Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1
Pages 155–162
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
January 20, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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155
Syllabus
CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v.
BUR
TON, chapter 7 trustee for VISTA-PRO
AUTOMOTIVE, LLC
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 24–808. Argued November 4, 2025—Decided January 20, 2026
The question in this case is whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(c)(1)'s requirement that parties make Rule 60(b) motions within a
“reasonable time” applies to a motion seeking relief from an allegedly
void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, en-
tered bankruptcy in 2014 and initiated adversarial proceedings against
Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., to collect $50,000 in allegedly
unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro attempted to serve process on Coney Island
by mail but purportedly failed to comply with Federal Rule of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(3)'s mail-service requirements. Coney Island
did not fle an answer, and the Bankruptcy Court entered a default judg-
ment. Over the next six years, Vista-Pro's bankruptcy trustee at-
tempted to enforce the judgment. These efforts bore fruit in 2021
when a marshal seized funds from Coney Island's bank account in satis-
faction of the judgment. Coney Island fled a motion to vacate the
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, arguing that Vista-
Pro's failure to make proper service rendered the judgment void. The
Bankruptcy Court denied relief, holding that Coney Island failed to
abide by Rule 60's requirement that parties make motions for relief
within a “reasonable time.” The District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affrmed.
Held: Rule 60(c)(1)'s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that
a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4). Pp. 158–162.
(a) The plain text of Rule 60(c)(1) provides that a “motion under Rule
60(b) must be made within a reasonable time,” and because a motion for
relief from an allegedly void judgment is a “motion under Rule 60(b),”
the reasonable-time limit applies. The structure of Rule 60 confrms
the plain-text interpretation. Rule 60 expressly modifes the default
reasonable-time limit, imposing a 1-year limit on Rule 60(b) motions
alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fraud. Yet the Rule does not in-
clude an analogous unlimited-time principle for motions alleging void-
ness. P. 158.
(b) The Court rejects the argument that because a “void judgment is
a legal nullity,” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U. S.

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156 CONEY
ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v.
BURTON
Syllabus
260, 270, no time limit should apply. Even if the passage of time cannot
cure
voidness, the same principle holds true for most legal errors, yet
statutes and rules routinely limit the time during which a party can
seek relief from a judgment infected by error. A party would need to
show that some principle of law, such as the Due Process Clause, gives
a party the right to allege voidness at any time, but Coney Island dis-
claims any such argument, and the Court cannot divine any such prin-
ciple. Allowing parties to allege voidness at any time would have
extreme implications, such as allowing parties to ignore deadlines for
fling notices of appeal or petitions for certiorari when subject-matter
jurisdiction is contested. The possibility that improper service is dif-
ferent from other legal errors because a party might not learn about
proceedings until long after judgment issues does not help Coney Island.
Rule 60(c)(1) accommodates such a scenario by imposing a reasonable-
time requirement rather than a fxed time limit. In the context of a
default judgment, it might be reasonable for a defendant not to seek
relief before learning about a plaintiff's attempted enforcement.
Pp. 159–160.
(c) The Court rejects Coney Island's argument that courts have his-
torically allowed litigants to seek relief from void judgments at any
time. No such historical consensus exists, and in any event, for Rule
60(b) motions, the Rule's text and structure take priority over historical
practice. The Court also rejects Coney Island's reliance on Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694,
as that case undermines Coney Island's plea for no time limits. Lastly,
the Court rejects Coney Island's invocation of policy concerns, Rule 60's
drafting history, and the canon of constitutional avoidance. To the ex-
tent that these interpretive tools carry any weight, they do so only when
a Rule's language is ambiguous. Pp. 160–161.
109 F. 4th 438, affrmed.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson,
JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 162.
Daniel Ginzburg argued the cause and fled briefs for
petitioner.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondent. With her
on the brief were Charles L. McCloud, Erin M. Sielaff, and
Phillip G. Young, Jr.

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 155 (2026)
157
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
A
party seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment
may fle a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(4). Rule 60(c)(1) requires parties to make Rule 60(b)
motions within a “reasonable time.” We hold that this time
limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void.
I
Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, entered bankruptcy in 2014.
As part of its bankruptcy litigation, Vista-Pro initiated ad-
versarial proceedings against Coney Island Auto Parts Un-
limited, Inc., to collect $50,000 in allegedly unpaid invoices.
Vista-Pro attempted to serve process on Coney Island by
mail, but in doing so, it purportedly failed to comply with
the mail-service requirements in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7004(b)(3).
Coney Island did not fle an answer in the adversarial pro-
ceedings, and the Bankruptcy Court entered a default judg-
ment against the company in 2015. Over the next six years,
Vista-Pro's bankruptcy trustee attempted to enforce that
judgment against Coney Island. As part of these efforts,
the trustee sent a demand letter to the company's CEO in
April 2016. Lower courts concluded that this letter gave
Coney Island notice of the judgment and the trustee's en-
forcement efforts.
These efforts bore fruit in 2021 when a marshal seized
funds from Coney Island's bank account in satisfaction of the
judgment. In response, Coney Island fled a motion to va-
cate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60. According to Coney Island, Vista-Pro's failure to make
proper service rendered the judgment void.
The Bankruptcy Court denied relief. It held that Coney
Island failed to abide by Rule 60's requirement that parties
make motions for relief within a “reasonable time.” The
District Court and Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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158 CONEY
ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v.
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Opinion of the Court
affrmed. We granted certiorari to resolve a split of author-
ity
on whether Rule 60's reasonable-time limit applies to mo-
tions seeking relief from allegedly void judgments.
1
605
U. S. 1001 (2025).
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 permits a court to “re-
lieve a party . . . from a fnal judgment, order, or proceeding,”
and subdivision (b)(4) specifcally authorizes a court to grant
relief from a “void” judgment.
2
Parties may seek relief
under Rule 60 by fling a motion with the court.
Rule 60 also imposes a time limit for such motions. Rule
60(c)(1) provides that a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be
made within a reasonable time.” Because a motion for relief
from an allegedly void judgment is a “motion under Rule
60(b),” the reasonable-time limit applies. Accord, Kemp v.
United States, 596 U. S. 528, 533 (2022) (“All [Rule 60(b) mo-
tions] must be fled `within a reasonable time' ”).
The structure of Rule 60 confrms what the plain text of
subdivision (c)(1) provides. When Rule 60 modifes the de-
fault reasonable-time limit, it does so expressly. For exam-
ple, Rule 60(c)(1) imposes a 1-year limit on Rule 60(b) mo-
tions alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fraud. Thus, one
would expect Rule 60 to include an analogous provision if a
special, unlimited-time principle applied to motions alleging
voidness. Cf. Kemp, 596 U. S., at 534–535. But the Rule
does not.
1
Compare In re Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, 109 F. 4th 438, 444 (CA6
2024) (case below), with Austin v. Smith, 312 F. 2d 337, 343 (CADC 1962);
V. T. A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F. 2d 220, 224, and n. 9 (CA10 1979); Rodd
v. Region Constr. Co., 783 F. 2d 89, 91 (CA7 1986); Hertz Corp. v. Alamo
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F. 3d 1126, 1130 (CA11 1994); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v.
Ceramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F. 3d 849, 852 (CA1 1998); United States v.
One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F. 3d 147, 157–158 (CA3 2000) (en banc);
Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F. 3d 515, 523 (CA5 2002).
2
Rule 60 governs motions to set aside default judgments, Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 55(c), including those issued in bankruptcy proceedings, Fed. Rules
Bkrtcy. Proc. 7055 and 9024.
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as: 607 U. S. 155 (2026)
159
Opinion of the Court
Coney Island, several Courts of Appeals, and a prominent
treatise
nonetheless maintain that Rule 60(c)(1)'s reasonable-
time limit does not apply to motions alleging voidness. See
n. 1, supra; 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 2862, pp. 431–433 (3d ed. 2012). These
authorities acknowledge that their interpretation clashes
with Rule 60's text. See, e. g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Ce-
ramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F. 3d 849, 852 (CA1 1998). But
relying on the generally accepted maxim that a “void judg-
ment is a legal nullity,” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 559 U. S. 260, 270 (2010), they argue that the pas-
sage of time cannot turn such a nullity into an enforceable
judgment. See, e. g., Austin v. Smith, 312 F. 2d 337, 343
(CADC 1962).
This argument cannot bear the weight that Coney Island
and others have placed on it. Even if the passage of time
cannot cure voidness, the same principle holds true for most
legal errors. Nevertheless, statutes and rules routinely
limit the time during which a party can seek relief from a
judgment infected by error. Therefore, a party in Coney
Island's position would need to show that some principle of
law, such as the Due Process Clause, gives a party the right
to allege voidness at any time.
Coney Island disclaims any such argument, and we cannot
divine any principle requiring courts to keep their doors per-
petually open to allegations of voidness. Giving a party a
“reasonable” time to seek relief from an allegedly void judg-
ment may well be all that due process demands. By con-
trast, the argument that a party may allege voidness at any
time, if taken to its logical conclusion, would have extreme
implications. For example, if a federal district court errone-
ously concluded that it possessed subject-matter jurisdiction
and proceeded to enter a judgment, the adversely affected
party could wait as long as it wanted before fling a notice of
appeal. But see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1). Similarly, if
a federal court of appeals erroneously asserted subject-

160 CONEY
ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v.
BURTON
Opinion of the Court
matter jurisdiction, the adversely affected party would not
be
required to comply with the deadline for fling a petition
for a writ of certiorari imposed by this Court's Rule 13. It
is hard to accept the proposition that due process requires
such a regime.
3
Coney Island maintains that the alleged defect in this
case—failure to perform proper service—is different from
other legal errors that might render a judgment void.
4
Coney Island emphasizes that when a party does not receive
proper service, it might not learn about the proceedings until
long after the judgment issues. But this possibility does not
help Coney Island's position. Rule 60(c)(1) accommodates
such a scenario by imposing a reasonable-time requirement,
rather than a fxed time limit. And in the context of a de-
fault judgment, it might be reasonable for a defendant not to
seek relief before learning about a plaintiff 's attempted
enforcement.
Coney Island separately contends that courts have histori-
cally allowed litigants to seek relief from void judgments at
any time. But the historical record is not so clear. To be
sure, courts have granted relief from void judgments long
after their entry, especially when the issuing court lacked
jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e. g., Harris v. Harde-
man, 14 How. 334, 338, 344–346 (1853) (affrming a lower
court order that set aside a judgment 11 years after its issu-
ance where the plaintiff did not make proper service and
the defendant did not appear). But there was no historical
consensus that a party could request such relief at any time.
3
Justice Sotomayor contends that we should abstain from addressing
any potential due-process considerations. Post, at 162 (opinion concurring
in judgment). Although Coney Island disclaims any constitutional argu-
ment, it cites a longstanding consensus of authority holding that a party
may allege voidness at any time despite the contrary language in Rule 60.
And the only possible basis for such a holding is a rule of constitutional law
that prevents the imposition of the Rule's reasonable-time requirement.
4
We express no view on whether the allegedly defective service in this
case would render the judgment void.
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as: 607 U. S. 155 (2026)
161
Opinion of the Court
Some courts, for instance, concluded that laches or other
ti
me limits could bar relief, even when a litigant alleged void-
ness. E. g., Stocking v. Hanson, 35 Minn. 207, 211–212, 28
N. W. 507, 507–508 (1886); Smith v. Jones, 174 Cal. 513, 515–
517, 163 P. 890, 890–892 (1917). In any event, for Rule 60(b)
motions, the Rule's “text and structure” take priority over
historical practice.
5
See Honeycutt v. United States, 581
U. S. 443, 453 (2017).
Coney Island turns next to this Court's decision in Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U. S. 694 (1982). There, we explained that a defendant
seeking to dispute personal jurisdiction is “always free to
ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and
then challenge that judgment . . . in a collateral proceeding.”
Id., at 706. Citing this sentence, Coney Island argues that
defendants need not comply with time limits when alleging
a lack of personal jurisdiction. But Insurance Corp. also
recognized that the “expression of legal rights is often sub-
ject to certain procedural rules,” and “the failure to enter a
timely objection” may result in the loss of a legal right. Id.,
at 705. Thus, Insurance Corp. undermines Coney Island's
plea for no time limits.
Coney Island lastly invokes policy concerns, Rule 60's
drafting history, and the canon of constitutional avoidance.
To the extent that these interpretive tools carry any weight,
they do so only when a Rule's language is ambiguous. See
BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S.
230, 245 (2021); Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562,
572 (2011); Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. 374, 393–
394 (2021). Here, the operative language clearly requires
parties to make Rule 60(b) motions within a reasonable time.
5
Rule 60(d) preserves parties' ability to obtain relief from a judgment
in limited ways other than through a Rule 60(b) motion. We express no
view regarding the limits applicable to obtaining relief through one of
those methods.
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162 CONEY
ISLAND AUTO PARTS UNLIMITED, INC. v.
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Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment
III
Litigants
seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(4) must comply
with Rule 60(c)(1) and fle a motion within a reasonable time.
Coney Island does not contend that it complied with this re-
quirement. Therefore, we need not expound on whether
Coney Island's timing was reasonable. The judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is
affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment.
The Court today rightly holds that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion
to set aside a default judgment that is void for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction must be made “within a reasonable time.”
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(c)(1). Rule 60's text and structure
require that conclusion, as the majority explains.
I concur in the judgment because the majority unnecessar-
ily opines on the potential validity of a constitutional chal-
lenge to the “reasonable time” limit under the Due Process
Clause. Ante, at 159. Coney Island did not make this ar-
gument below and the Sixth Circuit did not pass upon it.
See In re Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, 109 F. 4th 438, 443
(2024) (“Coney Island does not mount a constitutional attack
on Rule 60”). In this Court, Coney Island expressly dis-
claimed any due process argument. See Brief for Petitioner
22 (“To be clear, Coney Island does not contend that Rule 60
or Rule 60(c)(1) [is] unconstitutional”). This Court does “not
generally entertain arguments that were not raised below
and are not advanced in this Court by any party.” Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 721 (2014). There
is no reason to depart from that practice absent unusual cir-
cumstances, which certainly are not present here.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
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for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
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