Case v. Montana

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1
Pages 107–127
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
January 14, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
OCTOBER
TERM, 2025
107
Syllabus
CASE v. MONTANA
certiorari
to the supreme court of montana
No. 24–624. Argued October 15, 2025—Decided January 14, 2026
In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 400, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment allows police offcers to enter a home without a
warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing ” that
someone inside needs emergency assistance. In this case, Montana po-
lice offcers responded to the home of petitioner William Case after his
ex-girlfriend called 9–1–1 to report that he was threatening suicide and
may have shot himself. The offcers knocked on the doors and yelled
into an open window, but got no response. They could see an empty
handgun holster and something that looked like a suicide note inside,
and they ultimately decided to enter the home to render emergency aid.
When one offcer approached a bedroom closet in which Case was hiding,
Case threw open the closet curtain while holding an object that looked
like a gun. Fearing that he was about to be shot, the offcer shot and
injured Case. An ambulance was called to take Case to the hospital,
and offcers found a handgun next to where Case had stood.
Case was charged with assaulting a police offcer. Case moved to
suppress all evidence obtained from the home entry, arguing that the
police violated the Fourth Amendment by entering without a warrant.
The trial court denied the motion, and a jury found Case guilty. A
divided Montana Supreme Court upheld the offcers' entry as lawful
under Montana's caretaker doctrine, rejecting the contention that an
offcer must have probable cause to believe that an occupant needs emer-
gency aid.
Held: Brigham City's objective reasonableness standard for warrantless
home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and
was satisfed in this case. Pp. 113–119.
(a) “[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are pre-
sumptively unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. Brigham
City, 547 U. S., at 403. But the “warrant requirement is subject to cer-
tain exceptions,” Lange v. California, 594 U. S. 295, 301, including the
need to render emergency assistance. The Court frst approved a war-
rantless home entry to render emergency assistance in Brigham City,
holding that offcers may enter when they have “an objectively reason-
able basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or immi-
nently threatened with such injury.” 547 U. S., at 400.

Page Proof Pending Publication
108 CASE
v. MONTANA
Syllabus
The Montana Supreme Court's opinion below strayed from that
r
ule. Most important, the emergency-aid test incorporated in Mon-
tana's caretaker doctrine evokes the Fourth Amendment standard of
“reasonable suspicion” that applies to relatively non-invasive street
stops. But Brigham City adopted a different standard for home entries.
Case now urges the Court to understand Brigham City as sounding
in probable cause, but the Court declines to put a new probable-cause
spin onto the emergency-aid standard. Probable cause is “peculiarly
related to criminal investigations,” Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,
489 U. S. 656, 667, and that body of law would ft awkwardly, if at all, in
the non-criminal, non-investigatory setting at issue here. Rather than
strain to relate probable-cause decisions to emergency-aid situations,
Brigham City asked simply whether an offcer had “an objectively rea-
sonable basis for believing ” that entry was direly needed to prevent or
deal with serious harm. 547 U. S., at 400. Courts should assess the
reasonableness of an emergency-aid entry on its own terms, rather than
through the lens generally used to consider investigative activity.
Pp. 113–117.
(b) The offcers here had an “objectively reasonable basis for believ-
ing ” that their entry was needed to prevent Case from ending his life.
The information the offcers obtained from Case's ex-girlfriend, com-
bined with their observations at the scene, suggested that Case may
already have shot himself or would do so absent intervention. The of-
fcers' decision to enter his home to prevent that result was reasonable.
Accordingly, the Court affrms the judgment (even though not all the
reasoning) of the Montana Supreme Court. Pp. 117–119.
417 Mont. 354, 553 P. 3d 985, affrmed.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor,
J., post, p. 119, and Gorsuch, J., post, p. 124, fled concurring opinions.
Fred A. Rowley, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Mark R. Yohalem, John B. Ken-
ney, Eric O. Bravin, Elizabeth Nielson, Christopher R. Bet-
chie, Nathan D. Ellis, and Kelsey B. Catina.
Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General of Montana, ar-
gued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were
Austin M. Knudsen, Attorney General of Montana, and
Tyler R. Green.
Zoe A. Jacoby argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae supporting respondent. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Sauer, Acting Assistant Attor-

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
109
Opinion of the Court
ney General Galeotti, Deputy Solicitor General Feigin, and
J
enny C. Ellickson.*
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 400 (2006), this
Court held that police offcers may enter a home without
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for America's Future
et al. by William J. Olson and Jeremiah L. Morgan; for the Cato Institute
et al. by Matthew P. Cavedon and Brent Skorup; for the Constitutional
Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and
Brian R. Frazelle; for the Montana Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers by Mark S. Davies and David F. Ness; for the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Daniel B. Levin, Jeffrey L. Fisher,
Cecillia D. Wang, Yasmin Cader, and Brandon Buskey; and for the Proj-
ect for Privacy & Surveillance Accountability et al. by Gene C. Schaerr,
Erik S. Jaffe, and Mahesha P. Subbaraman.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Michigan et al. by Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, Ann M.
Sherman, Solicitor General, B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General,
and Timothy A. Baughman, Special Assistant Attorney General, and by
the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Steve
Marshall of Alabama, Stephen J. Cox of Alaska, Kris Mayes of Arizona,
Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Patrick J. Griffn of Connecticut, Kathleen Jen-
nings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, James
Uthmeier of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, Theodore E. Rokita of Indi-
ana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris W. Kobach of Kansas, Russell Coleman of
Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G.
Brown of Maryland, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Catherine L. Hanaway of
Missouri, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Mat-
thew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Jeff Jackson
of North Carolina, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma,
Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley
of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas,
Derek Brown of Utah, Jason S. Miyares of Virginia, Nicholas W. Brown
of Washington, and John B. McCuskey of West Virginia; for the Local
Government Legal Center et al. by Nadia A. Sarkis and James R. Nik-
raftar; and for Michael J. Z. Mannheimer by Richard A. Simpson, Michael J.
Z. Mannheimer, pro se, F. Andrew Hessick, and Elizabeth Guild Simpson.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion et al. by Aaron M. Panner; for the LONANG Institute by Kerry Lee
Morgan and Randall A. Pentiuk; and for The Rutherford Institute by
Michael J. Lockerby and John W. Whitehead.
Page Proof Pending Publication

110 CASE
v. MONTANA
Opinion of the Court
a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for
bel
ieving ” that someone inside needs emergency assistance.
The question presented is whether that standard means that
offcers must have “probable cause” for the intrusion, as they
typically would when investigating a crime. We hold it does
not. The probable-cause requirement is rooted in, and de-
rives its meaning from, the criminal context, and we decline
to transplant it to this different one. Brigham City's rea-
sonableness standard means just what it says, with no fur-
ther gloss. And here it was satisfed because the police had
“an objectively reasonable basis for believing ” that a home-
owner intended to take his own life and, indeed, may already
have shot himself.
I
This case began with an alarming phone call—from peti-
tioner William Case to his ex-girlfriend J. H., both residents
of a small town in Montana. Case told J. H. on the call that
“he was going to kill himself.” App. 67 (testimony of J. H.).
Because Case sounded “erratic,” J. H. assumed he had been
drinking. Ibid. She tried to talk Case out of committing
suicide, but “couldn't reel him back”: With each passing mo-
ment, Case “became more methodical about what he was
going to do.” Id., at 68. Case said that he was “going to
get a note”—presumably meaning a suicide note, for J. H. or
others to fnd. Ibid. And then J. H. heard a “clicking ”
sound, like the “cock[ing of] a gun.” Ibid. J. H. told Case
she was going to call the police, but that seemed only to
antagonize him: Case replied “he would shoot them all too.”
Id., at 69. Finally, J. H. heard “a pop” followed by “noth-
ing ”—“just dead air.” Ibid. She “yelled [Case's] name a
few times,” but got no response, leading her to think he had
“pulled the trigger.” Ibid. So she called 9–1–1 to report
the incident and drove as fast as she could to Case's home.
Three police offcers, dispatched to do “a welfare check on
a suicidal male,” met J. H. outside the house. Id., at 104
(testimony of offcer). They decided the situation was “very
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
111
Opinion of the Court
serious,” based both on what J. H. told them about the call
and
on what they already knew about Case. Id., at 75, 157.
The offcers were aware that Case had a history of alcohol
abuse and mental-health issues; that he had previously
threatened suicide at the school where he worked; and that
he had once seemed to attempt “suicide-by-cop,” by confront-
ing the police in a way that was likely to provoke a lethal
response. So the three offcers requested that the chief of
police come to the scene. While waiting for him, they cir-
cled the house looking for signs of injury or danger. They
knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window, but
got no response. Shining their fashlights inside, they could
make out empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and a
notepad with writing on it, which they took to be the suicide
note Case had mentioned to J. H. At that point, however,
they saw no sign of Case.
Once the chief came, the offcers conferred and decided to
enter the house “to render emergency aid.” Id., at 198. In
the best-case scenario, they hoped to “talk [Case] down” and
prevent any injury. Id., at 174. But given J. H.'s account,
the offcers considered as well another possibility—that Case
had already shot himself and might be “in there bleeding.”
Id., at 85. At the same time, they worried that if Case re-
mained unharmed, their entry could spark a confrontation.
See id., at 174, 192–193. So they equipped themselves with
long-barrel guns and a ballistic shield before going in.
The offcers entered the house through the front door,
about 40 minutes after they frst arrived. They announced
themselves loudly, and continued to call out as they walked
through the home. Case did not answer; he was hiding in
the closet of a bedroom upstairs. When one of the offcers
entered that room, Case threw open the closet curtain and
appeared from behind it, holding “a black object” which
looked like a gun. Id., at 194. Fearing that he was about
to be shot, the offcer fred his own rife. The bullet hit Case
in the abdomen, and another offcer rushed to administer frst

112 CASE
v. MONTANA
Opinion of the Court
aid. An ambulance was called to take Case to the nearest
hospit
al (where he recovered). Meanwhile, one of the off-
cers found a handgun in a laundry basket next to the place
where Case had stood.
The county attorney charged Case with assaulting a police
offcer. Case moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a
result of the home entry, arguing that the police had violated
the Fourth Amendment by coming into his house without a
warrant. The trial court denied the motion on the ground
that the police offcers were responding legitimately to an
“emergency.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. A Montana jury
then found Case guilty of the crime charged.
On appeal, a divided Montana Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's ruling that the offcers' entry was lawful. The
majority analyzed the issue under its “community caretaker
doctrine.” 553 P. 3d 985, 990 (Mont. 2024). It noted that a
recent Fourth Amendment decision of this Court, Caniglia v.
Strom, 593 U. S. 194, 198 (2021), had rejected a “community
caretaking rule” allowing a warrantless home entry even ab-
sent a “need to render emergency assistance” to an occupant.
But the Montana court thought its community-caretaker doc-
trine survived that holding because it demanded such an
emergency. Under that doctrine, the court explained, police
could enter a home to do a “welfare check” only when “objec-
tive, specifc and articulable facts” would lead an “experi-
enced offcer [to] suspect” that a person inside “is in need of
help or is in peril.” 553 P. 3d, at 990, 991. And the court
found that facts meeting that description existed here be-
cause of the likelihood of suicide. See id., at 994. The court
rejected Case's alternative standard: that a police offcer
must have “probable cause to believe” the occupant in need
of emergency aid. Id., at 992. The “probable cause” locu-
tion, the court suggested, applies only when the police are
“engaged in a criminal investigation.” Ibid. The dissent-
ing justices, by contrast, favored the proposed probable-
cause rule, which they concluded the offcers here did not
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
113
Opinion of the Court
satisfy. See id., at 996, 998 (opinion of McKinnon, J.). In
the
dissent's view, the court's different approach resembled
the “mere reasonable suspicion” standard applicable to com-
paratively non-invasive street stops. Id., at 999. That
standard, the dissent thought, was too easily met to support
a warrantless entry into a home. See id., at 996, 999.
We granted certiorari, 605 U. S. 968 (2025), because courts
have differed on whether police offcers entering a home to
provide emergency aid need “probable cause” to believe that
an occupant is in peril.* We conclude that standard, bor-
rowed from the criminal context, is inapt. We instead hold
just what we have held before: that the offcers may enter if,
but only if, they have an “objectively reasonable basis for
believing ” that an occupant faces serious danger. Brigham
City, 547 U. S., at 400.
II
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated.” At the “very core” of that guarantee, as this
Court has often stated, stands “the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion.” Caniglia, 593 U. S., at 198 (quoting
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6 (2013)). When the intru-
sion is into that most private place, “reasonableness” usually
means having a warrant. Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 403
(“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable”). “But not always: The war-
*Compare, e. g., Estate of Chamberlain v. White Plains, 960 F. 3d 100,
105 (CA2 2020) (requiring probable cause); United States v. Cooks, 920
F. 3d 735, 742 (CA11 2019) (same); Corrigan v. District of Columbia, 841
F. 3d 1022, 1030 (CADC 2016) (same), with, e. g., Hill v. Walsh, 884 F. 3d
16, 23 (CA1 2018) (not requiring probable cause); United States v. Quarter-
man, 877 F. 3d 794, 800 (CA8 2017) (same); United States v. Gambino-
Zavala, 539 F. 3d 1221, 1225 (CA10 2008) (same).
Page Proof Pending Publication

114 CASE
v. MONTANA
Opinion of the Court
rant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Lange
v
. California, 594 U. S. 295, 301 (2021). And among those is
one pertinent here, involving the need to provide an occu-
pant with emergency aid.
This Court frst approved a warrantless home entry to ren-
der emergency assistance in Brigham City. There, police
offcers responding to a noise complaint observed through a
kitchen window a physical altercation between an adolescent
and several adults. As they watched, the teenager punched
one of the adults in the face, “sending [him] to the sink spit-
ting blood.” 547 U. S., at 406. The offcers immediately
entered the home through a nearby screen door and, an-
nouncing their presence, caused the fght to cease. We
unanimously approved the warrantless entry as “reasonable
under the circumstances.” Ibid. And we explained what
made it so: The offcers had “an objectively reasonable basis
for believing that an occupant [was] seriously injured or im-
minently threatened with such injury.” Id., at 400.
Three years later, in Michigan v. Fisher, we reiterated
what we had said in Brigham City about the “emergency aid
exception.” 558 U. S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam). The po-
lice in Fisher, also responding to a neighbor's report, found a
scene redolent of violence and danger. Three windows were
broken, with the glass strewn on the ground outside; blood
was smeared on one of the doors, as well as on the smashed-
in hood of a pickup truck in the driveway; and, visible
through a window, a man inside the house was “screaming
and throwing things” at an unseen target. Id., at 48. We
held that the offcers' entry in those circumstances was “rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment,” just as it had been in
Brigham City. 558 U. S., at 48. Using the same standard
articulated there, we concluded that the offcers had “an ob-
jectively reasonable basis for believing ” that an occupant of
the home needed immediate aid. Id., at 47 (quoting Brig-
ham City, 547 U. S., at 406).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
115
Opinion of the Court
Finally, in Caniglia, we reaffrmed Brigham City even as
we
rejected a broader “community caretaking ” justifcation
for warrantless home entries. The police had gone to Ed-
ward Caniglia's home after his wife reported that he was
suicidal. Caniglia spoke with the offcers on his front porch
and agreed to go to a hospital for psychiatric testing. Then,
once he had left, the offcers went inside and took away two
handguns he owned. The lower courts approved the entry
on the ground that the offcers were performing “community
caretaking functions.” 593 U. S., at 196. But we declined
to recognize such an “open-ended license” for law enforce-
ment offcers to enter private homes. Id., at 199. Citing
Brigham City, we readily acknowledged that offcers may
enter a home to “render emergency assistance to an injured
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”
593 U. S., at 198. But such emergency conditions were in-
deed necessary and, given the facts, the offcers had never
tried to defend their entry on that basis.
The Montana Supreme Court's opinion strayed from the
Fourth Amendment rule that trio of decisions sets out. To
begin with, the court's use of “community caretaker” doc-
trine was ill-advised, given that Caniglia contrasted “com-
munity caretaking ” with “render[ing] emergency assistance”
and concluded that the former cannot alone justify a war-
rantless home entry. Ibid. The Montana court, to be sure,
tried to reconcile its approach with Caniglia by depicting its
community-caretaker rule as allowing home entries only in
emergencies. See 553 P. 3d, at 991. But using terminology
that this Court has held misplaced in home-entry cases could
serve only to confuse the issue. And yet more fundamental,
the emergency-aid test incorporated in Montana's caretaker
doctrine is different from the one adopted in Brigham City.
As noted above, Montana's test fnds a home entry “reason-
able” when an offcer has “specifc and articulable facts” from
which to “suspect” that someone needs help. 553 P. 3d, at
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
116 CASE
v. MONTANA
Opinion of the Court
991; see supra, at 112. That test's language, as the dissent-
i
ng justices noted, evokes the Fourth Amendment standard
applying to brief, investigative street stops: “reasonable sus-
picion” based on “specifc and articulable facts.” United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 21 (1968); 553 P. 3d, at 999 (McKinnon, J.). But Brig-
ham City did not adopt Terry's reasonable-suspicion stand-
ard for home entries, as both the State of Montana and the
United States as amicus curiae acknowledge. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 56, 68–69, 80. Rather, Brigham City formulated
its own standard for dealing with household emergencies—
again, whether an offcer has “an objectively reasonable basis
for believing ” that an occupant is seriously injured or immi-
nently threatened with such harm. 547 U. S., at 400.
Case, however, wants something more. He recognizes
that the Brigham City test applies here, and that it has had
but one formulation: In describing and applying that stand-
ard, we have never used any different terms. See Brief for
Case 24. But still, Case urges us now to understand the
Brigham City test as “sound[ing] in probable cause.” Brief
for Case 15, 24. What the test really requires, Case con-
tends, is that police offcers “have probable cause to believe
[an occupant is] seriously injured or imminently threatened
with such injury.” Id., at 2. Case reaches that conclusion
based mainly on the Fourth Amendment's recognition of the
“sanctity of the home.” Id., at 29. Given that special sta-
tus, he argues, a home entry's aid-giving, “noninvestigatory
purpose” should make no difference: The same probable-
cause principles used in deciding whether “criminal activity
[is] afoot” should apply as well in “assessing the risk and
gravity of an emergency.” Reply Brief 1–2, 8, 16.
We decline Case's invitation to put a new probable-cause
spin onto Brigham City. “[T]he probable-cause standard,”
this Court has often stated, “is peculiarly related to criminal
investigations.” Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489
U. S. 656, 667 (1989) (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S.

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
117
Opinion of the Court
367, 371 (1987)). The standard's history is “rooted” in the
“cr
iminal investigatory context.” O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U. S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); see Henry v. United
States, 361 U. S. 98, 100–102 (1959). And the standard has
acquired meaning over time by virtue of that context, as
judges have assessed, in case after case, the requisite likeli-
hood of fnding criminal contraband or evidence. See, e. g.,
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238–239 (1983). The result-
ing body of law would ft awkwardly, if at all, in the non-
criminal, non-investigatory setting at issue here. So Brig-
ham City adopted a different approach. Rather than strain
to relate probable-cause decisions to emergency-aid situa-
tions, we asked simply whether an offcer had “an objectively
reasonable basis for believing ” that his entry was direly
needed to prevent or deal with serious harm. 547 U. S., at
400. In adhering to that question, we respect as ever the
“frst among equals” status the Fourth Amendment affords
the home. Jardines, 569 U. S., at 6; see Caniglia, 593 U. S.,
at 198–199. And in that vein, we note that an emergency-
aid entry provides no basis to search the premises beyond
what is reasonably needed to deal with the emergency while
maintaining the offcers' safety. But we assess the reason-
ableness of that limited entry on its own terms, rather than
through the lens generally used to consider investigative
activity.
Doing so here yields a ready conclusion: The offcers had,
as Brigham City requires, an “objectively reasonable basis
for believing ” that their intervention was needed to prevent
serious harm. As earlier described, the offcers knew frst-
hand that Case suffered from mental-health and alcohol-
abuse problems, and that he had previously talked about
committing suicide. See supra, at 111. When they reached
Case's house, they learned about J. H. and Case's just con-
cluded phone call—that Case, in an apparently inebriated
state, threatened to kill himself, spoke of preparing a suicide
note, and quite possibly cocked or even shot a gun before the
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
118 CASE
v. MONTANA
Opinion of the Court
line went dead. The concerns that call raised were height-
ened
by what the offcers could see through the windows—
empty beer cans, an empty holster, and a notepad—as well
as by Case's failure to respond to their urgent knocking. If
Case had already shot himself, he could have been severely
injured and in need of immediate medical care. And if he
had not, the risk of suicide remained acute, given all the facts
then known to the offcers. It was thus objectively reason-
able for the police to believe that Case needed emergency
aid.
Case counters that only the police entry itself created a
“likely danger.” Brief for Case 45. His argument turns on
the prospect of suicide-by-cop. As noted earlier, Case had
once before acted in a way seemingly designed to provoke a
lethal police response, as the offcers knew. See supra, at
111. And J. H. told the offcers that Case had threatened to
“shoot them all too” if they came to the scene. Supra, at
110. So the “main risk the offcers objectively faced,” Case
posits, was that “their very entry would induce” a shoot-
out, leading to a “suicide-by-cop.” Brief for Case 18. And
indeed, Case contends, the offcers knew that: Why else
would they have “waited roughly 40 minutes after their ar-
rival” before entering his home? Id., at 43. Case concludes
that if the offcers had only left well enough alone, nothing
would have happened.
But Case much oversimplifes a complex situation. The
objective reasonableness of an offcer's conduct under Brig-
ham City, as in other Fourth Amendment contexts, is evalu-
ated by looking at the “totality of the circumstances.” E. g.,
Barnes v. Felix, 605 U. S. 73, 80 (2025); Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U. S. 33, 39 (1996). One of those circumstances was no
doubt that Case could provoke a confrontation. As noted
earlier, that was partly why the offcers called the police
chief to the scene and why they carefully considered protec-
tive measures—leading to some delay in their entry. See
supra, at 111. But there is no basis for thinking that the offi-

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
119
Sotomayor, J., concurring
cers would have gone into Case's home just so he could insti-
gate
a gunfght. The circumstances making their entry rea-
sonable, as just stated, were those suggesting that Case may
already have shot himself or would do so absent interven-
tion. The statements Case made to J. H. plus the visual
evidence corroborating them indicated that Case wanted to
end his life. The decision of the offcers to enter his home
to prevent that result—even at some signifcant risk to
themselves—was (at the least) reasonable. The Fourth
Amendment did not require them, as Case now argues, to
leave him to his fate.
***
We repeat today what we have held before: An offcer may
enter a home without a warrant if he has “an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously
injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” Brig-
ham City, 547 U. S., at 400. The offcers' entry satisfed that
test. Accordingly, we affrm the judgment (even though not
all the reasoning) of the Montana Supreme Court.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, which holds that police offcers
may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “ `objec-
tively reasonable basis for believing ' ” that an occupant is
seriously injured or imminently threatened with such harm.
Ante, at 114, 116, and this page. Although the Montana Su-
preme Court's opinion appeared, erroneously, to apply a
lower standard akin to reasonable suspicion, I agree that the
offcers here had an “ `objectively reasonable basis for believ-
ing ' ” that Case needed emergency assistance because he
may have already shot himself or was imminently going to
do so. Ante, at 116–118 and this page.
I write separately to underscore the unique considerations
that law enforcement and courts should bear in mind when
Page Proof Pending Publication

120 CASE
v. MONTANA
Sotomayor, J., concurring
assessing whether there is an “objectively reasonable basis
to
believe” that a person experiencing a mental-health crisis
needs law enforcement to “render emergency assistance.”
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006). As Brig-
ham City explained, the “ `justifcation for what would be
otherwise' ” an illegal warrantless entry of a home in this
context is “ `[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury.' ” Ibid. (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U. S. 385, 392 (1978)). The offcers in Brigham City, for in-
stance, needed to enter the house to break up an ongoing
fght to protect a person whom they saw through a window
being struck in the face and to prevent further violence.
547 U. S., at 406. When an offcer is called to respond to a
person at risk of suicide, however, entering the house may
not always be the objectively reasonable course of action to
“ `preserve life or avoid serious injury.' ” Id., at 403 (quoting
Mincey, 437 U. S., at 392).
In these kinds of circumstances, the presence of law en-
forcement at times can escalate the situation rather that
ameliorate it, putting both the occupant and the offcers in
danger. See, e. g., Chamberlain v. White Plains, 960 F. 3d
100, 101–104, 108 (CA2 2020) (offcers repeatedly attempted
entry of the home of a person with a known “history of men-
tal illness,” eventually shooting and killing the occupant
after he repeatedly said he was “ `okay' ” and offcers saw he
did not need medical attention); Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F. 3d
731, 734–736, 744 (CA4 2003) (offcers attempted to enter
house based on a neighbor's report of suicide, eventually
kicking and striking occupant to arrest him, despite occupant
telling the offcers that he was not suicidal and that they
should leave). The risk of escalation is also heightened by
the prevalence of frearms in nearly half of American house-
holds.
1
Police may employ more forceful tactics when they
1
In 2025, 42% of Americans reported living in a gun-owning household.
Gallup, Guns, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (archived at
https://perma.cc/G76N-5T7Z.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
121
Sotomayor, J., concurring
know a frearm is in the house, and an occupant who is expe-
r
iencing an acute mental-health crisis may react more unpre-
dictably in response. See, e. g., Corrigan v. District of Co-
lumbia, 841 F. 3d 1022, 1025–1028 (CADC 2016) (despite
occupant voluntarily meeting the police outside and disclaim-
ing any intention to harm himself, the offcers triggered
occupant's posttraumatic stress disorder after kicking his
door and searching his house, based on report that he was
suicidal and owned frearms); Frazier v. Miller, 404 Mont. 1,
484 P. 3d 912, 916 (2021) (occupant initially told police he was
“ `fne' ” and to “go away” but drew pistol to his own head
when the offcer continued to attempt entry, leading the off-
cer to draw his gun in response and eventually shoot the
occupant).
Studies show that individuals with serious mental-health
conditions are disproportionately likely to be injured and
seven times more likely to be killed during police interac-
tions compared to the general population.
2
One report
showed that over a 2-year period, “calls for help resulted in
law enforcement offcers shooting and killing the very people
they were called on to assist” in 178 cases.
3
Another study
found that police shooting incidents involving behavioral
health concerns (suicidal behavior, substance use, or serious
mental illness) were 2.1 times more likely to result in fatal
injury than other police shooting incidents.
4
Further, indi-
viduals with a mental illness were “2.8 times more likely” to
2
See H. Jun, J. DeVylder, & L. Fedina, Police Violence Among Adults
Diagnosed With Mental Disorders, 45 Health & Soc. Work 81 (May 2020);
A. Saleh, P. Applebaum, X. Liu, T. Stroup, & M. Wall, Deaths of People
With Mental Illness During Interactions With Law Enforcement, 58 Int'l
J. L. & Psychiatry 110, 114 (May-June 2018) (Saleh).
3
J. Gerberg & A. Li, When a Call to the Police for Help Turns Deadly,
Wash i ng ton Post, June 22, 2022, https://www.wash i ng tonpost.com/
investigations/ interactive/2022/police-shootings-mental-health-calls/.
4
J. Ward et al., National Burden of Injury and Deaths From Shootings
by Police in the United States, 2015–2020, 4 Am. J. Pub. Health 387, 391–
392 (2024).
Page Proof Pending Publication

122 CASE
v. MONTANA
Sotomayor, J., concurring
“be killed in their own homes” compared to those without a
ment
al illness.
5
Given these risks, in some circumstances it may be more
reasonable for offcers to try different means of de-escalation
before entering the home of a person experiencing a mental-
health crisis. Offcers could, for example, attempt to speak
with the occupant from a distance or over the phone; contact
family, friends, or neighbors to help intervene; call in special-
ized police units, such as negotiators or offcers trained in
crisis intervention;
6
or otherwise work with mental-health
professionals to approach the occupant.
7
Offcers called to
respond to these kinds of situations should carefully investi-
gate and assess the nature of the potential crisis and deter-
mine whether there is an objectively reasonable basis to be-
lieve that the occupant needs emergency aid inside before
entering without a warrant. Once the decision is made to
enter, moreover, the “manner” of the offcers' entry and their
subsequent conduct inside must also be “reasonable.” Brig-
ham City, 547 U. S., at 406.
This case highlights the very complexities that will often
attend emergency-aid interventions involving reported
mental-health crises. Multiple facts suggested that Case
did not need emergency aid but was instead waiting inside
for the offcers in order to provoke a confrontation that
would result in “suicide-by-cop.”
5
Saleh 114.
6
See id., at 114–115; Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al.
as Amici Curiae 18–25 (describing programs that involve sending teams
of specially trained police to respond to calls about mental-health crises).
7
Many jurisdictions around the country have introduced programs in
which police offcers and mental-health professionals jointly respond
to calls about mental-health crises. See Policy Research, Inc. & Na-
tional League of Cities, A. Krider, R. Huerter, K. Gaherty, & A. Moore,
Responding to Individuals in Behavioral Health Crisis Via Co-responder
M o d e l s ( J a n . 2 0 2 0 ) , h t t p s : / / w w w. t h e i a c p. o r g / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s/
S JCResponding%20to%20Individuals.pdf (archived at https://perma.cc/
LMZ2-FAC9) (describing “co-responder” programs).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
123
Sotomayor, J., concurring
Case had told his girlfriend, J. H., on the phone that he
wou
ld “shoot them all” if she called the police to his house.
App. 69. Once J. H. arrived at the house, she told the off-
cers that Case threatened to “shoot it out” with the police.
Id., at 70–74. The offcers also knew that in a prior incident
in which police were called to respond to a suicide attempt
by Case, Case had confronted the police in a way that sug-
gested he was attempting suicide-by-cop. Then, while sur-
veying the house, the offcers discussed how Case had “ `tried
suicide by cop before' ” and that it was likely Case was “ `going
to pull a gun on us' ” once they “ `go in the house.' ” 417 Mont.
354, 373, 553 P. 3d 985, 998 (2024) (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
These facts, taken together, suggested that Case was nei-
ther already injured nor about to injure himself, but rather
that the primary danger he faced would arise only if the
offcers entered his house. In other words, these facts
tended to undermine the offcers' basis to believe that he
needed emergency assistance inside.
The offcers' warrantless entry ultimately did not violate
the Fourth Amendment, however, because there were suff-
cient facts on the other side of the ledger supporting an ob-
jectively reasonable basis to believe that Case had shot him-
self. Critically, Case had told J. H. he had a “loaded gun”
and J. H. heard a “clicking ” sound like the “cock[ing]” of “a
gun,” a “pop,” and then “just dead air” despite J. H. yelling
Case's name multiple times over the phone. App. 68–69; 417
Mont., at 357, 553 P. 3d, at 988. Case also told J. H. that he
was “going to get a note” and “kill himself.” App. 67–68.
When the offcers arrived, they saw an empty handgun hol-
ster and notepad with writing inside Case's house, and Case
did not respond when they shouted his name into an open
window. Considered together, those facts gave rise to an
objectively reasonable basis for the offcers to believe that
Case was already injured and in need of emergency medical
assistance, and was not necessarily waiting inside for the of-
fcers seeking to provoke an escalation leading to suicide-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
124 CASE
v. MONTANA
Gorsuch, J., concurring
by-cop. As a result, the offcers did not violate the Fourth
Amendment
when they entered Case's home.
8
That conclusion, on the facts of this case, does not mean it
will always be objectively reasonable for offcers responding
to a mental-health crisis to make a warrantless entry. A
different mix of information might have led to the conclusion
that the offcers' entry itself would put the occupant (and
offcers) at a greater risk of escalation and serious injury.
Because the “objectively reasonable basis” test, as reaf-
frmed by the Court today, demands careful attention to the
case-specifc risks that attend mental-health crises, and re-
quires offcers to act reasonably in response, I join the
Court's opinion in full.
Justice Gorsuch, concurring.
Today's case, like another before it, holds that police off-
cers generally do not violate a person's Fourth Amendment
rights when they enter his house without a warrant, but with
an “ `objectively reasonable basis' ” for believing someone in-
side is in physical danger and in need of immediate aid.
Ante, at 116 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398,
400 (2006)). Importantly, the Court observes, this exception
to the warrant requirement permits entry only to the extent
reasonably necessary to address the apparent emergency
and does not authorize offcers to search a home more
broadly. See ante, at 117. With all that, I agree.
But to me, a question lingers: Why? Does the Fourth
Amendment tolerate this limited emergency aid exception
to the warrant requirement just because fve or more Jus-
tices of this Court happen to believe that such entries are
“reasonable”? Or is this exception more directly “tied to
the law”? Carpenter v. United States, 585 U. S. 296, 397
8
Case has not challenged the reasonableness of the offcers' manner of
entry or their conduct inside his house after entry. As a result, neither
the decision below nor this Court had occasion to consider the reasonable-
ness of that conduct.

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
125
Gorsuch, J., concurring
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The answer, I believe, is
the
latter.
From before the founding through the present day, the
common law has generally permitted a private citizen to
enter another's house and property in order to avert serious
physical harm. In those circumstances, and many others,
courts have historically held that property rights give way
to concern for human safety. See, e. g., 37 Hen. 6, pl. 26;
Mouse's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K. B. 1608);
Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357, 363 (Pa. 1788); Ploof v.
Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 474–475, 71 A. 188, 189 (1908). Courts
have long described property-law necessity defenses like
these as turning, too, on the adequacy of the defendant's
judgment, not a post-hoc assessment of necessity in fact.
See, e. g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 134–135 (1852);
Stone v. Mayor of City of New York, 25 Wend. 157, 176 (N. Y.
1840) (opinion of Verplanck, Sen.); Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal.
69, 72 (1853).*
The common-law emergency rule is now often summarized
this way: “One is privileged to enter or remain on land in
the possession of another if it is or reasonably appears to be
necessary to prevent serious harm to . . . the actor[,] . . . the
other[,] or a third person . . . unless the actor knows or has
reason to know that the one for whose beneft he enters is
unwilling that he shall take such action.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 197(1) (1963–1964). But, of course, this
*Contrary to Mr. Case's argument, King v. Coate, Lofft. 73, 98 Eng. Rep.
539 (K. B. 1772), does not establish that the common law demanded an
exacting showing of actual necessity to defeat a claim for trespass. True,
Lord Mansfeld explained that any necessity defense in that case would
need to “stand the strictest test,” with the “necessity manifestly proved.”
Id., at 75, 98 Eng. Rep., at 540. But Coate involved an effort to involun-
tarily “confn[e] a person in a madhouse” for two months, not a claim over
a home entry. Id., at 74, 98 Eng. Rep., at 539. And it is hardly surprising
that the common law would demand a good deal more to justify a serious
deprivation of liberty than to excuse an invasion of property rights aimed
at protecting human safety.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
126 CASE
v. MONTANA
Gorsuch, J., concurring
privilege comes with its logical limitations. So, for example,
a
private citizen who enters a home to render emergency aid
lacks license to do so in a manner “which a reasonable man
would not regard as necessary to” address the apparent
emergency. Id., § 214, and Comment a; see also id., § 197,
Comment a; Des Moines v. Webster, 861 N. W. 2d 878, 883–
885 (Iowa App. 2014); State v. Lukus, 149 Mont. 45, 50–51,
423 P. 2d 49, 52–53 (1967).
Today's decision echoes both the common-law emergency
aid rule and its limitations. It does so, to be sure, in the
context of a law enforcement offcer, not a private citizen,
who sought to enter another's home. But on this point as
well the common law has spoken, long providing that offcers
generally enjoy the same legal privileges as private citizens.
See, e. g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066
(C. P. 1765); 1 J. Chitty, Criminal Law 36 (1819); 2 M. Hale,
Historia Placitorum Coronae 91 (1736). And, refecting the
common law here again, this Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment usually permits offcers lacking a valid warrant
to “take actions that any private citizen might do without
fear of liability.” Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U. S. 194, 198
(2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). But they nor-
mally may do “no more” than that. Kentucky v. King, 563
U. S. 452, 469 (2011); see also Entick, 19 How. St. Tr., at 1066.
It should come as no surprise that our decision today
might accord with the accumulated learning of the common
law—just as it should come as no surprise that our applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment ought to be informed by the
common law's lessons rather than mere intuition. For a pe-
riod, to be sure, the miasma created by this Court's Katz era
led some to think the scope of the rights guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment depend on nothing more than current
judicial instincts about “reasonable expectations of privacy.”
See Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 394–395, 405–406 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). But that confusion cannot last forever, for no
one should think the rights of Americans hang on so thin

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 107 (2026)
127
Gorsuch, J., concurring
a thread. Instead, and as Justice Story recognized, the
F
ourth Amendment is made of sturdier stuff, representing
“the affrmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the com-
mon law.” 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 748 (1833).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 123, line 12: “(McKinnon, J., dissenting)” is inserted after “(2024)”