Pitchford v. Cain

1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
PITCHFORD v. CAIN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–7351. Argued March 31, 2026—Decided May 28, 2026
In 2004, two black teenagers, Terry Pitchford and Eric Bullins, robbed a
grocery store near Grenada, Mississippi. During the robbery, Bullins
shot and killed the white store owner. Bullins reached a plea agree-
ment and received a 20-year sentence for the homicide. The State
charged Pitchford with capital murder and sought the death penalty.
During jury selection at Pitchford’s trial, the prosecutor used peremp-
tory strikes against four of the five black potential jurors. As this
Court held in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, the Equal Protection
Clause bars prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based
on race. In Batson and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out a
three-step process for a trial court to determine whether a prosecutor
employed a peremptory challenge based on race. Here, Pitchford’s
counsel raised an objection under Batson and made a prima facie show-
ing that the strikes of the four black jurors were based on race (step
one). The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral reasons for
each strike, and the prosecutor offered reasons (step two). The trial
court declared the prosecutor’s stated reasons to be race neutral, but
the trial court did not afford defense counsel an opportunity to rebut
the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons as pretextual (step three); nor
did it make any findings regarding whether the prosecutor’s stated
reasons were pretextual. At the close of jury selection, defense counsel
sought to raise the Batson issue again, but the trial court twice cut off
defense counsel. The empaneled jury, consisting of 11 white jurors and
1 black juror, convicted Pitchford of capital murder and sentenced him
to death.
On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that
Pitchford had waived his Batson objection by not arguing to the trial
court that the prosecutor’s proffered explanations were pretextual.

2 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Syllabus
Pitchford later filed a habeas corpus petition in U. S. District Court.
Applying the applicable standard to obtain federal habeas relief under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the District
Court concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had unreasona-
bly applied Batson and had unreasonably determined that Pitchford
waived his Batson objection. The District Court explained that no state
court had conducted the full three-step Batson inquiry, and that the
trial court had “thwarted” the “attempt by Pitchford’s counsel to argue
pretext.” 706 F. Supp. 3d 614, 624. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
District Court, concluding that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
waiver finding was reasonable.
Held: The Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly
established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined that
Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted
race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospec-
tive jurors. Pp. 6–9.
(a) “[T]he job of enforcing Batson rests first and foremost with trial
judges.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284, 302. The bedrock prin-
ciple that a party ordinarily must raise an objection in the trial court
in order to preserve the issue for appeal applies in the Batson context.
See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411, 423. But here, the Mississippi trial
court erroneously omitted Batson’s third step: The trial court did not
afford Pitchford’s counsel a sufficient opportunity to rebut the prose-
cutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons for striking the four black jurors
and never determined whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were
pretextual. Pitchford’s counsel did not waive the Batson argument. As
the U. S. District Court explained, “Pitchford did object to the expla-
nations provided when he raised the issue again.” 706 F. Supp. 3d, at
624. The Mississippi trial court explicitly assured Pitchford’s counsel
that the Batson objection was preserved, stating: “I think you already
made those, and they are clear in the record.” 1 App. 175. Especially
given that specific assurance by the trial court, it was unreasonable for
the Mississippi Supreme Court to conclude that Pitchford waived the
Batson argument.
The State’s argument that Pitchford preserved his Batson objection
but nonetheless somehow waived his Batson pretext argument does
not make much sense and is not a reasonable reading of this record.
At that key point in the jury-selection process—after the prosecutor
had asserted facially race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes—
the Batson objection was a Batson pretext argument. Defense coun-
sel’s rebuttal necessarily would include a pretext argument—specifi-
cally, that similarly situated white jurors were not challenged by the
prosecutor. If allowed to continue, Pitchford could have argued that
the prosecutor did not challenge white jurors similarly situated to the

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
challenged black jurors, which is precisely what Pitchford’s post-trial
motion later did argue. In this case, the ordinary trial-court procedure
for resolving Batson claims at step three never occurred—notwith-
standing the repeated efforts of Pitchford’s counsel to pursue and pre-
serve the Batson objection. Pp. 6–8.
(b) The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act standard for
reviewing claims on federal habeas is deferential to the state court, but
deference does not mean abdication, and “deference does not by defini-
tion preclude relief.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 240. In light
of the entire record in this case, the Court agrees with the U. S. District
Court that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the
clearly established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined
that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s as-
serted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black
prospective jurors. 28 U. S. C. §§2254(d)(1), (2). P. 8.
126 F. 4th 422, reversed and remanded.
K
AVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined.

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1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–7351
TERRY PITCHFORD, PETITIONER v. BURL CAIN,
COMMISSIONER, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 28, 2026]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), this Court
held that the Equal Protection Clause bars prosecutors
from exercising peremptory challenges based on race. In
Batson and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out how
a trial court should determine whether a prosecutor
employed a peremptory challenge based on race. After the
defendant makes a prima facie showing that a peremptory
strike was based on race (step one), the prosecutor must
provide a race-neutral reason for the challenged strike (step
two). Then, at step three, defense counsel has an
opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason as
pretextual, and the trial court in turn decides whether the
prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for striking a juror is
pretextual “in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.”
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 252 (2005); see Flowers
v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284, 301–303 (2019); Snyder v.
Louisiana, 552 U. S. 472, 478–479 (2008).
In this capital case, the Mississippi trial court never
conducted the essential third step of the Batson inquiry.
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Pitchford’s

2 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Opinion of the Court
conviction and death sentence—but only by concluding that
Pitchford had waived his opportunity to rebut the
prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons as pretextual at Batson’s
third step. On habeas review, the U. S. District Court
determined that Pitchford had not waived rebuttal and that
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). The District Court
therefore granted relief to Pitchford. But the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. This Court granted
certiorari, 607 U. S. 1094 (2025), and we now reverse the
judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals.
I
A
The relevant factual background is as follows: In 2004,
two black teenagers, Terry Pitchford and Eric Bullins,
robbed a grocery store near Grenada, Mississippi—a small
town in Grenada County off I–55 in north-central
Mississippi. Grenada County was then about 60 percent
white and 40 percent black.
At the time of the robbery in 2004, Bullins was 16, and
Pitchford was 18. During the robbery, Bullins fired three
shots at the store owner, who was a white man, and killed
him. Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 223 (Miss. 2010); 706
F. Supp. 3d 614, 617 (ND Miss. 2023); 126 F. 4th 422, 424
(CA5 2025); Brief for Respondents 5.
Bullins, who fired the fatal shots, reached a plea
agreement and received a 20-year sentence for the
homicide. 1 App. 294, n. 46. Pitchford also fired a gun,
which was loaded with rat shot. It has been disputed
whether he shot at the store owner or fired his gun into the
store floor. Cf. 706 F. Supp. 3d, at 617. In any event, for
Pitchford, the State charged capital murder and sought the
death penalty.
During jury selection at Pitchford’s trial in Mississippi
state court, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
four of the five black potential jurors. In response,
Pitchford’s counsel raised a Batson objection. 1 App. 167–
168. The trial court asked the prosecutor for race-neutral
reasons for striking each of the four black potential jurors.
According to the prosecutor, one had returned 15 minutes
late to court, two others had brothers convicted of violent
offenses, and the fourth, like Pitchford, was young,
unmarried, and a father. Id., at 169–170. As the prosecutor
offered reasons for striking each of the jurors, the trial court
declared each to be race neutral. Upon hearing the
prosecutor’s reason for the last strike, the trial court stated
that “[t]he Court finds that to be race neutral as well,” and
pivoted immediately to the defense’s peremptory strikes.
Id., at 170. At that time, the trial court did not afford
defense counsel an opportunity to rebut as pretextual the
prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking the four black
jurors, nor did the trial court make any findings regarding
whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were pretextual.
In other words, as the U. S. District Court later explained
on habeas review, the trial court “full-stop ended its Batson
analysis” at step two and never proceeded to step three. 706
F. Supp. 3d, at 623.
At the close of jury selection, defense counsel sought to
raise the Batson issue again. But the trial court twice cut
off defense counsel and ended the inquiry before counsel
could try to rebut as pretextual the race-neutral reasons
articulated by the prosecution: “I think you already made
those, and they are clear in the record. For the reasons
previously stated, first the Court finds there to be no—well,
all the reasons were race neutral as to members that were
struck by the district attorney’s office. And so the, the
Court finds there to be no Batson violation.” 1 App. 175.
1
——————
1
During jury selection, Pitchford also separately raised a fair cross-
section argument. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 357, 363–364
(1979). That claim is not at issue here.

4 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Opinion of the Court
The empaneled jury consisted of 11 white jurors and 1
black juror. The jury convicted Pitchford of capital murder
and sentenced him to death.
In the trial court, Pitchford then filed a motion for a new
trial that raised numerous issues, including Batson. As
relevant here, Pitchford advanced the argument that he
was prevented from making during jury selection—that the
prosecutor’s stated reasons for the peremptory challenges
were pretextual because the prosecutor “deselected black
people from the jury panel who had the same familial,
living, social or marital circumstances as whites who were
not deselected, which is a clear violation of Batson and
Miller-El.” 1 App. 184. The trial court summarily denied
Pitchford’s motion.
B
For the last 20-plus years while in prison, Pitchford has
pursued appellate and collateral challenges to his
conviction and death sentence. In his direct appeal to the
Mississippi Supreme Court, Pitchford renewed his Batson
argument—in particular, that the prosecutor’s purported
race-neutral reasons for striking the four black prospective
jurors were pretextual. In a divided opinion, the
Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Pitchford had
waived his Batson objection by not arguing to the trial court
that the prosecutor’s proffered explanations were
pretextual. See 45 So. 3d, at 227–228. Justice Graves,
joined by Justice Kitchens, dissented, reasoning that
Pitchford had not waived his Batson objection and that the
prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking the black jurors
were pretextual. Id., at 260–268.
Pitchford later filed a habeas corpus petition in the U. S.
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. To
obtain federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pitchford was required
to clear a high bar—namely, to establish that the

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States” or “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U. S. C. §§2254(d)(1), (2).
Applying that AEDPA standard, the U. S. District Court
concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had
unreasonably applied Batson and had unreasonably
determined that Pitchford waived his Batson objection. The
District Court stated: “Simply put, no state court—whether
it be the majority in the Mississippi Supreme Court or the
trial court—conducted a full three-step Batson inquiry on
the State’s use of its peremptory strikes . . . . The trial court,
seemingly eager to proceed to the case itself, quickly
deemed the reasons as race-neutral and moved on.” 706 F.
Supp. 3d, at 626. The District Court further explained that
Pitchford had not waived his Batson claim. The District
Court noted that Pitchford initially raised a Batson
objection. And after the trial court completed the jury
selection process, Pitchford “raised the issue again and
confirmed it was on the record.” Id., at 624. But the
Mississippi trial court “thwarted,” although “likely
unintentionally,” the “attempt by Pitchford’s counsel to
argue pretext,” thus affording Pitchford “no chance to rebut
the State’s explanations and prove purposeful
discrimination.” Ibid.
For those reasons, the U. S. District Court ruled that the
Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the
clearly established Batson precedents and unreasonably
determined that Pitchford had waived his opportunity to
rebut the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons at
Batson’s third step. Id., at 627. The U. S. Court of Appeals
then reversed the District Court, concluding that the
Mississippi Supreme Court’s waiver finding was
reasonable. See 126 F. 4th, at 431.

6 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Opinion of the Court
II
As this Court has stated, “America’s trial judges operate
at the front lines of American justice,” and “the job of
enforcing Batson rests first and foremost with trial judges.”
Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284, 302 (2019). But here,
as the U. S. District Court explained, the Mississippi trial
court erroneously omitted Batson’s third step: In
particular, the trial court did not afford Pitchford’s counsel
a sufficient opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s proffered
race-neutral reasons for striking the four black jurors and
never determined whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons
were pretextual. And as the U. S. District Court further
stated, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s conclusion that
Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s
proffered race-neutral reasons was unreasonable.
To be clear, in state and federal courts, a party ordinarily
must raise an objection in the trial court in order to
preserve the issue for appeal. The Batson context is no
exception to that bedrock principle. See Ford v. Georgia,
498 U. S. 411, 423 (1991).
2
But as the U. S. District Court explained, “Pitchford did
object to the explanations provided when he raised the issue
again and confirmed it was on the record. Perhaps
Pitchford’s counsel should have been more assertive, but . . .
there was no waiver by Pitchford.” 706 F. Supp. 3d 614, 624
(ND Miss. 2023).
Notably, moreover, the Mississippi trial court explicitly
assured Pitchford’s counsel that the Batson objection was
preserved. When Pitchford’s counsel attempted to raise
Batson again after the prosecutor’s race-neutral
explanations for the four peremptory strikes of black jurors,
the trial court responded: “I think you already made those,
——————
2
In the trial court, a defendant might explicitly waive any Batson
objection or might forfeit a Batson objection by, for example, failing to
timely assert it.

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
and they are clear in the record.” 1 App. 175. Especially in
light of that specific assurance by the trial court, it was
unreasonable for the Mississippi Supreme Court to
conclude that Pitchford waived the Batson argument.
To try to overcome those problems with the Mississippi
Supreme Court’s waiver determination, the State asserts
that Pitchford’s defense counsel preserved a Batson
objection but not a Batson pretext argument. That slices
Batson way too thin. At that key point in the jury-selection
process—after the prosecutor had asserted facially race-
neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes—the Batson
objection was a Batson pretext argument. In other words,
defense counsel’s rebuttal necessarily would include a
pretext argument—specifically, that similarly situated
white jurors were not challenged by the prosecutor. See
Flowers, 588 U. S., at 301–302. If allowed to continue,
Pitchford therefore could have argued that the prosecutor
did not challenge white jurors similarly situated to the
challenged black jurors, which is precisely what Pitchford’s
post-trial motion later did argue. In that post-trial motion,
Pitchford contended that “the prosecution’s state of mind
was clearly racially discriminatory as it deselected black
people from the jury panel who had the same familial,
living, social or marital circumstances as whites who were
not deselected, which is a clear violation of Batson and
Miller-El.” 1 App. 184. The bottom line: The State’s
argument—that Pitchford preserved his Batson objection
but nonetheless somehow waived his Batson pretext
argument—does not make much sense and is not a
reasonable reading of this record.
3
——————
3
For its part, the dissent speculates that Pitchford’s counsel, at step
three, was seeking to make only a statistical argument, not an argument
that similarly situated white jurors were not challenged. Post, at 7–8
(opinion of G
ORSUCH, J.). To begin, that speculation does not reflect how
the Batson inquiry ordinarily operates. At step three, after the

8 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
Opinion of the Court
We need not belabor the matter. After a prosecutor
asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, the
defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue
that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual
reasons—that is, the reasons were pretextual. Then, the
trial court can determine whether those asserted reasons
were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual. In this
case, whether due to confusion, oversight, an overly hurried
jury selection process, or some other cause, things broke
down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving
Batson claims at step three never occurred—
notwithstanding the repeated efforts of Pitchford’s counsel
to pursue and preserve the Batson objection.
To be sure, the AEDPA standard for reviewing claims on
federal habeas is deferential to the state court. See
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412–413 (2000);
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102–103 (2011); Brown
v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 135 (2022); Klein v. Martin, 607
U. S. 213, 220–221 (2026) (per curiam). But deference does
not mean abdication, and “deference does not by definition
preclude relief.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 240
(2005) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). In light of
the entire record in this case, we agree with the U. S.
District Court that the Mississippi Supreme Court
unreasonably applied the clearly established Batson
precedents and unreasonably determined that Pitchford
waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted
race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four
black prospective jurors. 28 U. S. C. §§2254(d)(1), (2).
——————
prosecution has offered its facially race-neutral reasons, defense counsel
typically tries to show (because it is often the only way of proving a
Batson violation at step three) that similarly situated white jurors were
treated differently and not challenged. In any event, the more
fundamental point here is that the Mississippi trial court prevented
Pitchford’s counsel from pursuing a Batson argument at step three.

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–7351
TERRY PITCHFORD, PETITIONER v. BURL CAIN,
COMMISSIONER, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 28, 2026]
JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE
ALITO, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, dissenting.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may grant habeas corpus
relief to state prisoners only in narrowly defined circum-
stances. Appreciating as much, this Court has repeatedly
overturned lower-court decisions that have failed to respect
AEDPA’s constraints. See, e.g., Klein v. Martin, 607 U. S.
213 (2026) (per curiam); Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U. S. 731
(2021) (per curiam); Mays v. Hines, 592 U. S. 385 (2021)
(per curiam). Today, the Court looks past those constraints,
and its own admonitions, to issue a judgment that AEDPA
precludes. Respectfully, I dissent.
I
In 2004, Terry Pitchford and an accomplice robbed a store
in Mississippi. At the end of it, the store’s owner, Reuben
Britt, lay dead. Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 222–223
(Miss. 2010) (en banc). A state-court trial followed in which
a jury found Mr. Pitchford guilty of murder and sentenced
him to death, concluding that he “actually killed R[e]uben
Britt, . . . intended the killing of R[e]uben Britt[,] . . . and

2 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
. . . contemplated that lethal force would be employed.”
Trial Tr. 812.
1
This case concerns what happened during jury selection.
Midway through that process, Mr. Pitchford’s trial team ob-
jected that prosecutors were using their peremptory strikes
to exclude black prospective jurors in violation of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). 1 App. 167–168.
To resolve objections like that, Batson provides a three-
step framework. First, a defendant must make a “prima
facie showing” that prosecutors have struck prospective ju-
rors “on the basis of race.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S.
472, 476 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). One
common way to meet this burden is statistical—if prosecu-
tors have struck black prospective jurors at a higher rate
than white prospective jurors, that may suggest discrimi-
nation. Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. 284, 302 (2019).
Another common way to meet this burden is comparative—
if “side-by-side comparisons” show prosecutors have struck
black prospective jurors while accepting similar white pro-
spective jurors, that too may suggest discrimination. Ibid.
Should a defendant make a prima facie case, the court
then moves to step two. There, “the prosecution must offer
a race-neutral basis” for each strike. Snyder, 552 U. S., at
476–477 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the prose-
cution does so, the court proceeds to step three: The defend-
ant can try to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons
as “pretextual,” and ultimately the court must determine
whether the prosecution’s strikes were in fact based on
——————
1
To be sure, Mr. Pitchford has advanced various accounts of what hap-
pened the day of the robbery. Initially, he denied he was present at all.
See 1 App. 195. Later, he said he only fired his gun into the floor and did
not shoot Mr. Britt. Ibid.; id., at 329, n. 54. But later still, he acknowl-
edged the existence of “admissible proof” showing he did shoot Mr. Britt.
Id., at 329; see also Pitchford, 45 So. 3d, at 260. And, whatever his view
of the facts may be, there is no dispute that a jury found he “inten[tion-
ally]” and “actually killed R[e]uben Britt.” Trial Tr. 812.

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
purposeful discrimination. Id., at 477, 485. As at step one,
defendants commonly use statistical and comparative juror
arguments at step three.
In this case, Mr. Pitchford made his prima facie case
based on a statistical argument. The prosecution, he noted,
had refrained from striking only “one African-American ju-
ror out of the five that ha[d] thus far . . . arisen on the ve-
nire.” 1 App. 167. And, Mr. Pitchford continued, “this is
already a disproportiona[tely] white jury [pool] for the pop-
ulation of this county.” Id., at 167–168.
The trial judge agreed that Mr. Pitchford had made a
prima facie case under Batson and thus required the State
to offer race-neutral reasons for each of the peremptory
strikes it had used on black prospective jurors. The State
did so. One prospective juror, it said, had returned late to
court after lunch break and had a history of mental prob-
lems. 1 App. 86–88, 169. Two had brothers who had been
convicted of violent offenses. Id., at 169–170. Another “had
no opinion on the death penalty.” Id., at 170. Plus, he was
similar to Mr. Pitchford in several ways: They were “ap-
proximately the [same] age,” they “both ha[d] children
about the same age,” and they “both ha[d] never been mar-
ried.” Ibid.
The judge accepted these reasons as race neutral and di-
rected the parties to resume jury selection. Ibid. Mr. Pitch-
ford did not object to that direction or otherwise seek to
make a step three showing. Instead, after jury selection
concluded, Mr. Pitchford’s trial team approached the bench.
There, they sought “to reserve . . . [their] Batson objection.”
Id., at 175. The court agreed the Batson objection was “in
the record,” but “f[ound] there to be no Batson violation.”
Ibid. At that point, defense counsel reiterated their earlier
statistical argument. “[O]ne,” “[a]nd only one,” of the final
jury panel selected for service, Mr. Pitchford’s lawyers said,
was black even though the “county is approximately . . . 40
percent black.” Id., at 176.

4 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
After that exchange, the case proceeded to trial and, in
the end, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Seeking to undo
that verdict later, Mr. Pitchford filed a motion for a new
trial based in part on his statistical Batson argument. 1
App. 179, 184, 186. But for the first time, he also briefly
introduced a new comparative juror argument, asserting in
one sentence that the prosecution had improperly “dese-
lected black people from the jury panel who had the same
familial, living, social or marital circumstances as whites
who were not deselected.” Id., at 184.
After the trial court denied Mr. Pitchford’s motion, he ap-
pealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. There, Mr. Pitch-
ford continued to press the statistical argument he had
made during jury selection. Id., at 209–210, 223–225. But
now he directed most of his efforts to the separate compar-
ative juror argument he introduced for the first time after
trial, drawing detailed comparisons in his appellate brief
between white jurors who were not struck and the four
black jurors who were. Id., at 210–223.
The Mississippi Supreme Court analyzed Mr. Pitchford’s
Batson claim this way. At step one, the court upheld the
trial court’s ruling that Mr. Pitchford’s statistical argument
sufficed to make out a prima facie case. Pitchford, 45
So. 3d, at 224–226. It also upheld the trial court’s step two
ruling that the prosecution’s reasons were race neutral. Id.,
at 226–227. And when it came to step three, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that Mr. Pitchford hadn’t carried his
ultimate burden to show purposeful discrimination. See
id., at 227–228.
He hadn’t, the court ruled, because he had failed to rebut
the State’s step two submission in the trial court. Put
simply, Mr. Pitchford had “waive[d]” any step three argu-
ment. Id., at 227, n. 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Yes, Mr. Pitchford “devoted a considerable portion” of his
appellate brief to a step three comparative juror argument,
expanding on the one-sentence version he introduced for

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
the first time in his post-trial motion. Id., at 227. But, the
court held, Mr. Pitchford had not adequately presented this
argument to the trial court in the first instance. Ibid. And,
the court added, it could “not now fault the trial judge with
failing to discern whether the State’s race-neutral reasons
were overcome by rebuttal evidence and argument never
presented.” Ibid.
Following his loss in state court, Mr. Pitchford sought ha-
beas relief in federal court. Among other things, he argued
that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s waiver holding was
unreasonable. The district court agreed and granted relief,
explaining that it “view[ed] the record a bit differently”
than the Mississippi Supreme Court had. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 22. In the district court’s view, the state trial court
had “failed to provide” Mr. Pitchford with any “opportunity”
to make a step three argument “rebut[ting]” the prosecu-
tion’s proffered race-neutral reasons. Ibid. The Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
waiver finding was both reasonable and, indeed, correct.
126 F. 4th 422, 429, 431 (2025). We granted certiorari. 607
U. S. 1094 (2025).
II
To secure federal habeas relief under AEDPA, Mr. Pitch-
ford must shoulder a considerable burden. Pursuant to 28
U. S. C. §2254(a), he must prove that he is being held in
custody in violation of the Constitution or federal laws. In
this case, that means Mr. Pitchford must show his trial was
in fact infected by a Batson violation. In addition to that
showing, he must make one of two further showings. Under
§2254(d)(1), he must demonstrate that the Mississippi Su-
preme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an un-
reasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”
Or, under §2254(d)(2), he must demonstrate that the court’s
“decision was based on an unreasonable determination of

6 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
the facts in light of the evidence presented” in state court.
See Klein, 607 U. S., at 220.
This Court has long recognized the rigor of §2254(d)’s re-
quirements. Showing legal error, we have said, isn’t
enough to satisfy §2254(d)(1). Instead, a petitioner must
demonstrate that “no fairminded jurist could reach the
state court’s conclusion under this Court’s precedents.”
Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 135 (2022) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Likewise, to sat-
isfy §2254(d)(2), “it is not enough to show that reasonable
minds reviewing the record might disagree about the [fac-
tual] finding in question.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Instead, the finding must have so little support
in the record that only an “unreasonable” jurist could make
it. §2254(d)(2); see also §2254(e)(1).
As I see things, Mr. Pitchford has failed to satisfy either
of these standards. Start with §2254(d)(1). The Court to-
day seems to think the Mississippi Supreme Court “unrea-
sonably” applied our clearly established precedents by con-
cluding that Mr. Pitchford “waived” any step three
argument. Ante, at 8. But in Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411
(1991), we said that States enjoy authority to fashion their
own preservation rules governing Batson claims. 498 U. S.,
at 423. And taking us at our word, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has adopted just such a rule: Any Batson argument
not adequately presented in a trial court is “waived.” See
Pitchford, 45 So. 3d, at 227, and n. 16 (collecting cases).
Nothing about that rule defies our clearly established prec-
edents.
2
——————
2
Where Mississippi preservation law operates on an argument-by-ar-
gument basis, we have sometimes said ours operates on a claim-by-claim
basis. See Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S.
374, 379 (1995). And what Mississippi calls “waiver,” we would ordinar-
ily call “forfeiture.” See Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chi-
cago, 583 U. S. 17, 20, n. 1 (2017). But our preferences on these matters

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
Nor does the Mississippi Supreme Court’s application of
its rule offend any of our precedents. The court recognized
that Mr. Pitchford had preserved a step one statistical ar-
gument, but held that he had waived the step three com-
parative juror argument he sought to press on appeal by
failing to raise it during jury selection or trial. See id., at
227–228. The Court today suggests this analysis “slices
Batson . . . too thin[ly].” Ante, at 7. Yet it nowhere pauses
to identify any of our clearly established precedents the
Mississippi Supreme Court supposedly defied or mistook.
Turn next to §2254(d)(2). The Court concludes that the
Mississippi Supreme Court’s waiver holding rests on an
“unreasonable” reading of the trial record. Ante, at 6–7. Af-
ter all, the Court observes, Mr. Pitchford didn’t entirely
forgo a comparative juror argument in the trial court; his
motion for a new trial included a line devoted to just that
topic. Ante, at 7; 1 App. 184. But be that as it may, the
Court does not (and cannot) explain how it was unreasona-
ble for the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine that
Mr. Pitchford waived a Batson argument he never made
during jury selection and introduced for the first time only
in a single sentence in a post-trial motion.
Perhaps sensing the problem, the Court ultimately rests
its §2254(d)(2) analysis on a different ground. Citing the
exchange that took place at the end of jury selection, the
Court says that the state trial court “explicitly assured” de-
fense counsel that the “Batson objection was preserved.”
Ante, at 6. And this assurance, the Court reasons, must
mean that Mr. Pitchford adequately preserved the step
three comparative juror argument he sought to make before
the Mississippi Supreme Court.
——————
do not bind the State. See Ford, 498 U. S., at 423. And for that reason,
I use the term “waiver” here the same way the Mississippi Supreme
Court did.

8 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
But that much is far from clear. Rather than announcing
an intent to raise a new step three comparative juror argu-
ment at the conclusion of jury selection, Mr. Pitchford’s at-
torneys said only that they “want[ed] to reserve . . . [their]
Batson objection,” which sounds like a reference to the step
one statistical argument they had made earlier. 1 App. 175.
Supporting that inference, counsel proceeded to repeat the
same statistical argument they had already made. Id., at
175–176. True, resting on that point alone might not have
been the best move. But considering what happened later,
it hardly seems an unlikely explanation. After his appeal
to the Mississippi Supreme Court failed, Mr. Pitchford
sought state post-conviction relief. And in support of that
effort, one of his trial attorneys expressly represented that
she had “‘failed to challenge the prosecution’s reasons as
pretextual at trial’” and that she “did not . . . do anything
to . . . reserve” the pretext argument Mr. Pitchford sought
to press on appeal. App. to Brief for Respondents 40a, 77a.
Of course, Mr. Pitchford now advances a very different
reading of the trial court record. Now, he says his lawyers
did seek to preserve a step three comparative juror argu-
ment at the conclusion of jury selection. To be sure, Mr.
Pitchford admits, his lawyers did not ask the trial court to
compare any seated white juror with any struck black juror.
But, he suggests, that is only because the court cut off his
attorneys and didn’t allow them to get the argument out.
See Brief for Petitioner 33–35.
That account is difficult to credit as well. Not only is it
inconsistent with his own attorney’s representation that
she failed to preserve a pretext argument. Nothing in the
record indicates a trial court seeking to thwart defense
counsel’s ability to represent their client. In fact, the record
shows that Mr. Pitchford’s attorneys were more than capa-
ble of speaking up when they had something to say. For
just one example, consider the page of the transcript follow-
ing the initial Batson exchange. On that one page alone,

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
counsel cut off another lawyer, raised an objection, and then
interrupted the trial judge mid-sentence to make another
point. 1 App. 171. There are plenty of other examples like
it. See, e.g., id., at 158–160, 164–165.
Put simply, Mr. Pitchford’s account of a muzzled defense
team is hard to square with the record. But even if it were
a plausible account, that still would not be enough. Under
§2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must show not only
that his version of events is plausible. He must show that
the record “compel[s]” it. Rice v. Collins, 546 U. S. 333, 341
(2006). And no matter how generously one interprets the
record in this case, that is a standard Mr. Pitchford cannot
meet. It is just as reasonable, if not more so, to conclude
that Mr. Pitchford’s attorneys meant to “reserve” only the
statistical argument they had made at step one—not a step
three comparative juror argument they never mentioned at
any point during jury selection or trial. 1 App. 175. Reflect-
ing as much, not only did the Mississippi Supreme Court
read the record differently than Mr. Pitchford now does.
The Fifth Circuit did too, holding that the Mississippi Su-
preme Court’s waiver conclusion was not only reasonable
but correct. 126 F. 4th, at 429.
In response to all this, the Court insists that “defense
counsel typically” make a step three comparative juror ar-
gument before the trial court. Ante, at 7–8, n. 3. Perhaps
that is right. But the Court points to nothing in the record
showing that Mr. Pitchford’s counsel made such an argu-
ment in this case. The Court reasserts, too, its “fundamen-
tal point” that, even if Mr. Pitchford’s counsel failed to pre-
sent a step three comparative juror argument, it was only
because the trial court “prevented” them from doing so.
Ante, at 8, n. 3. But the Court’s repetition of its point serves
only to highlight its failure to cite anything in the record
supporting, much less compelling, its conclusion. See Rice,
546 U. S., at 341.

10 PITCHFORD v. CAIN
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
*
In short, I respectfully dissent because, as I see it, the
Court’s opinion errs on the law and the factual record alike.
But if the Court’s decision is mistaken, at least its impact
is limited. Precisely because so many of our AEDPA prece-
dents go unmentioned, I do not read today’s decision as call-
ing any of them into question. Notably, too, the Court is-
sues a narrow judgment, holding only that Mr. Pitchford
did not waive a step three Batson argument without dictat-
ing what further proceedings may be appropriate on re-
mand consistent with §2254.