Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc.

1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–6. Argued March 24, 2026—Decided June 11, 2026
Thomas Keathley and his wife filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in
U. S. Bankruptcy Court in December 2019. The Bankruptcy Code re-
quires debtors to file bankruptcy schedules listing their property, in-
cluding “[c]laims against third parties, whether or not [the debtor]
ha[s] filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment.” Official Form
106A/B, Schedule A/B: Property, Pt. 4, Question 33. Debtors must
swear “[u]nder penalty of perjury” that the information provided is
“true and correct.” Official Form 106Dec, Declaration About an Indi-
vidual Debtor’s Schedules. In April 2020, based on the Keathley’s dis-
closures, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed an amended repayment
plan providing for interest-free repayment of 100% of creditors’ claims
over five years. In August 2021, while the bankruptcy case remained
open, Keathley was involved in a car accident in Mississippi with a
driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. Keathley retained
a personal-injury attorney and informed his bankruptcy counsel that
he intended to sue Buddy Ayers Construction. Neither Keathley nor
his bankruptcy counsel disclosed the potential personal-injury claim to
the Bankruptcy Court. Keathley then filed a personal-injury action in
U. S. District Court in December 2021, asserting negligence claims
against the company, again without notifying the Bankruptcy Court.
In March 2023, Buddy Ayers Construction moved for summary judg-
ment on grounds of judicial estoppel based on Keathley’s failure to dis-
close his personal-injury claims in the pending bankruptcy proceeding.
Keathley immediately filed an amended schedule notifying the Bank-
ruptcy Court of his pending claims. He then submitted affidavits in
response to the motion for summary judgment, explaining that his
omission had been inadvertent. The District Court, relying on Fifth
Circuit precedent, found that Keathley knew of the facts underlying

2 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Syllabus
his claims and hypothetically had a motive to conceal, and therefore
held the omission was not inadvertent or a mistake, entering summary
judgment for Buddy Ayers Construction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed,
with one judge concurring but expressing doubt that judicial estoppel’s
goals were advanced by its application given evidence the omission was
an “honest mistake.”
Held: To determine whether an omission of a claim in the bankruptcy
context was inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial estoppel,
courts should look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
omission; the Fifth Circuit erred by artificially narrowing its inquiry
to whether the debtor had knowledge of the underlying facts or a po-
tential motive to conceal the claim. Pp. 6–9.
(a) Judicial estoppel is an “equitable doctrine” intended “to protect
the integrity of the judicial process” by “prohibiting parties from delib-
erately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment”
and preventing the “risk of inconsistent court determinations.” New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749–751 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Some lower courts apply judicial estoppel to bar lawsuits by
debtors who fail to disclose claims in bankruptcy proceedings, viewing
the failure to disclose as an “implicit representation” that the claim
does not exist. 18B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure §4477.9. Pp. 6–7.
(b) Assuming without deciding that judicial estoppel can apply in the
bankruptcy context and that “inadvertence or mistake” can function as
an exception to that application, the Fifth Circuit’s rule is both too
rigid and too broad. The rigidity comes from the Fifth Circuit’s failure
to fully recognize that “judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine.” New
Hampshire, 532 U. S., at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted). Eq-
uity “eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility,” Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 396, and when a court conducts an equitable
inquiry, it must act “on a case-by-case basis,” considering all relevant
facts and circumstances, Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 649–650
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit’s rule allows
courts to consider only two circumstances—whether the debtor knew
of the underlying facts and whether there was a potential motive to
conceal—and does not permit courts to look at any other evidence tend-
ing to show the omission was inadvertent. That rigidity is out of step
with equity. The Fifth Circuit’s rule is also overly broad because it
holds that an omission falls outside the exception any time a debtor
knows certain facts or could potentially benefit from nondisclosure, cir-
cumstances that will almost always be true, as the Fifth Circuit recog-
nized. A near-dispositive criterion is a poor fit for a fair inquiry into
whether an omission is actually the result of inadvertence or mistake.
Pp. 7–9.

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
Vacated and remanded.
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which G
ORSUCH, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–6
THOMAS KEATHLEY, PETITIONER v. BUDDY AYERS
CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
After commencing a bankruptcy case, the debtor must
disclose his assets to the bankruptcy court to facilitate the
creation of an accurate bankruptcy estate. These assets in-
clude any claims the debtor has against third parties, re-
gardless of whether those claims have already been filed as
part of an active lawsuit. The debtor also avers that he has
no relevant assets other than those disclosed.
Occasionally, a debtor who has failed to disclose a claim
to the bankruptcy court will later attempt to press that
claim in court. When that happens, some lower courts have
considered whether the lawsuit should be dismissed under
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which generally prevents a
party from assuming inconsistent positions in successive
litigation.
This Court has never applied judicial estoppel in the
bankruptcy context. But we have suggested in other situa-
tions that judicial estoppel may be inapposite where the in-
consistent position was the result of “inadvertence or mis-
take.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 753 (2001).
In this case, the Fifth Circuit applied a follow-on rule that
the omission of a claim in the bankruptcy context will be

2 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Opinion of the Court
considered inadvertent or a mistake in only two circum-
stances: (1) when the debtor was unaware of the underlying
facts of his claim, or (2) where there was no hypothetical
motive to conceal the claim.
We reject that approach. To determine whether an omis-
sion was inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial
estoppel, courts should look to the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the omission. Thus, we hold that the
Fifth Circuit’s less holistic formulation was erroneous.
I
A
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate
is created comprising the debtor’s property. 11 U. S. C.
§541(a). That property encompasses “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement”
of the bankruptcy case, including pending and unliquidated
claims against third parties. §541(a)(1); see 5 Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶541.07 (R. Levin & H. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2026) (Collier). As relevant here, for bankruptcy cases pro-
ceeding under Chapter 13, the estate also includes prop-
erty—and therefore claims—that the debtor acquires after
the bankruptcy case commences but before it is closed, dis-
missed, or converted to a case under another chapter.
§1306(a)(1); see also Harris v. Viegelahn, 575 U. S. 510, 514
(2015).
An accurate bankruptcy estate is necessary for orderly
bankruptcy proceedings. Chapter 13 allows a debtor to re-
tain his property if he proposes, and a bankruptcy court
confirms, a plan for debt repayment over a 3- to 5-year pe-
riod. §§1306(b), 1322(d), 1327(b). Creditors and the trustee
(who helps administer the bankruptcy proceedings) must
understand the full scope of the debtor’s assets to determine
whether to support or object to the proposed repayment
plan. See §§1302(b)(2)(B), 1324(a), 1325(b); 8 Collier
¶1302.03, at 1302–8 to 1302–9. The estate also provides

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
valuable information to the bankruptcy court because the
court may confirm the debtor’s repayment plan only if the
proposed repayments are “not less than the amount that
would be paid” to creditors if the estate were liquidated un-
der Chapter 7. §1325(a)(4). In addition, the value of the
estate helps the court evaluate whether to require the
debtor to pay creditors back on a more accelerated timeline
or with interest. See §1322(b).
To facilitate the creation of an accurate bankruptcy es-
tate, the Bankruptcy Code imposes disclosure obligations
on debtors. For instance, debtors must file bankruptcy
schedules listing their property. See §521(a)(1)(B); Fed.
Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 1007(b)(1). One such schedule requires
debtors to disclose all “[c]laims against third parties,
whether or not [the debtor] ha[s] filed a lawsuit or made a
demand for payment.” Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B:
Property, Pt. 4, Question 33. The schedule lists “[a]cci-
dents” and “rights to sue” as “[e]xamples” of possible claims.
Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Debtors must swear, “[u]nder
penalty of perjury,” that the information provided is “true
and correct.” Official Form 106Dec, Declaration About an
Individual Debtor’s Schedules.
1
B
Thomas Keathley and his wife filed a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy petition in the U. S. Bankruptcy Court for the East-
ern District of Arkansas in December 2019. In April 2020,
that court confirmed an amended repayment plan, provid-
ing for interest-free repayment of 100% of the creditors’
claims over the course of five years.
——————
1
The parties here have proceeded on the understanding that the
debtor has a continuing duty to disclose assets that arise after the initial
filing of the bankruptcy petition (and therefore are part of the Chapter
13 estate). See Brief for Petitioner 5–6. We presume the same and do
not opine on whether such a duty exists. See Brief for National Con-
sumer Bankruptcy Rights Center et al. as Amici Curiae 6–12 (noting
split on continuing duty to disclose).

4 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Opinion of the Court
In August 2021, Keathley was involved in a car accident
in Mississippi with a driver employed by respondent Buddy
Ayers Construction, Inc. Keathley retained a personal-
injury attorney and informed his bankruptcy counsel that
he intended to sue Buddy Ayers Construction. Even though
Keathley’s bankruptcy case remained open, neither Keath-
ley nor his bankruptcy counsel disclosed the potential
personal-injury claims to the Bankruptcy Court. Keathley
then filed the instant personal-injury action in the U. S.
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in
December 2021, asserting claims for negligence against the
company. Keathley did not notify the Bankruptcy Court of
the existence of his claims at this point, either.
In March 2023, Buddy Ayers Construction moved for
summary judgment on grounds of judicial estoppel based on
Keathley’s failure to disclose his personal-injury claims in
the open bankruptcy proceeding. Keathley immediately
filed an amended schedule notifying the Bankruptcy Court
of his personal-injury claims. Then, in response to the
pending motion for summary judgment in the personal-
injury suit, Keathley explained that the omission had been
inadvertent. In support, he submitted an affidavit attest-
ing that, after he told his bankruptcy counsel about his
personal-injury claims, he “believed [he] had done every-
thing [he] needed to do.” App. 184. He also filed an affida-
vit from his bankruptcy counsel noting that Keathley “re-
ceived no benefit monetarily, or otherwise, from the
nondisclosure.” Id., at 182. Based on this evidence, he ar-
gued that judicial estoppel was inappropriate.
The District Court disagreed. Relying on Fifth Circuit
precedent, the court explained that the omission of a claim
on the bankruptcy schedules will be considered the result
of inadvertence or mistake only if (1) the debtor did not
know the facts underlying the claim, or (2) there was no po-
tential motive to conceal the claim. 686 F. Supp. 3d 495,
497, 500–501 (ND Miss. 2023) (citing United States ex rel.

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Long v. GSDMIdea City, LLC, 798 F. 3d 265, 273 (CA5
2015); Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F. 3d 258, 262 (CA5
2012)). Applying that rule, the District Court found that
Keathley concededly knew of the facts underlying his
personal-injury claims and had a hypothetical motive to
conceal: Keathley might have had to pay interest on his
debts had the Bankruptcy Court and creditors known of the
personal-injury lawsuit. The District Court therefore held
that Keathley’s omission was not inadvertent or a mistake
and entered summary judgment for Buddy Ayers Construc-
tion based on judicial estoppel. 686 F. Supp. 3d, at 501,
503.
2
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on the same precedent
as the District Court. 2025 WL 673434 (Mar. 3, 2025)
(per curiam). Judge Haynes concurred based on her agree-
ment that Fifth Circuit precedent dictated this outcome.
But she expressed “doubt that the goals” of judicial estoppel
were advanced by its application to Keathley’s claims, given
her view that there was evidence his omission was, in fact,
an “honest mistake.” Id., at *8. Judge Haynes further
noted that “[o]ther circuits take a more holistic approach
than” the Fifth Circuit does when assessing the application
of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context. Ibid. (collect-
ing cases).
Much like the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit also con-
siders an omission to be inadvertent only if the debtor
lacked knowledge of the underlying claim or had no poten-
tial motive to conceal the claim.
3
But five other Courts of
——————
2
Keathley moved for reconsideration based on an affidavit he submit-
ted from the staff attorney for the Chapter 13 Trustee in his bankruptcy
case. The affidavit explained that it is common practice in the Eastern
District of Arkansas for debtors to amend their filings to disclose postpe-
tition personal-injury claims shortly before settlement or other disposi-
tion of the claims. The District Court denied the motion. 706 F. Supp. 3d
628, 630 (ND Miss. 2023).
3
Eastman v. Union Pacific R. Co., 493 F. 3d 1151, 1157 (CA10 2007).

6 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Appeals conduct a more fact-specific inquiry and do not so
stringently limit the analysis.
4
We granted certiorari to re-
solve this conflict. 607 U. S. 992 (2025).
II
A
Judicial estoppel is an “equitable doctrine” intended “to
protect the integrity of the judicial process,” both by “pro-
hibiting parties from deliberately changing positions ac-
cording to the exigencies of the moment,” and by preventing
the “risk of inconsistent court determinations.” New Hamp-
shire, 532 U. S., at 749–751 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
Sometimes, as happened here, a debtor seeks to litigate a
claim against a third party that he failed to disclose in his
bankruptcy proceedings. Some lower courts apply judicial
estoppel to bar such lawsuits, reasoning that application of
the doctrine “raises the cost of lying” and “induces debtors
to be truthful in their bankruptcy filings.” Cannon-Stokes
v. Potter, 453 F. 3d 446, 448 (CA7 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The courts that apply judicial estoppel to claims in the
bankruptcy context view the debtor’s failure to disclose a
particular claim as an “implicit representation” that the
claim does not exist. 18B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure §4477.9 (3d ed. 2019 and
Supp. 2026) (collecting cases). On this view, when the
debtor files a lawsuit based on that claim, he has taken in-
consistent positions in the two judicial proceedings “by as-
serting in the civil lawsuit that he has a claim against the
defendant while denying under oath in the bankruptcy
——————
4
Martineau v. Wier, 934 F. 3d 385, 393–396 (CA4 2019); Stanley v. FCA
US, LLC, 51 F. 4th 215, 221 (CA6 2022); Spaine v. Community Contacts,
Inc., 756 F. 3d 542, 548 (CA7 2014); Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Dept. of
Transp., 733 F. 3d 267, 276–277 (CA9 2013); Slater v. United States Steel
Corp., 871 F. 3d 1174, 1189, and n. 17 (CA11 2017) (en banc).

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
proceeding that the claim exists.” Slater v. United States
Steel Corp., 871 F. 3d 1174, 1176 (CA11 2017) (en banc).
Based on that understanding, those lower courts have de-
veloped a general rule for the application of judicial estop-
pel in the bankruptcy context: “If a plaintiff-debtor omits a
pending (or soon-to-be-filed) lawsuit from the bankruptcy
schedules and obtains a discharge (or plan confirmation),
judicial estoppel bars the action.” Ah Quin v. County of Ka-
uai Dept. of Transp., 733 F. 3d 267, 271 (CA9 2013).
B
While this Court has never applied judicial estoppel in
the bankruptcy context, in a different context we left open
whether it “may be appropriate to resist application of judi-
cial estoppel” when the party’s prior inconsistent position
was due to “inadvertence or mistake.” New Hampshire, 532
U. S., at 753. For purposes of this opinion, we assume with-
out deciding that judicial estoppel can apply in the bank-
ruptcy context and that “inadvertence or mistake” can func-
tion as an exception to that application. Operating under
those assumptions, the Fifth Circuit’s understanding of “in-
advertence or mistake” is simultaneously too rigid and too
broad.
The rigidity comes from the Fifth Circuit’s failure to fully
recognize that “judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine.”
Id., at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, its
“examination must be made in the light of the recognized
principles of equity.” United States Nat. Bank v. Chase Nat.
Bank, 331 U. S. 28, 36 (1947). Equity, we have said, “es-
chews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility.”
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 396 (1946). Thus,
when a court conducts an equitable inquiry, it must act “on
a case-by-case basis,” considering all relevant facts and cir-
cumstances. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 649–650
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words,

8 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
Opinion of the Court
equitable doctrines require room to consider all of the par-
ticulars.
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit’s rule allows courts to con-
sider only two circumstances when assessing inadvertence
or mistake: whether the debtor knew of the underlying facts
of the claim, and whether there was a potential motive to
conceal the claim. See In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F. 3d
197, 210 (CA5 1999); Love, 677 F. 3d, at 262. And under
this rule, a court may not look at any other evidence tending
to show that the omission was inadvertent. That rigidity is
out of step with equity. To determine whether the omission
was inadvertent or a mistake, the Fifth Circuit instead
should have examined the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding Keathley’s failure to report his personal-injury
claims earlier. See, e.g., Ah Quin, 733 F. 3d, at 276
(“[R]ather than applying a presumption of deceit, judicial
estoppel requires an inquiry into whether the plaintiff ’s
bankruptcy filing was, in fact, inadvertent or mistaken, as
those terms are commonly understood” (emphasis added
and deleted)).
The Fifth Circuit’s rule is not only overly rigid; it is also
overly broad. In particular, the Fifth Circuit holds that an
omission falls outside of the exception any time a debtor
knows certain facts or could potentially benefit from non-
disclosure of a claim. But it is rare for a debtor to be una-
ware of the underlying facts of his claim, and a debtor will
almost always hypothetically benefit from not revealing
such a claim to his creditors. In essence, then, the Fifth
Circuit’s approach is a one-size-fits-all test that requires
courts to view as purposeful nearly every bankruptcy omis-
sion. Indeed, the decision below acknowledged as much,
noting that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, the potential-
motive element “‘is almost always met if a debtor fails to
disclose a claim or possible claim to the bankruptcy court.’”
2025 WL 673434, *5 (quoting Love, 677 F. 3d, at 262).

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
The overbreadth of the Fifth Circuit’s rule (the fact that
it almost always is satisfied) makes it patently incompati-
ble with an inadvertence-or-mistake standard, which sug-
gests that circumstances—and outcomes—may vary. A
near-dispositive criterion is a poor fit for a fair inquiry into
whether an omission is actually the result of inadvertence
or mistake.
5
***
Today’s decision is straightforward. The Fifth Circuit ar-
tificially narrowed its inquiry into whether Keathley’s
bankruptcy-schedule omission was the result of inadvert-
ence or mistake by assessing only whether he had
knowledge of the underlying facts or a potential motive to
conceal his personal-injury suit. That was error. Accord-
ingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
——————
5
The parties also dispute at some length whether bad faith is required
for judicial estoppel to apply. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 11–24; Brief
for Respondent 20–35. In light of our narrow holding—responding only
to the analysis used by the Fifth Circuit—we need not resolve any further
questions about the application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy
context.

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1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–6
THOMAS KEATHLEY, PETITIONER v. BUDDY AYERS
CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2026]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,
concurring.
The Court’s opinion correctly concludes that the Fifth
Circuit’s approach to judicial estoppel is not defensible on
its own terms. I join it in full. I write separately to express
doubt about the foundation of the doctrine of judicial estop-
pel. Judicial estoppel generally prevents a party from as-
serting a position in one lawsuit that contradicts its posi-
tion in a previous proceeding. Lower federal courts have
applied this doctrine broadly without clear authority to do
so, and with only limited support from this Court’s prece-
dents. In a future case, we should reexamine it.
I
The doctrine of judicial estoppel entered the mainstream
in the federal courts only in the past few decades. See Brief
for American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae 7–9.
By all accounts, it was first recognized in an 1857 decision
of the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Hamilton v. Zimmer-
man, 37 Tenn. 39; see D. Henkin, Judicial Estoppel—Beat-
ing Shields Into Swords and Back Again, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1711, 1719 (1991). A century later, judicial estoppel was
still “the minority viewpoint which has encountered inhos-
pitable reception outside the State of Tennessee.” Parkin-
son v. California Co., 233 F. 2d 432, 437–438 (CA10 1956).

2 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
As late as 1980, the D. C. Circuit declined to apply judicial
estoppel because it “ha[d] not been followed by anything ap-
proaching a majority of jurisdictions, nor [was] there a dis-
cernible modern trend in that direction.” Konstantinidis v.
Chen, 626 F. 2d 933, 938.
Despite its slow and late start, judicial estoppel has now
become commonplace in the Courts of Appeals.
1
As gener-
ally understood, the doctrine can bar a party’s suit based on
its representations in an entirely unrelated suit against an-
other party. In the Fifth Circuit, for example, judicial es-
toppel can bar a claim whenever it is inconsistent with a
prior position that the party took; a court accepted the prior
position; and the party’s inconsistency was not inadvertent.
In re Flugence, 738 F. 3d 126, 129 (2013) (per curiam). In
this way, judicial estoppel reaches much further than the
older doctrine of “equitable estoppel,” which requires the
party invoking the doctrine to prove that it was itself the
object of a previous representation, that it relied on the pre-
vious representation, and that it was prejudiced by the
change in positions. See Konstantinidis, 626 F. 2d, at 937.
Cases such as this one show the doctrine’s breadth: The
Fifth Circuit applied judicial estoppel to foreclose a lawsuit
against a defendant because the plaintiff failed to mention
——————
1
Every Court of Appeals has recognized it in one form or another. See,
e.g., Perry v. Blum, 629 F. 3d 1, 8 (CA1 2010); Clark v. AII Acquisition,
LLC, 886 F. 3d 261, 266 (CA2 2018); Ryan Operations G. P. v. Santiam-
Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F. 3d 355, 358–359 (CA3 1996); Lowery v.
Stovall, 92 F. 3d 219, 223 (CA4 1996); In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F. 3d
197, 204 (CA5 1999); Reynolds v. Commissioner, 861 F. 2d 469, 472, 474
(CA6 1988); Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F. 3d 446, 447–448 (CA7 2006);
Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F. 3d 1041, 1047 (CA8 2006); Milton
H.Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F. 3d 983, 986 (CA9
2012); Eastman v. Union Pacific R. Co., 493 F. 3d 1151, 1156 (CA10
2007); Slater v. United States Steel Corp., 871 F. 3d 1174, 1180 (CA11
2017) (en banc); Marshall v. Honeywell Tech. Systems, Inc., 828 F. 3d
923, 931 (CADC 2016); Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F. 3d 1556, 1565
(CA Fed. 1996).

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
the cause of action on a form in prior bankruptcy proceed-
ings involving an entirely unrelated set of parties. As a re-
sult, the defendant was relieved of all liability for injuring
the plaintiff, regardless of whether his conduct was tortious
and regardless of whether he was in any manner affected
by the plaintiff ’s other proceedings. Other jurisdictions ap-
ply judicial estoppel in similar circumstances. See, e.g.,
Slater v. United States Steel Corp., 871 F. 3d 1174, 1176
(CA11 2017) (en banc); Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc.,
756 F. 3d 542, 547 (CA7 2014); Ah Quin v. County of Kauai
Dept. of Transp., 733 F. 3d 267, 271 (CA9 2013); Payless
Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P. R.) Inc.,
989 F. 2d 570, 571–572 (CA1 1993).
II
Despite the widespread modern adoption of judicial es-
toppel, its foundation remains questionable.
It is unclear what gives federal courts the authority to
bar suits based on judicial estoppel. Often, as in the case
below, federal courts treat judicial estoppel as a matter of
federal law and feel free to craft their own standards and
extend the doctrine to new contexts.
2
But, the doctrine ap-
pears to have no basis in any statute, any Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, or any traditional inherent power of fed-
eral courts. Although the doctrine purports to punish liti-
gants to “protect the integrity of the judicial process,” Ed-
wards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F. 2d 595, 598 (CA6 1982),
the courts of appeals have not justified it as an exercise of
the traditional sanctioning power that courts have been
held to have in other contexts, see, e.g., Link v. Wabash
R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 629–630 (1962). And, although
——————
2
2025 WL 673434, *4–5 (CA5, Mar. 3, 2025) (per curiam) (case below);
see also Ryan Operations G. P., 81 F. 3d, at 358; John S. Clark Co. v.
Faggert & Frieden, P. C., 65 F. 3d 26, 28–29 (CA4 1995); Patriot Cine-
mas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F. 2d 208, 215 (CA1 1987); Warda
v. Commissioner, 15 F. 3d 533, 538, n. 4 (CA6 1994).

4 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
federal courts often assume that the doctrine can arise from
their general equitable authority, see Slater, 871 F. 3d, at
1187–1188; Ryan Operations G. P. v. Santiam-Midwest
Lumber Co., 81 F. 3d 355, 365 (CA3 1996); In re Flugence,
738 F. 3d, at 131–132, that “equitable authority is not free-
wheeling,” and requires for its use “a founding-era anteced-
ent,” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U. S. 831, 841, 846–847
(2025); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 716 (2018)
(T
HOMAS, J., concurring). Judicial estoppel appears to lack
such an antecedent.
3
This Court’s precedents do not justify the current state of
judicial-estoppel doctrine, either. The Court has appar-
ently enforced judicial estoppel only a single time, in an
original-jurisdiction case that did not resemble many of the
cases in which lower courts now apply it. See New Hamp-
shire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742 (2001).
4
Because New
——————
3
The Courts of Appeals sometimes instead treat judicial estoppel as a
matter of substantive state law in diversity cases, an approach that
raises its own set of questions, such as in what sense the doctrine is sub-
stantive and whose law governs. E.g., Kirk v. Schaeffler Group USA,
Inc., 887 F. 3d 376, 383 (CA8 2018). The choice of law for judicial estop-
pel is a source of deep confusion. See N. Frazer, Reassessing the Doctrine
of Judicial Estoppel: The Implications of the Judicial Integrity Rationale,
101 Va. L. Rev. 1501, 1503 (2015); 18B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure §4477.8, p. 591 (3d ed. 2019) (“The ques-
tion . . . cannot be fully answered”). But, this approach would at least
cohere with the treatment of the related, but distinct doctrine of equita-
ble estoppel, which is generally treated as a substantive question gov-
erned by the applicable state law under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U. S. 64 (1938). Cf. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U. S. 624, 631
(2009); see Petro Harvester Operating Co. v. Keith, 954 F. 3d 686, 698
(CA5 2020).
4
New Hampshire cited the Court’s 1895 decision in Davis v. Wakelee,
156 U. S. 680, for the proposition that “ ‘[w]here a party assumes a cer-
tain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that po-
sition, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed,
assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party
who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.’ ” 532 U. S.,
at 749 (quoting Davis, 156 U. S., at 689). But, Davis does not appear to

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
Hampshire was an original-jurisdiction case, the Court un-
derstood itself to have greater flexibility in adjudicating the
dispute than lower courts have in ordinary diversity ac-
tions. Cf. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 15 (1939)
(explaining, even after Erie, that controversies between
States are decided based on “the accepted principles of the
common law or equity systems of jurisprudence”). Moreo-
ver, the Court applied the doctrine based on prior litigation
between the same two parties. It estopped New Hampshire
from adopting a new position after it had taken the opposite
position in a previous suit against the same party before the
same Court: New Hampshire “convinced this Court to ac-
cept one interpretation” of a decree in a case against Maine,
“benefited from that interpretation,” and then “urge[d] an
inconsistent interpretation to gain an additional advantage
at Maine’s expense.” 532 U. S., at 755. Given these facts,
the Court’s decision may well have been justifiable as a
matter of equitable estoppel.
New Hampshire certainly does not ordain that judicial es-
toppel should apply in cases like Keathley’s, in which his
inconsistency was between, on the one hand, representa-
tions to creditors in a bankruptcy court, and, on the other
hand, representations in a separate tort suit against a
stranger to those bankruptcy proceedings. At a minimum,
it is difficult to see how application of this doctrine in cases
such as this one serves any equitable purpose, or how an
interest in “the integrity of the judicial process” could jus-
tify it. Id., at 749 (internal quotation marks omitted).
——————
be a judicial-estoppel case. The Court did not invoke the doctrine, and
the facts appear to have satisfied the distinctive elements of equitable
estoppel: mutuality of parties and reliance by the nonestopped party.
156 U. S., at 690. Davis also rejected the argument that an honest mis-
take could prevent estoppel, ibid., which is consistent with equitable es-
toppel but, as the Court explains, not judicial estoppel, ante, at 7.

6 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
III
Judicial estoppel has secured widespread acceptance in
the Courts of Appeals without any clear authority in stat-
utes, rules of procedure, or this Court’s precedents. In a
future case, this doctrine merits a closer look.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–6
THOMAS KEATHLEY, PETITIONER v. BUDDY AYERS
CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2026]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.
Today, the Court correctly holds that, assuming judicial
estoppel applies in the bankruptcy context, the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s exceedingly narrow test for determining whether an
inconsistent position was based on inadvertence or mistake
is erroneous. I write to address why it may not ever make
sense to apply judicial estoppel when bankruptcy proceed-
ings are pending, and why, in any context, judicial estoppel
should always turn on the totality of the circumstances.
I
One of the principal justifications for judicial estoppel is
that it prevents a party from using the “ ‘judicial process’”
to “derive an unfair advantage” by taking a position in one
proceeding and an inconsistent position in a separate pro-
ceeding. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749, 751
(2001). In bankruptcy, the “unfair advantage” a dishonest
debtor gains by failing to disclose assets comes at the cred-
itors’ expense and deprives them of potential recovery.
From here, the argument goes, judicial estoppel is needed
in other proceedings to deter that bankruptcy misconduct
and to protect both the “integrity of the bankruptcy system”
and “the rights of creditors to an equitable distribution of
the assets of the debtor’s estate.” Reed v. Arlington, 650
F. 3d 571, 574 (CA5 2011) (en banc).

2 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
S
OTOMAYOR, J., concurring
There are many reasons to doubt the logic of this argu-
ment, which may account for why “this Court has never ap-
plied judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context.” Ante, at
7. To start, applying judicial estoppel to debtors still in-
volved in open bankruptcies is more likely to hurt creditors
than it is to help them. Instead, the party most likely to
benefit is the potential tortfeasor in the separate proceed-
ing: someone who is not prejudiced by the debtor’s earlier,
inconsistent position, but whom judicial estoppel permits to
escape liability.
Take the facts of this case as an example. At the time the
District Court applied judicial estoppel to dismiss petitioner
Keathley’s tort claim against respondent, Keathley and his
wife were operating under an amended repayment plan in
which they still needed to make interest-free payments to
creditors for about four more years. If the District Court
had not applied judicial estoppel, and if Keathley had pre-
vailed on the merits of that tort claim, any judgment he re-
ceived could have been used in turn to pay creditors interest
or shorten the repayment period or both. See, e.g., 11
U. S. C. §§1329(a)(1)–(2). By applying judicial estoppel, the
courts below prevented Keathley from recovering any
money at all and thus “vaporiz[ed] assets that could [have
been] used for the creditors’ benefit.” Biesek v. Soo Line
R. Co., 440 F. 3d 410, 413 (CA7 2006). They also gave re-
spondent, the employer of the alleged tortfeasor, a windfall
even though it was not involved in the bankruptcy and thus
was neither misled nor impacted by the delayed disclosure.
“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine,” but this is “not
an equitable application.” Ibid.; see 18 J. Moore, D. Coquil-
lette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore’s Federal
Practice §134.31, p. 134–102 (3d ed. 2026) (explaining that
judicial estoppel should be applied “with an intent to
achieve substantial justice”).
There were other, more equitable options available that
would have served the underlying goals of judicial estoppel.

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., concurring
For instance, because the Keathleys had not yet completed
the repayment process at the time Keathley filed this claim,
the Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction over the bank-
ruptcy. That court was better positioned than both the Dis-
trict Court and Fifth Circuit in the personal-injury suit to
address any harm to creditors caused by Keathley’s belated
disclosure of the suit in the bankruptcy proceeding. In the
wake of that disclosure, the Bankruptcy Court could have
imposed sanctions, Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 9011, or modi-
fied the repayment plan, 11 U. S. C. §1329. It could have
even converted this Chapter 13 bankruptcy to a Chapter 7
case, which would have allowed a trustee to pursue this suit
on the creditors’ behalf. See §§323(b), 704(a)(1), 1307(c);
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U. S. 365, 372–374
(2007). The Solicitor General of the United States, as ami-
cus curiae, lists further options still. See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 20–23 (surveying tools in a bank-
ruptcy court’s arsenal). Judicial estoppel, by contrast, pro-
vides one remedy and one remedy only: dismissal of the tort
claim. Given that bankruptcy courts can craft full remedies
to alleviate any prejudice to creditors caused by a belated
disclosure of a claim, it is difficult to see how using judicial
estoppel to bar the debtor from pursuing a separate claim,
which only harms creditors, is either needed or warranted.
For similar reasons, a bankruptcy court is also well posi-
tioned to mitigate any harms to the “integrity of the bank-
ruptcy system,” and the judicial system generally, caused
by inconsistent positions. For instance, in response to de-
liberate nondisclosures, a bankruptcy court may, in certain
circumstances, revoke an order of confirmation, e.g.,
§1330(a), decline to discharge the debtor, §§727(a)(2), (4),
fine the debtor, 18 U. S. C. §401, or refer the debtor to the
United States Attorney’s Office for potential perjury, §§152,
1621. It can also protect the broader judicial system’s in-
terest in preventing “‘inconsistent court determinations,’”
New Hampshire, 532 U. S., at 751, by simply modifying its

4 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
S
OTOMAYOR, J., concurring
earlier orders.* Applying judicial estoppel to a case (and
thereby dismissing it) arguably has the opposite effect. Alt-
hough judicial estoppel might prevent inconsistent judg-
ments in some circumstances, it likely “‘undermines the in-
tegrity’” of both court systems when it becomes “a tool in
the arsenal of potentially bad actors to reap a windfall” and
secure that advantage at creditors’ detriment. 2025 WL
673434, *8 (CA5, Mar. 3, 2025) (Haynes, J., concurring in
judgment), App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a, 22a.
All told, judicial estoppel is based in equity, and “specific
factual contexts” must “inform the doctrine’s application.”
New Hampshire, 532 U. S., at 751. The above discussion
has focused on the context of pending bankruptcy proceed-
ings because the judicial estoppel calculus may look differ-
ent if the debtor takes an inconsistent position long after
discharge. Cf. 11 U. S. C. §350(b) (allowing bankruptcy
courts to reopen closed cases to “administer assets” or for
other “cause[s]”); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
22 (observing that, for closed bankruptcies, a bankruptcy
court can revoke a discharge within certain time periods de-
pending on the kind of bankruptcy at issue). When such a
proceeding is still open, however, it is doubtful that equity
ever demands the application of judicial estoppel to a claim
asserted by a debtor in a different proceeding, even when
that claim relies on a deliberately inconsistent position.
II
This case also illustrates another important facet of judi-
cial estoppel: In assessing whether certain circumstances
——————
*Notably, after Keathley informed the Bankruptcy Court of his claim,
the court did not impose any sanctions. In an affidavit submitted to the
District Court here, a staff attorney for the Chapter 13 trustee assigned
to the case explained, moreover, that “there [was] nothing unusual or
misleading about [the Keathleys] not disclosing the [tort claim] while [it]
was ongoing,” and that even if they had “notified the” Bankruptcy Court
“immediately, . . . it would not have had any effect on the administration
of the bankruptcy.” App. 253.

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., concurring
warrant using this equitable tool, courts should apply tests
that account for their totality. As this Court has explained,
and reiterates today, “‘[t]he circumstances under which ju-
dicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably
not reducible to any general formulation of principle.’” New
Hampshire, 532 U. S., at 750 (alteration in original). This
stems from the doctrine’s grounding in equity, which “es-
chews mechanical rules” and “depends on flexibility.”
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 396 (1946).
Although Courts of Appeals have attempted to add struc-
ture to this analysis, some have more successfully captured
the doctrine’s underlying principles than others. Take how
courts have approached the judicial estoppel inquiry in the
bankruptcy context specifically. If the doctrine is to apply
in this context, then the Fifth Circuit’s approach, as the
Court correctly identifies, was both “too rigid and too
broad.” Ante, at 7. It distilled the test for whether a prior
inconsistent position was “inadvertent or a mistake” down
to two factors and then defined one of them in such a way
that ensured a prior inconsistent position was never inad-
vertent or mistaken. See ante, at 8–9.
The Eleventh Circuit previously employed a test that suf-
fered from a similar problem. That Circuit used to “permi[t]
the inference that a plaintiff intended to make a mockery of
the judicial system simply because he failed to disclose a
civil claim.” Slater v. United States Steel Corp., 871 F. 3d
1174, 1185 (2017) (en banc) (describing the Circuit’s prior
test). Like the Fifth Circuit’s test, this inference resembled
a “one-size-fits-all approach,” which did not ensure that ju-
dicial estoppel applied “only when a party acted with a suf-
ficiently culpable mental state.” Id., at 1185–1186. It also
did not allow a court to factor in “any proceedings that oc-
curred in the bankruptcy court after the omission was dis-
covered,” which hampered a court’s ability to “ensure that
the integrity of the bankruptcy court [was] protected” by the
application of judicial estoppel. Id., at 1186. Finally, it did

6 KEATHLEY v. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
S
OTOMAYOR, J., concurring
not tie the application of the doctrine to the “facts and cir-
cumstances” of a given dispute, which “risk[ed] that [its]
application” would “give the civil defendant a windfall at
the expense of innocent creditors.” Ibid.
The Eleventh Circuit in Slater retreated from this test.
It now applies one that considers “all the facts and circum-
stances of [a] particular case” and therefore one that does
not suffer from any of the same shortfalls that arise when
the application of the doctrine neglects critical context. Id.,
at 1185; id., at 1186–1189 (listing a nonexhaustive set of
considerations). This new approach appears more closely
to adhere to the “‘case-by-case’” assessment that equity re-
quires and that judicial estoppel is intended to facilitate.
Ante, at 7–9 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631,
649–650 (2010)).
Any test for applying judicial estoppel, not only in the
bankruptcy context but in other factual contexts as well,
must ensure that it captures the totality of the circum-
stances and consistently leads to equitable applications.
The Court rightfully vacates the decision below.