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 App.
Div. 3d 415, 127 N. Y. S. 3d 33.
No. 20–7524. Byrd v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 838 Fed. Appx. 762.
No. 20–7529. Moore v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7546. Shumpert v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7551. Bolze v. Warden, Federal Correctional In-
stitution Coleman. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7552. Alvarez-Reyes v. Cain, Superintendent,
Snake River Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7556. McKnight v. Johnson et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 839 Fed. Appx. 130.
No. 20–7567. Cole v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20 – 8. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
et al. v. Robert R. McCormick Foundation et al. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 946
F. 3d 66.
No. 20–209. Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 950
F. 3d 458.
No. 20–363. Whatley v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and
Classication Prison. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 927 F. 3d 1150.

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Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
A
jury sentenced petitioner Frederick R. Whatley to death the
morning after watching him reenact a murder while wearing un-
necessary leg irons and manacles. When the State called What-
ley to the stand during the sentencing proceeding, his attorney
waved away the prosecutor's concerns about the visible shackles,
then sat silent when the prosecutor handed Whatley a fake gun
and asked him to reenact the murder for which he had just been
convicted. Defense counsel's unreasonable failure to object to
Whatley's shackling was plainly prejudicial under this Court's
precedent. I would grant the petition, summarily reverse, and
remand for a new sentencing proceeding.
I
Following Whatley's conviction for robbing and killing the
owner of a Georgia bait shop and liquor store, the State asked the
jury to impose a sentence of death. The sentencing proceeding
involved just one day of evidence. The State relied on two, con-
ceded statutory aggravating circumstances: Whatley committed
the murder (1) during an armed robbery, Ga. Code Ann. § 17–10–
30(b)(2) (Supp. 2019), and (2) after having “escaped from [a] place
of lawful confnement,” § 17–10–30(b)(9), because he had walked
away from a halfway house to which he had been paroled a few
months earlier. The State further showed that Whatley had
prior convictions for forging a check, threatening a man with a
shotgun and taking his wallet, and simple assault. Finally, the
State elicited testimony from a sheriff's deputy that Whatley once
wondered aloud whether he would miss the Super Bowl while in
custody. Electronic Case Filing in Whatley v. Upton, No. 3:09–
cv–00074, Doc. 7–9 (ND Ga., July 28, 2009), pp. 15, 22 (ECF).
This, the State argued, proved Whatley felt no remorse for his
crimes. ECF Doc. 7–11, at 31.
Defense counsel called a number of Whatley's friends and fam-
ily, followed by Whatley himself. Whatley had worn shackles
throughout the guilt phase, but the court took care to ensure the
jury did not see the restraints. See, e. g., ECF Doc. 7–5, at 110,
135–138. When defense counsel called Whatley to testify at sen-
tencing, the prosecutor sensibly asked if the court needed to “take
the jury out before he takes the stand” in light of the “chains” and
“shackles on him.” Defense counsel waved off the prosecutor's
concern. “Well, he's convicted now,” he shrugged, referencing

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the jury's earlier guilty verdict. The trial court echoed that con-
clusi
on: “He's been convicted.” ECF Doc. 7–9, at 106. The court
never found that the restraints were even necessary, much less
that there was no way to hide them from the jury.
Whatley hobbled to the witness stand. His leg irons and cuffs
were in plain view. He testifed for several hours in those re-
straints. Among other things, Whatley contested the State's ver-
sion of the shooting for which he had been convicted. The State
claimed that Whatley tried to execute the witnesses to his crime
after the storeowner gave him the money, shooting the owner in
the chest and nearly shooting an employee but hitting the counter
instead. The storeowner, mortally wounded, pulled his own gun.
Whatley ran, and the two exchanged shots in the parking lot
before the owner died. Whatley, however, testifed that the
storeowner pulled a gun immediately after giving him the money,
and Whatley refexively fred a single shot that hit the counter
before running away. The owner gave chase, and Whatley killed
him during the shootout outside.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Whatley to “step
down” from the witness box to demonstrate his version of events.
The prosecutor handed Whatley a “toy pistol,” noting, “Now, this
is not the type of gun you had that day. I hope you'll understand
why I don't want to give you a real gun.” ECF Doc. 7–10, at
13. He told Whatley to “show this jury how you held a gun on
[the victim] and told him to give you that money. Now, you go
ahead and show them. You pretend I'm [the victim]. You pull
the gun on me and show them how you did it.” Id., at 14. With
no objection from his attorney, Whatley reenacted the armed rob-
bery and shooting, shuffing around the courtroom with shackles
on his legs and waving the gun around with cuffs on his wrists.
The prosecutor maintained a running commentary. See ibid.
(“Show me how you pointed it at him”); id., at 15 (“I want you
to point the gun at me just like you did him that day”). He
ended his cross-examination shortly thereafter. Id., at 19. De-
fense counsel never objected.
The next morning, the prosecutor argued in closing that the
jury should sentence Whatley to death primarily because he posed
a severe threat of future violence. See, e. g., ECF Doc. 7–11, at
20 (“[I]f you think that a guard gets between him and life and
he won't kill a guard, you'd better think again”). The court gave

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Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
no curative instruction about Whatley's shackling. The jury de-
l
iberated for 90 minutes before recommending the death penalty.
On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court found that What-
ley forfeited his claim that his visible shackling violated his due
process rights because his lawyer affrmatively waived any objec-
tion despite the prosecutor's stated concerns. Whatley v. State,
270 Ga. 296, 302, 509 S. E. 2d 45, 52 (1998).
Whatley then fled a state habeas petition, arguing that his trial
attorney's failure to object to his unnecessary shackling consti-
tuted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Supreme
Court rejected the petition. Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 571–
572, 668 S. E. 2d 651, 663 (2008). While acknowledging that un-
necessary shackling is presumptively prejudicial when an objec-
tion is properly preserved, the court held that defendants retain
their burden to show prejudice when they claim trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object. Ibid. The court summarily
concluded that Whatley had not made that showing. Ibid.
Whatley fled a federal habeas petition, arguing that the state
court's denial of his ineffective-assistance claim was contrary to
and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. 927 F. 3d 1150, 1184–1187
(2019). The court explained at length why Whatley was not enti-
tled to a presumption of prejudice, and then determined in one
short paragraph that Whatley's “violent criminal history” and fail-
ure to “turn things around,” together with the crimes at issue,
rendered the shackling “trivial.” Id., at 1187.
Judge Jordan dissented. In his view, the state court's ruling
might have been reasonable “had the shackles merely been visible
to the jury when Mr. Whatley walked to the witness box. Or if
the trial court had given a curative instruction to the jury about
the restraints. Or if Mr. Whatley was not forced to reenact the
murder in front of the jury while the prosecutor played the role
of the victim. Or if the prosecutor had not explicitly made
Mr. Whatley's future dangerousness a key theme in favor of his
request for death.” Id., at 1193. But with these facts taken
together, prejudice was “undeniable.” Ibid.
II
To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, What-
ley must show that his counsel's defcient performance prejudiced

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him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Pre
judice means a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Id., at 694. Because Georgia requires unanim-
ity to impose a capital sentence, Whatley need only show a rea-
sonable probability that one juror would have voted against the
death penalty absent his counsel's defciency.
1
See Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 537 (2003). However, relief is only available
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) if the state court's conclusion that any defciency was
not prejudicial “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, federal courts do not defer to
a “state-court decision that correctly identifes the governing legal
rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prison-
er's case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 407–408 (2000).
III
A
This Court long ago recognized that “no person should be tried
while shackled . . . except as a last resort,” in part because “the
sight of shackles . . . might have a signifcant effect on the jury's
feelings about the defendant.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337,
1
Georgia argued in state court that “counsel should not be regarded as
having performed defciently by failing to object to the shackling, because
the practice had not yet been established as unconstitutional.” Whatley v.
Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 571, 668 S. E. 2d 651, 663 (2008). The Georgia Supreme
Court all but rejected that argument, as it “had already strongly suggested
in dictum that it was unconstitutional to place visible shackles on a death
penalty defendant during the sentencing phase without a showing of particu-
lar need.” Ibid., and n. 38 (citing Moon v. State, 258 Ga. 748, 755, 375 S. E.
2d 442, 449 (1988)). Given its conclusion on prejudice, however, the court
simply assumed defciency. 284 Ga., at 571, 668 S. E. 2d, at 663. The State
wisely does not raise this issue here. In addition to state-court decisions,
this Court had several times emphasized the prejudicial nature of shackling,
well before the trial in this case. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 344
(1970); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560, 568–569 (1986). Indeed, the prose-
cutor himself suggested that the court excuse the jury so Whatley could
take the stand outside their presence, thus hiding his chains. ECF Doc. 7–
9, at 106. Certainly, a reasonable defense attorney would not have taken it
upon himself to overrule the prosecutor's objection to the defendant's unfair
treatment.

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yor, J., dissenting
344 (1970). “Shackling ” is “the sort of inherently prejudicial
prac
tice that . . . should be permitted only where justifed by an
essential state interest specifc to each trial.” Holbrook v. Flynn,
475 U. S. 560, 568–569 (1986).
In 2005, this Court held that needless, visible shackling at sen-
tencing likewise violates a capital defendant's right to due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Deck v. Missouri,
544 U. S. 622, 633 (2005). In that case, Carman Deck was visibly
“shackled with leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain” during his
capital sentencing, over his attorney's objection and with no fnd-
ing of specifc need. Id., at 625. This Court explained in no
uncertain terms that shackling is highly likely to be prejudicial
at a capital sentencing:
“The Court has stressed the acute need for reliable decision-
making when the death penalty is at issue. The appearance
of the offender during the penalty phase in shackles, however,
almost inevitably implies to a jury, as a matter of common
sense, that court authorities consider the offender a danger
to the community—often a statutory aggravator and nearly
always a relevant factor in jury decisionmaking, even where
the State does not specifcally argue the point. It also al-
most inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of the
character of the defendant. And it thereby inevitably under-
mines the jury's ability to weigh accurately all relevant
considerations—considerations that are often unquantifable
and elusive—when it determines whether a defendant de-
serves death.” Id., at 632–633 (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
Because these prejudicial effects “ `cannot be shown from a trial
transcript,' ” the Court in Deck further held that “where a court,
without adequate justifcation, orders the defendant to wear
shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not
demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process viola-
tion.” Id., at 635. The burden instead rests on the State to
prove the shackling harmless. Ibid.
B
To be sure, Deck does not require reviewing courts to presume
prejudice when the defendant fails to object to his shackling at
trial. This Court has not decided to what extent such a presump-

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Sotomayor, J., dissenting 593 U. S.
tion applies on collateral review, in the context of an ineffective-
assist
ance-of-counsel claim. Cf. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582
U. S. 286, 302 (2017). Both the Georgia Supreme Court and Elev-
enth Circuit held that the Deck presumption does not apply to
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. 284 Ga., at 571–572, 668
S. E. 2d, at 663; 927 F. 3d, at 1184–1187. That was not a clearly
erroneous application of federal law.
What was clearly unreasonable, however, was to ignore entirely
the ways in which visible shackling is likely to distort the outcome
of a capital sentencing proceeding. As Deck explains, reasonable
jurors confronted with a defendant in chains will assume court
offcials have determined those chains were necessary to prevent
the defendant from trying to escape or attack the lawyers, the
judge, or even the jurors. Chains paint a defendant as an imme-
diate threat. Jurors faced with a defendant in shackles will fnd
it more diffcult to consider the defendant as a whole person and
to weigh mitigating evidence impartially. If jurors think the
court does not trust a capital defendant to avoid violence at his
own sentencing proceeding, with his life on the line, they are
unlikely to trust him to do so while serving a life sentence with
no hope of parole. “In these ways, the use of shackles can be a
thumb on death's side of the scale.” Deck, 544 U. S., at 633 (alter-
ation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Absent a presumption, this may not matter in some cases.
Other facts may overwhelmingly suggest a defendant's future
dangerousness, or the circumstances surrounding the shackling
may indicate it likely did not matter. Reasonable jurists faith-
fully applying Strickland in light of the observations in Deck
might then disagree about whether counsel's failure to object may
have caused prejudice. Under AEDPA, federal courts should
defer to state-court decisions fnding no prejudice in such cases.
That is not what happened here. For the grand fnale of his
cross-examination, the prosecutor handed Whatley a fake gun and
had him reenact the murder, with the prosecutor playing the
victim. Whatley's chains clanked and rattled with every move,
constantly reminding the jury that the court apparently believed
he might do more than just pretend to kill someone in the court-
room if left unrestrained. Leaving nothing to implication, the
prosecutor remarked, “I hope you'll understand why I don't want
to give you a real gun.” ECF Doc. 7–10, at 13.

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Apr
il 19, 2021
The prosecutor hammered this point home at length in closing.
“F
rederick Whatley,” he told the jury, “is going to kill somebody
else unless you execute him.” ECF Doc. 7–11, at 17. Prison
was “only going to make him smarter and meaner.” Id., at 27.
“[D]o you think he won't kill a guard if that guard stands between
him and freedom? He will be a threat until the day he is exe-
cuted.” Ibid. “This man should be given the death penalty be-
cause he is dangerous, he has had a history of violence, he's never
going to get any better than what you've seen right now.” Id.,
at 28.
Whatley's chains, fresh in the jury's mind from the previous
afternoon's spectacle, powerfully corroborated the prosecutor's ar-
gument. It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial example of
needless shackling.
On the other hand, Whatley's criminal history was relatively
minor and largely from his teenage years. The statutory aggra-
vators in his case were less serious than in many other capital
cases.
2
The State's only evidence of lack of remorse was that
Whatley likes football. The evidence at the sentencing proceed-
ing also showed that Whatley's mother abandoned him, he never
knew his father, and he was experiencing homelessness when he
committed this crime. Whatley's friends and family testifed to
his redeeming qualities and begged the jury to show mercy. If
Whatley had testifed free of chains, it is reasonably probable that
at least one juror would have done so.
On these facts, defense counsel's failure to object to Whatley's
unnecessary shackling renders his death sentence not only unreli-
able, but unconstitutional. The only way to conclude otherwise
is to disregard this Court's clear precedent about the likely effect
of visible, unnecessary shackling. Because I would not allow the
State to put Frederick Whatley to death based on such a constitu-
tionally fawed sentencing proceeding, I respectfully dissent.
No. 20–902. Flick v. Garland, Attorney General. C. A.
11th Cir. Motion of Firearms Policy Coalition et al. for leave to
2
See, e. g., Ga. Code Ann. § 17–10–30(b)(7) (authorizing the death penalty
for those who commit murders that involve “torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery”); § 17–10–30(b)(11) (authorizing the death penalty for
those who commit murder and have prior convictions for “rape, aggravated
sodomy, aggravated child molestation, or aggravated sexual battery”).

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fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below:
812 Fed. Appx. 974.
No. 20–982. Brown v. Polk County, Wisconsin, et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 965 F. 3d 534.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Petitioner Sharon Lynn Brown asks this Court to decide what
degree of suspicion the Fourth Amendment requires to justify the
physically penetrative cavity search of a pretrial detainee. While
Brown was in pretrial detention, offcials at Polk County Jail
directed a male doctor to insert a speculum into her vagina,
spread it open, and shine a fashlight inside to search for contra-
band. The doctor did the same to Brown's anus. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that mere reasonable suspi-
cion justifed this search. That is, for example, the same degree
of suspicion required for police to stop someone on the street and
ask a few, brief questions. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21–22
(1968). Brown argues this much more invasive search required
probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances. Those
are, by comparison, the same prerequisites for police to draw
blood from an unconscious motorist to determine his blood alcohol
content. See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U. S. 840, 857 (2019).
This petition raises an important question. Nonetheless, I
agree with the Court's decision to deny certiorari, as “further
consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifcations of
the problem by other courts will enable us to deal with the issue
more wisely at a later date.” McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961,
962 (1983) (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
It bears emphasis, however, that the degree of suspicion re-
quired for a search should be substantially informed by the avail-
ability of less intrusive alternatives. This Court does not lightly
permit an entire category of warrantless, invasive searches when
less offensive options exist. Particularly searches of those who
have not been convicted of any crime. The courts below consid-
ered no such alternatives before holding that reasonable suspicion
alone justifed this degrading search into Brown's vagina and
anus. Future courts presumably will not do the same.

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atement of Sotomayor, J.
I
In
May 2017, police arrested Brown for shoplifting and took
her to Wisconsin's Polk County Jail. The jail's written policy at
the time permitted offcials to direct medical personnel to perform
“an inspection and penetration of the anal or vaginal cavity . . .
by means of an instrument, apparatus, or object, or in any other
manner” whenever they had “reasonable grounds” to believe a
detainee was concealing “weapons, contraband, or evidence,” or
otherwise “believe[d] that the safety and security of the jail would
beneft” from such a search. Electronic Case Filing in No. 3:18–
cv–00391, Doc. 12–1 (WD Wis.), pp. 1, 6 (ECF). At least one
correctional offcer, respondent Steven Hilleshiem, sought permis-
sion for penetrative vaginal and anal searches “any time one in-
mate sa[id] another inmate ha[d] contraband on their person in a
body cavity.” ECF Doc. 14, p. 6, Tr. 19. He generally would
not investigate the tipster's source, determine her reputation for
honesty, or seek any other indicia of reliability. Id., at 5–6, Tr.
17–19. In his view, the tip alone provided “reasonable grounds.”
Id., at 7, Tr. 23. The jail administrator, respondent Wes Revels,
similarly needed only Hilleshiem's word to approve a search.
ECF Doc. 19, pp. 7–8, Tr. 22–23, 26–28.
A day after Brown's arrest, two inmates told jail staff that
Brown was hiding drugs in her body. Hilleshiem contacted Rev-
els, who authorized a cavity search.
1
Brown was taken to the
hospital, where a male doctor performed an ultrasound that re-
vealed no foreign objects. The doctor then inserted a speculum
into her vagina, spread open the vaginal walls, and shined his
headlamp inside. He did the same to her anus. He found no
contraband.
Brown testifed that, when the doctor removed the speculum
from her anus, “I immediately started crying. I couldn't stop. I
cried myself to sleep. I cried all the way back to the jail. I
cried the whole time I was getting dressed.” ECF Doc. 17, p. 32,
Tr. 121. When she returned to the jail, she “asked to stay in the
holding cell because [she] couldn't quit crying.” Ibid., Tr. 124.
This trauma left Brown with anxiety and depression. She slept
just three hours a night. Id., at 15, Tr. 55. She experienced
1
Because it is irrelevant to the question presented, there is no need to
address whether these tips in fact provided reasonable suspicion.

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fashbacks and feared leaving the house, terrifed the police would
pu
ll her over and send her back to jail. Id., at 15, Tr. 53; id., at
17, Tr. 62–63. Nearly two years later, Brown was still afraid of
being alone in a room with a man. Even her own brother. Id.,
at 16–17, Tr. 59–61.
Brown sued Polk County, Hilleshiem, Revels, and others, alleg-
ing that they violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches. The District Court granted re-
spondents' motion for summary judgment, concluding that a pene-
trative cavity search of a pretrial detainee requires only reason-
able suspicion. The Seventh Circuit agreed. “[G]iven the heft
of the security interest at stake,” it reasoned, “the invasion to
[Brown's] privacy was not so . . . grea[t] that it pushes the thresh-
old suspicion requirement into probable cause.” 965 F. 3d 534,
540 (2020).
II
The Seventh Circuit nowhere considered whether something
less intrusive than “prying open [Brown's] vagina and anus” was
suffcient to ensure jail security. Id., at 541. That was error.
The necessity of a search and its extent cannot be determined in
a vacuum. It must instead “be judged in light of the availability
of . . . less invasive alternative[s].” Birchfeld v. North Dakota,
579 U. S. 438, 474 (2016). When such an option exists, the State
must offer a “satisfactory justifcation for demanding the more
intrusive alternative.” Ibid. See also Florida v. Royer, 460
U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (“[T]he investigative methods employed
should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify
or dispel the offcer's suspicion”).
This Court has thus held, for example, that the availability of
a breath test to determine a suspect's blood alcohol content makes
a blood draw for that purpose unreasonable, absent a warrant or
exigent circumstances. Birchfeld, 579 U. S., at 474. Two Mem-
bers of this Court have underscored the importance of considering
less intrusive alternatives in the context of searching pretrial
detainees. See Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of
County of Burlington, 566 U. S. 318, 341–342 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“[A]dmission to the general jail population, with the
concomitant humiliation of a strip search, may not be reasonable”
for those who will soon be released, “particularly if an alternative
procedure is feasible,” such as separating “minor offenders from
the general population”); id., at 340 (Roberts, C. J., concurring)

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atement of Sotomayor, J.
(emphasizing that “there was apparently no alternative” to hous-
i
ng the arrestee with the general population).
This is a sensible rule, particularly where, as here, the State
seeks a categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. If courts permit extraordinarily intrusive searches
of pretrial detainees without a warrant, correctional offcers may
abandon less invasive, but more burdensome, practices. Like-
wise, if offcers are free to decide for themselves if they have the
requisite degree of suspicion, some may cross the line, even if in
perfectly good faith.
2
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S.
160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“We must remember that
the extent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant
which we sustain, the offcers interpret and apply themselves and
will push to the limit”). The consequences will be borne by both
the innocent and the guilty.
Consider Polk County Jail. Its offcial policy was to perform
penetrative searches of pretrial detainees' vaginal and anal cavit-
ies based on mere reasonable suspicion. In practice, both Hilles-
hiem and Revels believed that even the barest accusations met
that standard, with no corroboration needed. But see, e. g., Ala-
bama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990) (“[I]f a tip has a relatively
low degree of reliability, more information will be required to
establish the requisite quantum of suspicion”). Anyone could
have suffered the indignity of this practice. “If an offcer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even
a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater
v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 354 (2001). Meanwhile, “criminal
laws have grown so exuberantly and come to cover so much
previously innocent conduct that almost anyone can be arrested
for something.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S. 391, 412 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). An
unbuckled seatbelt, a noisy muffer, an unleashed dog: Any one of
countless petty misdemeanors might land you in jail. See Flor-
ence, 566 U. S., at 346–347 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Polk County
did not distinguish between detainees. An unverifed charge
2
That said, “the authority which we concede to conduct searches and sei-
zures without [a] warrant may be exercised by the most unft and ruthless
offcers as well as by the ft and responsible.” Brinegar v. United States,
338 U. S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

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from a stranger with unknown motives could send anyone to the
hospit
al for a penetrative search, just like Brown.
3
Given the degrading nature of the search in this case, less
invasive possibilities abound. The court below did not address
the option of a solely visual search, see id., at 322, or multiple
visual searches over time. Prison offcials could order an X ray
or transabdominal ultrasound, as occurred here. They could iso-
late the detainee and investigate further to obtain probable cause.
They could await a monitored bowel movement. See United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U. S. 531, 534–535, 541, and
n. 4 (1985) (upholding prolonged detention of a traveler at the
border reasonably suspected of smuggling contraband in her
body); United States v. Booker, 728 F. 3d 535, 547 (CA6 2013)
(discussing Customs and Border Patrol policy to frst “attempt an
x-ray,” then “engage in a monitored bowel movement,” and “only
engage in an involuntary body cavity search after obtaining a
court order”). There are likely many other less invasive options
worth considering.
Some of these searches would be, to different degrees, less
effective than that performed here. As discussed above, this is
not the case to decide whether a penetrative cavity search is
necessarily unreasonable in light of these potential alternatives.
Going forward, however, courts must consider less intrusive possi-
bilities before categorically allowing warrantless searches. This
obligation weighs particularly heavily for dehumanizing searches
of pretrial detainees like that which Brown endured here.
No. 20 –1008. State Farm Life Insurance Co. v. Vogt.
C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of American Council of Life Insurers for
leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 963 F. 3d 753.
3
People of color disproportionately bear these burdens. Brown is a mem-
ber of the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa. ECF Doc. 17,
p. 17. Native American people are vastly overrepresented in Wisconsin jails
and prisons. See Brief for National Alliance To End Sexual Violence et al.
as Amici Curiae 12–13. Native American women, meanwhile, “experience
sexual violence at higher rates than any other population in the United
States.” Id., at 14. Consequently, “non-consensual body cavity searches
are more likely to traumatize and retraumatize” Native American women
and their communities. Ibid.

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Apr
il 19, 2021
No. 20–1086. Stephens v. Dow Chemical Co. Ct. App.
Oh
io, 8th App. Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Jus-
tice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
No. 20–1107. Melvin v. Federal Express Corp. C. A. 11th
Cir. Motion of Jobs With Justice for leave to fle brief as amicus
curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed.
Appx. 506.
No. 20–7148. Fawley v. Jablonski et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 827 Fed.
Appx. 805.
No. 20–7437. Ramsey v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 830 Fed.
Appx. 584.
No. 20–7467. Carver v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8413. Pope v. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama De-
partment of Corrections, 591 U. S. 1007;
No. 20–607. Drevaleva v. Alameda Health System, 592
U. S. 1174;
No. 20–732. Wyche v. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, 592 U. S. 1235;
No. 20–758. Reynolds v. U. S. Bank N. A., 592 U. S. 1264;
No. 20–781. United States ex rel. Concilio de Salud In-
tegral de Loiza, Inc., et al. v. J. C. Remodeling, Inc., et al.,
592 U. S. 1265;
No. 20–863. Akeva L. L. C. v. Nike, Inc., et al., 592 U. S.
1267;
No. 20–909. Randhawa v. Bank of New York Mellon, fka
Bank of New York, 592 U. S. 1303;
No. 20–932. Franklin v. Laughlin et al., 592 U. S. 1303;
No. 20–942. Buie v. Department of Labor, Administra-
tive Review Board, 592 U. S. 1310;

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No. 20–978. Metaxas v. United States, 592 U. S. 1269;
N
o. 20–5504. Martin v. Capron et al., 592 U. S. 1028;
No. 20–5532. Golden v. United States, 592 U. S. 1128;
No. 20–5594. Lucy v. Estate of Fox, 592 U. S. 1079;
No. 20–6139. Alvarado v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, 592 U. S. 1182;
No. 20–6325. Delima v. Walmart Stores Arkansas, LLC,
592 U. S. 1221;
No. 20–6413. Shepard v. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs et al., 592 U. S. 1311;
No. 20–6423. Lee v. AT&T Services, Inc., et al., 592 U. S.
1190;
No. 20–6501. Riley v. Meehan, 592 U. S. 1272;
No. 20–6525. Aranoff v. Aranoff, 592 U. S. 1272;
No. 20–6961. Pfoff v. United States, 592 U. S. 1285; and
No. 20–6976. Doctor v. United States, 592 U. S. 1285. Peti-
tions for rehearing denied.
No. 20–302. Dotson v. United States, 592 U. S. 1003;
No. 20–976. Penny v. Lincoln’s Challenge Academy, 592
U. S. 1306; and
No. 20–6487. Johnston v. United States, 592 U. S. 1225.
Petitions for rehearing denied. Justice Barrett took no part
in the consideration or decision of these petitions.
No. 20–5989. Karnofel v. Superior Waterproong, Inc.,
592 U. S. 1152. Motion for leave to fle petition for rehearing
denied.
April 23, 2021
Miscellaneous Order
No. 19–251. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v.
Rodriquez, Acting At torney General of California;
and
No. 19–255. Thomas More Law Center v. Rodriquez, Act-
ing Attorney General of California. C. A. 9th Cir. [Cer-
tiorari granted sub nom. in No. 19–251, Americans for Prosperity
Foundation v. Becerra; in No. 19–255, Thomas More Law Center
v. Becerra, 592 U. S. 1162.] Motion of Thomas More Law Center
to fle reply brief out of time granted.

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U. S.
April 26, 2021
C
ertiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded. (See also Alaska
v. Wright, 593 U. S. 152 (2021) (per curiam).)
No. 20 –746. South Bay United Pentecostal Church
et al. v. Newsom, Governor of California, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded
for further consideration in light of Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U. S.
61 (2021) (per curiam).
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–7201. Alfred v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 809 Fed.
Appx. 737.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A150. Texas et al. v. Cook County, Illinois, et al.
D. C. N. D. Ill. In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security
promulgated through notice and comment a rule defning the term
“public charge.” The District Court in this case vacated the rule
nationwide, but that judgment was stayed pending DHS' appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
On March 9, 2021, following the change in Presidential administra-
tion, DHS voluntarily dismissed that appeal, thereby dissolving
the stay of the District Court's judgment. And on March 15,
DHS relied on the District Court's now-effective judgment to
remove the challenged rule from the Code of Federal Regulations
without going through notice and comment rulemaking. Shortly
after DHS had voluntarily dismissed its appeal, a group of States
sought leave to intervene in the Court of Appeals. When that
request was denied, the States fled an application for leave to
intervene in this Court and for stay of the District Court's judg-
ment. The States argue that DHS has prevented enforcement of
the rule while insulating the District Court's judgment from re-
view. The States also contend that DHS has rescinded the rule
without following the requirements of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. We deny the application, without prejudice to the
States raising these and other arguments before the District

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Court, whether in a motion for intervention or otherwise. After
the
District Court considers any such motion, the States may
seek review, if necessary, in the Court of Appeals, and in a re-
newed application in this Court. Justice Barrett took no part
in the consideration or decision of this application.
No. 20M70. Zegeye v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; and
No. 20M72. Montana Department of Public Service Reg-
ulation v. MTSUN, LLC. Motions to direct the Clerk to fle
petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 20M71. King v. Klem et al. Motion to direct the Clerk
to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. Justice
Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
No. 153, Orig. Texas v. California. Motion for leave to fle
bill of complaint denied. [For earlier order herein, see 590 U. S.
991.]
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.
Suppose the following occurred. A Texan and a Californian
are involved in a traffc accident in California. The Texan tries
to sue the Californian in federal district court and invokes the
“diversity” jurisdiction conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(1), which
provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions . . . between . . . citizens of different States”
where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Suppose the
district court refuses to allow the fling of the complaint and
explains: “I know that the Constitution and a federal statute give
me jurisdiction over diversity cases, and I know that the Framers
of the Constitution and the Congress that enacted the statute
thought that diversity jurisdiction was important because it pro-
vides a neutral forum for out-of-state parties. But in my opinion,
that's not really so important anymore, and if I have to handle
diversity suits, I won't have the time I need to deal with more
important matters. Therefore, in the exercise of my discretion,
I am ordering that the complaint not be accepted for fling.”
Suppose a court of appeals affrmed this decision and the case
came before us. What would we do?
We would reverse in the blink of an eye. We might also wag
a fnger at the lower courts and remind them that a federal court's
obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is “vir-

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Alito,
J., dissenting
tually unfagging.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
U
nited States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976); see also, e. g., Lexmark
Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U. S. 118, 126
(2014); Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. 69, 77
(2013). We might emphasize that federal courts do not have free-
wheeling discretion to spurn categories of cases that they don't like.
If this is how we would respond to this imaginary Texan versus
Californian tort suit, how can we refuse to allow the fling of the
complaint in this case? The State of Texas wishes to sue the
State of California and invokes our “original and exclusive juris-
diction of all controversies between two or more States.” 28
U. S. C. § 1251(a); see also U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Can
we justify our refusal to entertain Texas's suit on essentially the
same ground that we would reject out of hand in the hypothetical
diversity case just described, that is, on the ground that our origi-
nal jurisdiction no longer seems as important as it was when the
Constitution was adopted, and that a proliferation of original
cases would crowd out more important matters on our appellate
docket? See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 93–94 (1972);
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 497–499 (1971).
It is not easy to see how the refusal to entertain Texas's suit can
be justifed on that ground—particularly since our rejection of
Texas's complaint leaves the State in a more diffcult position than
our imaginary Texas motorist. That person could at least fle
suit in a state court, but if our jurisdiction under § 1251(a) is
truly exclusive, the State is left without any judicial forum. Cf.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. 230, 245 (2019)
(noting “inability of one State to hale another into its courts
without the latter's consent”).
In fairness to the Court, what it does in this case—claiming
the discretion to refuse to entertain Texas's suit—is consistent
with a practice the Court has followed for the past 45 years.
But in all that time, the Court has never provided a convincing
justifcation for the practice. In Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.
264 (1821), Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court famously
proclaimed: “We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Id.,
at 404.
The Court has stepped back a bit from this categorical pro-
nouncement—but only a bit. See, e. g., Sprint Communications,

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Alito, J., dissenting 593 U. S.
Inc., 571 U. S., at 77. The Court has repeatedly stressed that a
federa
l court is almost always obligated to entertain a case over
which it has jurisdiction. Ibid. Instances in which this is not
required are the rare exception.
The Court's practice regarding original jurisdiction cases, how-
ever, has expanded far beyond anything that might be called an
exception. Indeed, commentators have written that the practice
has made our original jurisdiction “ `almost as discretionary as
[our] certiorari jurisdiction over appellate cases.' ” S. Shapiro, K.
Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court
Practice 639 (10th ed. 2013) (hereinafter Stern & Gressman).
I
How did the Court come to adopt a practice that seems so
inconsistent with the principle the Cohens Court thought self-
evident? Like many a questionable habit, the practice developed
incrementally. For the frst 150 years after the adoption of the
Constitution, the Court never refused to permit the fling of a
complaint in a case falling within its original jurisdiction.
1
See
Stern & Gressman 634; Stevenson, Exclusive Original Jurisdiction
of the United States Supreme Court: Does It Still Exist? 1982 B.
Y. U. L. Rev. 727, 729. The frst whisper of the notion that the
Court might decline to exercise its original jurisdiction appeared
in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1 (1900). There, the Court held
that the case did not actually constitute a dispute between two
States, but it added that the Court's jurisdiction to hear such
suits “is of so delicate and grave a character that it was not
contemplated that it would be exercised save when the necessity
was absolute.” Id., at 15.
Another 39 years would go by before the Court took the next
step toward its current practice, and when it took that step, it
did so in a roundabout way. In Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308
U. S. 1 (1939), the dispute concerned the two States' right to
impose state inheritance taxes on securities held in trusts that
had been created by a Massachusetts decedent but were adminis-
1
The Court did not accept every case fled during that period, of course—
it rejected some for lack of standing and on account of other justiciability
defects. See, e. g., Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 24 (1900) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result) (arguing Article III did not bestow jurisdiction over
cases testing the constitutionality of “local statutes or regulations that do
not affect the property or the powers of the complaining State in its sover-
eign or corporate capacity”); see generally Stern & Gressman 622–634.

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Alito,
J., dissenting
tered in Missouri by Missouri trustees. Noting that there were
ample
funds in the trusts to pay the taxes imposed by both States,
the Court frst held the dispute was not really between two States
and that therefore the controversy did not fall within the Court's
exclusive original jurisdiction. Id., at 15–17. The Court then
turned to Massachusetts's fallback argument that its claim could
be understood as one against Missouri citizens and that therefore
the claim at least fell within the Court's non-exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases between a State and a citizen of another
State. The Court expressed doubt that the bill could be read to
assert such a claim and only then turned to the question whether
the Court would be obligated to entertain the claim if the bill
could be interpreted that way. The Court observed that a court
is not always required to entertain a suit within its jurisdiction
when the suit may be brought in another forum; that the suit at
hand was not necessary for Massachusetts's “protecti on” be-
cause Massachusetts could apparently bring its suit in a Missouri
court; and that entertaining suits like this one would poten-
tially impose an “enormous burden” and “might seriously inter-
fere with the discharge by th[e] Court of its duty in deciding
cases and controversies appropriately brought before it.” Id.,
at 18–19.
In Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, the Court re-
turned to the question of declining to exercise its non-exclusive
original jurisdiction. The Court acknowledged that “it may ini-
tially have been contemplated that this Court would always exer-
cise its original jurisdiction when properly called upon to do so.”
Id., at 497. But the Court opined that changes in the American
legal system had rendered that view “untenable, as a practical
matter.” Ibid. “What gives rise to the necessity for recognizing
[the] discretion” to decline to entertain original-jurisdiction cases,
the Court explained, was “pre-eminently the diminished societal
concern in our function as a court of original jurisdiction and the
enhanced importance of our role as the fnal federal appellate
court.” Id., at 499.
The next year, the Court said in dicta that it would exercise
the same discretion in cases within its exclusive original jurisdic-
tion: “We construe 28 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1), as we do Art. III, § 2,
cl. 2, to honor our original jurisdiction but to make it obligatory
only in appropriate cases.” Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S., at
93. The Court provided little justifcation for this assertion. In
the next sentence, the Court noted that an important factor in

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Alito, J., dissenting 593 U. S.
determining whether a case is “appropriate” is “the availability
of
another forum where there is jurisdiction over the named par-
ties,” ibid., but it is hard to see how this factor has a bearing on
the refusal to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. And in the fnal
sentence devoted to the subject, the Court gave this explanation:
“We incline to a sparing use of our original jurisdiction so that
our increasing duties with the appellate docket will not suffer.”
Id., at 93–94.
The dicta in Illinois v. Milwaukee became a holding in Arizona
v. New Mexico, 425 U. S. 794 (1976) (per curiam), where, for the
frst time, the Court declined to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction
i n a controversy between two St ates. See i d., at 796 –797.
While the state parties could not litigate in any other federal
court, the Court justifed its decision by observing that the “is-
sues tendered” were already being litigated in a pending state-
court action. Id., at 797.
Since that time, the Court has repeatedly declined to exercise
its exclusive original jurisdiction in state-versus-state cases, rely-
ing on the rationales provided in these earlier decisions. See,
e. g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S. 437 (1992); Louisiana v.
Mississippi, 488 U. S. 990 (1988); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U. S.
554 (1983); California v. Texas, 457 U. S. 164 (1982) (per curiam).
Justices have written separately to question whether we really
have discretion to decline to hear such cases. See Arizona, 425
U. S., at 798–799 (Stevens, J., concurring); California v. West Vir-
ginia, 454 U. S. 1027 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Louisiana,
488 U. S., at 990 (White, J., dissenting); Nebraska v. Colorado, 577
U. S. 1211 (2016) (Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J., dissenting);
Arizona v. California, 589 U. S. 1199 (2020) (same). And schol-
ars have criticized the practice. See, e. g., R. Fallon, J. Manning,
D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 275 (7th ed. 2015); Shapiro, Jurisdic-
tion and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 561, 576 (1985); Ste-
venson, 1982 B. Y. U. L. Rev., at 747–748. But the Court has
not relented.
II
The practice of refusing to permit the fling of a complaint in
cases that fall within our original jurisdiction is questionable, and
that is especially true when, as in this case, our original jurisdic-
tional is exclusive. As the history recounted above reveals, the
Court adopted this practice without ever providing a convincing

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Alito,
J., dissenting
justification. The principal reason provided—that entertaining
a
ll suits between two States would crowd out consideration of
more important matters on our appellate docket—rests on a dubi-
ous factual premise and, in any event, is essentially indistinguish-
able from the justifcation given by the imaginary district court
judge with a distaste for diversity cases. And the suggestion in
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S., at 15, that we should hesitate to
entertain suits between two States because they are of a “delicate
and grave” character seems exactly backwards. It is precisely
because these disputes have a “delicate and grave” character that
they were placed exclusively in our hands. See The Federalist
No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (“In cases in
which a State might happen to be a party, it would ill suit its
dignity to be turned over to an inferior tribunal”); California v.
Arizona, 440 U. S. 59, 65–66 (1979). Unlike the regional courts
of appeals, the federal district courts, and the state courts, we
are not tied to any region or State and were therefore entrusted
with the responsibility of adjudicating cases where the suspicion
of local bias may run high. Cf. The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamil-
ton); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 475 (1793). The present
case is just such a suit.
III
This case involves a dispute between our two most populous
States. In 2016, the California Legislature enacted a law, AB
1887, that prohibits state-funded or state-sponsored travel to any
State whose laws fail to meet specifed standards regarding dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or
gender expression. See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 11139.8 (West).
The law authorizes the California attorney general to identify
States that should be subject to the ban, § 11139.8(e)(1), and as of
the date of the fling of Texas's motion, 11 States had been tar-
geted: Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Texas. According to press releases issued by California Attorney
General Becerra and the State's website, 9 of the 11 States were
subjected to the ban because of laws or practices designed to
protect religious liberty.
2
Iowa was placed on the list because it
2
See California Will Restrict State-Funded and State-Sponsored Travel to
South Carolina (Apr. 2, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-
general-becerra-california-will-restrict-state-funded-and-state-0; California

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won't provide Medicaid coverage for gender-reassignment sur-
g
ery. See Califor nia Will Restr ict State-Funded and State-
Sponsored Travel to Iowa (Sept. 13, 2019), https://oag.ca.
gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-california-will-
restrict-state-funded-and-state-1. Travel to North Carolina was
banned because the State enacted a law requiring state agencies
to maintain separate-sex bathrooms and changing facilities and
that prohibited certain local antidiscrimination ordinances. See
North Carolina Remains on List of Restricted States (Apr. 12,
2017), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-
xavier-becerra-north-carolina-remains-list-restricted-states. Sev-
eral of the States placed on California's list have retaliated by
imposing similar restrictions on state-funded or state-sponsored
travel to California. See Press Release, Offce of Okla. Governor,
Stitt Issues Executive Order Banning State-Funded Travel to
California (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ok.gov/articles/
press_releases/stitt-issues-executive-order-banning-state-funded-;
A. Sher, Legislators Strike Back at California Ban on State-
Funded Travel to Volunteer State, Chattanooga Times Free
Press, Mar. 16, 2018, 2018 WLNR 8221967.
In seeking to fle its complaint, Texas argues that this is pre-
cisely the type of dispute for which our exclusive original jurisdic-
tion was designed. Texas writes that “ `the model case for [the]
invocation of [our] original jurisdiction is a dispute between States
of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the
States were fully sovereign.' ” Brief in Support of Motion for
Leave To File Bill of Complaint 15 (quoting Texas v. New Mex-
ico, 462 U. S., at 571, n. 18; frst alteration in original). Texas
notes that economic sanctions have often roiled international rela-
tions and have sometimes led to war. Brief in Support of Motion
15–18. And Texas reminds us that the Founders were well aware
Will Restrict State-Funded and State-Sponsored Travel to Oklahoma (June
1, 2018), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-
california-will-restrict-state-funded-and-state; Alabama, Kentucky, South Da-
kota and Texas Added to List of Restricted State Travel (June 22, 2017),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-alabama-
kentucky-south-dakota-and-texas-added-list; Cal. Dept. of Justice, Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQs)—AB 1887: Why Are the States on the Travel Pro-
hibition List?, https://www.oag.ca.gov/ab1887/faqs (citing Kansas, Mississippi,
and Tennessee laws).

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of the danger of economic warfare between States. See id., at
15
–16 (citing The Federalist No. 7 (A. Hamilton)).
The Republic of Texas was an independent nation for 10 years
(1836–1846), and the California Republic claimed a similar status
for a brief time in 1846. If they were independent nations today,
it is entirely possible that their dispute would be the source of
considerable international tension. As sovereign nations, they
might resolve their dispute by diplomacy, by submitting it to in-
ternational arbitration, or by self-help measures. When they en-
tered the Union, these two behemoths relinquished the full meas-
ure of sovereign power that they once possessed, see Franchise
Tax Bd., 587 U. S., at 245–247, but they acquired the right to
have their disputes with other States adjudicated by the Nation's
highest court.
The Court now denies Texas that right. It will not even per-
mit the fling of Texas's bill of complaint. This understanding of
our exclusive original jurisdiction should be reexamined. At a
minimum, we should note probable jurisdiction and receive
briefng and argument on the question. Texas raises novel consti-
tutional claims, arguing that California's travel ban violates the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1,
the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Equal Protection
Clause, Amdt. 14, § 1. I express no view regarding any of those
claims, but I respectfully dissent from the Court's refusal even to
permit the fling of Texas's complaint.
No. 20–429. American Medical Assn. et al. v. Becerra,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.;
No. 20–454. Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore;
and
No. 20 – 539. Oregon et al. v. Becerra, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certio-
rari granted sub nom. in No. 20–429, American Medical Assn. v.
Cochran; in No. 20–454, Cochran v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore; in No. 20–539, Oregon v. Cochran, 592 U. S. p. 1262.]
The Acting Solicitor General is directed to fle a letter brief
addressing the following question: Whether the Government in-
tends to continue to enforce the challenged rule and regulations
outside the State of Maryland until the completion of notice and

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comment; and, if further litigation is brought against the chal-
lenged
rule and regulations outside of Maryland, how the Govern-
ment would intend to respond. Brief, not to exceed three pages,
is to be fled by Monday, May 3, 2021. Nonfederal parties and
proposed intervenors may submit any responses in letter briefs,
not to exceed three pages each, by Monday, May 10, 2021.
No. 20–994. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., et al.
v. Environmental Protection Commission of Hillsborough
County, Florida, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. The Acting Solicitor
General is invited to fle a brief in this case expressing the views
of the United States. Justice Breyer took no part in the con-
sideration of this petition.
No. 20–7599. Tucker v. McDonough, Secretary of Veter-
ans Affairs. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until
May 17, 2021, within which to pay the docketing fee required by
this Court's Rule 38(a).
No. 20–7211. In re Dale;
No. 20–7597. In re Peel; and
No. 20–7603. In re Rutherford. Petitions for writs of man-
damus denied.
No. 20–1145. In re Arunachalam. Petition for writ of man-
damus denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.
Certiorari Granted
No. 20 – 804. Houston Community College System v.
Wilson. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below:
955 F. 3d 490.
No. 20–827. United States v. Husayn, aka Zubaydah,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 938
F. 3d 1123.
No. 20–843. New York State Rie & Pistol Assn., Inc.,
et al. v. Corlett, Superintendent of New York State Po-
lice, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted limited to the
following question: “Whether the State's denial of petitioners' ap-
plications for concealed-carry licenses for self-defense violated the
Second Amendment.” Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 99.

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Certiorari Denied
N
o. 19–1194. Jiahao Kuang et al. v. Department of De-
fense et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 778 Fed. Appx. 418.
No. 20–748. PHI Air Medical, LLC v. Texas Mutual In-
surance Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 610 S. W. 3d 839.
No. 20–819. Mai v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 1106.
No. 20–837. Bakor v. Garland, Attorney General. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 732.
No. 20–889. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Delaware County,
Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 968 F. 3d 264.
No. 20–907. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation et al. (Reported below:
810 Fed. Appx. 589); and Bourne Valley Court Trust v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. (810 Fed. Appx. 492). C. A. 9th. Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–908. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. M&T Bank
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963
F. 3d 854.
No. 20–953. Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of
Boston. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
958 F. 3d 1271.
No. 20–1132. Moore et al. v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App.
Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1146. Smith v. PacerMonitor, LLC, et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx.
940.
No. 20–1147. Smallwood v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1150. Haynes et al. v. Central States, Southeast
and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 655.

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No. 20–1156. Olefsky v. Illinois Department of Finan-
cial
and Professional Regulation et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 IL App (1st)
191059–U.
No. 20–1169. Haynes et al. v. World Wrestling Enter-
tainment, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 827 Fed. Appx. 3.
No. 20–1226. Vaughn v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2020 Ark. 313, 608 S. W. 3d 569.
No. 20–1264. Fusion IV Pharmaceuticals, Inc., dba Axia
Pharmaceutical, et al. v. Sodergren. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 438.
No. 20–1278. Johnson et ux. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N. A. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1292. Parts Galore L. L. C. et al. v. Harrison.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 826 Fed.
Appx. 517.
No. 20–1296. Skipper v. A&M Dockside Repair, Inc., et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed.
Appx. 1.
No. 20–1338. Li Li v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1341. Smilowitz v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 974 F. 3d 155.
No. 20–1344. Maehr v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 780.
No. 20–1350. Go New York Tours, Inc. v. Gray Line New
York Tours, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 584.
No. 20–1361. Heisler, Individually and as the Execu-
trix of the Succession of Heisler v. Girod LoanCo, LLC
(three judgments). Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 2020–00643 (La. 1/20/21), 308 So. 3d 1162 (frst judgment);
2020–01130 (La. 1/20/21), 308 So. 3d 1163 (second judgment); 2020–
01324 (La. 1/20/21), 308 So. 3d 1163 (third judgment).

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No. 20–1366. Gomez-Arzate v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 981 F. 3d 832.
No. 20–1371. Posey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6359. Ybaben v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 253.
No. 20–6374. Brown v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 818.
No. 20–6668. Zamarripa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6756. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6799. Chanthakoummane v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App.
Tex. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6876. Tollette v. Ford, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 361.
No. 20–7184. Wagner v. Scarborough et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 143.
No. 20–7191. Shuler v. Lassiter et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7196. Rasnick v. Dickenson County Department
of Social Services. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7212. Davenport v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7219. Westbrook v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7222. Cormier v. Riverside County District At-
torney et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 834 Fed. Appx. 419.
No. 20–7225. Rigsby v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 471 P. 3d 1068.
No. 20–7227. Conner v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 146 N. E. 3d 343.

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No. 20–7236. Boyd v. Radtke, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 20–7239. Hung Linh Hoang v. Madden, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7245. Kerr v. Collier, Judge, Court of Common
Pleas of Ohio, Henry County (Reported below: 159 Ohio
St. 3d 319, 2020-Ohio-457, 150 N. E. 3d 909); and Kerr v. Kerr
Buildings, Inc. (157 Ohio St. 3d 1562, 2020-Ohio-313, 138 N. E.
3d 1154). Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7248. Page v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 20–7249. Miles v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 IL App (1st) 171258, 161
N. E. 3d 1021.
No. 20–7261. Redmond v. United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7264. Sonnenberg v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institu-
tions Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 799 Fed. Appx. 260.
No. 20–7271. Boyce v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 2d App. Dist.,
Clark County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020-Ohio-
3573.
No. 20–7315. Owens v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 162 Ohio St. 3d 596, 2020-Ohio-4616, 166
N. E. 3d 1142.
No. 20–7331. Martin v. Vanihel, Warden (two judgments).
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7332. Laster v. Georgia et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7334. Carr v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Secu-
rity. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7347. Tarver v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

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No. 20–7401. Brandon v. Forshey, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7431. Wint, By and Through His Next Friend,
Wint v. Bradshaw, Sheriff, Palm Beach County, Florida,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 842
Fed. Appx. 468.
No. 20–7442. Shalash v. Gray, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7454. Manuel v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 308 So. 3d 599.
No. 20–7492. Roundtree v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 136.
No. 20 –7505. Gaskins v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7511. Espinoza v. Montgomery, Acting Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed.
Appx. 217.
No. 20–7543. Real-Alomar v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7544. Dominguez v. Williams et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7547. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 832 Fed. Appx. 432.
No. 20–7548. Luster v. Trate, Warden. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 836 Fed. Appx. 78.
No. 20–7554. Jordan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 227.
No. 20–7563. Udoh v. Dooley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7564. Udoh v. United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7580. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

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No. 20–7586. Blough v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 832 Fed. Appx. 961.
No. 20–7591. Perales-Perez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 208.
No. 20–7593. Clarke v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 979 F. 3d 82.
No. 20–7594. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 834 Fed. Appx. 6.
No. 20–7598. Thomas v. Nicklaus, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7608. Kazeem v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 144.
No. 20–7619. Powers v. Scott. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–7624. Martin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 225.
No. 20–7635. Biron v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7636. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7639. Harris v. Pacheco, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 331.
No. 20–7640. Garner v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7652. Colton v. Terris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1137. California Parents for the Equalization
of Educational Materials v. Torlakson et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Motion of Shree Shakti Mandir of Atlanta et al. for leave to
fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Justice
Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this
motion and this petition. Reported below: 973 F. 3d 1010.
No. 20–1259. Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al. v. City of
Chicago, Illinois, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

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Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision
of
this petition. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 722.
No. 20–1352. Miles v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 836 Fed.
Appx. 678.
No. 20–7233. Bumphus v. Unique Personnel Consultants
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re-
ported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 427.
No. 20–7629. Martin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 20–752. Davis v. California, 592 U. S. 1264;
No. 20–756. Baylor v. Eto, fka Baylor, 592 U. S. 1264;
No. 20–766. Archer v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., et al., 592
U. S. 1264;
No. 20–771. Debera P. v. Maine Department of Health
and Human Services, 592 U. S. 1265;
No. 20–820. Jackson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 592
U. S. 1266;
No. 20–931. Hillier v. Central Intelligence Agency
et al., 592 U. S. 1303;
No. 20–5764. Berryman v. Wong, Warden, 592 U. S. 1270;
No. 20–6041. Perry v. United States, 592 U. S. 1110;
No. 20–6796. Sanchez v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al., 592 U. S. 1281;
No. 20–6801. Palacio v. Sullivan, 592 U. S. 1281; and
No. 20–7292. Staszak v. United States, 592 U. S. 1357. Pe-
titions for rehearing denied.
No. 20–7115. Carter v. Lawrence, Warden, 592 U. S. 1314.
Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Barrett took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition.
April 27, 2021
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A160. Rolls-Royce PLC v. Servotronics, Inc. D. C.
S. C. Application for stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and

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by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Alito took no
par
t in the consideration or decision of this application.
April 29, 2021
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–1460. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 974
F. 3d 320.
May 3, 2021
Appointment of Marshal
It is ordered that Gail A. Curley be appointed Marshal of this
Court, effective June 21, 2021.
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 19–250. Oklahoma v. Johnson. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re-
manded for further consideration in light of Jones v. Mississippi,
593 U. S. 98 (2021). Reported below: 2019 OK CR 9, 457 P. 3d
1089.
No. 19–507. Publishers Business Services, Inc., et al. v.
Federal Trade Commis sion. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consid-
eration in light of AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC, 593
U. S. 67 (2021). Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 735.
No. 19–720. United States v. Briones. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U. S. 98 (2021).
Reported below: 929 F. 3d 1057.
No. 19–1208. Yanez-Pena v. Garland, Attorney General.
C. A. 5th Cir. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 239;
No. 19–1234. Bun Cchay Cheat v. Garland, Attorney
General. C. A. 6th Cir.;
No. 19–1300. Jian Chen v. Garland, Attorney General.
C. A. 6th Cir. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 597;
No. 19–1316. Garcia-Romo v. Garland, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 6th Cir. Reported below: 940 F. 3d 192;

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No. 20–45. Khaytekov v. Garland, Attorney General.
C
. A. 6th Cir. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 497;
No. 20–179. Hernandez-Maldonado v. Garland, Attorney
General. C. A. 6th Cir.;
No. 20–268. Argueta-Ayala v. Garland, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 5th Cir.;
No. 20–517. Figueroa-Diaz v. Garland, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 5th Cir. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 278;
No. 20 –709. Fuentes-Angel v. Garland, At torney
General. C. A. 5th Cir.;
No. 20–832. Nunez Castro v. Garland, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 6th Cir.;
No. 20 –1021. Navarrete-Lopez v. Garland, At torney
General. C. A. 5th Cir. Repor ted below: 826 Fed. Appx.
412;
No. 20–1070. Rico Olvera v. Garland, Attorney General.
C. A. 5th Cir. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 862; and
No. 20–6152. Luquin-Coronel v. Garland, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated,
and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Niz-
Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155 (2021).
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–7263. Robinson v. Yee. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–7323. Moretti v. Borough of Paramus, New Jer-
sey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed.
See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused
this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any fur-
ther petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the
docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is
submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of
this motion and this petition.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20M73. Quintana v. Mulheron, Warden, et al.; and

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No. 20M75. Kunkle v. Shapiro, Attorney General of
Pennsyl
vania, et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to fle peti-
tions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 20M74. Under Seal v. Virginia Board of Medicine.
Motion for leave to fle petition for writ of certiorari under seal
with redacted copies for the public record denied.
No. 20– 891. American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v.
Neapco Holdings LLC et al. C. A. Fed. Cir.; and
No. 20 – 905. Independent School District No. 283 v.
E. M. D. H., a Minor, By and Through Her Parents and
Next Friends, L. H. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. The Acting Solici-
tor General is invited to fle briefs in these cases expressing the
views of the United States.
No. 20–7715. In re DeCaro. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 20–7354. In re Robinson. Petition for writ of manda-
mus denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1511. Newton v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 19–62 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/23/20), 297
So. 3d 190.
No. 19–399. Garcia v. North Dakota. Sup. Ct. N. D. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 ND 103, 925 N. W. 2d 442.
No. 20– 356. Garland, Attorney General v. Banuelos-
Galviz. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
953 F. 3d 1176.
No. 20 – 397. Garland, At torney General v. Portillo
Martinez. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
811 Fed. Appx. 493.

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May
3, 2021
No. 20–554. Smith v. McKinney, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 1075.
No. 20–855. Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., et al. v. Hogan,
Governor of Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 963 F. 3d 356.
No. 20–861. Fry v. Rand Construction Corp. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 239.
No. 20–866. Allen et al. v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 767.
No. 20–881. Tran et al. v. City of Holmes Beach, Flor-
ida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
817 Fed. Appx. 911.
No. 20–923. Garland, Attorney General v. Acosta-Pena
(Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 796); Garland, Attorney Gen-
eral v. Artur (819 Fed. Appx. 618); Garland, Attorney Gen-
eral v. Moreno-Lopez (818 Fed. Appx. 824); Garland, Attor-
ney General v. Jimenez Juarez (821 Fed. Appx. 930); and
Garland, Attorney General v. Magana Arias (821 Fed.
Appx. 933). C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–989. City of Newark, New Jersey v. Fraternal
Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 244 N. J. 75, 236 A. 3d 965.
No. 20–999. Lloyd Industries, Inc. v. Watson. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 709.
No. 20–1002. Cox v. Wilson. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 1159.
No. 20–1012. Guenther v. Lockheed Martin Corp. et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 972 F. 3d
1043.
No. 20–1014. Organic Cannabis Foundation, LLC, dba
Organicann Health Center v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and
No. 20–1031. Northern California Small Business As-
sistants, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 1082.

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No. 20–1152. Luna et al. v. U. S. Bank N. A. C. A. 8th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 672.
No. 20–1157. Yaney v. Superior Court of California, Riv-
erside County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 2.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1168. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Invest-
ment Services of Nevada, Inc., et al. v. Chandra et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed.
Appx. 597.
No. 20–1171. Madison v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 160 Ohio St. 3d 232, 2020-Ohio-3735,
155 N. E. 3d 867.
No. 20–1176. Trustees of the Thomas E. Proctor Heirs
Trust v. Keta Gas & Oil Co. et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 225 A. 3d 1140.
No. 20–1185. Edwards v. Solomon & Solomon P. C. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx.
425.
No. 20–1186. Dynasty Group, Inc. v. Smith, Trustee for
Bankruptcy Estate of Heritage Real Estate Investment
Corp. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1188. Thomason v. Benecial Financial I Inc.
Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1192. Fouse et ux. v. Saratoga Partners L. P.
et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 662
Pa. 200, 238 A. 3d 1198.
No. 20–1194. Lopez v. Corona Police Department et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed.
Appx. 113.
No. 20–1196. McClellan v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 4th App.
Dist., Highland County. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1201. Eisenberg v. Swain. Ct. App. D. C. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 233 A. 3d 13.
No. 20–1208. Agha-Khan v. Pacic Community Mortgage,
Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

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3, 2021
No. 20–1217. Lak v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 730.
No. 20–1235. Burgoyne, LLC v. Chicago Terminal Rail-
road Co. et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 2020 IL App (1st) 190098, 169 N. E. 3d 815.
No. 20–1243. Burk v. Ducey, Governor of Arizona, et al.
Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1245. Vasquez v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 485 Mass. 405, 150
N. E. 3d 723.
No. 20–1256. French v. United States; and
No. 20–7661. Russell v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 977 F. 3d 114.
No. 20–1268. Suarez v. Aanonsen. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 306 So. 3d 294.
No. 20–1271. Blanton v. McDonough, Secretary of Vet-
erans Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 823 Fed. Appx. 958.
No. 20–1308. White v. Super Gasoline, Inc., et al. Sup.
Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1359. Superama Corp., Inc., dba USA Sumo v. Tokyo
Broadcasting System Television, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 830 Fed. Appx. 821.
No. 20–1360. Hubbard v. State Bar of California. Sup.
Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1382. Gettinger et al. v. Picard et al. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 976 F. 3d 184.
No. 20 –1393. Keehn v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 922.
No. 20–1421. Ballerstein et al. v. McHatten et al. Sup.
Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5686. Hulsey v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794
Fed. Appx. 659.

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No. 20–6407. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 338.
No. 20–6428. Herron v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 762 Fed. Appx. 25.
No. 20–6664. Lepe Moran v. Garland, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d
1158.
No. 20–6679. Dortley v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 303 So. 3d 931.
No. 20–6914. Petersen v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6957. Centofanti v. Neven, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 555.
No. 20–7258. Horn v. Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 826 Fed. Appx. 298.
No. 20–7279. Vue v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7281. Wright v. Cardenas et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 612.
No. 20–7293. Safford v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7297. Sturgis v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 246 Md. App. 788.
No. 20–7298. Bunn v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 WI App 70, 394 Wis. 2d 524, 950
N. W. 2d 694.
No. 20–7299. Adkisson v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 136 Nev. 774, 466 P. 3d 1289.
No. 20–7303. Barrera v. Newsome et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 –7308. Kelsey v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 174
App. Div. 3d 962, 107 N. Y. S. 3d 150.

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3, 2021
No. 20–7309. Maldonado v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 237 A. 3d 1079.
No. 20–7311. Matthews v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio-
rar i denied. Repor ted below: 2019 – 01636 (La. 8/14 /20), 307
So. 3d 1038.
No. 20–7316. Luis Morales v. Sherman, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7317. Chester v. Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi
Department of Corrections. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 20–7318. Klinger v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7321. Douglas v. Superior Court of California,
Los Angeles County. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7328. Matias-Martinez v. Williams, Executive Di-
rector, Colorado Department of Corrections, et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed.
Appx. 883.
No. 20–7329. Knight v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 28 Neb. App. –––.
No. 20–7335. Carr v. Gonzalez, Sheriff, Harris County,
Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 830 Fed. Appx. 739.
No. 20–7337. Thurlow v. Edmark, Warden. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7338. Tarver v. Shapiro, Attorney General of
Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7344. Davis v. Shinn, Director, Arizona Depart-
ment of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 892.
No. 20–7350. DeVore v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 5th App. Dist.,
Richland County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020-
Ohio-4668.
No. 20 –7374. Alexander v. Headley, Warden, et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

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May 3, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7429. Davis v. Shinn, Director, Arizona Depart-
ment
of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7450. Patel v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 8. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7464. Long v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 6th App. Dist.,
Wood County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020-Ohio-
4090, 157 N. E. 3d 362.
No. 20–7499. Brewer, aka Green v. Pollard, Warden,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7500. Brown v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 300 So. 3d 332.
No. 20–7561. Pocopanni v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 304 So. 3d 760.
No. 20–7562. Kamme O v. Texas A&M University and Sys-
tem et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7570. Frazier v. Slatery, Attorney General of
Tennessee, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7572. Holden v. Nevada et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7582. Green v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7628. Johnson v. Mississippi. Ct. App. Miss. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 311 So. 3d 1161.
No. 20–7632. Hixon v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 838 Fed. Appx. 961.
No. 20–7633. Alford v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7647. Muho v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 978 F. 3d 1212.
No. 20–7655. Bershan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 845 Fed. Appx. 37.

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May
3, 2021
No. 20–7656. Monson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7657. MacLloyd v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7659. Soriano Nunez v. United States. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 835 Fed. Appx. 655.
No. 20–7663. Watson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 852 Fed. Appx. 164.
No. 20–7699. Horn v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 303 So. 3d 1285.
No. 19–825. Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau
Center, LLC, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Jus-
tice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition. Reported below: 937 F. 3d 764.
No. 20–559. Doe v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 592.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
Petitioner alleges that she was raped by a fellow cadet while
she was a student at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point.
She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
claiming that West Point's sexual assault policies were inadequate
to protect students from sexual violence. Under the plain text
of the Act, petitioner's status as a West Point cadet should have
posed no bar to litigation. But 70 years ago, this Court made
the policy judgment that members of the military should not be
able to sue for injuries incident to military service. See Feres v.
United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950). Relying on Feres, the Second
Circuit held that sovereign immunity barred petitioner's claims,
even if she could have brought these same claims had she been a
civilian contractor employed by West Point instead of a student.
As I have previously explained, this approach has little justif-
cation. The Act “ `renders the United States liable to all persons,
including servicemen, injured by the negligence of Government
employees. ' ” L anu s v. Un i ted Sta tes, 570 U. S. 932 (2013)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 481 U. S. 681, 693 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting));

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Thomas, J., dissenting 593 U. S.
see also Daniel v. United States, 587 U. S. 1020, 1020–1021 (2019)
(
Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Emphasizing
its breadth, the law contains a narrow carve out for military-
related claims: those “arising out of . . . combatant activities . . .
during time of war.” 28 U. S. C. § 2680( j). This single military
exception involving “combatant activities” clearly does not apply
here. And, other than this specifc exception, the law does not
“ `preclud[e] . . . suits brought by servicemen' ”—at least not be-
cause of their military status. Lanus, 570 U. S., at 932. Feres
was wrongly decided; and this case was wrongly decided as a
result.
We should grant certiorari to correct this error. The Feres
Court's foray into judicial legislating has been met with “ `wide-
spread, almost universal criticism.' ” Johnson, 481 U. S., at 700
(Scalia, J., dissenting). And it is easy to see why. Under our
precedent, if two Pentagon employees—one civilian and one a
servicemember—are hit by a bus in the Pentagon parking lot and
sue, it may be that only the civilian would have a chance to
litigate his claim on the merits. Cf. Frankel v. United States,
810 Fed. Appx. 176, 180–182 (CA4 2020) (per curiam) (Feres
barred claim of servicemember who was struck by a vehicle);
Newton v. Lee, 677 F. 3d 1017, 1030 (CA10 2012) (Feres does not
bar claim by “a purely civilian employee of the military”). Noth-
ing in the text of the Act requires this disparate treatment. Nor
is there any background rule that federal bus drivers owe a
greater duty of care toward workers who are civilian than those
who are military.
At a minimum, we should take up this case to clarify the scope
of the immunity we have created. Without any statutory text to
serve as a guide, lower courts are understandably confused about
what counts as an injury “incident” to military service. One
might be surprised to learn, for example, that Feres sometimes
bars claims of a drunken servicemember who drowns, except
when it does not. Compare Morey v. United States, 903 F. 2d
880, 881 (CA1 1990), with Dreier v. United States, 106 F. 3d
844, 845–846 (CA9 1996). Or, to discover that Feres apparently
forecloses a claim for a servicemember's injury while waterskiing
because the recreational boat belonged to the military, but not
for an injury while attending a rugby event caused by a service-
member's negligent operation of an Army van. Compare McCon-
nell v. United States, 478 F. 3d 1092, 1093–1094 (CA9 2007), with
Whitley v. United States, 170 F. 3d 1061, 1068–1070 (CA11 1999).

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3, 2021
And like Judge Chin in dissent, one might be concerned to fnd
out
that a student's rape is considered an injury incident to mili-
tary service. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F. 3d 36, 51, 58–62 (CA2
2017) (“[I]n my view Doe's injuries did not arise `incident to mili-
tary service' ”). But that is exactly what the court held below.
See 815 Fed. Appx. 592, 595 (CA2 2020).
Perhaps the Court is hesitant to take up this issue at all be-
cause it would require fddling with a 70-year-old precedent that
is demonstrably wrong. But if the Feres doctrine is so wrong
that we cannot fgure out how to rein it in, then the better answer
is to bid it farewell. There is precedent for that approach. See,
e. g., Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 710 (2018) (overruling Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944)); Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 882 (2007)
(overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U. S. 373 (1911)); Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. System
of Ga., 535 U. S. 613, 623 (2002) (overruling Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945)); Exxon
Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U. S. 603, 612 (1991) (over-
ruling Minturn v. Maynard, 17 How. 477 (1855)); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 2, 6 (1964) (overruling Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78 (1908)); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483,
494–495 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537
(1896)); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 79–80 (1938) (over-
ruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842)).
We should follow it.
No. 20–1165. Arunachalam v. Citigroup, Inc., et al. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice took no part
in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 20–1267. Byers v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re-
ported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 7.
No. 20–7626. Miller v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 953
F. 3d 804.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8650. Campbell v. Maryland, 592 U. S. 1169;
No. 20–849. P. F. v. J. S. et al., 592 U. S. 1303;

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No. 20–6477. Ardaneh v. Massachusetts, 592 U. S. 1272;
N
o. 20–6497. Bridges v. Gray, Warden, 592 U. S. 1272;
No. 20–6617. In re Romain, 592 U. S. 1261; and
No. 20–6829. Buttercase v. Nebraska, 592 U. S. 1282. Pe-
titions for rehearing denied.
No. 19–8736. Clark v. Washington, 592 U. S. 939; and
No. 20–6595. Brockington v. Salem United Methodist
Church et al., 592 U. S. 1274. Motions of petitioners for leave
to fle petitions for rehearing denied.
May 17, 2021
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–429. American Medical Assn. et al. v. Becerra,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.;
No. 20–454. Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore;
and
No. 20–539. Oregon et al. v. Becerra, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certio-
rari granted sub nom. in No. 20–429, American Medical Assn. v.
Cochran; in No. 20–454, Cochran v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore; in No. 20–539, Oregon v. Cochran, 592 U. S. 1262.]
The Government has fled a letter brief representing that it will
continue enforcing the challenged rule and regulations outside the
State of Maryland for as long as they remain operative. If fur-
ther litigation is brought against the challenged rule and regula-
tions outside of Maryland, the Government represents that it will
either oppose that litigation on threshold grounds or seek to hold
the litigation in abeyance pending completion of notice and com-
ment. In light of the Government's representations, motions for
leave to intervene are denied, and writs of certiorari in Nos. 20–
429, 20–454, and 20–539 dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1.
If the Government fails to enforce the challenged rule and regula-
tions outside of Maryland prior to the completion of notice and
comment, or if litigation is brought against the challenged rule
and regulations outside of Maryland, any aggrieved party may fle
an application in this Court after seeking relief in the appropriate
District Court and Court of Appeals. Justice Thomas, Justice
Alito, and Justice Gorsuch would grant the motions for leave
to intervene and deny the stipulations to dismiss the petitions.

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Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
N
o. 20–1047. Alabama et al. v. Alabama State Confer-
ence of the NAACP et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer ti orari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded with instructions
to dismiss the case as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear,
Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). Reported below: 949 F. 3d 647.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–7445. Allen v. SunTrust Bank et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Reported below: 832 Fed. Appx. 820.
No. 20–7550. Baccus v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this
Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further
petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the dock-
eting fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is sub-
mitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 207.
No. 20–7693. Wilkins, aka Brown v. Joksch et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders.
No. 20A156. Vinkov v. United States District Court for
the Central District of California. D. C. C. D. Cal. Ap-
plication for stay, addressed to Justice Barrett and referred to
the Court, denied.
No. 20M76. Bizzarro v. First National Bank. Motion to
direct the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time
denied.
No. 20M77. O’Neal v. United States. Motion for leave to
fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted.

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No. 20–807. LeDure v. Union Pacic Railroad Co. C. A.
7th
Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to fle a brief in
this case expressing the views of the United States. Justice
Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
No. 20–7821. In re Toth; and
No. 20–7833. In re Wright. Petitions for wrist of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 20–1266. In re Moore et al.;
No. 20–7518. In re Stone;
No. 20–7753. In re Johnson; and
No. 20–7789. In re Ciacci. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus denied.
No. 20–7481. In re Vaidyanathan. Petition for writ of man-
damus denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.
No. 20–7733. In re Spencer. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–1297. In re Riley; and
No. 20–7352. In re Rudolph. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus and/or prohibition denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–1009. Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of
Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry v. Martinez
Ramirez (Reported below: 937 F. 3d 1230); and Shinn, Director,
Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and
Reentry, et al. v. Jones (943 F. 3d 1211). C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari granted.
No. 20–1143. Badgerow v. Walters et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 975 F. 3d 469.
No. 19–1392. Dobbs, State Health Ofcer of the Missis-
sippi Department of Health, et al. v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer ti orari
granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Re-
ported below: 945 F. 3d 265.

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Certiorari Denied
N
o. 20–101. Harris v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 242 Md. App. 655, 219 A. 3d 1.
No. 20–718. Reyes-Romero v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 80.
No. 20–745. Lechuga v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 261.
No. 20–773. Khan et al. v. Merit Medical Systems Inc.
et al.; and
No. 20–1363. Merit Medical Systems, Inc. v. Khan et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed.
Appx. 762.
No. 20–791. Eglise Baptiste Bethanie De Ft. Lauder-
dale, Inc., et al. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx.
680.
No. 20–895. Seldin, Individually and as Trustee of the
Selden 2002 Irrevocable Trust, dated October 9, 1993,
et al. v. Estate of Silverman et al. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 305 Neb. 185, 939 N. W. 2d 768.
No. 20–937. Andrews v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 243 N. J. 447, 234 A. 3d 1254.
No. 20 –1048. Moore v. Garland, At torney General.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed.
Appx. 11.
No. 20–1061. Dantzler, Inc., et al. v. S2 Services Puerto
Rico, LLC, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 958 F. 3d 38.
No. 20–1095. Haws v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 167 Idaho 471, 472 P. 3d 576.
No. 20–1110. Sandoz Inc. et al. v. Immunex Corp. et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d
1049.
No. 20–1116. Seward v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 57.

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No. 20–1130. Ericsson Inc. et al. v. TCL Communication
Technology
Holdings Ltd. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 1317.
No. 20–1159. Vermont National Telephone Co. v. Ver-
mont Department of Taxes. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 2020 VT 83, 213 Vt. 421, 250 A. 3d 567.
No. 20–1213. Mignott et al. v. Gardiner. Ct. App. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1219. Curry v. Mackenzie. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 160 Ohio St. 3d 1484, 2020-Ohio-
5454, 158 N. E. 3d 612.
No. 20–1221. Ramon Ochoa v. Rubin. Ct. Civ. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1231. Smith v. Florida Agricultural and Mechan-
ical University Board of Trustees. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 434.
No. 20–1234. Baptiste et al. v. Massachusetts Executive
Ofce of Health and Human Services et al. App. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 97 Mass. App. 110,
143 N. E. 3d 1052.
No. 20–1236. Anderson v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1242. Endencia v. Arce. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–1248. Kinzy et al. v. First Tennessee Bank, N. A.
App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020
IL App (2d) 180799–U.
No. 20–1251. Anderson v. Harbor Bank of Maryland.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed.
Appx. 259.
No. 20–1253. Stringer v. Storesonline, Inc., et al. Sup.
Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1254. Rao v. Midland Trust Co. App. Ct. Ill., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied.

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May
17, 2021
No. 20–1257. Jensen v. West Jordan City, Utah. C. A.
10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 968 F. 3d 1187.
No. 20–1265. Moore et al. v. Martin-Bragg. Ct. App. Cal.,
2d App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1273. Olstowski v. Petroleum Analyzer Co. L. P.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 210.
No. 20–1275. Vesuvius USA Corp. et al. v. Phillips. Ct.
App. Ohio, 8th App. Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 2020-Ohio-3285.
No. 20–1277. Meyer v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–1291. WPEM, LLC v. SOTI Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 837 Fed. Appx. 773.
No. 20–1299. Clark v. City of Williamsburg, Kansas.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 844 Fed.
Appx. 4.
No. 20–1303. Pappas v. Lorintz et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 832 Fed. Appx. 8.
No. 20–1310. McCann v. Wold et al. Sup. Ct. Mont. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 402 Mont. 425, 472 P. 3d 1204.
No. 20 –1316. Fling v. United States Postal Service
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–1329. Trayvilla et al. v. Japan Airlines et al.
App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 178 App. Div. 3d 746, 111 N. Y. S. 3d 224.
No. 20–1335. A. P. v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 2020 VT 86, 213 Vt. 291, 246 A. 3d
399.
No. 20–1355. Johnson v. Yellen, Secretary of the Treas-
ury. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827
Fed. Appx. 603.
No. 20–1368. Rollo-Carlson, as Trustee for Flackus-
Carlson, Deceased v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 768.

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No. 20–1408. Fernandez v. Wharton School of the Uni-
versity
of Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–1411. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. v. EHM
Productions, Inc., dba TMZ, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 773.
No. 20–1414. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Razak
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 951
F. 3d 137 and 979 F. 3d 192.
No. 20–1416. Neske et al., Individually and as Parents
and Natural Guardians of A. N. v. New York City Depart-
ment of Education. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 81.
No. 20–1418. Cirino v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed.
Appx. 204.
No. 20–1422. 76 Orinda v. Moralez. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 830 Fed. Appx. 209.
No. 20–1423. Grundstein v. Vermont Board of Bar Exam-
iners. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020
VT 102, 213 Vt. 528, 251 A. 3d 30.
No. 20–1427. Pacheco Pacheco v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 977 F. 3d 764.
No. 20–1428. Noergaard v. Noergaard. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 Cal.
App. 5th 841, 271 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905.
No. 20–1439. Loyd v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–1441. Beecher v. New Jersey; and
No. 20–1442. Stoveken v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J.,
App. Div. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 464 N. J. Super.
86, 234 A. 3d 309.
No. 20–1445. Foreman v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 613 S. W. 3d 160.
No. 20–1449. Persaud v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

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May
17, 2021
No. 20–1463. Mortgage Investors Corp. et al. v. United
St
ates ex rel. Bibby et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 987 F. 3d 1340.
No. 20 –1470. Jeffrey v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 175 A. 3d 382.
No. 20–1478. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security v.
Probst et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 980 F. 3d 1015.
No. 20–6387. Woodard v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 626.
No. 20–6626. Masalmani v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 505 Mich. 1090, 943 N. W. 2d 359.
No. 20–6743. Dussard v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 149.
No. 20–6808. Tracante v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 99.
No. 20–6822. Berryman v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 1222.
No. 20–6837. Owens v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 818.
No. 20–6840. Darrington v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6841. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 1290.
No. 20–6923. Abbate v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 970 F. 3d 601.
No. 20–6972. Jenkins v. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama
Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 1248.
No. 20–7030. Love v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7071. Russell v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions

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Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
827
Fed. Appx. 378.
No. 20–7205. Franqui v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 301 So. 3d 152.
No. 20–7228. Pooler v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 302 So. 3d 744.
No. 20–7312. Parker v. Pickens et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 833 Fed. Appx. 656.
No. 20–7351. Shaw v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s De-
partment et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 810 Fed. Appx. 553.
No. 20–7356. Spivey v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7357. Johnson v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7358. Harris v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 136 Nev. 817, 468 P. 3d 375.
No. 20–7371. Marsh v. Fleming, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 238.
No. 20–7373. Payne v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Pima
County. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7375. Wooten v. Parker, Sheriff, Howard County,
Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 830 Fed. Appx. 443.
No. 20–7376. Martin v. Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–7379. Corujo Mercado v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App.
Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 303 So. 3d
1242.
No. 20–7391. Turner v. Gray, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7392. Woodfork v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.

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593 U. S.
May
17, 2021
No. 20–7396. Calhoun v. Walmart Stores East, LP. C. A.
11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx.
899.
No. 20–7397. King v. Winn, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7403. Luna v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20 –7407. Solar-Somohano v. Coca-Cola Co. et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7411. Jackson v. Berean et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7420. Kilman v. Williams, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 396.
No. 20–7424. Douglas v. Superior Court of California,
Los Angeles County. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7426. Williams v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 7th App.
Dist., Columbiana County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2020-Ohio-4430.
No. 20–7432. Lucien v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 10th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7433. Chaudron v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7434. Dawes v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7435. Knickerbocker v. Wisconsin et al. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7436. Knight v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 306 So. 3d 953.
No. 20–7440. Salazar v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7443. Salu et al. v. Miranda et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 830 Fed. Appx. 341.

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TERM, 2020
May 17, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7455. Jones v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari
denied.
Reported below: 398 Mont. 309, 459 P. 3d 841.
No. 20–7462. Kirkland v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 160 Ohio St. 3d 389, 2020-Ohio-4079,
157 N. E. 3d 716.
No. 20–7463. Jackson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 309 So. 3d 205.
No. 20–7466. Burgett v. General Store No. Two Inc.
et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 826
Fed. Appx. 579.
No. 20–7470. Ramon Guerrero v. Nevada. Ct. App. Nev.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 Nev. 816, 459 P. 3d 240.
No. 20–7478. Lewis v. Southern Connecticut State Uni-
versity et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7485. Cooper v. Chapman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 970 F. 3d 720.
No. 20–7512. Cox v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 307 Neb. 762, 985 N. W. 2d 395.
No. 20–7513. Jones v. New York City Police Department
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7534. Tijerino-Sevilla v. Garland, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 840
Fed. Appx. 416.
No. 20–7539. James v. Campbell, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7557. Nora v. Ofce of Lawyer Regulation. Sup.
Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 WI 70, 393
Wis. 2d 359, 945 N. W. 2d 559.
No. 20–7565. Udoh v. Garland, Attorney General. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 835 Fed. Appx. 895.
No. 20–7566. Chailla et vir v. Saul, Commissioner of So-
cial Security, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 838 Fed. Appx. 653.

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ORDERS 993
593 U. S.
May
17, 2021
No. 20–7569. Hunt v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 305 So. 3d 536.
No. 20–7573. Harris v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 29 Neb. App. –––.
No. 20–7585. Bowser v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 312 Kan. 289, 474 P. 3d 744.
No. 20–7587. Brandon v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821
Fed. Appx. 857.
No. 20–7607. Burris v. Mason, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7623. Drake v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 239 A. 3d 72.
No. 20–7625. Ross v. Myrick et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 499.
No. 20–7641. Hawkins v. Shoop, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7644. Hansen v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–7664. Green v. Chapman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7672. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 840.
No. 20–7673. Sliter-Matias v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 837 Fed. Appx. 910.
No. 20–7675. Stroming v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 838 Fed. Appx. 624.
No. 20–7677. Fuentes-Morales v. United States. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 926.
No. 20–7679. Lucas, aka Madron v. United States. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 836 Fed. Appx. 142.

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TERM, 2020
May 17, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7680. Beasley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 832 Fed. Appx. 314.
No. 20–7684. Glenn v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7689. Wilmore v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7697. Berckmann v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 999.
No. 20–7702. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 833 Fed. Appx. 516.
No. 20–7703. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 187.
No. 20–7705. Serrano v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7707. Ledford v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 834 Fed. Appx. 12.
No. 20–7708. Castro Orellana v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 832 Fed. Appx. 923.
No. 20–7709. Henry v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 842 Fed. Appx. 809.
No. 20–7716. Mosley v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 164.
No. 20–7723. Davis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 980 F. 3d 1089.
No. 20–7726. Davis v. Musselwhite, Warden. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7728. Smeaton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7729. Rose v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 788.
No. 20–7730. Brooks v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 841 Fed. Appx. 346.

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May
17, 2021
No. 20–7737. Fleming v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7738. Grant v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7743. Milliron v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 984 F. 3d 1188.
No. 20–7744. Price v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 247 A. 3d 687.
No. 20–7745. Myles v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7746. Angel Mendoza v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 507.
No. 20–7755. Veasey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 843 Fed. Appx. 555.
No. 20–7764. Carter v. Winn, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7767. Ellison v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed. Appx. 310.
No. 20–7773. Jaiyeola v. Toyota Motor Corp. et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7775. Spann v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 984 F. 3d 711.
No. 20–7779. Shrader v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 20–7784. Goins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 324.
No. 20–7785. Graham v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7786. McCaskill v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7793. Lira Estrada v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 72.

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May 17, 2021 593 U. S.
No. 20–7795. Hutchinson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 195.
No. 20–7801. Herman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–7803. Hall v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 242 A. 3d 1085.
No. 20–7807. Clark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–7838. Vargas v. Koenig, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 796.
No. 20–701. Calvert v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Petitioner James Calvert was convicted in Texas of murdering
his ex-wife. At sentencing, the State called David Logan, a for-
mer corrections offcer. Logan testifed in detail about an inci-
dent in which an inmate stabbed him in the eye with a pencil,
leaving him blind in that eye. The State introduced a medical
scan showing that the pencil traveled four inches into Logan's
brain before coming to rest against an artery. Logan was unsure
why the inmate attacked him, but testifed that if an inmate “ `has
it on his mind to hurt you, there's nothing you can do.' ” 2019
WL 5057268, *58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
You may be asking what Calvert had to do with this gruesome
incident. The answer is nothing. The State nonetheless argued
that Logan's testimony and brain scan were admissible because
they revealed “an inmate's opportunity for violence within the
penitentiary.” 164 Record 20. “Do you think they can be con-
trolled in the pen, these inmates?” the State rhetorically asked
the jury in its closing argument. 171 id., at 128. “Then you tell
me why David Logan got a pencil stabbed into his brain.” Ibid.
“Because of what happened to [Logan],” the State argued, Calvert
“should get the death penalty.” 164 id., at 19. At the jury's
recommendation, the trial court sentenced Calvert to death.
Calvert appealed. He argued that admission of the evidence
about the inmate's attack on Logan violated his right to individu-

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St
atement of Sotomayor, J.
alized sentencing under the Eighth Amendment.
1
See
Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(capital sentencing proceedings must “allow the particularized
consideration of relevant aspects of the [defendant's] character
and record”). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed,
holding that “[t]he individualized sentencing requirement is satis-
fed when the jury is able to consider and give full effect to a
defendant's mitigating evidence.” 2019 WL 5057268, *59. That
requirement was satisfed here, the court concluded, because Cal-
vert was not “prevented from presenting relevant mitigating evi-
dence.” Ibid.
Calvert now asks this Court to grant certiorari.
2
In my view,
Calvert raises a serious argument that the State's reliance on a
graphic instance of violence by an unrelated inmate to prove that
he posed a future danger deprived him of his right to an individu-
alized sentencing.
Despite this weighty question, I do not dissent from the deci-
sion to deny Calvert's petition, because I agree that his claim
does not meet the Court's traditional criteria for granting certio-
rari. See this Court's Rule 10. The legal question Calvert pre-
sents is complex and would beneft from further percolation in
the lower courts prior to this Court granting review. Certainly,
the law is not clear enough to warrant this Court summarily
1
Calvert also argued that admission of the evidence about the inmate's
attack on Logan violated the Texas Rules of Evidence. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals agreed, but found the error harmless “because the State
presented considerable admissible evidence of [Calvert's] future dangerous-
ness and the prison conditions in which he would be confned.” 2019 WL
5057268, *59 (2019).
2
Calvert raises another claim based on courtroom deputies administering
a 50,000-volt electric shock to him because of his failure to follow the court's
rule that he stand when addressing the court. While the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals agreed with Calvert that the incident violated due proc-
ess, it denied relief, concluding that the error was not structural because it
occurred outside of the presence of the jury and did not affect Calvert's
presumption of innocence or ability to participate in his defense at trial.
Id., at *9–*11. Although it may be appropriate for this Court to defer to
the lower court's factbound prejudice determination, I underscore how aston-
ishing it is for a court to direct deputies to shock a defendant during trial.
If there could ever be an excuse for such violence, enforcing courtroom deco-
rum would not be it.

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May 17, 2021 593 U. S.
reversing the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, as Calvert re-
quests.
See Kansas v. Carr, 577 U. S. 108, 123 (2016) (declining
to “shoehorn . . . into the Eighth Amendmen[t]” a claim that the
jury considered evidence that “clouded [its] consideration of
mitigating evidence, ” and suggesti ng such clai ms shou ld be
brought under the Due Process Clause); see also Sears v. Upton,
561 U. S. 945, 946 (2010) (per curiam) (summarily reversing be-
cause constitutional error was “plain from the face of the state
court's opinion”).
I write separately to emphasize that the denial of Calvert's
petition should not be construed as a rejection of his claim on
the merits.
3
Nor does the denial of certiorari suggest the Court
approves of the State's tactics. As the court below recognized,
the gruesome attack on Offcer Logan “had no connection” to
Calvert. 2019 WL 5057268, *58. Indeed, the State introduced
no evidence that Calvert “had attempted to attack or physically
injure anyone” while incarcerated. Ibid. The State asked the
jury to sentence Calvert to death in part because of a different
person's violent conduct that had nothing to do with Calvert. It
succeeded. Although this case does not meet this Court's tradi-
tional criteria for certiorari, it still stands as a grim reminder
that courts should rigorously scrutinize how States prove that a
person should face the ultimate penalty. Juries must have a clear
view of the “uniquely individual human beings” they are sentenc-
ing to death, Woodson, 428 U. S., at 304 (plurality opinion), not
one tainted by irrelevant facts about other people's crimes. The
Constitution and basic principles of justice require nothing less.
No. 20 – 888. Ali v. Biden, President of the United
States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 364.
No. 20–1004. Collier v. Dallas County Hospital District,
dba Parkland Health & Hospital System. C. A. 5th Cir.
Motion of Howard University School of Law Human and Civil
3
In addition to Calvert's Eighth Amendment claim, the State's conduct
here may implicate due process. The introduction of irrelevant evidence can
“so infec[t] the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury's
imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process.” Romano v. Okla-
homa, 512 U. S. 1, 12 (1994). The Court's decision today should not be
viewed as a rejection of the merits of that potential claim, either.

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ORDERS 999
593 U. S.
May
17, 2021
Rights Clinic for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed. Appx. 373.
No. 20–1069. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. v.
A. Y. et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re-
ported below: 224 A. 3d 1.
No. 20–1227. Whitehead v. Netix, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 830
Fed. Appx. 967.
No. 20–1247. Dix v. Edelman Financial Services, LLC,
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re-
ported below: 978 F. 3d 507.
No. 20–1317. MacIntyre v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 827 Fed. Appx. 812.
No. 20–6448. Davis v. Quay, Warden. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 147.
No. 20–6484. Tyler v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 116.
No. 20–7694. Escobar De Jesus v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8464. Mitchell v. United States, 590 U. S. 983;
No. 20–959. Thigpen v. Board of Trustees of the Local
807 Labor-Management Pension Fund, 592 U. S. 1319;
No. 20–972. Ibeabuchi v. Eggleston, Director of Opera-
tion, et al., 592 U. S. 1319;
No. 20–1228. Jaye v. United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa, 593 U. S. 915;
No. 20–5814. Webb v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion, 592 U. S. 1116;

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No. 20–6007. Wright v. United States, 592 U. S. 1093;
N
o. 20–6039. McBride v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 592 U. S. 1180;
No. 20–6138. Walker v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction, 592 U. S. 1153;
No. 20–6161. Brunson v. United States, 592 U. S. 1271;
No. 20–6361. Davis v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al., 592 U. S. 1222;
No. 20–6395. Grifth v. New York, 592 U. S. 1222;
No. 20–6440. Toscano v. Adam et al., 592 U. S. 1190;
No. 20–6510. Ford v. Budde, 592 U. S. 1238;
No. 20–6673. Diehl v. United States, 592 U. S. 1240;
No. 20–6735. McClung et al. v. Estevez, 592 U. S. 1321;
No. 20–6751. Waldrep v. Shinn, Director, Arizona De-
partment of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry,
et al., 592 U. S. 1305;
No. 20–6881. Douglas v. Zimmerman et al., 592 U. S. 1322;
No. 20–6882. Zou v. Linde Engineering North America,
Inc., 592 U. S. 1322; and
No. 20–6999. Bounchanh v. Washington State Health
Care Authority et al., 592 U. S. 1324. Petitions for rehear-
ing denied.
No. 20–5808. In re Liverman, 592 U. S. 1104. Motion for
leave to fle petition for rehearing denied.
No. 20–6835. Hamilton v. Reagle, Warden, 592 U. S. 1313.
Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Barrett took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition.
May 19, 2021
Certiorari Denied
No. 20–8037 (20A166). Jones v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied.
May 20, 2021
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–1484. SFPP, L. P. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari dismissed under
this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 788.

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ORDERS 1001
593
U. S.
May 21, 2021
D
ismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–892. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., et al. v. Illumina,
Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this
Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 1319.