Mahmoud v. Taylor

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 606 U. S. Part 2
Pages 522–655
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 27, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
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522 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
MAHMOUD et al. v. TAYLOR et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 24–297. Argued April 22, 2025—Decided June 27, 2025
During the 2022–2023 school year, the Montgomery County Board of Edu-
cation (Board) introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts into
the public school curriculum. Those texts included fve “LGBTQ+-
inclusive” storybooks approved for students in kindergarten through
ffth grade, which have story lines focused on sexuality and gender.
When parents in Montgomery County sought to have their children ex-
cused from instruction involving those books, the Board initially com-
promised with the parents by notifying them when the “LGBTQ+-
inclusive” storybooks would be taught and permitting their children to
be excused from the instruction. That compromise was consistent with
the Board's “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity,” which pro-
fessed a commitment to making “reasonable accommodations” for the
religious “beliefs and practices” of students. Less than a year after the
Board introduced the books, however, it rescinded the parental opt out
policy. Among other things, the Board said that it “could not accom-
modate the growing number of opt out requests without causing sig-
nifcant disruptions to the classroom environment.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 607a.
The petitioners here are a group of individual parents and an unincor-
porated association of other interested parties. The individual parents
come from diverse religious backgrounds and hold sincere views on sex-
uality and gender which they wish to pass on to their children. Faced
with the Board's decision to rescind opt outs, petitioners fled a lawsuit
i n the United St ates D istr ic t Cour t for the D istr ic t of Maryland.
Among other things, they asserted that the Board's no-opt-out policy
infringed on parents' right to the free exercise of their religion. See
Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 524. They relied
heavily on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, in which the Court recog-
nized that parents have a right “to direct the religious upbringing of
their children” and that this right can be infringed by laws that pose “a
very real threat of undermining ” the religious beliefs and practices that
parents wish to instill in their children. Id., at 218, 233. Petitioners
sought a preliminary and permanent injunction “prohibiting the School
Board from forcing [their] children and other students—over the objec-
tion of their parents—to read, listen to, or discuss” the storybooks.

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as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025)
523
Syllabus
App. to Pet. for Cert. 206a. The District Court denied relief, and a
div
ided panel of the Fourth Circuit affrmed.
Held: Parents challenging the Board's introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclu-
sive” storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are enti-
tled to a preliminary injunction. Pp. 545–570.
(a) The parents assert that the Board's introduction of the “LGBTQ+-
inclusive” storybooks—combined with its decision to withhold notice
and opt outs—unconstitutionally burdens their religious exercise. At
this stage, the parents seek a preliminary injunction that would permit
them to have their children excused from instruction related to the sto-
rybooks while this lawsuit proceeds. To obtain that form of prelimi-
nary relief, the parents must show that: they are likely to succeed on
the merits; they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief; the balance of equities tips in their favor; and an
injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20. The parents have made
such a showing. Pp. 545–546.
(b) The parents are likely to succeed on their claim that the Board's
policies unconstitutionally burden their religious exercise. The Court
has “long recognized the rights of parents to direct `the religious
upbringing ' of their children.” Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Rev-
enue, 591 U. S. 464, 486 (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214). Those
rights are violated by government policies that “substantially inter-
fer[e] w ith the relig i ous development” of ch i ldren. Id., at 218.
Pp. 546–555.
(1) For many people of faith, there are few religious acts more im-
portant than the religious education of their children. See Our Lady
of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 754. And the
practice of educating one's children in one's religious beliefs, like all
religious acts and practices, receives a generous measure of constitu-
tional protection. The Constitution protects, for example, a parent's
decision to send his or her child to a private religious school instead of
a public school. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 532–535.
And the Court has recognized limits on the government's ability to in-
terfere with a student's religious upbringing in a public school setting.
In West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, for example, the
Court held that a policy requiring public school students to salute the
fag could not be enforced against Jehovah's Witnesses—who consider
the fag a “graven image”—consistent with the First Amendment.
Barnette involved an egregious kind of direct coercion: a requirement
that students make an affrmation contrary to their parents' religious
beliefs. In Yoder, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause also

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524 MAHMOUD
v. TAYLOR
Syllabus
protects against policies that impose more subtle forms of interference
w
ith the religious upbringing of children. There, the Court considered
a compulsory-education law that would place Amish children into “an
environment hostile to Amish beliefs,” where they would face “pressure
to conform” to contrary viewpoints and lifestyles. 406 U. S., at 211.
The Court concluded that such a law “substantially interfer[ed] with the
religious development of the Amish child” and therefore “carrie[d] with
it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion
that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id., at 218.
Pp. 546–550.
(2) The Board's introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” story-
books, combined with its decision to withhold notice to parents and to
forbid opt outs, substantially interferes with the religious development
of petitioners' children and imposes the kind of burden on religious exer-
cise that Yoder found unacceptable. The books are unmistakably nor-
mative. They are designed to present certain values and beliefs as
things to be celebrated, and certain contrary values and beliefs as things
to be rejected.
Take, for example, the message sent by the books concerning same-
sex marriage. Many Americans “advocate with utmost, sincere convic-
tion that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be con-
doned.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 679. That group includes
each of the parents in this case. The storybooks, however, are designed
to present the opposite viewpoint to young, impressionable children who
are likely to accept without question any moral messages conveyed by
their teacher's instruction. The storybooks present same-sex weddings
as occasions for great celebration and suggest that the only rubric for
determining whether a marriage is acceptable is whether the individuals
concerned “love each other.”
The storybooks similarly convey a normative message on the subjects
of sex and gender. Many Americans, like the parents in this case, be-
lieve that biological sex refects divine creation, that sex and gender are
inseparable, and that children should be encouraged to accept their sex
and to live accordingly. The storybooks, however, suggest that it is
hurtful, and perhaps even hateful, to hold the view that gender is inex-
tricably bound with biological sex.
Like the compulsory high school education considered in Yoder, these
books impose upon children a set of values and beliefs that are “hostile”
to their parents' religious beliefs. 406 U. S., at 211. And the books
exert upon children a psychological “pressure to conform” to their spe-
cifc viewpoints. Ibid. The books therefore present the same kind of
“objective danger to the free exercise of religion” that the Court identi-
fed in Yoder. Id., at 218. Pp. 550–555.

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Syllabus
(c) None of the counterarguments raised by the Board, the courts
below
, or the Board's amici give this Court any reason to doubt the
existence of a burden on religious exercise here. Pp. 555–563.
(1) The Court does not accept the Board's characterizations of the
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction as mere “exposure to objectionable
ideas” or as lessons in “mutual respect.” The storybooks unmistakably
convey a particular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and gender.
And the Board has specifcally encouraged teachers to reinforce this
viewpoint and to reprimand any children who disagree. That goes be-
yond mere “exposure.” Regardless, the question in cases of this kind
is whether the educational requirement or curriculum at issue would
“substantially interfer[e] with the religious development” of the child,
or pose “a very real threat of undermining ” the religious beliefs and
practices the parent wishes to instill in the child. Yoder, 406 U. S., at
218. Whether or not a requirement or curriculum could be character-
ized as “exposure” is not the touchstone for determining whether that
line is crossed. Pp. 555–556.
(2) The Board's reliance on the Court's decisions in Bowen v. Roy,
476 U. S. 693, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.,
485 U. S. 439, is likewise unpersuasive. In those cases, the Court held
that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require
the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport
with the religious beliefs of particular citizens,” Bowen, 476 U. S., at
699, even when the conduct of such internal affairs might result in “inci-
dental interference with an individual's spiritual activities,” Lyng, 485
U. S., at 450. That principle has no application here. The govern-
ment's operation of public schools is not a matter of “internal affairs”
akin to the administration of Social Security or the selection of “fling
cabinets.” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 700. It implicates direct, coercive in-
teractions between the State and its young residents. Pp. 556–557.
(3) The courts below erred by dismissing this Court's decision in
Yoder. The Court has never confned Yoder to its facts, and there is no
reason to conclude that the decision is “sui generis” or “tailored to [its]
specifc evidence,” as the courts below reasoned. While the Court
noted in Yoder that the Amish made a showing “that probably few other
religious groups or sects could make,” that language must be read in
the context of the specifc claims raised by the Amish respondents, i. e.,
the right to withdraw their children from all conventional schooling
after a certain age. 406 U. S., at 235–236. Contrary to the suggestions
of the courts below, Yoder embodies a robust principle of general appli-
cability. Pp. 557–559.
(4) The Fourth Circuit's view that the record in this case is too
“threadbare” to demonstrate a burden on religious exercise is also un-

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526 MAHMOUD
v. TAYLOR
Syllabus
convincing. 102 F. 4th 191, 209. That court faulted the parents for
fai
ling to make specifc allegations describing how the books “are actu-
ally being used in classrooms.” Id., at 213. But when a deprivation of
First Amendment rights is at stake, a plaintiff need not wait for the
damage to occur before fling suit. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
573 U. S. 149, 158. To evaluate the plaintiffs' claims, the Court need
only decide whether—if teachers act according to the clear and undis-
puted instructions of the Board—a burden on religious exercise will
occur. Pp. 559–560.
(5) It is no answer that parents remain free to place their children
in private school or to educate them at home. Public education is a
public beneft, and the government cannot “condition” its “availability”
on parents' willingness to accept a burden on their religious exercise.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449,
462. Moreover, given that education is compulsory in Maryland, the
parents are not being asked simply to forgo a public beneft. They have
an obligation—enforceable by fne or imprisonment—to send their chil-
dren to public school unless they fnd an adequate substitute they can
afford. Md. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 7–301(a)(3), (e).
Nor is it of any comfort to suggest that parents can educate their
children at home after school. The parents in Barnette and Yoder were
similarly capable of teaching their religious values “at home,” but that
made no difference in the First Amendment analysis in those cases. It
is similarly unconvincing to suggest that the parents could have chal-
lenged the educational requirements via the democratic process. The
parents tried and failed to obtain legislative change, and had every right
to resort to judicial review to protect their rights. Pp. 560–563.
(d) Having concluded that the Board's policy burdens the parents'
right to the free exercise of religion, the Court turns to the question
whether that burden is constitutionally permitted. Pp. 563–569.
(1) In most circumstances, the government is generally free to
place incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as it does so pursu-
ant to a neutral policy that is generally applicable. Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878–879.
But when a law imposes a burden of the same character as that in Yoder,
as does the challenged Board policy here, strict scrutiny is appropriate
regardless of whether the law is neutra l or genera l ly applicable.
Smith, 494 U. S., at 881. Pp. 564–565.
(2) To survive strict scrutiny, a government must demonstrate that
its policy “advances `interests of the highest order' and is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve those interests.” Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S.
522, 541 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U. S. 520, 546). The Board asserts that its curriculum and no-opt-out

Cite
as: 606 U. S. 522 (2025)
527
Syllabus
policy serve its compelling interest in maintaining a school environment
that
is safe and conducive to learning for all students. As a general
matter, schools have a “compelling interest in having an undisrupted
school session conducive to the students' learning.” Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 119. But the Board's conduct in continuing
to permit opt outs in a variety of other circumstances undermines its
assertion that its no-opt-out policy is necessary to serve that interest.
Pp. 565–569.
(e) Without an injunction, the parents will continue to suffer an un-
constitutional burden on their religious exercise, and such a burden un-
questionably constitutes irreparable injury. See Roman Catholic Dio-
cese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14, 19 (per curiam). And an
injunction here would be both equitable and in the public interest.
Thus, the petitioners have shown that they are entitled to a preliminary
injunction. Specifcally, until all appellate review in this case is com-
pleted, the Board should be ordered to notify the petitioners in advance
whenever one of the books in question or any other similar book is to
be used in any way and to allow them to have their children excused
from that instruction. P. 569.
102 F. 4th 191, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barret t, JJ., joi ned.
Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 581. Sotomayor, J., fled
a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined, post, p. 592.
Eric S. Baxter argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were William J. Haun, Michael J. O'Brien,
and Colten L. Stanberry.
Principal Deputy Solicitor General Harris argued the
cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur.
With her on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Roth, Nicholas S. Crown, Michael S. Raab, and Lowell
V. Sturgill, Jr.
Alan Schoenfeld argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Emily Barnet, Bruce M. Berman,
Joseph M. Meyer, and Jeremy W. Brinster.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of West
Virginia et al. by John B. McCuskey, Attorney General of West Virginia,
and Michael R. Williams, Solicitor General, by Jason Miyares, Attorney
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528 MAHMOUD
v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
Board of Education of Montgomery County, Maryland
(Board), has introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” sto-
General of Virginia, Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Kevin M. Gal-
lagher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Meredith Baker, Assistant
Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn
of Arkansas, James Uthmeier of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia,
Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird
of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Russell Coleman of Kentucky, Liz Mur-
rill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri,
Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrig-
ley of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner F. Drummond of Okla-
homa, David W. Sunday, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of South Caro-
lina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Ken Paxton of Texas, Derek E.
Brown of Utah, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for Advancing American
Freedom et al. by J. Marc Wheat; for the America First Legal Foundation
by Christopher Mills; for the American Center for Law and Justice by
Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, and Walter M.
Weber; for Americans for Prosperity Foundation by Cynthia Fleming
Crawford and Casey Mattox; for America's Frontline Doctors et al. by
David A. Dalia; for the Center for American Liberty by Dale Schoweng-
erdt and Josh Dixon; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Eric W.
Treene, Roman P. Storzer, Steven T. McFarland, and Laura Nammo; for
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al. by R. Shawn Gun-
narson, Christopher A. Bates, Donald N. Lundwall, Gene C. Schaerr, and
Hannah C. Smith; for the Defense of Freedom Institute for Policy Studies
et al. by Donald A. Daugherty, Jr.; for the Ethics and Public Policy Center
by Eric N. Kniffn; for the Independence Law Center by Randall L.
Wenger, Janice L. Martino-Gottshall, and Jeremy L. Samek; for Law Pro-
fessors by Natalie C. Rhoads; for the Legal Insurrection Foundation by
Eric Hudson; for the Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver, Anita L.
Staver, and Horatio G. Mihet; for the Manhattan Institute et al. by Ilya
Shapiro; for the Maryland Family Institute et al. by Helen M. Alvaré; for
Muslim Parents et al. by Steven T. Collis and John Greil; for National
Religious Broadcasters et al. by William Wagner and Michael P. Farris;
for the NC Values Institute et al. by Deborah J. Dewart, Tami Fitzgerald,
and John W. Whitehead; for Our Duty-USA et al. by Mary E. McAlister
and Vernadette R. Broyles; for Parent Nicholas Brown et al. by Frederick
W. Claybrook, Jr., Steven W. Fitschen, and James A. Davids; for Parents
Defending Education by J. Michael Connolly and James F. Hasson; for

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529
Opinion of the Court
rybooks into the elementary school curriculum. These
books—and
associated educational instructions provided to
teachers—are designed to “disrupt” children's thinking
about sexuality and gender. The Board has told parents
Protect Our Kids (California) et al. by Thomas L. Brejcha; for the Suther-
land Institute by William C. Duncan; for Thirty-fve Maryland Legisla-
tors by Edward M. Wenger; for the Women's Liberation Front by Elspeth
B. Cypher; for Tammy Fournier by John J. Bursch, James A. Campbell,
Katherine L. Anderson, and Vincent M. Wagner; for Douglas Laycock
et al. by Christopher Mills; for Nathan Lewin, pro se; for S. Ernie Walton
et al. by Christopher T. Holinger; and for 66 Members of Congress by
Erik S. Jaffe. William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, J. Mark Brewer,
and Michael Boos fled a brief for America's Future et al. as amici curiae
urging vacatur.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Maryland et al. by Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General of Maryland,
Julia Doyle, Solicitor General, and Joshua M. Segal, Principal Deputy
Solicitor General, by Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massa-
chusetts, David C. Kravitz, State Solicitor, Anna Lumelsky, Deputy State
Solicitor, and Adam Cambier, Assistant Attorney General, and by the At-
torneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Rob Bonta of
California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut,
Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Co-
lumbia, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey
of Maine, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D.
Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Letitia James of New
York, Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Charity
R. Clark of Vermont, and Nicholas W. Brown of Washington; for Ameri-
can Atheists, Inc., et al. by Geoffrey T. Blackwell; for the American Civil
Liberties Union et al. by Daniel Mach, Heather L. Weaver, Deborah Jeon,
Sonia Kumar, Cecillia D. Wang, and Louise Melling; for the American
Psychological Association et al. by Jessica Ring Amunson and Deanne M.
Ottaviano; for the Authors Guild, Inc., et al. by Marc A. Fuller and Mag-
gie I. Burreson; for the Coalition for Responsible Home Education by Jo-
seph J. Poppen and Geoffrey M. Pipoly; for Constitutional Scholars by
Joshua Matz, Martin Totaro, and Richard B. Katskee, pro se; for the Free-
dom From Religion Foundation by Samuel T. Grover; for GLBTQ Legal
Advocates and Defenders et al. by Mary L. Bonauto, Gary D. Buseck,
and Hannah Hussey; for Interfaith Alliance by James C. Dugan and Mia
Guizzetti Hayes; for the Leadership Conference Education Fund et al. by
Karen L. Loewy and Jeffrey M. Gutkin; for Lebo Pride et al. by Susan

530 MAHMOUD
v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
that it will not give them notice when the books are going
to
be used and that their children's attendance during those
periods is mandatory. A group of parents from diverse reli-
gious backgrounds sued to enjoin those policies. They as-
sert that the new curriculum, combined with the Board's
decision to deny opt outs, impermissibly burdens their reli-
gious exercise.
Today, we hold that the parents have shown that they are
entitled to a preliminary injunction. A government burdens
the religious exercise of parents when it requires them to
submit their children to instruction that poses “a very real
threat of undermining ” the religious beliefs and practices
that the parents wish to instill. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 218 (1972). And a government cannot condition
the beneft of free public education on parents' acceptance of
such instruction. Based on these principles, we conclude
that the parents are likely to succeed in their challenge to
the Board's policies.
J. Frietsche; for Montgomery County Faith Leaders by Meaghan VerGow
and Joshua Revesz; for Muslim Organizations by Z. Gabriel Arkles and
Anya Marino; for the National Education Association et al. by Alice
O'Brien, Jason Walta, Robert Kim, and Jessica Levin; for the PEN Amer-
ican Center, Inc., by Linda Steinman, Alexandra Perloff-Giles, and Ryan
H i cks; for Relig i ous and Civ i l-Rights Organi zati ons by Alex J. Lu-
chenitser, Alexandra Zaretsky, and Randall T. Adams; for Scholars
for the Advancement of Children's Constitutional Rights et al. by Cather-
ine E. Smith and Travis F. Chance; for Justin Driver et al. by Amanda
Flug Davidoff and H. Rodgin Cohen; and for Robert D. Kamenshine,
pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for AASA, The School Superintend-
ents Association, et al. by John A. Freedman and Steven L. Mayer; for
California Parents for the Equalization of Educational Materials by Glenn
Katon; for the Foundation for Moral Law by Roy S. Moore and Jeffrey
Tuomala; for Jaco Booyens Ministries et al. by Frank J. Wright; for the
Lonang Institute by Kerry Lee Morgan and Randall A. Pentiuk; for Me-
lissa Moschella, Ph.D., by Robert P. George and William C. Porth; and for
Lawrence G. Sager et al. by Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler.
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531
Opinion of the Court
I
A
1
W
ith just over one million residents, Montgomery County
is Maryland's most populous county. According to a recent
survey, it is also the “most religiously diverse county” in the
Nation.
1
In addition to hosting a diverse mix of Christian
denominations, the county ranks in the top fve in the Nation
in per-capita population of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Bud-
dhists.
2
The county's religious diversity is accompanied by
strong cultural diversity as well. The county is home to sev-
eral notable ethnic communities. For example, the Ethio-
pian community in Silver Spring is one of the largest in the
country.
3
And according to one survey, “[o]nly 56.8% of
county residents speak English at home.” N. 1, this page.
Most Montgomery County residents with school age chil-
dren, by choice or necessity, send them to public school. As
a general matter, Maryland law requires that resident chil-
dren ages 5 to 18 “attend a public school regularly during
the entire school year.” Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7–301(a–
1)(1) (2025). As an exception to this general rule, the State
permits parents to send their children to private school or to
educate them at home if certain requirements can be met.
§ 7–301(a)(3). Parents who cause their children to be absent
1
See A. Hertzler-McCain, Montgomery County, Maryland, Was Most
Religiously Diverse US County in 2023, Religion News Service (Aug. 30,
2024), https://religionnews.com/2024/08/30/montgomery-county-maryland-
was-most-religiously-diverse-u-s-county-in-2023/.
2
Public Religion Research Institute, 2023 PRRI Census of American
Religion: County-Level Data on Religious Identity and Diversity 19, 28,
42–49 (Aug. 29, 2024).
3
See, e. g., R. Skirble, Silver Spring Is the Epicenter of a Thriving Ethi-
opian Diaspora, Montgomery Magazi ne (Oct. 19, 2022), https://www.
montgomerymag . com / si lver - spr i ng - is - the-epicenter-of-a-thr iv i ng-
ethiopian-diaspora /.
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532 MAHMOUD
v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
unlawfully from school can face fnes, mandatory community
serv
ice, and even imprisonment. § 7–301(e).
Public education in Montgomery County is provided by
Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS), one of the
largest school districts in the Nation. In the 2022–2023
school year, MCPS enrolled 160,554 students in its 210
schools and had an operating budget of nearly $3 billion.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 597a–598a; MCPS, FY2024 Operating
Budget, p. vi–1 (2023). The district is overseen and man-
aged by the Montgomery County Board of Education, a poli-
cymaking body consisting of seven elected county residents
and one student. See Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 3–901(b).
In recognition of the county's religious diversity, the
Board's “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity” pro-
fess a commitment to making “reasonable accommodations”
for the religious “beliefs and practices” of MCPS students.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 210a, 212a.
4
These accommodations
take various forms. For example, according to one MCPS
offcial, the Board “advises principals that schools should
avoid scheduling tests or other major events on dozens of . . .
`days of commemoration,' during which MCPS expects that
many students may be absent . . . or engaged in religious or
cultural observances.” Id., at 602a.
This case, however, arises from the Board's abject refusal
to heed widespread and impassioned pleas for accommoda-
tion. In the years leading up to 2022, the Board apparently
“determined that the books used in its existing [English &
Language Arts] curriculum were not representative of many
students and families in Montgomery County because they
4
The Board has modifed its religious diversity guidelines since the
2022–2023 school year, when many of the events in this lawsuit took place.
The most recent version of the Board's guidelines, available online, contin-
ues to state that “MCPS is committed to making reasonable accommoda-
tions” for the religious “beliefs and practices” of its students. MCPS,
Religious Diversity Guidelines in Montgomery County Public Schools 1
(2024–2025).
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did not include LGBTQ characters.” Id., at 603a. The
Board
therefore decided to introduce into the curriculum
what it described as “ `LGBTQ+-inclusive texts.' ”
5
Id., at
174a. As one email sent by MCPS principals refects, the
Board selected the books according to a “Critical Selection
Repertoire” that required selectors to review potential texts
and ask questions such as: “Is heteronormativity reinforced
or disrupted?”; “Is cisnormativity reinforced or disrupted?”;
and “Are power hierarchies that uphold the dominant culture
reinforced or disrupted?” Id., at 622a.
In accordance with this “[r]epertoire” and other criteria,
the Board eventually selected 13 “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts
for use in the English and Language Arts curriculum from
pre-K through 12th grade. Id., at 603a–604a, 622a. At
issue in this lawsuit are the fve “LGBTQ+-inclusive” story-
books that are approved for students in Kindergarten
through ffth grade—in other words, for children who are
generally between 5 and 11 years old.
6
A few short descriptions will serve to illustrate the gen-
eral tenor of the storybooks. Intersection Allies tells the
stories of several children from different backgrounds, in-
cluding Kate, who is apparently a transgender child. One
page shows Kate in a sex-neutral or sex-ambiguous bath-
room, and Kate proclaims: “My friends defend my choices
and place. A bathroom, like all rooms, should be a safe
5
Some sources in the record use different variations of “LGBTQ+-
inclusive” when referring to the books at issue in this case (e. g., “LGBTQ-
Inclusive”). App. to Pet. for Cer t. 603a. For consistency, we use
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” throughout the opinion, except in instances where
the designation appears in the middle of other quoted language, in which
case we retain the formulation that appears in the source.
6
This lawsuit initially concerned seven books: one approved for pre-K
and Head Start students, and six approved for grades K through 5. How-
ever, the one book approved for pre-K students was removed from the
curriculum due to content concerns, and one of the books approved for
grades K through 5 was removed for similar reasons. Brief for Petition-
ers 11, n. 10; Brief for Respondents 6, n. 4.
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space.” Id., at 323a. Intersection Allies includes a “Page-
By-Page
Book Discussion Guide” that asserts: “When we are
born, our gender is often decided for us based on our sex . . . .
But at any point in our lives, we can choose to identify with
one gender, multiple genders, or neither gender.” Id., at
349a–350a. The discussion guide explains that “Kate pre-
fers the pronouns they/their/them” and asks “What pro-
nouns ft you best?” Id., at 350a (boldface in original).
Prince & Knight tells the story of a coming-of-age prince
whose parents wish to match him with “a kind and worthy
bride.” Id., at 397a. After meeting with “many ladies,”
the prince tells his parents that he is “ `looking for something
different in a partner by [his] side.' ” Id., at 398a, 400a.
Later in the book, the prince falls into the “embrace” of a
knight after the two fnish battling a fearsome dragon. Id.,
at 415a. After the knight takes off his helmet, the prince
and knight “gaz[e] into each other's eyes, [and] their hearts
beg[in] to race.” Id., at 418a–419a. The whole kingdom
later applauds “on the two men's wedding day.” Id., at 424a.
Love Violet follows a young girl named Violet who has a
crush on her female classmate, Mira. Mira makes Violet's
“heart skip” and “thunde[r] like a hundred galloping horses.”
Id., at 431a, 436a. Although Violet is initially too afraid to
interact with Mira, the two end up exchanging gifts on Val-
entine's Day. Afterwards, the two girls are seen holding
hands and “galloping over snowy drifts to see what they
might fnd. Together.” Id., at 446a.
Born Ready: The True Story of a Boy Named Penelope
tells the story of Penelope, a child who is initially treated as
a girl. The story is told from the perspective of Penelope,
who at one point says “If they'd all stop and listen, I'd tell
them about me. Inside I'm a boy.” Id., at 454a. When Pe-
nelope's mother later assures her that “ `If you feel like a boy,
that's okay,' ” Penelope responds: “ `No, Mama, I don't feel
like a boy. I AM a boy.' ” Id., at 458a. Penelope tells her
mother:

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“ `I love you, Mama, but I don't want to be you. I want
to
be Papa. I don't want tomorrow to come because
tomorrow I'll look like you. Please help me, Mama.
Help me be a boy.' ” Id., at 459a.
Penelope's mother then agrees that she is a boy, and Penel-
ope says: “For the frst time, my insides don't feel like fre.
They feel like warm, golden love.” Id., at 462a. Later,
after the family starts treating Penelope as a boy, Penelope's
brother complains that “ `You can't become a boy. You have
to be born one.' ” Id., at 465a. This comment draws a re-
buke from Penelope's mother: “ `Not everything needs to
make sense. This is about love.' ” Ibid.
Finally, Uncle Bobby's Wedding tells the story of a young
girl named Chloe who is informed that her favorite uncle,
Bobby, will be getting married to his boyfriend, Jamie.
When Bobby and Jamie announce their engagement, every-
one is jubilant “except . . . Chloe.” Id., at 287a. Chloe says
that she does not “ `understand' ” why her uncle is getting
married, but her mother responds by explaining: “ `When
grown-up people love each other that much, sometimes they
get married.' ” Id., at 288a.
The Board suggested “that teachers incorporate the new
texts into the curriculum in the same way that other books
are used, namely, to put them on a shelf for students to fnd
on their own; to recommend a book to a student who would
enjoy it; to offer the books as an option for literature circles,
book clubs, or paired reading groups; or to use them as a
read aloud.” Id., at 604a–605a. And “[a]s with all curricu-
lum resources,” the Board voiced its “expectation that teach-
ers use the LGBTQ-Inclusive Books as part of instruction.”
Id., at 605a. An MCPS offcial has made clear that “[t]each-
ers cannot . . . elect not to use the LGBTQ-Inclusive Books
at all.” Ibid.
The Board also contemplated that instruction involving
the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks would include classroom
discussion. See id., at 642a (Board's lawyer: “there will be
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discussion that ensues. In fact, I think everyone would
hope
that discussion ensues”). In anticipation of such dis-
cussion, the Board hosted a “professional development work-
shop” in the summer of 2022, where it provided teachers with
a guidance document suggesting how they might respond to
student inquiries regarding the themes presented in the
books. Id., at 273a–276a, 604a, 628a–635a. For example, if
a student asserts that two men cannot get married, the guid-
ance document encouraged teachers to respond by saying:
“When people are adults they can get married. Two men
who love each other can decide they want to get married.”
Id., at 628a. If a student claims that a character “can't be a
boy if he was born a girl,” teachers were encouraged to re-
spond: “That comment is hurtful.” Id., at 630a. And if a
student asks “[w]hat's transgender?”, it was recommended
that teachers explain: “When we're born, people make a
guess about our gender and label us `boy' or `girl' based on
our body parts. Sometimes they're right and sometimes
they're wrong.” Ibid. The guidance document encouraged
teachers to “[d]isrupt the either/or thinking ” of their stu-
dents. Id., at 629a, 633a.
At the same workshop, the Board also provided teachers
with a guidance document that suggested particular re-
sponses to inquiries by parents. For example, if a parent
were to ask whether the school was attempting to teach a
child to “reject” the values taught at home, teachers were
encouraged to respond that “[t]eaching about LGBTQ+ is not
about making students think a certain way; it is to show that
there is no one `right' or `normal' way to be.” Id., at 638a.
The guidance also urged teachers to assure parents that
there would not be “explicit instruction” about gender and
sexual identity, but that “there may be a need to defne
words that are new and unfamiliar to students,” and that
“questions and conversations might organically happen.”
Id., at 640a. If parents were not comforted by that informa-
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tion, teachers could tell them that “[p]arents always have the
choice
to keep their student(s) home while using these texts;
however, it will not be an excused absence.” Ibid.
2
The Board offcially launched the “LGBTQ+-inclusive”
texts into MCPS schools in the 2022–2023 school year.
Shortly thereafter, parents “began contacting individual
teachers, principals, or MCPS staff” about the storybooks
and asking that their children be excused from classroom
instruction related to them. Id., at 606a. Some parents
showed up at the Board's public business meetings to ex-
press their concerns about the storybooks' content. In an
early 2023 meeting, for example, one parent represented her-
self as “a voice for parents in [her] community, many of
[whom] are actually working today and unable to attend.”
See MCPS, Jan. 12, 2023, Business Meeting, at 27:15–27:20,
https://mcpsmd.new.swagit.com/videos/196679. She said
that MCPS parents were “frustrated” because, in their view,
“educators and administrators are going behind what [par-
ents] are teaching their kids at home, and pushing ideas of
gender ideology on their kids.” Id., at 27:21–27:30. The
parent felt that the Board was “implying to [children] that
their religion, their belief system, and their family tradition
is actually wrong.” Id., at 28:25–28:30.
At the same Board meeting, one Board member responded
by saying that “some of the testimony today was disturbing
to me personally. Transgender, LGBTQ individuals are not
an ideology, they are a reality. . . . [T]here are religions out
there that teach that women should only achieve certain sub-
servient roles in life, and MCPS would never think of not
having a book in a classroom that showed a woman” in a
professional role. Id., at 38:35–39:00. The Board's student
member agreed with the sentiment and proclaimed that “ig-
norance and hate does exist within our community, but
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please know that every student—each of our 160,000 stu-
dents
in our large county—has a place in the school system.”
Id., at 40:25–40:36.
Initially, the Board compromised with objecting parents
by notifying them when the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks
would be taught and permitting their children to be excused
from instruction involving the books. That policy was con-
sistent with the Board's general “Guidelines for Respecting
Religious Diversity,” which at the time provided that
“[w]hen possible, schools should try to make reasonable and
feasible adjustments to the instructional program to accom-
modate requests from students, or requests from parents/
guardians on behalf of their students, to be excused from
specifc classroom discussions or activities that they believe
would impose a substantial burden on their religious beliefs.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 220a–221a.
This compromise, however, did not last long. In March
2023, less than a year after the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts
were introduced, the Board issued a statement declaring that
“[s]tudents and families may not choose to opt out of engag-
ing ” with the storybooks and that “teachers will not send
home letters to inform families when inclusive books are
read in the future.” Id., at 657a. According to one MCPS
offcial, the Board decided to change its policy because,
among other things, “individual principals and teachers
could not accommodate the growing number of opt out re-
quests without causing signifcant disruptions to the class-
room environment.” Id., at 607a. The offcial also stated
that permitting some students to exit the classroom while
the storybooks were being taught would expose other stu-
dents “to social stigma and isolation.” Id., at 608a. It was
therefore announced that any existing accommodations
would expire at the end of the 2022–2023 school year.
Shortly after the Board rescinded parental opt outs, more
than 1,000 parents signed a petition asking the Board to re-
store opt out rights. See Brief for Petitioners 14. And
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hundreds of displeased parents, including many Muslim and
Eth
iopian Orthodox parents, appeared at the Board's public
meetings and implored the Board to allow opt outs. Id., at
14–15. At a May 2023 meeting, one community member testi-
fed that “thousands” of parents felt “deeply dismayed and
betrayed” by the rescission of opt outs from “content that
confict[s] with their sincerely held religious beliefs.”
MCPS, May 25, 2023, Business Meeting, at 35:33–35:44,
https://mcpsmd.new.swagit.com/videos/232766. At the same
meeting, an MCPS student testifed and asked the Board “to
allow students like me to opt out of content and books that
contain sensitive and mature topics that go against my reli-
gious beliefs.” Id., at 40:47–40:56.
The Board was unmoved. After the testimony, several
Board members and another MCPS offcial spoke up to “clar-
ify” that the storybooks would not be used for explicit in-
struction on sexuality and gender, but rather as part of the
“literacy curriculum.” Id., at 1:11:14–1:16:22. According to
a later news article, one Board member recalled that “she
felt `kind of sorry' ” for the student who testifed in favor of
opt outs, “and wondered to what extent she may have been
`parroting dogma' learned from her parents.”
7
The Board
member also expressed her view that “ `[i]f [parents] want
their child to receive an education that strictly adheres to
their religious dogma, they can send their kid to a private
religious school.' ” N. 7, this page. The Board member
went on to suggest that the objecting parents were compara-
ble to “ `white supremacists' ” who want to prevent their chil-
dren from learning about civil rights and “ `xenophobes' ”
who object to “ `stories about immigrant families.' ” Ibid.
7
E. Espey, Parents, Students, Doctors React to MCPS Lawsuit Target-
ing LGBTQ+ Storybooks, Bethesda Magazine (June 2, 2023), https://
bethesdamagazine.com/2023/06/02/parents-students-doctors-react-to-
mcps-lawsuit-targeting-lgbtq-storybooks; see also Mahmoud v. McKnight,
688 F. Supp. 3d 265, 285 (Md. 2023) (recounti ng the Board member's
statements).
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The Board continues to permit children to opt out of other
school
activities, including the “family life and human sexual-
ity” unit of instruction, for which opt outs are required under
Maryland law. Code of Md. Regs., tit. 13A, § 04.18.01(D)
(2)(e)(i) (2025); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 657a. And al-
though the Board has amended its “Guidelines for Respect-
ing Religious Diversity” to narrow the circumstances in
which opt outs are permissible, those guidelines still allow
opt outs from “noncurricular activities, such as classroom
parties or free-time events that involve materials or prac-
tices in confict with a family's religious, and/or other, prac-
tices.” Id., at 672a.
B
1
At the time when this lawsuit was fled, petitioners Tamer
Mahmoud and Enas Barakat had three children enrolled in
MCPS, including one who was still in elementary school.
Mahmoud and Barakat are Muslims who believe “that man-
kind has been divinely created as male and female” and “that
`gender' cannot be unwoven from biological `sex'—to the ex-
tent the two are even distinct—without rejecting the dignity
and direction God bestowed on humanity from the start.”
Id., at 165a–166a. Mahmoud and Barakat believe that it
would be “immoral” to expose their “young, impressionable,
elementary-aged son” to a curriculum that “undermine[s] Is-
lamic teaching.” Id., at 532a. And, in their view, “[t]he sto-
rybooks at issue in this lawsuit . . . directly undermine [their]
efforts to raise” their son in the Islamic faith “because they
encourage young children to question their sexuality and
gender . . . and to dismiss parental and religious guidance on
these issues.” Ibid.
Af ter the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks were intro-
duced, Mahmoud and Barakat asked to have their son ex-
cused from the classroom when Prince & Knight was read.
Their son's principal initially permitted the boy to sit outside

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Opinion of the Court
the classroom during that time. But, soon after, the Board
announced
that opt outs would no longer be available. Mah-
moud and Barakat then felt “religiously compelled to send
their son to private school at signifcant fnancial sacrifce.”
Brief for Petitioners 16.
Petitioners Jeff and Svitlana Roman also had a son en-
rolled in an MCPS elementary school when this lawsuit was
fled. Jeff Roman is Catholic, and Svitlana Roman is Ukrai-
nian Orthodox. They believe that “sexuality is expressed
only in marriage between a man and a woman for creating
life and strengthening the marital union.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 166a. The Romans further believe “that gender and
biological sex are intertwined and inseparable” and that “the
young need to be helped to accept their own body as it was
created.” Id., at 537a (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Romans understand that their son “loves his teachers
and implicitly trusts them,” and so they fear that allowing
those teachers to “teach principles about sexuality or gender
identity that confict with [their] religious beliefs” would
“signifcantly interfer[e] with [their] ability to form [their
son's] religious faith and religious outlook on life.” Id., at
541a.
Af ter the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks were intro-
duced, the Romans asked the principal of their son's elemen-
tary school to notify them when the books were being read
and to excuse their son from that instruction. The Romans
were initially told that it was their “right” to ask that their
son not be present when the books are read, id., at 496a,
but they were later informed that notice and opt outs
would no longer be provided. Thus, the Romans, like Mah-
moud and Barakat, were “religiously compelled to send their
son to private school, at signifcant expense.” Brief for Peti-
tioners 18.
Petiti oners Chr is and Mel issa Persak have two
elementary-age daughters who attend public school in Mont-
gomery County. The Persaks are Catholics who believe
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“that all humans are created as male or female, and that a
person'
s biological sex is a gift bestowed by God that is both
unchanging and integral to that person's being.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 543a. The Persaks believe “that children—
particularly those in elementary school—are highly impres-
sionable to ideological instruction presented in children's
books or by schoolteachers.” Id., at 544a. They are con-
cerned that the Board's “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks “are
being used to impose an ideological view of family life and
sexuality that characterizes any divergent beliefs as `hurt-
ful.' ” Ibid. They think that such instruction will “under-
mine [their] efforts to raise [their] children in accordance
with” their religious faith. Ibid. The Persaks' daughters
were initially permitted to opt out of instruction related to
the storybooks, but they no longer have that option.
The fnal petitioner, Kids First, is an unincorporated asso-
ciation of parents and teachers that was “formed to advocate
for the return of parental notice and opt-out rights in the
Montgomery County Public Schools.” Id., at 624a. One of
Kids First's board members—Grace Morrison—has a daugh-
ter who previously attended an MCPS elementary school.
Morrison's daughter has Down syndrome and attention def-
cit disorder. She previously required special accommoda-
tions from her public school, including a “full time, one-on-
one paraeducator.” Id., at 624a–625a. Morrison's daughter
also received special services from the school, such as speech
and occupational therapy. Morrison and her husband are
Catholics who believe that “marriage is the lifelong union of
one man and one woman” and that gender is “interwoven”
with sex. Id., at 625a. Due to their daughter's learning
challenges, they fear that she “doesn't understand or differ-
entiate instructions from her teachers and her parents” and
that they “won't be able to contradict what she hears from
teachers.” Id., at 626a.
Because of the services provided to her disabled daughter
in public school, Morrison faced enormous “pressure” to keep
her daughter enrolled. Ibid. She asked that her daughter
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be excused from “LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction, even after
the
Board's decision to rescind opt outs. She was told, how-
ever, that opt outs would not be possible. As a result,
the Morrisons felt “religiously compelled” to remove their
daughter from public school. Brief for Petitioners 19.
They anticipate that it will cost at least $25,000 per year to
replace the academic and other services that their daughter
formerly received from the public school system.
2
Faced with the Board's decision to rescind opt outs, peti-
tioners fled this lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. Among other things, they as-
serted that the Board's no-opt-out policy infringed their
right to the free exercise of their religion. See Kennedy
v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 524 (2022). They
sought a preliminary and permanent injunction “prohibiting
the School Board from forcing [their] children and other
students—over the objection of their parents—to read,
listen to, or discuss” the storybooks. App. to Pet. for Cert.
206a.
In support of their request, the parents relied heavily on
this Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205.
That case concerned Amish parents who wished to withdraw
their children from conventional schooling after the eighth
grade, in direct contravention of a Wisconsin law requiring
children to attend school until the age of 16. In Yoder, we
recognized that parents have a right “to direct the religious
upbringing of their children,” and that this right can be in-
fringed by laws that pose “a very real threat of undermin-
ing ” the religious beliefs and practices that parents wish to
instill in their children. Id., at 218, 233. Given the substan-
tial burdens that Wisconsin's compulsory-attendance law
placed on the religious practices of the Amish, we held that
it “carrie[d] with it precisely the kind of objective danger to
the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was
designed to prevent.” Id., at 218.
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In the present case, the parents asserted that Yoder's prin-
ciple
applies to their situation, and they therefore asked for
a preliminary injunction permitting their children to opt out
of the challenged instruction pending the completion of their
lawsuit. The District Court denied that relief. It charac-
terized the petitioners' primary argument as an objection to
school “indoctrination” and asserted that the petitioners had
not “identifed any case recognizing a free exercise violation
based on indoctrination.” Mahmoud v. McKnight, 688
F. Supp. 3d 265, 295 (Md. 2023). It dismissed Yoder as “sui
generis” and “inexorably linked to the Amish community's
unique religious beliefs and practices.” 688 F. Supp. 3d, at
294, 301. And although the District Court acknowledged
that the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” curriculum might result in
petitioners' being “less likely to succeed” in raising their
children in their religious faiths, id., at 300, it nonetheless
held that the curriculum was likely consistent with the Free
Exercise Clause.
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affrmed. The ma-
jority did not expressly endorse the District Court's view
regarding the constitutionality of “indoctrination,” but it
suggested that petitioners could succeed on their free exer-
cise claim only if they could “show direct or indirect coercion
arising out of the exposure” to the storybooks. Mahmoud
v. McKnight, 102 F. 4th 191, 212 (2024). And the majority
found that the evidence in the record was insuffcient to
make that showing. The majority expressed concern that
“[t]he record does not show how the Storybooks are actually
being used in classrooms.” Id., at 213. And without such
evidence, the majority held, petitioners could not obtain a
preliminary injunction because it could not simply be as-
sumed that any past lessons had or that any future lessons
would “cross the line and pressure students to change their
views or act contrary to their faith.” Ibid. As for petition-
ers' reliance on Yoder, the majority quickly dismissed that
argument, describing the decision as “markedly circum-
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scribed” and “tailored to the specifc evidence in [its] record.”
102
F. 4th, at 210–211.
Judge Quattlebaum dissented. He accepted the parents'
representation that “their faith compels that they teach their
children about sex, human sexuality, gender and family life.”
Id., at 222. And he acknowledged their claim that “the mes-
sages from the books confict with and undermine the sin-
cerely held religious beliefs they hold and seek to convey to
their children.” Ibid. Judge Quattlebaum therefore con-
cluded that the Board had “force[d] the parents to make a
choice—either adhere to their faith or receive a free public
education for their children.” Ibid. Forcing parents to
make such a choice was, in his view, a burden on their reli-
gion exercise.
After the Fourth Circuit ruled, the parents asked this
Court to review the decision, and we granted their petition
for a writ of certiorari. 604 U. S. 1096 (2025). We now hold
that the parents have shown that they are entitled to a pre-
liminary injunction and reverse the judgment below.
II
Our Constitution proclaims that “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Amdt. 1.
That restriction applies equally to the States by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S.
296, 303 (1940). And the right to free exercise, like other
First Amendment rights, is not “shed . . . at the schoolhouse
gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506–507 (1969). Government
schools, like all government institutions, may not place un-
constitutional burdens on religious exercise.
The parents assert that the Board's introduction of the
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—combined with its decision
to withhold notice and opt outs—unconstitutionally burdens
their religious exercise. At this stage, the parents seek a
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546 MAHMOUD
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children excused from instruction related to the storybooks
wh
ile this lawsuit proceeds. To obtain that form of prelimi-
nary relief, the parents must show that they are likely to
succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irrepara-
ble harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the bal-
ance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction
would be in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008). The
parents have made that showing.
III
To begin, we hold that the parents are likely to succeed on
their claim that the Board's policies unconstitutionally bur-
den their religious exercise. “[W]e have long recognized
the rights of parents to direct `the religious upbringing ' of
their children.” Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue,
591 U. S. 464, 486 (2020) (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–
214). And we have held that those rights are violated by
government policies that “substantially interfer[e] with the
religious development” of children. Id., at 218. Such inter-
ference, we have observed, “carries with it precisely the kind
of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the
First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Ibid. For
the reasons explained below, we conclude that such an “ob-
jective danger” is present here.
A
We start by describing the nature of the religious practice
at issue here and explaining why it is burdened by the
Board's policies.
1
At its heart, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment protects “the ability of those who hold religious beliefs
of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through the
performance of ” religious acts. Kennedy, 597 U. S., at 524
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(internal quotation marks omitted). And for many people of
faith
across the country, there are few religious acts more
important than the religious education of their children.
See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591
U. S. 732, 754 (2020) (“Religious education is vital to many
faiths practiced in the United States”). Indeed, for many
Christians, Jews, Muslims, and others, the religious educa-
tion of children is not merely a preferred practice but rather
a religious obligation. See id., at 754–756. The parent
petitioners in this case refect this reality: they all believe
they have a “sacred obligation” or “God-given responsibility”
to raise their children in a way that is consistent with their
religious beliefs and practices. App. to Pet. for Cert. 531a,
538a, 543a, 625a.
The practice of educating one's children in one's religious
beliefs, like all religious acts and practices, receives a gener-
ous measure of protection from our Constitution. “Drawing
on `enduring American tradition,' we have long recognized
the rights of parents to direct `the religious upbringing ' of
their children.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 486 (quoting Yoder,
406 U. S., at 213–214, 232). And this is not merely a right
to teach religion in the confnes of one's own home. Rather,
it extends to the choices that parents wish to make for their
children outside the home. It protects, for example, a par-
ent's decision to send his or her child to a private religious
school instead of a public school. Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U. S. 510, 532–535 (1925).
Due to fnancial and other constraints, however, many par-
ents “have no choice but to send their children to a public
school.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U. S. 393, 424 (2007)
(Alito, J., concurring). As a result, the right of parents “to
direct the religious upbringing of their” children would be
an empty promise if it did not follow those children into the
public school classroom. We have thus recognized limits on
the government's ability to interfere with a student's reli-
gious upbringing in a public school setting.
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An early example comes from our decision in West Vir-
g
inia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). In that
case, we considered a resolution adopted by the West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education that required students “to
participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented by
the Flag.” Id., at 626 (internal quotation marks omitted).
If students failed to comply, they faced expulsion and could
not be readmitted until they yielded to the State's command.
Id., at 629. A group of plaintiffs sued to prevent the en-
forcement of this policy against Jehovah's Witnesses who
considered the fag to be a “graven image” and refused to
salute it. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
challengers asserted that the policy was, among other
things, “an unconstitutional denial of religious freedom.”
Id., at 630.
We agreed that the policy could not be squared with the
First Amendment. The effect of the State's policy, we ob-
served, was to “condition access to public education on mak-
ing a prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to
coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child.” Id.,
at 630–631. Although the policy did not clearly require stu-
dents to “forego any contrary convictions of their own and
become unwilling converts,” it nonetheless required a partic-
ular “affrmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.” Id.,
at 633. For a public school to require students to make such
an affrmation, in contravention of their beliefs and those of
their parents, was to go further than the First Amendment
would allow.
Barnette dealt with an especially egregious kind of direct
coercion: a requirement that students make an affrmation
contrary to their parents' religious beliefs. But that does
not mean that the protections of the First Amendment ex-
tend only to policies that compel children to depart from the
religious practices of their parents. To the contrary, in
Yoder, we held that the Free Exercise Clause protects
against policies that impose more subtle forms of interfer-
ence with the religious upbringing of children.
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Yoder concerned a Wisconsin law that required parents to
send
their children to public or private school until the age
of 16. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin
Yutzy were members of Wisconsin's Amish community who
refused to send their children to public school after the com-
pletion of the eighth grade. In their view, the values taught
in high school were “in marked variance with Amish values
and the Amish way of life,” and would result in an “imper-
missible exposure of their children to a `worldly' infuence in
confict with their beliefs.” 406 U. S., at 211. In response,
this Court observed that formal high school education would
“plac[e] Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish
beliefs . . . with pressure to conform to the styles, manners,
and ways of the peer group” and that it would “tak[e] them
away from their community, physically and emotionally, dur-
ing the crucial and formative adolescent period of life.”
Ibid. “In short,” the Court concluded, “high school attend-
ance . . . interposes a serious barrier to the integration of
the Amish child into the Amish religious community.” Id.,
at 211–212.
In Yoder, unlike in Barnette, there was no suggestion that
the compulsory-attendance law would compel Amish chil-
dren to make an affrmation that was contrary to their par-
ents' or their own religious beliefs. Nor was there a sugges-
tion that Amish children would be compelled to commit some
specifc practice forbidden by their religion. Rather, the
threat to religious exercise was premised on the fact that
high school education would “expos[e] Amish children to
worldly infuences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values
contrary to [their] beliefs” and would “substantially inter-
fer[e] with the religious development of the Amish child.”
406 U. S., at 218.
That interference, the Court held, violated the parents'
free exercise rights. The compulsory-education law “car-
rie[d] with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the
free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was de-
signed to prevent” because it placed Amish children into “an
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environment hostile to Amish beliefs,” where they would
face
“pressure to conform” to contrary viewpoints and life-
styles. Id., at 211, 218.
As our decision in Yoder refects, the question whether a
law “substantially interfer[es] with the religious develop-
ment” of a child will always be fact-intensive. Id., at 218.
It will depend on the specifc religious beliefs and practices
asserted, as well as the specifc nature of the educational
requirement or curricular feature at issue. Educational re-
quirements targeted toward very young children, for exam-
ple, may be analyzed differently from educational require-
ments for high school students. A court must also consider
the specifc context in which the instruction or materials at
issue are presented. Are they presented in a neutral man-
ner, or are they presented in a manner that is “hostile” to
religious viewpoints and designed to impose upon students
a “pressure to conform”? Id., at 211.
We now turn to the application of these principles to this
case.
2
In light of the record before us, we hold that the Board's
introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—com-
bined with its decision to withhold notice to parents and to
forbid opt outs—substantially interferes with the religious
development of their children and imposes the kind of burden
on religious exercise that Yoder found unacceptable.
To understand why, start with the storybooks themselves.
Like many books targeted at young children, the books are
unmistakably normative. They are clearly designed to pres-
ent certain values and beliefs as things to be celebrated and
certain contrary values and beliefs as things to be rejected.
Take, for example, the message sent by the books concern-
ing same-sex marriage. Many Americans “advocate with
utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex
marriage should not be condoned.” Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U. S. 644, 679 (2015). That group includes each of the
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parents in this case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 530a, 537a, 543a,
625a.
The storybooks, however, are designed to present the
opposite viewpoint to young, impressionable children who
are likely to accept without question any moral messages
conveyed by their teachers' instruction.
For example, the book Prince & Knight clearly conveys
the message that same-sex marriage should be accepted by
all as a cause for celebration. The young reader is guided
to feel distressed at the prince's failure to fnd a princess,
and then to celebrate when the prince meets his male part-
ner. See id., at 397a–401a, 419a–423a. The book relates
that “on the two men's wedding day, the air flled with cheer
and laughter, for the prince and his shining knight would live
happily ever after.” Id., at 424a. Those celebrating the
same-sex wedding are not just family members and close
friends, but the entire kingdom. For young children, to
whom this and the other storybooks are targeted, such cele-
bration is liable to be processed as having moral connota-
tions. If this same-sex marriage makes everyone happy and
leads to joyous celebration by all, doesn't that mean it is in
every respect a good thing? High school students may un-
derstand that widespread approval of a practice does not
necessarily mean that everyone should accept it, but very
young children are most unlikely to appreciate that fne
point.
Uncle Bobby's Wedding, the only book that the dissent is
willing to discuss in any detail, conveys the same message
more subtly. The atmosphere is jubilant after Uncle Bobby
and his boyfriend announce their engagement. Id., at 286a
(“Everyone was smiling and talking and crying and laugh-
ing ” (emphasis added)). The book's main character, Chloe,
does not share this excitement. “ `I don't understand!' ” she
exclaims, “ `Why is Uncle Bobby getting married?' ” Id., at
288a. The book is coy about the precise reason for Chloe's
question, but the question is used to tee up a direct message
to young readers: “ `Bobby and Jamie love each other,' said
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Mummy. `When grown-up people love each other that
much,
sometimes they get married.' ” Ibid. The book
therefore presents a specifc, if subtle, message about mar-
riage. It asserts that two people can get married, regard-
less of whether they are of the same or the opposite sex, so
long as they “ `love each other.' ” Ibid. That view is now
accepted by a great many Americans, but it is directly con-
trary to the religious principles that the parents in this case
wish to instill in their children.
It is signifcant that this book does not simply refer to
same-sex marriage as an existing practice. Instead, it pre-
sents acceptance of same-sex marriage as a perspective that
should be celebrated. The book's narrative arc reaches its
peak with the actual event of Uncle Bobby's wedding, which
is presented as a joyous event that is met with universal
approval. See id., at 300a–305a. And again, there are
many Americans who would view the event that way, and it
goes without saying that they have every right to do so.
But other Americans wish to present a different moral mes-
sage to their children. And their ability to present that
message is undermined when the exact opposite message is
positively reinforced in the public school classroom at a very
young age.
Next, consider the messages sent by the storybooks on the
subject of sex and gender. Many Americans, like the par-
ents in this case, believe that biological sex refects divine
creation, that sex and gender are inseparable, and that chil-
dren should be encouraged to accept their sex and to live
accordingly. Id., at 530a–531a, 538a–540a, 543a, 625a. But
the challenged storybooks encourage children to adopt a con-
trary viewpoint. Intersection Allies presents a transgender
child in a sex-ambiguous bathroom and proclaims that “[a]
bathroom, like all rooms, should be a safe space.” Id., at
323a. The book also includes a discussion guide that asserts
that “at any point in our lives, we can choose to identify with
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children “What pronouns ft you best?” Id., at 350a (bold-
face
in original). The book and the accompanying discussion
guidance present as a settled matter a hotly contested view
of sex and gender that sharply conficts with the religious
beliefs that the parents wish to instill in their children.
The book Born Ready presents similar ideas in an even
less veiled manner. The book follows the story of Penelope,
an apparently biological female who asserts “ `I AM a boy.' ”
Id., at 458a. Not only does the story convey the message
that Penelope is a boy simply because that is what she
chooses to be, but it slyly conveys a positive message about
transgender medical procedures. Penelope says the follow-
ing to her mother:
“ `I love you, Mama, but I don't want to be you. I want
to be Papa. I don't want tomorrow to come because
tomorrow I'll look like you. Please help me, Mama.
Help me be a boy.' ” Id., at 459a.
Penelope's mother then agrees that Penelope is a boy, and
Penelope exclaims: “For the frst time, my insides don't feel
like fre. They feel like warm, golden love.” Id., at 462a.
To young children, the moral implication of the story is that
it is seriously harmful to deny a gender transition and that
transitioning is a highly positive experience. The book goes
so far as to present a contrary view as something to be repri-
manded. When the main character's brother says “ `You
can't become a boy. You have to be born one,' ” his mother
corrects him by saying: “ `Not everything needs to make
sense. This is about love.' ” Id., at 465a (emphasis in origi-
nal). The upshot is that it is hurtful, perhaps even hateful,
to hold the view that gender is inextricably bound with bio-
logical sex.
These books carry with them “a very real threat of under-
mining ” the religious beliefs that the parents wish to instill
in their children. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. Like the com-
pulsory high school education considered in Yoder, these
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books impose upon children a set of values and beliefs that
are
“hostile” to their parents' religious beliefs. Id., at 211.
And the books exert upon children a psychological “pressure
to conform” to their specifc viewpoints. Ibid. The books
therefore present the same kind of “objective danger to the
free exercise of religion” that we identifed in Yoder. Id.,
at 218.
That “objective danger” is only exacerbated by the fact
that the books will be presented to young children by author-
ity fgures in elementary school classrooms. As representa-
tives of the Board have admitted, “there is an expectation
that teachers use the LGBTQ-Inclusive Books as part of in-
struction,” and “there will be discussion that ensues.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 605a, 642a.
The Board has left little mystery as to what that discus-
sion might look like. The Board provided teachers with sug-
gested responses to student questions related to the books,
and the responses make it clear that instruction related to
the storybooks will “substantially interfer[e]” with the par-
ents' ability to direct the “religious development” of their
children. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. In response to a child
who states that two men “can't get married,” teachers are
encouraged to respond “[t]wo men who love each other can
decide they want to get married . . . . There are so many
different kinds of families and ways to be a family.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 628a–629a. If a child says “[h]e can't be a
boy if he was born a girl,” the teacher is urged to respond
“[t]hat comment is hurtful.” Id., at 630a. If a child asks
“What's transgender?”, it is suggested that the teacher an-
swer: “When we're born, people make a guess about our gen-
der . . . . Sometimes they're right and sometimes they're
wrong.” Ibid.
In other contexts, we have recognized the potentially coer-
cive nature of classroom instruction of this kind. “The
State exerts great authority and coercive power through”
public schools “because of the students' emulation of teachers
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as role models and the children's susceptibility to peer pres-
sure
.” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 584 (1987); see
also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 592 (1992) (“[T]here are
heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience
from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and second-
ary public schools”). Young children, like those of petition-
ers, are often “impressionable” and “implicitly trus[t]” their
teachers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 532a, 541a.
8
Here, the
Board requires teachers to instruct young children using sto-
rybooks that explicitly contradict their parents' religious
views, and it encourages the teachers to correct the children
and accuse them of being “hurtful” when they express a de-
gree of religious confusion. Id., at 630a. Such instruction
“carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the
free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was de-
signed to prevent.” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218.
3
None of the counterarguments raised by the dissent, the
Board, the courts below, or the Board's amici give us any
reason to doubt the existence of a burden here.
a
To start, we cannot accept the Board's characterization of
the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction as mere “exposure to
objectionable ideas” or as lessons in “mutual respect.” Brief
for Respondents 27–28; Tr. of Oral Arg. 101, 169. As we
have explained, the storybooks unmistakably convey a par-
8
The dissent tries to divert attention from the ages of the children sub-
ject to the instruction at issue here. It sees no difference between peti-
tioners' young children and the high school students in Kennedy v. Brem-
erton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507 (2022). See post, at 602–603 (opinion of
Sotomayor, J.). And it criticizes our decision for taking the age of stu-
dents into account. Post, at 610. It goes without saying, however, that
the age of the children involved is highly relevant in any assessment of
the likely effect of instruction on the subjects in question.
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ticular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and gender.
And
the Board has specifcally encouraged teachers to rein-
force this viewpoint and to reprimand any children who dis-
agree. That goes far beyond mere “exposure.”
We similarly disagree with the dissent's deliberately blink-
ered view that these storybooks and related instruction
merely “[e]xpos[e] students to the `message' that LGBTQ
people exist” and teach them to treat others with kindness.
See post, at 593, 622 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). In making
this argument, the dissent ignores what anyone who reads
these books can readily see. It ignores the messages that the
authors plainly intended to convey. And, what is perhaps
most telling, it ignores the Board's stated reasons for inserting
these books into the curriculum and much of the instructions
it gave to teachers. See supra, at 532–533, 535–537. Only
by air-brushing the record can the dissent claim that the books
and instructions are just about exposure and kindness.
In any event, the Board and the dissent are mistaken when
they rely extensively on the concept of “exposure.” The
question in cases of this kind is whether the educational re-
quirement or curriculum at issue would “substantially inter-
fer[e] with the religious development” of the child or pose “a
very real threat of undermining ” the religious beliefs and
practices the parent wishes to instill in the child. Yoder,
406 U. S., at 218. Whether or not a requirement or curricu-
lum could be characterized as “exposure” is not the touch-
stone for determining whether that line is crossed.
b
We are also unpersuaded by the Board's reliance—echoed
by the dissent—on our decisions in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S.
693 (1986), and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Assn., 485 U. S. 439 (1988). See post, at 607–610 (opinion
of Sotomayor, J.). In Bowen, a father mounted a free exer-
cise challenge to the Government's use of a Social Security
number associated with his daughter. 476 U. S., at 695–698.

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And in Lyng, Native Americans and other plaintiffs raised a
free
exercise challenge to the construction of a paved road
on federal land. 485 U. S., at 442–443. In those cases, we
held that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be un-
derstood to require the Government to conduct its own inter-
nal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of
particular citizens,” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 699, even when the
conduct of such internal affairs might result in “incidental
interference with an individual's spiritual activities,” Lyng,
485 U. S., at 450. And, we emphasized, that conclusion was
appropriate because the government actions at issue did not
“discriminate” against religion or “coerce individuals into
acting contrary to their religious beliefs.” Id., at 450, 453;
see also Bowen, 476 U. S., at 703 (plurality opinion).
These cases have no application here. The government's
operation of the public schools is not a matter of “internal
affairs” akin to the administration of Social Security or the
selection of “fling cabinets.” Id., at 699–700 (majority opin-
ion). It implicates direct, coercive interactions between the
State and its young residents. The public school imposes
rules and standards of conduct on its students and holds a
limited power to discipline them for misconduct. See, e. g.,
Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L., 594 U. S. 180, 187–188
(2021). If questions of public school curriculum were purely
a matter of internal affairs, one could imagine that other
First Amendment protections—such as the right to free
speech or the right to be free from established religion—
would also be inapplicable in the public school context. But
our precedents plainly provide otherwise. See Tinker, 393
U. S., at 506; Weisman, 505 U. S., at 587.
c
Next, we cannot agree with the decision of the lower
courts to dismiss our holding in Yoder out of hand. Al-
though the decision turned on a close analysis of the facts in
the record, there is no reason to conclude that the decision
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is “sui generis” or uniquely “tailored to [its] specifc evi-
dence
,” as the courts below reasoned. See 688 F. Supp. 3d,
at 301; 102 F. 4th, at 211. We have never confned Yoder to
its facts. To the contrary, we have treated it like any other
precedent. We have at times relied on it as a statement
of general principles. See, e. g., Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 486;
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.
Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 881, and n. 1 (1990). And we have dis-
tinguished it when appropriate. See, e. g., Lyng, 485 U. S.,
at 456–457.
True, we noted in Yoder that the Amish had made a “con-
vincing showing, one that probably few other religious
groups or sects could make.” 406 U. S., at 235–236; see post,
at 612 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But that language must
be read in the context of the specifc claims raised by the
Amish respondents. They did not challenge a discrete edu-
cational requirement or element of the curriculum, like the
plaintiffs in Barnette. Instead, they asserted a right to
withdraw their children from all conventional schooling after
a certain age. Such a claim required them to show that the
practice of formal education after the eighth grade would
substantially and systemically interfere with the religious
development of their children. It was on that point that
they had made a “convincing showing ” that others might
struggle to make. But that says nothing at all about
whether other parents could make the same convincing
showing with respect to more specifc educational require-
ments. Yoder is an important precedent of this Court, and
it cannot be breezily dismissed as a special exception granted
to one particular religious minority.
It instead embodies a principle of general applicability, and
that principle provides more robust protection for religious
liberty than the alarmingly narrow rule that the dissent pro-
pounds. The dissent sees the Free Exercise Clause's guar-
antee as nothing more than protection against compulsion or
coercion to renounce or abandon one's religion. See post,
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at 601 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.) (“the Clause prohibits the
gover
nment from compelling individuals, whether directly or
indirectly, to give up or violate their religious beliefs”); ibid.
(the “Free Exercise Clause forbids affrmatively compelling
individuals to perform acts undeniably at odds with funda-
mental tenets of their religious beliefs” (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted)); ibid. (the “Free Exercise
Clause prohibits laws that have a tendency to coerce individ-
uals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Under this test, even instruc-
tion that denigrates or ridicules students' religious beliefs
would apparently be allowed.
9
We reject this chilling vision of the power of the state to
strip away the critical right of parents to guide the religious
development of their children. Yoder and Barnette embody
a very different view of religious liberty, one that comports
with the fundamental values of the American people.
d
We also disagree with the Fourth Circuit's view that the
record before us is too “threadbare” to demonstrate a burden
on religious exercise. 102 F. 4th, at 209. That court faulted
the parents for failing to make specifc allegations describing
how the books “are actually being used in classrooms.” Id.,
at 213. But when a deprivation of First Amendment rights
9
In a footnote, the dissent retreats and suggests that denigration and
ridicule could amount to prohibited “coercion.” See post, at 603, n. 5
(opinion of Sotomayor, J.). But this concession is either meaningless or
undermines the dissent's entire argument. The primary defnition of “co-
ercion” is little different from compulsion. See Webster's Third New In-
ternational Dictionary 439 (1971) (“use of physical or moral force to compel
to act or assent”); Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 398
(2d ed. 2001) (“use of force or intimidation to obtain compliance”). If that
is what the dissent means by “coercion,” then it is unclear why ridicule or
denigration would qualify as coercion under its test. By contrast, if the
dissent defnes “coercion” to require less, then it has failed to explain why
our understanding of what the Clause protects is fawed.
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is at stake, a plaintiff need not wait for the damage to occur
before
fling suit. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573
U. S. 149, 158 (2014) (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459 (1974)). Instead, to pursue a pre-enforcement chal-
lenge, a plaintiff must show that “the threatened injury
is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that
the harm will occur.” 573 U. S., at 158 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, the parents have undoubtedly made
that showing. The Board does not dispute that it is intro-
ducing the storybooks into classrooms, that it is requiring
teachers to use them as part of instruction, and that it has
encouraged teachers to approach classroom discussions in a
certain way. See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 9–10. We do
not need to “wait and see” how a particular book is used in
a particular classroom on a particular day before evaluating
the parents' First Amendment claims. We need only decide
whether—if teachers act according to the clear and undis-
puted instructions of the Board—a burden on religious exer-
cise will occur.
Besides, it is not clear how the Fourth Circuit expects the
parents to obtain specifc information about how a particular
book was used or is planned for use at a particular time.
The Board has stated that it will not notify parents when
the books are being read. And it is not realistic to expect
parents to rely on after-the-fact reports by their young chil-
dren to determine whether the parents' free exercise rights
have been burdened. In circumstances like these, where the
Board has clearly stated how it intends to proceed, the par-
ents may base their First Amendment claim on the Board's
representations.
e
Finally, we reject the alternatives offered to parents by
those who would defend the judgment below. The frst of
those proposed alternatives is the suggestion that any par-
ents who are unhappy about the instruction in question can
simply “place their children in private school or . . . educate
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them at home.” Brief for Religious and Civil-Rights Orga-
ni
zations as Amici Curiae 14; accord, Brief for National Edu-
cation Association et al. as Amici Curiae 15; Brief for Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 10; Tr. of
Oral Arg. 61–62. The availability of this option is no answer
to the parents' First Amendment objections. As we have
previously held, when the government chooses to provide
public benefts, it may not “condition the availability of
[those] benefts upon a recipient's willingness to surrender
his religiously impelled status.” Trinity Lutheran Church
of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 462 (2017) (inter-
nal quotations marks and alterations omitted). That is what
the Board has done here. Public education is a public bene-
ft, and the government cannot “condition” its “availability”
on parents' willingness to accept a burden on their religious
exercise. Ibid. Moreover, since education is compulsory in
Maryland, see Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7–301(a–1)(1), the par-
ents are not being asked simply to forgo a public beneft.
They have an obligation—enforceable by fne or imprison-
ment—to send their children to public school unless they
fnd an adequate substitute. §§ 7–301(a)(3), (e).
10
And many
parents cannot afford such a substitute.
The provision of education is an expensive endeavor. In
Montgomery County, as in many other jurisdictions, public
10
In light of this obligation, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972),
cannot be distinguished, as the dissent claims, see post, at 606 (opinion
of Sotomayor, J.), on the ground that it involved compulsory school at-
tendance. Here, the parents are being “affrmatively compel[ led]” to do
the same thing as the parents in Yoder: submit their children to instruc-
tion that would “substantially interfer[e] with the[ir] religious develop-
ment.” 406 U. S., at 218. The dissent claims that the parents in Yoder,
unlike petitioners, “were prohibited by the challenged law from engaging
in religious teaching at home,” post, at 607, n. 6, but that is plainly untrue.
All that the Wisconsin law required was that the children attend school
until they reached the age of 16. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 207. The State
made no effort to prevent religious training when students were not in
school.
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education is the most signifcant expenditure in the county
budget
by a wide margin.
11
In the 2025–2026 school year,
the county expects to spend $3.6 billion on public schools,
amounting to roughly $22,644 per student. See M. Elrich,
County Executive, FY26 Recommended Operating Budget
and FY26–FY31 Public Services Program, pp. 16 (message),
10–1 (Mar. 2025). To help fnance that budget, Montgomery
County will levy property taxes and income taxes on all resi-
dents, regardless of whether they send their children to a
public school. Id., at 5–10 to 5–11. Private elementary
schools in Montgomery County are expensive; many cost
$10,000 or more per year prior to fnancial aid.
12
And
homeschooling comes with a hefty price as well; it requires
at least one parent to stay at home during the normal work-
day to educate children, thereby forgoing additional income
opportunities. It is both insulting and legally unsound to
tell parents that they must abstain from public education in
order to raise their children in their religious faiths, when
alternatives can be prohibitively expensive and they already
contribute to fnancing the public schools.
Although the dissent does not follow suit in proposing that
the objecting parents send their children to private school,
it offers two other alternatives that are no better. First, it
suggests that the parents in this case have no legitimate
cause for concern because enforcement of the Board's policy
11
In fscal year 2026, the county expects to spend 47.3% of its budget
on public schools. See Montgomery County MD, Operati ng Budget
by the Numbers (2025), https://apps.montgomerycountymd.gov/
BASISOPERATING/Common/Index.aspx. By comparison, the next
greatest expenditure (public safety) is expected to account for just 10.6%
of the budget. Ibid.
12
See, e. g., Melvin J. Berman Hebrew Academy, Tuition and Finan-
cial Aid, https://www.bermanhebrewacademy.org/admissions/fnancial-aid;
S t . B a r t h o l o m e w C a t h o l i c S c h o o l , T u i t i o n , h t t p s : / / w w w. s c h o o l.
stbartholomew.org/tuition-and-support; St. Bernadette Catholic School,
2025–2026 Tuition, https://saintbernadetteschool.org/tuition; Alim Acad-
emy, Tuition 2025–2026, https://alimacademy.org/tuition-2025-2026/.
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would not prevent them from “teach[ing] their religious be-
l
iefs and practices to their children at home.” Post, at 607,
n. 6 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). This suggestion comple-
ments the dissent's narrow view of the right of parents to
raise their children in accordance with their faith. Accord-
ing to the dissent, parents who send their children to public
school must endure any instruction that falls short of direct
compulsion or coercion and must try to counteract that
teaching at home. The Free Exercise Clause is not so fee-
ble. The parents in Barnette and Yoder were similarly capa-
ble of teaching their religious values “at home,” but that
made no difference to the First Amendment analysis in
those cases.
Mustering one last alternative, the dissent asserts that,
under its approach, the parents would “remain free to raise
objections to specifc material through the” democratic proc-
ess. Post, at 619. In making this argument, the dissent
seems to confuse our country with those in which laws
enacted by a parliament or another legislative body cannot
be challenged in court. In this country, that is not so.
Here, the Bill of Rights and the doctrine of judicial review
protect individuals who cannot obtain legislative change.
The First Amendment protects the parents' religious liberty,
and they had every right to fle suit to protect that right.
13
B
For these reasons, we conclude that the Board's introduc-
tion of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, combined with
its no-opt-out policy, burdens the parents' right to the free
exercise of religion. We now turn to the question whether
that burden is constitutionally permitted.
13
In any event, the dissent's argument ignores the extensive efforts al-
ready made by parents in Montgomery County. Indeed, hundreds of par-
ents beseeched the Board to allow opt outs, but those pleas fell largely on
deaf ears. Supra, at 537–539.
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1
U
nder our precedents, the government is generally free to
place incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as it
does so pursuant to a neutral policy that is generally applica-
ble. Smith, 494 U. S., at 878–879. Thus, in most circum-
stances, two questions remain after a burden on religious
exercise is found. First, a court must ask if the burdensome
policy is neutral and generally applicable. Second, if the
frst question can be answered in the negative, a court will
proceed to ask whether the policy can survive strict scrutiny.
Under that standard, the government must demonstrate that
“its course was justifed by a compelling state interest and
was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.” Kennedy,
597 U. S., at 525.
Here, the character of the burden requires us to proceed
differently. When the burden imposed is of the same char-
acter as that imposed in Yoder, we need not ask whether the
law at issue is neutral or generally applicable before proceed-
ing to strict scrutiny. That much is clear from our decisions
in Yoder and Smith.
In Yoder, the Court rejected the contention that the case
could be “disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin's re-
quirement . . . applies uniformly to all citizens of the State
and does not, on its face, discriminate against religions or a
particular religion.” 406 U. S., at 220. Instead, the Court
bypassed those issues and proceeded to subject the law to
close judicial scrutiny, asking whether the State's interest
“in its system of compulsory education [was] so compelling
that even the established religious practices of the Amish
must give way.” Id., at 221.
Then, in Smith, we recognized Yoder as an exception to
the general rule that governments may burden religious ex-
ercise pursuant to neutral and generally applicable laws.
Specifcally, we described Yoder as a case “in which we have
held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action.”
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Opinion of the Court
Smith, 494 U. S., at 881. And we explained that the general
r
ule did not apply in Yoder because of the special character
of the burden in that case. 494 U. S., at 881. Thus, when a
law imposes a burden of the same character as that in Yoder,
strict scrutiny is appropriate regardless of whether the law
is neutral or generally applicable.
14
As we have explained, the burden in this case is of the
exact same character as the burden in Yoder. The Board's
policies, like the compulsory-attendance requirement in
Yoder, “substantially interfer[e] with the religious develop-
ment” of the parents' children. 406 U. S., at 218. And
those policies pose “a very real threat of undermining ” the
religious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill
in their children. Ibid. We therefore proceed to consider
whether the policies can survive strict scrutiny.
2
To survive strict scrutiny, a government must demon-
strate that its policy “advances `interests of the highest
order' and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.”
Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 541 (2021) (quoting
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S.
520, 546 (1993)). In its flings before us, the Board asserts
that its curriculum and no-opt-out policy serve its compelling
14
In Smith, the Court speculated that the general rule was not applied
in Yoder because it “involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protec-
tions.” 494 U. S., at 881. We need not consider whether the case before
us qualifes as such a “hybrid rights” case. Contra, post, at 626 (Soto-
mayor, J., dissenting). Rather, it is suffcient to note that the burden
imposed here is of the exact same character as that in Yoder. That is
enough to conclude that here, as in Yoder, strict scrutiny is appropriate
regardless of whether the policy is neutral and generally applicable.
We acknowledge the many arguments pressed by the parents that the
Board's policies are not neutral and generally applicable. See Brief for
Petitioners 35–44. But we need not consider those arguments further
given that strict scrutiny is appropriate under Yoder.
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Opinion of the Court
interest in “maintaining a school environment that is safe
and
conducive to learning for all students.” Brief for Re-
spondents 49 (internal quotation marks omitted). It relies
on the statements of an MCPS offcial who testifed that per-
mitting opt outs would result in “signifcant disruptions to
the classroom environment” and would expose certain stu-
dents to “social stigma and isolation.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
607a–608a.
We do not doubt that, as a general matter, schools have a
“compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session
conducive to the students' learning.” Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 119 (1972). But the Board's conduct
undermines its assertion that its no-opt-out policy is neces-
sary to serve that interest. As we have noted, the Board
continues to permit opt outs in a variety of other circum-
stances, including for “noncurricular” activities and the
“Family Life and Human Sexuality” unit of instruction, for
which opt outs are required under Maryland law. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 672a; Brief for Respondents 10–11 (citing Code
of Md. Regs., tit. 13A, § 04.18.01(D)(2)). And the Board goes
to great lengths to provide independent, parallel program-
ming for many other students, such as those who qualify as
emergent multilingual learners (EMLs) or who qualify for
an individualized educational program.
15
15
As of September 30, 2023, 24.6% of Montgomery County elemen-
tary school students qualifed as EMLs. See MCPS, School Profles,
MCPS Element ary Summary Dashboard, at Slide 1, https://www.
montgomeryschoolsmd.org/school-profles/. Many MCPS schools provide
EML students with independent parallel programming pursuant to a
“[p]ullout” model, “in which . . . teachers work with EML students outside
of regular content classrooms.” M. McKnight, MCPS Superintendent,
English Language Development Program Evaluation Report, pt. 2, pp. 2–
4 to 2–5 (Dec. 15, 2022) (prepared by Center for Applied Linguistics). In
the 2022–2023 school year, “approximately one out of every eight stu-
dents” in MCPS schools received “special education services” pursuant
to an “ `Individualized Educational Program.' ” Brief for 66 Members of
Congress as Amici Curiae 18–19 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Th is robust “system of excepti ons” under mi nes the
Board'
s contention that the provision of opt outs to religious
parents would be infeasible or unworkable. Fulton, 593
U. S., at 542.
The Board's attempt to distinguish the other programs for
which it provides opt outs is unconvincing. The Board as-
serts that the “Family Life and Human Sexuality” unit of
instruction is meaningfully different because it is “discrete”
and “predictably timed,” and therefore schools can accommo-
date opt outs without producing the same “absenteeism and
administrability concerns.” Brief for Respondents 46. But
this assertion only tends to show that the Board's concerns
about “administrability” are a product of its own design. If
the Board can structure the “Family Life and Human Sexual-
ity” curriculum to more easily accommodate opt outs, it could
structure instruction concerning the “LGBTQ+-inclusive”
storybooks similarly. The Board cannot escape its obliga-
tion to honor parents' free exercise rights by deliberately
designing its curriculum to make parental opt outs more
cumbersome.
The Board also suggests that permitting opt outs from the
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks would be especially un-
workable because, when it permitted such opt outs in the
past, they resulted in “unsustainably high numbers of absent
students.” Id., at 12. But again, the Board's concern is
self-inficted. The Board is doubtless aware of the presence
in Montgomery County of substantial religious communities
whose members hold traditional views on marriage, sex, and
gender. When it comes to instruction that would burden
the religious exercise of parents, the Board cannot escape
its obligations under the Free Exercise Clause by crafting a
curriculum that is so burdensome that a substantial number
of parents elect to opt out. There is no de maximis excep-
tion to the Free Exercise Clause.
Nor can the Board's policies be justifed by its asserted
interest in protecting students from “social stigma and isola-
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568 MAHMOUD
v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
tion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 608a. In Maryland, the “Fam-
i
ly Life and Human Sexuality” unit of instruction includes
discussions about sexuality and gender. See Maryland
State Dept. of Ed., Maryland Comprehensive Health Educa-
tion Framework 33 (June 2021). Yet the Board has not sug-
gested that the legally-required provision of opt outs from
that curriculum has resulted in stigma or isolation. Even if
it did, the Board cannot purport to rescue one group of stu-
dents from stigma and isolation by stigmatizing and isolating
another. A classroom environment that is welcoming to all
students is something to be commended, but such an environ-
ment cannot be achieved through hostility toward the reli-
gious beliefs of students and their parents.
We acknowledge that “courts are not school boards or leg-
islatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the `necessity' of
discrete aspects of a State's program of compulsory educa-
tion.” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 235. It must be emphasized that
what the parents seek here is not the right to micromanage
the public school curriculum, but rather to have their chil-
dren opt out of a particular educational requirement that
burdens their well-established right “to direct `the religious
upbringing ' of their children.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 486
(quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214). We express no view
on the educational value of the Board's proposed curriculum,
other than to state that it places an unconstitutional burden
on the parents' religious exercise if it is imposed with no
opportunity for opt outs. Providing such an opportunity
would give the parents no substantive control over the cur-
riculum itself.
Several States across the country permit broad opt outs
from discrete aspects of the public school curriculum without
widespread consequences. See, e. g., 22 Pa. Code § 4.4(d)(3)
(2025); Minn. Stat. § 120B.20 (2024); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 15–102(A)(4), (8)(c) (2024). And prior to the introduction
of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, the Board's own

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Opinion of the Court
“Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity” gave par-
ents
a broad right to have their children excused from spe-
cifc aspects of the school curriculum. These facts belie any
suggestion that the provision of parental opt outs in circum-
stances like these “will impose impossible administrative
burdens on schools. ” Post, at 615 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
IV
The Board's introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” sto-
rybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, places
an unconstitutional burden on the parents' rights to the free
exercise of their relig i on. The parents have therefore
shown that they are likely to succeed in their free exercise
claims. They have likewise shown entitlement to a prelimi-
nary injunction pending the completion of this lawsuit. In
the absence of an injunction, the parents will continue to be
put to a choice: either risk their child's exposure to burden-
some instruction, or pay substantial sums for alternative ed-
ucational services. As we have explained, that choice un-
constitutionally burdens the parents' religious exercise, and
“ `[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable in-
jury.' ” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592
U. S. 14, 19 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427
U. S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Furthermore, in
light of the strong showing made by the parents here, and
the lack of a compelling interest supporting the Board's poli-
cies, an injunction is both equitable and in the public interest.
The petitioners should receive preliminary relief while this
lawsuit proceeds. See Winter, 555 U. S., at 20. Specifcally,
until all appellate review in this case is completed, the Board
should be ordered to notify them in advance whenever one
of the books in question or any other similar book is to be
used in any way and to allow them to have their children
excused from that instruction.
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Opinion of the Court
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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571
Appendix to opinion of the Court
APPENDIX
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 286a

572 MAHMOUD
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Appendix to opinion of the Court
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 287a

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Appendix to opinion of the Court
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 288a

574 MAHMOUD
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Appendix to opinion of the Court
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 323a

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Appendix to opinion of the Court
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 350a

576 MAHMOUD
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Appendix to opinion of the Court
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 424a

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Appendix to opinion of the Court
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 459a

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Appendix to opinion of the Court
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 461a

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App. to Pet. for Cert. 462a

580 MAHMOUD
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Appendix to opinion of the Court
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App. to Pet. for Cert. 465a

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581
Thomas, J., concurring
Justice Thomas, concurring.
The
Board of Education of Montgomery County (Board)
adopted a series of controversial “LGBTQ+-inclusive” story-
books for use in its prekindergarten through ffth-grade
English Language Arts (ELA) curriculum. Hundreds of
parents raised religious objections and sought to use the
Board's then-existing opt-out policy to exclude their children
from lessons involving these books. The Board responded
by removing the opt-out option, and even refused to provide
parents with notice of when schools would use the materials.
Parents sued, arguing that the Board's new no-opt-out policy
violates their First Amendment rights. The Court cor-
rectly holds that the policy contravenes the parents' free ex-
ercise right to direct the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren, see ante, at 546, and I join its opinion in full. I write
separately to highlight additional reasons why the Board's
policy cannot survive constitutional scrutiny, as well as to
emphasize an important implication of this decision for
schools across the country.
I
As the Court today holds, the Board's policy is incompati-
ble with this Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S.
205 (1972). Ante, at 546–555. Yoder addressed whether a
Wisconsin law requiring children to attend school past the
eighth grade violated the free exercise rights of Amish par-
ents who objected on the ground that the law interfered with
their ability to direct their children's religious upbringing.
406 U. S., at 207–209. In holding that the law violated the
parents' First Amendment rights, the Court made clear that
only “interests of the highest order” that are “not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion.” Id., at 215.
The Court understood history and tradition to inform the
inquiry whether Wisconsin had established “interests of the
highest order,” and it explicitly examined the historical pedi-
gree of the State's alleged interest in education past the
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Thomas, J., concurring
eighth grade. The Court explained that one key reason why
W
isconsin's interests could not justify its law as applied to
the Amish was that “compulsory education beyond the
eighth grade [was] a relatively recent development” that
emerged “[l]ess than 60 years ago,” yet the Amish had a
track record of “successful social functioning . . . approaching
almost three centuries.” Id., at 226–227. In a similar vein,
the Court observed that the Amish were not “a group claim-
ing to have recently discovered some `progressive' or more
enlightened process for rearing children,” but instead had a
centuries-long history “as an identifable religious sect and
a long history as a successful and self-suffcient segment of
American society.” Id., at 235. Thus, for the Amish, educa-
tion past the eighth grade was demonstrably inessential to
“meeting the duties of citizenship.” Id., at 227.
That analysis is instructive here. As with compulsory ed-
ucation past the eighth grade at the time the Court decided
Yoder, sex education is also a “relatively recent develop-
ment”—and the practice of teaching sexuality- and gender-
related lessons to young children even more so. And, as in
Yoder, there is little to suggest that these lessons are critical
to the students' civic development.
What is now labeled “sex education” is a 20th-century in-
novation. Early in the Nation's history, “schooling seldom
extended beyond the elementary subjects.” M. Katz, A His-
tory of Compulsory Education Laws 14 (1976). It was not
until the 1970s that public schools began implementing what
we might today recognize as sex education, with lessons fo-
cused on cautioning students about how to avoid “unintended
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.” K. Rufo,
Note, Public Policy vs. Parent Policy: States Battle Over
Whether Public Schools Can Provide Condoms to Minors
Without Parental Consent, 13 N. Y. L. S. J. Hum. Rights 589,
591–592, and n. 15 (1997). Sex education has shifted in re-
cent decades toward the even more controversial “[c]ompre-
hensive [a]pproach,” though the curriculum generally still
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583
Thomas, J., concurring
“begin[s] with `basic facts' ” and emphasizes “contraceptive
use”
to avoid pregnancy and disease. Id., at 592–593; see
Brief for Petitioners 32.
The practice of teaching sexuality and gender identity to
very young children at school appears to be signifcantly
more recent than typical sex education. Although the plain-
tiffs placed the storybook curriculum's recency and lack of
historical pedigree in issue, see id., at 47, the Board failed to
identify any tradition of teaching sexuality and gender iden-
tity to young children—much less a tradition of preventing
parents from opting their children out of such instruction.
The Board's “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybook curriculum ap-
pears to be as novel as the storybooks themselves, all of
which were published within the last decade.
1
See App. to
Pet. for Cert. 603a (storybook curriculum was adopted be-
cause “[i]n recent years” ELA curriculum had not been suf-
fciently representative of Montgomery County community).
The storybook curriculum is also different in kind from
traditional sex education. See Brief for Respondents 1–2
(“[T]he storybooks are not sex-education materials”). In-
stead of incorporating materials focused on health and repro-
duction, for example, the Board chose the storybooks based
on factors such as whether they “reinforced or disrupted”
“heteronormativity,” “cisnormativity,” and “power hierar-
chies that uphold the dominant culture.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 622a; see also ante, at 532–533. The Board further
provided teachers with guidance about how to conduct
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction, which, among other things,
suggested that teachers should “[d]isrupt” their students'
“either/or thinking ” about sexuality and gender. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 629a, 633a. In the Board's view, these instruc-
tional directives helped advance its objective of “educational
equity”—that is, viewing each student's “[g]ender identity
1
See S. Brannen, Uncle Bobby's Wedding (2020); C. Johnson, L. Coun-
cil, & C. Choi, Intersection Allies (2019); D. Haack, Prince & Knight (2020);
C. Wild, Love, Violet (2021); J. Patterson, Born Ready (2021).
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Thomas, J., concurring
and expression,” “[s]exual orientation,” and other specifed
“
individual characteristics as valuable.” Code of Md. Regs.,
tit. 13A, §§ 01.06.01(B), 01.06.03(B) (2025).
2
Yoder's historical analysis applies with full force in this
case. Until very recently, young children have gone without
sexual- and gender-identity education in school. Nothing
suggests that the countless generations who did not receive
such education failed to “mee[t] the duties of citizenship,” 406
U. S., at 227—or that, if they did, their failure was due to a
lack of exposure to sexual- and gender-identity instruction
during early adolescence. Further, as in Yoder, the parents
seeking to protect their children's religious upbringings do
not belong to a group pushing some “recently discovered . . .
`progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing chil-
dren for modern life.” Id., at 235. They are devout Chris-
tians and Muslims. See ante, at 540–542. Given the nov-
elty of its “LGBTQ+-inclusive” curriculum and no-opt-out
policy, if any party is pressing a progressive child-rearing
process in this litigation, clearly it is the Board. Such an
unprecedented curriculum cannot “overbalance” the parents'
“legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” 406
U. S., at 215.
3
2
The majority discusses fve books currently incorporated in the Board's
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” curriculum. Ante, at 533–535. The Board had also
approved another book, Pride Puppy, but, after more than a year of using
the book in classroom instruction, the Board removed it due to content
concerns during the course of this litigation. See N. Asbury, Montgomery
Schools Stopped Using Two LGBTQ-Inclusive Books Amid Legal Battle,
Wash i ng ton Post, Oc t. 23, 2024, https://www.wash i ng tonpost.com/
education/2024/10/23/montgomery-schools-opt-out-storybooks/; see also
ante, at 533, n. 6. Pride Puppy tells the story of a young child “celebrat-
ing Pride Day” and losing her dog in the parade. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. 234a. The book, which the Board intended for teachers to read to
3- and 4-year-olds, see ibid., invites readers to search for items depicted
in the book's illustrations, including “underwear,” a “[drag] king,” and a
“[drag] queen,” id., at 270a.
3
According to Justice Sotomayor, the recency inquiry outlined in
Yoder could inhibit schools' ability to teach “computer literacy, robotics,
and flm studies,” and thus “fails to appreciate the constantly evolving
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II
P
erhaps recognizing that its ban on parental opt-outs lacks
historical support, the Board seeks to defend its policy by
claiming that it promotes “equity” and “inclusi[on]” and di-
minishes classroom disruption. Decl. of N. Hazel in Mah-
moud v. McKnight, No. 8:23–cv–01380 (D Md.), ECF Doc.
42–1, pp. 2, 6; Brief for Respondents 49. But, these asser-
tions do not amount to “interests of the highest order” suff-
cient to justify the policy's interference with parents' First
Amendment rights. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 215. And, much
of the alleged potential for classroom disruption stems from
choices that the Board itself made.
A
The record in this case suggests that the Board's
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” curriculum and no-opt-out policy rest
on the sort of conformity-driven rationales that this Court
rejected in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
In Yoder, the Court observed that if a State were “empow-
ered, as parens patriae, to `save' a child” from the supposed
“ignorance” of his religious upbringing, then “the State will
in large measure infuence, if not determine, the religious
future of the child.” 406 U. S., at 222, 232. Such an ar-
rangement would upend the “enduring American tradition”
of parents occupying the “primary role . . . in the upbringing
of their children”—a role that includes the “inculcation of . . .
religious beliefs.” Id., at 232–233.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on its
earlier decision in Pierce, which articulated “perhaps the
most signifcant statements of the Court in this area.”
nature of education.” Post, at 628, n. 16 (dissenting opinion). But, Jus-
tice Sotomayor fails to appreciate the enduring nature of religion—and
the Constitution's respect for it. As the Court explained in Yoder, a com-
pelled curriculum focused on “contemporary worldly society”—no matter
how practically useful—may still impermissibly “contraven[e] . . . basic
religious tenets and practice . . . , both as to the parent and the child.”
406 U. S., at 211, 218.
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Yoder, 406 U. S., at 232. The Court held in Pierce that Ore-
gon'
s Compulsory Education Act, 1922 Ore. Laws p. 9, § 1,
amending § 5259, which mandated public schooling for chil-
dren between 8 and 16 years old and thus forbade them from
attending religious schools, “unreasonably interfere[d] with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control.” Pierce, 268
U. S., at 530, 534–535. “The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose,” the Court
explained, “excludes any general power of the State to stand-
ardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only.” Id., at 535. The Court rejected the
premise that the child was merely a “creature of the State”;
rather, “those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations.” Ibid.
While the Court did not decide Pierce on free exercise
grounds,
4
the context in which Pierce arose confrms that it
“stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the
religious upbringing of their children.” Yoder, 406 U. S., at
233. The case came to the Court during “a time of broad
and relentless hostility to the European immigrants whose
labor the nation needed but whose religions were seen as
alien and un-American.” S. Carter, Parents, Religion, and
Schools: Refections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 Seton Hall
L. Rev. 1194, 1196 (1997) (Carter). “Roman Catholicism and,
to a lesser extent, Judaism, were widely viewed as threats
to America, which was self-consciously a Protestant coun-
try.” Id., at 1197. Public schooling was perceived as a solu-
tion that could “Protestantize the immigrant children” and
thus diminish the threats these foreign beliefs posed. Id.,
at 1199; see also Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591
U. S. 464, 499–504 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring) (describing
4
The Court decided Pierce 15 years before it recognized that the First
Amendment's free-exercise guarantee applies against the States. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
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popular anti-Catholic sentiment and attempts to “ `American-
i
ze' the incoming Catholic immigrants”). Unsurprisingly,
parents who adhered to the disfavored faiths sought alterna-
tive educational options. “[B]y the end of the nineteenth
century, there were Catholic schools everywhere there were
Catholics.” Carter 1200.
The arguments that Oregon pressed in defense of its
compulsory-education law make clear that the State sought
ideological conformity among its citizens, and viewed immi-
grants and their religious schools as standing in the way. It
would be “both unjust and unreasonable,” Oregon argued,
“to prevent [the States] from taking the steps which each
may deem necessary and proper for Americanizing its new
immigrants and developing them into patriotic and law-
abiding citizens.” Pierce, 268 U. S., at 526 (arguments of
counsel). Absent such power, there would be no way to
“prevent the entire education of a considerable portion of [a
State's] future citizens being controlled and conducted
by bolshevists, syndicalists and communists.” Ibid. The
State even asserted an interest in “a greater equality” to
justify its attempt at state-enforced uniformity. Id., at 527.
Though these sentiments were “comfortably consonant with
the smart-set views of the day,” R. Garnett, Taking Pierce
Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to
Children, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 109, 124 (2000) (Garnett),
5
5
The anti-Catholic views animating Oregon's law were both popular and
prestigious. Harper's Weekly warned that “every good citizen should
strenuously oppose” Catholics' plans for “extension of the Roman sect.”
The “Parochial” Schools, 19 Harpers Weekly 294 (1875); see also Espinoza
v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. 464, 500 (2020) (Alito, J., concur-
ring) (picturing 1871 Harper's Weekly cartoon “depict[ing] Catholic [bish-
ops] as crocodiles slithering hungrily toward American children”).
“Books full of anti-Catholic sentiment, and stern nativist warnings, were
best-sellers” at the time. Carter 1197. Ellwood Cubberley of Stanford
University—the “preeminent education scholar” of the era—“identifed
the assimilation of immigrants as a dominant schooling challenge of the
time.” J. Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme
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the Court rejected them as antithetical to our Nation's “fun-
dament
al theory of liberty,” 268 U. S., at 535.
The Board's “LGBTQ+-inclusive” curriculum and no-opt-
out policy pursue the kind of ideological conformity that
Pierce and Yoder prohibit. To be sure, the Board frames its
policy in more veiled terms. It has maintained throughout
this litigation that the storybooks serve broad interests in
“promot[ing] equity, respect, and civility among [its] diverse
community”; “normaliz[ing] a fully inclusive environment”;
“encourag[ing] respect for all”; and creating a “safe educa-
tional environment.” Defendants' Memorandum of Law in
Opposition, ECF Doc. 42, p. 32; ECF Doc. 42–1, at 2, 6 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). It further determined that
allowing opt-outs might “expos[e]” students “who believe
that the books represent them or their families” to “social
stigma and isolation.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 607a–608a; see
also ante, at 538. As the acting principal of one Montgom-
ery County public school euphemistically explained, “being
accepting is the goal.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 498a.
But, the Board's response to parents' unsuccessful at-
tempts to opt their children out of the storybook curriculum
conveys that parents' religious views are not welcome in the
“fully inclusive environment” that the Board purports to fos-
ter. ECF Doc. 42–1, at 6. As the majority recounts, the
Board ignored that “ `thousands' of parents felt `deeply dis-
mayed and betrayed' by the rescission of opt outs from `con-
tent that confict[s] with their sincerely held religious be-
liefs.' ” Ante, at 539. After parents attempted to opt their
children out of the Board's new curriculum on religious
grounds, at least one Board member suggested that students
were “ ` “parroting ” ' ” their parents' “ ` “dogma. ” ' ” Ibid.
Court, and the Battle for the American Mind 44 (2018). And, John Dewey,
one of the 20th century's most prominent educational reformers, “insisted
that parents should not be permitted to `inoculate' their children with the
outdated and useless religious beliefs that they `happen[ed] to have found
serviceable to themselves.' ” Garnett 124, n. 69.
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The Board member further analogized the parents to
“
` “white supremacists” ' ” and “ ` “xenophobes.” ' ” Ibid.
And, a different Board member suggested that any objection
to the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” curriculum stemmed from “ `ig-
norance and hate.' ” Ante, at 537–538. In the Board's view,
for parents to suggest that the storybooks were inappropri-
ate would be “a dehumanizing form of erasure.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 514a. At a minimum, these statements sug-
gest that “being accepting ” has limits—and that parents' sin-
cerely held religious beliefs fall beyond them. Id., at 498a.
The curriculum itself also betrays an attempt to impose
ideological conformity with specifc views on sexuality and
gender. The storybooks are, “[l]ike many books targeted at
young children, . . . unmistakably normative.” Ante, at 550.
They present views that run contrary to traditional religious
teachings as correct and worthy of acclaim, asserting, for
example, that sex is irrelevant to whether two people can
get married, that students should question their genders,
and that gender transitions are unequivocally positive. See
ante, at 550–553. Beyond the materials themselves, the
Board instructed teachers to reprimand certain traditional
religious views about sex and gender as “ `hurtful,' ” and to
respond to students' questions with answers that, among
other things, endorse same-sex marriage and transgender
ideology. See ante, at 554.
The Board's exclusion of traditional religious views, cou-
pled with a curriculum that “pressure[s students] to con-
form,” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 211, constitute an impermissible
attempt to “standardize” the views of students, Pierce, 268
U. S., at 535. Just as Oregon claimed that it would use its
education system to promote “equality” and generate “patri-
otic and law-abiding citizens,” id., at 526–527 (arguments of
counsel), the Board purports to use the same means to pro-
mote “ `equity' ” and create “ `civi[l]' ” students. ECF Doc.
42, at 8, 9. But, in both instances, the government's vision
is irreconcilable with “the rights of parents to direct the reli-
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gious upbringing of their children,” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 233,
e
ven if it aligns with “the smart-set views of the day,” Gar-
nett 124; see, e. g., H. Alvaré, Families, Schools, and Reli-
gious Freedom, 54 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 579, 631–632 (2022)
(observing that “the most visible corporations and websites
. . . celebrate beliefs and conduct about the family that di-
rectly contradict Christian norms”).
At bottom, the parents in this case are “member[s] of the
community too.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 463 (2017). Their objections to
the Board's curriculum follow “decent and honorable reli-
gious . . . premises.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644,
672 (2015). Far from promoting “inclusi[on]” and “respect
for all,” ECF Doc. 42–1, at 6, the Board's no-opt-out policy
imposes conformity with a view that undermines parents'
religious beliefs, and thus interferes with the parents' right
to “direct the religious upbringing of their children,” Yoder,
406 U. S., at 232–233.
6
B
The Board's alleged interest in effcient administration
does not help it, either. In the Board's view, if it can show
that it “ `could not accommodate the growing number of opt
out requests without causing signifcant disruptions to the
classroom and undermining [its] educational mission,' ” then
it can vindicate its policy. Brief for Respondents 49. But,
as the majority notes, the signifcant disruptions that the
Board complains about are “a product of its own design.”
6
Justice Sotomayor responds that, “[i]f there is any conformity that
the Board seeks to instill, it is universal acceptance of kindness and civil-
ity.” Post, at 623–624, n. 14. I recognize that the Board purports to
instill such a principle. See supra, at 588. But, as discussed above, in
this case Board members' treatment of parents has been neither “kin[d]”
nor “civi[ l]” nor “universal[ ly] accept[ing].” Post, at 624, n. 14 (opinion of
Sotomayor, J.). The Board's decision to disregard—or, in some cases,
to denigrate—parents' sincerely held religious beliefs is anathema to its
declared objectives.
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Ante, at 567. If the Court were to accept the Board's argu-
ment,
we would effectively give schools a playbook for evad-
ing the First Amendment.
Teaching young children about sexual and gender identity
in ways that contradict parents' religious teachings under-
mines those parents' right to “direct the religious upbringing
of their children,” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 233,
7
and the Board
may undermine that right only if it has no other way to ad-
vance a compelling interest. Here, not only do the Board's
interests in its curriculum and policy fall below the “highest
order” of importance, see supra, at 584, 588–590, but these
alleged logistical challenges are attributable to the Board's
deliberate decision to “weave” the storybooks into its
broader curriculum. Brief for Respondents 13; see also
ante, at 567.
The Board easily could avoid sowing tension between its
curriculum and parents' First Amendment rights. Most
straightforwardly, rather than attempt to “weave the story-
books seamlessly into ELA lessons,” the Board could cabin
its sexual- and gender-identity instruction to specifc units.
Brief for Respondents 13; see ante, at 567. The Board's for-
mal sex-education curriculum, for example, is a “discrete”
“[u]nit of [i]nstruction” from which parents may opt out their
7
Not only are “sexual orientation and gender identity” “sensitive politi-
cal topics,” Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S.
878, 913–914 (2018), but education about these subjects is uniquely likely
to “interfer[e]” with children's “religious development,” Yoder, 406 U. S.,
at 218. These subjects relate to “the very architecture” of many faiths.
H. Alvaré, Families, Schools, and Religious Freedom, 54 Loyola U. Chi.
L. J. 579, 629 (2022). Thus, when schools “offe[r] normative answers to
moral questions” about these “familial matters,” their moral statements
inevitably address “religious matter[s],” leaving the instruction “insepara-
ble from what Pierce and Yoder frmly agreed belongs to parents' constitu-
tional authority respecting their children.” Id., at 617. The interference
with parents' right to direct their children's religious upbringing is espe-
cially pronounced here, given the Board's concession that the storybook
curriculum may provide children with “a new perspective not easily con-
travened by their parents.” App. 46.
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children “for any reason.” Brief for Respondents 11; see
a
lso Tr. of Oral Arg. 131 (noting that sex education is “some-
thing where you're able to predict precisely when the curric-
ulum is going to be deployed”). Had the Board confned its
“LGBTQ-inclusive” curriculum to a “discrete” “[u]nit” as
well, Brief for Respondents 11, parental opt outs would
pose no greater administrative burden on schools than those
that the schools already confront. The Board instead chose
to incorporate these controversial concepts into broader
instruction.
The Board may not insulate itself from First Amendment
l iabi l ity by “weav[i ng] ” rel ig i ously offensive mater ia l
throughout its curriculum and thereby signifcantly increase
the diffculty and complexity of remedying parents' constitu-
tional injuries. Id., at 13. Were it otherwise, the State
could nullify parents' First Amendment rights simply by sat-
urating public schools' core curricula with material that un-
dermines “family decisions in the area of religious training.”
Yoder, 406 U. S., at 231. The “Framers intended” for “free
exercise of religion to fourish.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 497
(Thomas, J., concurring). Insofar as schools or boards at-
tempt to employ their curricula to interfere with religious
exercise, courts should carefully police such “ingenious def-
ance of the Constitution” no less than they do in other con-
texts. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309
(1966).
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan and
Justice Jackson join, dissenting.
Public schools, this Court has said, are “ `at once the sym-
bol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for pro-
moting our common destiny.' ” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U. S. 578, 584 (1987). They offer to children of all faiths and
backgrounds an education and an opportunity to practice liv-
ing in our multicultural society. That experience is critical
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to our Nation's civic vitality. Yet it will become a mere
memory
if children must be insulated from exposure to ideas
and concepts that may confict with their parents' religious
beliefs.
Today's ruling ushers in that new reality. Casting aside
longstanding precedent, the Court invents a constitutional
right to avoid exposure to “subtle” themes “contrary to the
religious principles” that parents wish to instill in their chil-
dren. Ante, at 552. Exposing students to the “message”
that LGBTQ people exist, and that their loved ones may cele-
brate their marriages and life events, the majority says, is
enough to trigger the most demanding form of judicial scru-
tiny. Ibid. That novel rule is squarely foreclosed by our
precedent and offers no limiting principle. Given the great
diversity of religious beliefs in this country, countless inter-
actions that occur every day in public schools might expose
children to messages that confict with a parent's religious
beliefs. If that is suffcient to trigger strict scrutiny, then
little is not.
The result will be chaos for this Nation's public schools.
Requiring schools to provide advance notice and the chance
to opt out of every lesson plan or story time that might impli-
cate a parent's religious beliefs will impose impossible ad-
ministrative burdens on schools. The harm will not be
borne by educators alone: Children will suffer too. Class-
room disruptions and absences may well infict long-lasting
harm on students' learning and development.
Worse yet, the majority closes its eyes to the inevitable
chilling effects of its ruling. Many school districts, and par-
ticularly the most resource strapped, cannot afford to engage
in costly litigation over opt-out rights or to divert resources
to tracking and managing student absences. Schools may
instead censor their curricula, stripping material that risks
generating religious objections. The Court's ruling, in ef-
fect, thus hands a subset of parents the right to veto curricu-
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lar choices long left to locally elected school boards. Be-
cause
I cannot countenance the Court's contortion of our
precedent and the untold harms that will follow, I dissent.
I
By the majority's telling, the Montgomery County Public
School Board (Board) has undertaken an intentional cam-
paign to “impose upon children a set of values and beliefs
that are `hostile' to their parents' religious” principles.
Ante, at 554; see ante, at 532–540. The Court draws on ex-
cerpts from Board documents and statements, shorn from
context, see infra, at 621–624, and n. 15, that it claims refect
that intent. The full record reveals a starkly different
reality.
A
In the years leading up to the present dispute, the Board
determined that the books in its English language curricu-
lum failed to represent many students and families in the
county. The Board has long been committed to promoting a
“fully inclusive environment for all students” by using in-
structional materials that “refect [the] diversity of the
global community,” including “persons with disabilities, per-
sons from diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, as
well as persons of diverse gender identity, gender expres-
sion, or sexual orientation.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 589a–
590a, 603a. Yet certain perspectives, the Board concluded,
were absent from its English language curriculum. The
Board, for instance, determined that some “races and cul-
tures” were not adequately refected. Id., at 602a. In re-
sponse, it added books like The Leavers, which tells the story
of an Asian-American immigrant family, and the March tril-
ogy, which recounts the life of civil rights leader John Lewis.
The Board found that LGBTQ children and families were
similarly underrepresented in its English language curricu-
lum. The books taught in English classes simply “did not
include LGBTQ characters.” Id., at 603a. To fll that gap,
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the Board worked with a committee of specialists to identify
LGBTQ-i
nclusive books that it could incorporate into the ex-
isting curriculum. After a years-long process, the Board an-
nounced in October 2022 that it would add several new books
into the elementary school English language curriculum, fve
of which are at issue in this case (collectively, the Storybooks).
1
Uncle Bobby's Wedding tells the story of a young girl
named Chloe and her “favourite uncle.” Id., at 282a. Chloe
loves spending time with her Uncle Bobby, and the two often
go on adventures, like boating trips and stargazing outings.
One day, during a family picnic, Uncle Bobby announces that
he is engaged to his friend, Jamie. The announcement is
met with much excitement, and the whole family is “smiling
and talking and crying and laughing.” Id., at 286a. Chloe,
however, is apprehensive. She tells her uncle she “do[esn't]
think [he] should get married” because she “want[s them] to
keep having fun together like always.” Id., at 292a. Uncle
Bobby promises that they will “ `still have fun together,' ”
ibid., and he and Jamie take Chloe on trips to the ballet,
to the beach, and out camping. Chloe's excitement for the
wedding grows, and on the day of the ceremony, she “was so
happy, she felt like doing a cartwheel” down the aisle. Id.,
at 302a. The story ends with everyone dancing happily at
the wedding under the light of the moon.
1
The complaint identifed seven books to which petitioners object, but
two are no longer approved for instructional use. See Brief for Respond-
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596 MAHMOUD
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Id., at 279a.
Because the majority selectively excerpts the book in
order to rewrite its story, readers are encouraged to go di-
rectly to the source, reproduced below. See Appendix,
infra; see also infra, at 611, and n. 7.
2
The remaining books play on similar themes. Prince &
Knight tells the story of a prince who falls in love with a
young knight after the knight helps him defeat a fearsome
dragon. Love, Violet describes a shy girl who has a crush
on her classmate, Mira, and eventually gives her a Valentine's
Day card that says “For Mira, Love, Violet.” Id., at 434a.
Other books introduce readers to children from different
backgrounds and identities. Intersection Allies features
eight different characters, each with their own unique attrib-
2
The majority buries this book at the end of its discussion of the chal-
lenged materials, see ante, at 535, and understandably so. The Court's
conclusion that even mere exposure to Uncle Bobby's Wedding poses an
intolerable “threat” to religious views illustrates the untenable breadth of
its position. Ante, at 553; see in fra, at 610–612, and n. 7.
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utes. Alejandra, for instance, uses a wheelchair that allows
her
to “zzzip glide and play,” id., at 316a, while Kate prefers
“superhero cape[s]” over “[s]kirts and frills” and is pictured
in a gender-neutral bathroom, id., at 322a–323a. Born
Ready: The True Story of a Boy Named Penelope tells the
story of a child who likes skateboarding, “baggy blue jeans,
button-front shirts, math, science, and getting straight A's,”
and “most of all” wants a “Mohawk haircut.” Id., at 452a.
When Penelope tells his mother that he is a boy, she accepts
him: “ `However you feel is fne, baby,' ” she says. Id., at
458a. When Penelope's brother expresses skepticism, his
mother says, “ `Not everything needs to make sense. This
is about love.' ” Id., at 465a (emphasis in original).
The fve Storybooks introduce readers to LGBTQ charac-
ters, but they draw on many of the themes common to chil-
dren's books. Indeed, Montgomery County Public Schools
(MCPS) libraries are replete with children's books that tell
similar stories about overcoming differences, fairytale ro-
mances, and celebrating big milestones like weddings. See
MCPS Library Portal, https://mcpsmd.follettdestiny.com/
portal (online catalogue of MCPS elementary school books).
The Board directed the schools to use the new books in
the same manner as all other books in the English language
program, namely, to “assist students with mastering reading
concepts like answering questions about characters, retelling
key events about characters in a story, and drawing infer-
ences about story characters based on their actions.” Id.,
at 605a. The Board made clear to individual schools that
“there is no planned explicit instruction on gender identity
and sexual orientation in elementary school,” using the Sto-
rybooks or otherwise. Ibid. The Board's policies, more-
over, mandate that “no student or adult [will be] asked to
change how they feel about” issues of “gender identity and
sexual orientation,” ibid., and that, “[i]f a child does not
agree with or understand another student's gender identity
or expression or their sexuality . . . , they do not have to
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change how they feel about it,” id., at 638a; see also id., at
520a.
Before
MCPS introduced the books into classrooms, the
Board provided guidance to teachers on how to respond to
student questions and commentary regarding the books.
The guidance focuses on encouraging mutual tolerance and
“respect” for all those in the community. Id., at 628a. To
take one example, if a child says that “[b]eing . . . gay, les-
bian, queer, etc[.] is wrong and not allowed in [her] religion,”
the guidance suggests that a teacher could respond by
saying:
“I understand that is what you believe, but not every-
one believes that. We don't have to understand or sup-
port a person's identity to treat them with respect and
kindness. School is a place where we learn to work to-
gether regardless of our differences. In any commu-
nity, we'll always fnd people with beliefs different from
our own and that is okay—we can still show them re-
spect.” Ibid.
The guidance also directs teachers to discourage the use
of language that could be hurtful to students in the class. If
a student says, “That's so gay,” for instance, the guidance
suggests a teacher may respond by saying: “Regardless of
how it's intended, using gay to describe something negative
refects a long history of prejudice against LGBTQ+ people,
so please don't use it in that way.” Id., at 634a.
During the frst year of the Storybooks' inclusion in the
Eng l ish lang uage program, MCPS per mitted parents,
through agreements with individual schools, to opt their chil-
dren out of lessons that featured the books. Parents began
making individualized opt-out requests. Although some of
the requests were religious in nature, many were not.
In March 2023, the Board met with a “small group of prin-
cipals” and learned that teachers could not accommodate the
opt-out requests “without causing signifcant disruptions to
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the classroom environment and undermining MCPS's educa-
ti
onal mission.” Id., at 607a. The Board also worried that
permitting some students to leave the classroom whenever a
teacher brought out books featuring LGBTQ characters
could expose LGBTQ students (and those with LGBTQ par-
ents) to social stigma and isolation. MCPS therefore an-
nounced it would no longer permit parents to opt out of
instruction using the Storybooks.
B
MCPS regulations establish a multilevel appeal process for
parents to challenge the “appropriateness of instructional
materials or library books.” App. 25. Parents can frst
raise objections at the school level. If that proves unsuc-
cessful, parents can appeal to the head of the district's evalu-
ation and selection unit, who must “[a]ppoint an ad hoc com-
mittee” of library media specialists, teachers, principals, and
other staff “to reevaluate the material.” Ibid. The com-
mittee makes a recommendation to the associate super-
intendent for instruction and program development, who
herself considers the appropriateness of the relevant instruc-
tional material and renders a decision. If the parents are
still unsatisfed, they may appeal to the superintendent of
schools, and then the board itself, pursuant to exten-
sive county reg u lati ons gover ni ng appea l and hear i ng
procedures.
C
Rather than avail themselves of the district's established
process for challenging objectionable instructional material,
petitioners sued the MCPS Board in federal court.
3
Using
3
There are three sets of parent-plaintiffs: Tamer Mahmoud and Enas
Bakarat, Jeff and Svitlana Roman, and Chris and Melissa Persak. Al-
though the majority discusses evidence in the record related to the associ-
ational plaintiff, Kids First, see ante, at 542–543, that association did not
join in the parent-plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. See
Mahmoud v. McKnight, 102 F. 4th 191, 201, n. 4 (CA4 2024).
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the Storybooks in English class “without parental notice or
opt-out
rights,” the parents argued, violates the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the Constitution by “expos[ing]” their children
to content that conficts with the parents' religious views.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 190a, 194a. More specifcally, petition-
ers Tamer Mahmoud and Enas Barakat object to “exposing ”
their son “to activities and curriculum on sex, sexuality, and
gender that undermine Islamic teaching on these subjects.”
Id., at 532a. They worry that “reading th[e] [Story]books
and engaging in related discussions would confuse [their
son's] religious upbringing ” and “undermine [their] efforts to
raise” their son “in accordance with [their] faith.” Id., at
532a–533a. Chris and Melissa Persak likewise object to
“exposing ” their children to “viewpoints on sex, sexuality,
and gender that contradict Catholic teaching on these sub-
jects.” Id., at 544a. Jeff and Svitlana Roman similarly be-
lieve that their son's teachers should not “teach principles
about sexuality or gender identity that confict with [their]
religious beliefs.” Id., at 541a.
Petitioners asked the district court to enjoin MCPS from
“denying [them] notice and opportunity to opt their children
out of reading, listening to, or discussing the . . . Storybooks,”
and “any other instruction related to family life or human
sexuality that violates the Parents' or their children's reli-
gious beliefs.” Motion for Preliminary Injunction in No. 23–
cv–01380 (D Md., June 12, 2023), ECF Doc. 23, p. 1. After
an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied petitioners'
preliminary injunction motion. See Mahmoud v. McKnight,
688 F. Supp. 3d 265, 272 (Md. 2023). The Fourth Circuit af-
frmed. 102 F. 4th 191 (2024). It held that petitioners had
failed to establish that the Board “direct[ly] or indirect[ly]
pressure[d]” them or their children to “abandon [their] reli-
gious beliefs or affrmatively act contrary to those beliefs” in
the way this Court's precedents require. Id., at 210 (citing
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485
U. S. 439, 450 (1988)).
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II
A
The
Free Exercise Clause commands that the government
“shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of reli-
gion. U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. “The crucial word in the con-
stitutional text is `prohibit,' ” for it makes clear “ `the Free
Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government
cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the indi-
vidual can exact from the government.' ” Lyng, 485 U. S.,
at 451.
It follows from the text that the Free Exercise Clause does
not “require the Government itself to behave in ways that
the individual believes will further his or her spiritual devel-
opment or that of his or her family.” Bowen v. Roy, 476
U. S. 693, 699 (1986) (emphasis in original). Instead, the
Clause prohibits the government from compelling individu-
als, whether directly or indirectly, to give up or violate their
religious beliefs. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S.
205, 218 (1972) (Free Exercise Clause forbids “affrmatively
compel[ling]” individuals “to perform acts undeniably at
odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs”);
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S.
203, 223 (1963) (“[I]t is necessary in a free exercise case for
one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it oper-
ates against him in the practice of his religion”); Bowen, 476
U. S., at 700 (“The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual
protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion
. . . ”); Lyng, 485 U. S., at 450 (Free Exercise Clause prohibits
laws that have a “tendency to coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs”); Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 463 (2017)
(“[T]he Free Exercise Clause protects against `indirect coer-
cion . . .' ”); Carson v. Makin, 596 U. S. 767, 778 (2022) (same).
Consistent with these longstanding principles, this Court
has made clear that mere exposure to objectionable ideas
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does not give rise to a free exercise claim. That makes
sense:
Simply being exposed to beliefs contrary to your own
does not “prohibi[t]” the “free exercise” of your religion.
Amdt. 1. Nor does mere “ `[o]ffense . . . equate to coercion.' ”
Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 539 (2022)
(quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 589
(2014) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original)). The Con-
stitution thus does not “ `guarantee citizens a right entirely
to avoid ideas with which they disagree.' ” Id., at 589. In-
deed, “[i]t would betray its own principles if it did,” for “no
robust democracy insulates its citizens from views that they
might fnd novel or even infammatory.” Elk Grove Unifed
School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 44 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
There is no public school exception to these principles.
This Court's decision in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 624 (1943), is instructive. There, the Court held
that “compelling ” students who adhere to the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses faith to salute the fag, in contravention of their reli-
gious beliefs, violated the First Amendment. Id., at 642.
Yet the Court distinguished the “compulsion of students to
declare a belief ” from simply exposing students to ideas that
might confict with their religious tenets. Id., at 631. For
instance, the Court recognized that schools could “acquain[t
students] with the fag salute so that they may be informed
as to what it is or even what it means.” Ibid. No problem
arose, either, the Court observed, from having objecting stu-
dents “remai[n] passive during a fag salute ritual,” while
watching the rest of the class engage in it. Id., at 634.
What the State could not do, however, is “compe[l] the fag
salute and pledge,” when those actions required students to
“declare a belief ” contrary to their own religious views. Id.,
at 631, 642.
So too, in Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., the Court
recognized that seeing objectionable conduct alone is not ac-
tionable under the First Amendment. There, the Court re-
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jected the argument that the exposure of children to a school
coach'
s religious prayer violated the Establishment Clause.
See 597 U. S., at 538–539. Even though hearing and watch-
ing an authority fgure engage in a denominational prayer
with classmates at a school-sponsored event could, of course,
undermine parents' efforts to instill different religious be-
liefs in their children, a majority of this Court concluded that
no cognizable “coercion” had occurred, and so no Establish-
ment Clause violation inhered in the coach's conduct. See
id., at 539.
4
In sum, never, in the context of public schools or else-
where, has this Court held that mere exposure to concepts
inconsistent with one's religious beliefs could give rise to a
First Amendment claim.
5
4
The Court misconstrued the record in that case, and thus erred in
deciding that the coach's prayer ritual was not coercive. See Kennedy,
597 U. S., at 547–556, 561–562 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Taking the
majority's recitation of the facts at face value, however, the Court plainly
viewed exposure to the aforementioned activities as insuffcient to raise
First Amendment concerns, notwithstanding their apparent potential to
undermine a parent's religious upbringing of their child. See id., at
538–539.
5
The majority claims that this Court's precedent, as set forth above,
establishes an “alarmingly narrow rule” that would permit “even instruc-
tion that denigrates or ridicules students' religious beliefs.” Ante, at
558–559. That the majority sees exposure to books featuring LGBTQ
characters as comparable to “denigrat[ion] or ridicul[e]” of religion is tell-
ing. Ante, at 559. In any event, the majority is wrong: Denigration and
ridicule can easily amount to coercion. Such conduct bears no resem-
blance to merely exposing children to concepts or ideas that incidentally
confict with a parent's religious beliefs. (The majority, for its part, can-
not comprehend that coercion may cover denigration without reaching ex-
posure, and so mistakes this point for a concession. See ante, at 559, n. 9.)
Additionally, this Court's precedent forbids government action motivated
by “hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.” Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U. S. 617, 638 (2018). Existing
precedent thus addresses the majority's hypotheticals without resort to
its unbounded test. See in fra, at 611–615.

604 MAHMOUD
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B
These
well-established principles, previously recognized
and respected by this Court, resolve this case. As re-
counted earlier, each of the three sets of parent-plaintiffs
premised their objections on, in essence, “expos[ure]” to ma-
terial that conficts with their religious beliefs. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 532a; see supra, at 599–600; see also App. to Pet.
for Cert. 194a (challenging “exposure to the Pride Story-
books” and having “children . . . read the Pride Storybooks”).
Yet for the reasons just explained, the effects of mere expo-
sure to material with which one disagrees does not and
should not give rise to a free exercise claim.
Nor have petitioners shown that MCPS's policies coerced
them to give up or violate their religious beliefs. See Bar-
nette, 319 U. S., at 633. To the contrary, MCPS explicitly
prohibits teachers from asking students to give up or change
their views regarding gender and sexuality, whether reli-
gious or not. See supra, at 597–598; see also App. to Pet.
for Cert. 520a, 605a, 638a. The parents have proffered no
evidence of teachers acting contrary to that policy.
Recall, too, that MCPS exclusively uses the challenged
Storybooks to teach students literacy in English language
class. Like all other books in the English language curricu-
lum, the Storybooks will be used to “assist students with
mastering reading concepts like answering questions about
characters, retelling key events about characters in a story,
and drawing inferences about story characters based on their
actions.” Id., at 605a. As for integrating the books into
classes, teachers may opt “to put them on a shelf for students
to fnd on their own; to recommend a book to a student who
would enjoy it; to offer the books as an option for literature
circles, book clubs, or paired reading groups; or to use them
as a read aloud.” Id., at 604a–605a. It is possible, of
course, that such instruction may introduce students to con-
cepts or views objectionable to their faiths. Being “merely
made acquainted with” these themes, however, does not give
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rise to a cognizable free exercise burden. Barnette, 319
U
. S., at 631.
III
Rather than follow this Court's unambiguous precedent,
the majority rescues petitioners' exposure theory by simply
renaming it. Petitioners' free exercise rights are burdened
by the Storybooks, the majority claims, because they “carry
with them `a very real threat of undermining ' the religious
beliefs that the parents wish to instill in their children.”
Ante, at 553. In other words, reading books like Uncle Bob-
by's Wedding is suffcient, in the majority's view, because of
the “ `threat' ” those books pose to the religious upbringing
of petitioners' children. Ibid.; see ante, at 551, 553–554, 565.
That is simply exposure by another name.
From where does the majority derive its novel “threat”
test? Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, the majority claims, established
it over half a century ago, unbeknownst to any court of ap-
peals in the Nation (and until today, this Court as well).
The faws in the majority's reasoning are legion. The
Court's reading of Yoder is not simply incorrect; it is defni-
tively foreclosed by precedent. The majority's novel test,
moreover, imposes no meaningful limits on the types of
school decisions subject to strict scrutiny, as the Court's own
application of its test confrms. Today's ruling thus prom-
ises to wreak havoc on our Nation's public schools and the
courts tasked with resolving this new font of litigation.
A
1
Start with the majority's misreading of Yoder. According
to the Court, Yoder held that the government violates the
“ `rights of parents to direct “the religious upbringing ” of
their children' ” whenever a government policy “poses `a
very real threat of undermining ' the religious beliefs and
practices that the parents wish to instill.” Ante, at 530, 546.
That is incorrect.

606 MAHMOUD
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Yoder addressed a First Amendment challenge to Wiscon-
si
n's “compulsory-attendance law” for high school students.
406 U. S., at 207. The law compelled parents to send their
children to public school or an equivalent until age 16, and
imposed criminal penalties on violators. See ibid. A group
of Amish parents punished under the law argued that their
convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause because “their
children's attendance at high school, public or private, was
contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.” Id., at 209.
This Court agreed. See id., at 234–236. Wisconsin's law
violated the Free Exercise Clause because it “affrmatively
compel[led]” the parents, “under threat of criminal sanction,
to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets
of their religious beliefs.” Id., at 218. “Formal high school
education beyond the eighth grade,” the Court explained,
foreclosed Amish religious practice by “tak[ing children]
away from their community” at a time when they “must ac-
quire . . . the specifc skills needed to perform the adult role
of an Amish farmer or housewife.” Id., at 211. Sending
their children to school during that “crucial” time would ac-
cordingly require the Amish parents to “abandon” their faith.
Id., at 218.
Yoder thus does not support the proposition that any gov-
ernment policy that poses a “ `very real threat' ” to a parent's
religious development of their child triggers strict scrutiny.
Ante, at 530, 553. The problem in Yoder was not that the
law exposed children to material that would incidentally “un-
dermine” religious beliefs, but that it compelled Amish par-
ents to do what their religion forbade: send their children
away rather than integrate them into the Amish community
at home. Contra, ante, at 530, 549–550, 561, n. 10.
6
6
The majority sets up a strawman in response, claiming that the preced-
ing analysis distinguishes Yoder because it “involved compulsory school
attendance.” Ante, at 561, n. 10. That misses the point entirely: Yoder is
distinguishable because the challenged law “affrmatively compel[ led]” the
parents “to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of
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If there were any doubt, this Court already rejected the
major
ity's fawed reading of Yoder in Lyng, 485 U. S. 439.
There, a group of Native Americans brought a free exercise
challenge to the construction of a federal road through an
area that the group used “to conduct a wide variety of spe-
cifc rituals.” Id., at 451. This Court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claim. Id., at 449–451. Although “the challenged
Government action would interfere signifcantly with private
persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfllment according to
their own religious beliefs,” the Court reasoned, the affected
individuals would not be “coerced by the Government's
action into violating their religious beliefs.” Id., at 449.
Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed
to make out a cognizable free exercise claim. See id., at
451–452.
The dissent in Lyng argued that the Court's ruling con-
ficted with Yoder, which it described as “str[iking] down a
state compulsory school attendance law on free exercise
grounds not so much because of the affrmative coercion the
law exerted on individual religious practitioners, but because
of `the impact' ” that the law would have on Amish communi-
ties. 485 U. S., at 466 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (emphasis de-
leted). Wisconsi n's law i mpl icated the Free Exercise
Clause, the dissent claimed, because the school environment
their religious beliefs.” 406 U. S., at 218 (emphasis added). That is not
true here. See supra, at 604–605. It also bears emphasis that the par-
ents in this case remain free to teach their religious beliefs and practices
to their children at home, as petitioners acknowledge. See Reply Brief 8.
The parents in Yoder, by contrast, were prohibited by the challenged law
from engaging in religious teaching at home that was critical to “integrat-
[ing] . . . Amish child[ren] into the Amish religious community” because
the law required them to send their children away to school during that
same time. 406 U. S., at 211–212; see id., at 218. It was thus impossible
to both comply with the law and engage in the religious teaching at home
deemed necessary by the Amish parents. So they were not “similarly
capable of teaching their religious values `at home.' ” Contra, ante, at
562–563.
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“posed `a very real threat of undermining the Amish commu-
nity
and religious practice.' ” Id., at 467 (quoting Yoder, 406
U. S., at 218). The majority today uses that same refrain as
the foundation of its analysis. See, e. g., ante, at 530, 543,
553, 556, 565.
The Court in Lyng, however, could not have been clearer:
“The dissent . . . misreads Wisconsin v. Yoder.” 485 U. S.,
at 456. “The statute directly compelled the Amish to send
their children to public high schools `contrary to the Amish
religion and way of life,' ” the Court explained. Id., at 457.
“The dissent's out-of-context quotations notwithstanding,
there is nothing whatsoever in the Yoder opinion to support
the proposition that the `impact' on the Amish religion would
have been constitutionally problematic if the statute at issue
had not been coercive in nature.” Ibid. So the mere
“threat of undermining ” Amish beliefs and practices was not,
on its own, what gave rise to a cognizable free exercise bur-
den in Yoder. Contra, ante, at 530, 543, 553, 556, 565.
“Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional
prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the legiti-
mate conduct by government of its own affairs,” Lyng ex-
plained, “the location of the line cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's
spiritual development.” 485 U. S., at 451.
The majority's novel test directly contravenes not only
Lyng, but also Bowen, 476 U. S. 693. There, the Court ad-
dressed a father's free exercise challenge to the Govern-
ment's use of a Social Security number associated with his
daughter as a condition of receiving certain Government
benefts. See id., at 695–696. According to the father's sin-
cerely held religious beliefs, use of the Social Security num-
ber would “ `rob the spirit' of his daughter and prevent her
from attaining greater spiritual power,” thereby interfering
with his ability to direct the religious development of his
child. Id., at 696. This Court rejected the father's claim.
“Never . . . has the Court interpreted the First Amendment
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to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the
i
ndividual believes will further his or her spiritual develop-
ment or that of his or her family,” the Court explained. Id.,
at 699 (emphasis in original).
The majority's “very real threat” test is irreconcilable with
Bowen. There can be no question that the Government's
challenged policy in Bowen gravely threatened the father's
ability to direct his child's religious development; the Gov-
ernment's “us[e]” of his daughter's Social Security number
would (in the father's sincerely held view) “ `rob the spirit'
of his daughter.” Id., at 696. So if the test for identifying
a cognizable free exercise burden is, as the majority today
claims, whether the law poses “ `a very real threat of under-
mining ' ” a parent's religious development of their child,
ante, at 553, then Bowen was wrongly decided.
2
The majority relegates its discussion of Bowen and Lyng
to a few sentences, claiming that those cases involved “inter-
nal affairs” of Government. Ante, at 557. The majority,
however, articulates no coherent line between the “internal
affairs” that the Court deemed nonactionable in those two
cases and the external effects of government decisions that
the majority announces are actionable here.
In Bowen, the entire premise of the father's claim was that
the Government's internal choices about how to operate its
program would have external effects on his right to direct
the religious development of his child: The father averred
that the Government's use of his child's Social Security num-
ber would irrevocably destroy his child's “spirit,” and thus
his ability to protect her spiritual development. 476 U. S.,
at 696. Here, by the majority's own telling, the parents
make the same type of claim. They argue that the schools'
use of the Storybooks will harm their ability to direct their
children's religious development. See ante, at 530, 540–541,
553–554. The underlying theories are indistinguishable.
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The incoherence of the majority's “internal affairs” theory
comes
into even sharper focus as applied to the Court's deci-
sion in Lyng. There, the Court acknowledged that the Gov-
ernment's construction of the road would “ `physically de-
stro[y] the environmental conditions and the privacy without
which the [religious] practices cannot be conducted.' ” 485
U. S., at 449 (alterations in original). Yet the majority today
recasts the decision to build a road through sacred land as a
purely “internal affai[r]” of the Government, thereby render-
ing Lyng inapposite. Ante, at 557. Implausible as that as-
sertion may be, it is the majority's only maneuver around
Bowen and Lyng. In short, the Court's novel “threat” test
fouts settled precedent, and the majority's contrary claim
is illogical.
B
That is only the beginning of the majority's errors. Turn,
next, to the Court's articulation of what, exactly, the “very
real threat” is that triggers the most demanding level of judi-
cial review. The majority declares the inquiry will turn on
several context clues: the “specifc religious beliefs and prac-
tices asserted,” the “specifc nature of the educational re-
quirement or curricular feature at issue,” the age of the chil-
dren, and the context and manner in which the relevant
materials “are presented.” Ante, at 550. On that last
point, the majority adds, courts should ask whether the ma-
terials are “presented in a neutral manner” or “in a manner
that is `hostile' to religious viewpoints and designed to im-
pose upon students a `pressure to conform.' ” Ibid. (quoting
Yoder, 406 U. S., at 211).
That test lacks any meaningful limit. Consider what the
majority deems intolerably “hostile” to religious views.
Uncle Bobby's Wedding, the Court asserts, contains a “sub-
tle” “normative” message about marriage that is “contrary
to the religious principles that the parents in this case wish
to instill in their children”: that “two people can get married,
regardless of whether they are of the same or the opposite
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sex, so long as they ` “love each other.” ' ” Ante, at 550, 552.
A
ccording to the Court, that message is apparent in the “ju-
bilant” reactions of Uncle Bobby's family to his engagement
announcement and a statement by the protagonist's mother
that, “ ` “[w]hen grown-up people love each other that much,
sometimes they get married.” ' ” Ante, at 551, 552; see App.
to Pet. for Cert. 288a.
7
With those snippets in hand, the majority concludes that
Uncle Bobby's Wedding is akin to “the compulsory high
school education [law] considered in Yoder.” Ante, at 553.
Reading the book aloud in elementary class, the majority
claims, “impose[s] upon children a set of values and beliefs
that are `hostile' to their parents' religious [views]” and “ex-
ert[s] upon children a psychological `pressure to conform' ” to
the view that families can be happy about same-sex wed-
dings. Ante, at 554 (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 211). That
is apparently enough, in the majority's view, to create a cog-
nizable free exercise burden, for the Court ultimately prohib-
its use of the Storybooks “or any other similar book” “in any
way” absent an opt-out right. Ante, at 569.
Even if Yoder had established some form of “threat” test,
the majority's application of it in this case would expand it
beyond recognition. The Court in Yoder detailed, at length,
the record evidence that compulsory high school attendance
would “result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish
church community as it exist[ed] in the United States.” 406
7
The majority strains to cast the book as a story about a child who is
apprehensive that her uncle is marrying a man. See ante, at 535, 551.
The book is “coy,” the majority claims, about the reason the protagonist,
Chloe, asks her mother, “ ` “Why is Uncle Bobby getting married?” ' ”
Ante, at 551. With respect, the reason is plainly stated in the book and
has nothing to do with the gender of anyone involved: “Bobby was Chloe's
favourite uncle,” the book explains, and Chloe “ `do[esn't] think [Uncle
Bobby] should get married' ” because she “ `wants [them] to keep having
fun together like always.' ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 282a, 292a. Perhaps con-
scious of its creative reading, the majority admits the message it identifes
is “subtle.” Ante, at 552. The right word, instead, might be “imagined.”

612 MAHMOUD
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U. S., at 212; see id., at 209–213. Compelled attendance ef-
fec
tively barred “integration of the Amish child into the
Amish religious community,” id., at 211–212, such that, under
Wisconsin's law, the petitioners in Yoder were forced “either
[to] abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large,
or . . . to migrate to some other and more tolerant region,”
id., at 218. Yoder thus set an exceedingly high bar for fu-
ture plaintiffs to clear. Indeed, the Court in Yoder explicitly
predicted that “few other religious groups” could make the
showing that the Amish parents in that case had. Id., at
236.
Yet, in the majority's eyes, reading aloud Uncle Bobby's
Wedding is just “[l]ike the compulsory high school education
considered in Yoder.” Ante, at 553. That assertion is re-
markable. Reading a storybook that portrays a family as
happy at the news of their gay son's engagement, the major-
ity claims, is equivalent to a law that threatened the very
“survival of [the] Amish communit[y]” in the United States.
406 U. S., at 209; see ante, at 553–554. To read that sen-
tence is to refute it.
8
The majority's myopic attempt to resolve a major constitu-
tional question through close textual analysis of Uncle Bob-
by's Wedding also reveals its failure to accept and account for
a fundamental truth: LGBTQ people exist. They are part
of virtually every community and workplace of any apprecia-
ble size. Eliminating books depicting LGBTQ individuals as
happily accepted by their families will not eliminate student
exposure to that concept. Nor does the Free Exercise
8
The majority's discussion of Prince & Knight is no less eye opening.
See ante, at 551. The Court zeroes in on the book's classic fairytale end-
ing, in which the protagonists' marriage is celebrated by their family and
others in the kingdom. See ibid.; App. to Pet. for Cert. 424a (“[T]he air
flled with cheer and laughter, for the prince and his shining knight would
live happily ever after”). According to the majority, that makes reading
Prince & Knight equivalent to a law that risked “destruction of the Old
Order Amish church community.” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 212. The absur-
dity of that claim, once again, requires no explanation.
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Clause require the government to alter its programs to insu-
late
students from that “message.” Ante, at 551–552.
In distorting Yoder to say otherwise, the majority leaves
its test without any discernible limits. How are courts ob-
jectively to evaluate what amounts to a “very real threat” to
a parent's religious development of their child? Should they
try to measure the intensity of the parent's protestations, or
must they simply accept the parent's assertion that exposure
to any particular book threatens their child's religious up-
bringing? Or will judges simply know it when they see it
and call their analysis “fact-intensive”? Ante, at 550. Per-
haps cognizant of this problem, the majority insists repeat-
edly that its test looks for an “ `objective danger to the free
exercise of religion.' ” Ante, at 543, 546, 549, 554, 555.
That incantation, however, will be cold comfort to courts at-
tempting to apply this peculiarly subjective test.
What is more, if even potentially imagined “coy” messages
hidden in a picture book are suffcient to trigger strict scru-
tiny when they confict with a parent's religious beliefs, ante,
at 551, then it is hard to say what will not. Indeed, as the
majority admits, “many books targeted at young children”
contain a “normative” message, ante, at 550, about, say, the
virtues of helping your community or the joys of getting
married. (How many children's books, after all, end with a
joyous wedding and the couple living happily ever after?)
The same is true for books and textbooks throughout any
public school curriculum.
Given the multiplicity of religious beliefs in this country,
innumerable themes may be “contrary to the religious princi-
ples” that parents “wish to instill in their children.” Ante,
at 552. Books expressing implicit support for patriotism,
women's rights, interfaith marriage, consumption of meat,
immodest dress, and countless other topics may confict with
sincerely held religious beliefs and thus trigger stringent ju-
dicial review under the majority's test. Imagine a children's
picture book that celebrates the achievements of women in

614 MAHMOUD
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
history, including female scientists, politicians, astronauts,
and
authors. Perhaps the book even features a page that
states, “Girls can do it all!” That message may be “directly
contrary to the religious principles that” a parent “wish[es]
to instill in their chil[d].” Ibid. In the majority's view, it
appears, that is suffcient to trigger strict scrutiny of any
school policy not providing notice and opt out to objecting
parents.
These types of challenges are not mere hypotheticals,
either. Lower courts have long felded religious objections
of this nature. See, e. g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Ed.,
827 F. 2d 1058, 1062 (CA6 1987) (religious objections to “bio-
graphical material about women who have been recognized
for achievements outside their homes,” lessons on “evolu-
tion,” and teaching “children to use imagination beyond the
limitation of scriptural authority”); Fleischfresser v. Direc-
tors of School Dist. 200, 15 F. 3d 680, 683 (CA7 1994) (reli-
gious objections to materials containing “ `wizards, sorcerers,
giants and unspecifed creatures with supernatural pow-
ers' ”); Altman v. Bedford Central School Dist., 245 F. 3d
49, 56, 60–63 (CA2 2001) (religious objections to activities
involving, among other things, yoga, meditation exercises,
and the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) pro-
gram); Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270, 272 (CD Ill. 1979)
(religious objections to “mandatory coeducational physical
education” that requires children to “view and interact with
members of the opposite sex who are wearing `immodest
attire' ”).
Nor is the Court's reasoning seemingly limited to reading
material. Interactions with teachers and students could pre-
sumably involve implicit “normative” messages that parents
may fnd “contrary to the religious principles” they wish to
impart to their children and therefore “hostile” to their reli-
gious beliefs. Ante, at 550, 552, 554. A female teacher dis-
playing a wedding photo with her wife; a student's presenta-
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tion on her family tree featuring LGBTQ parents or siblings;
or
an art display with the phrase “Love Is Love” all could
“positively reinforc[e]” messages that parents disapprove on
religious grounds. Ante, at 552. Would that be suffcient
to trigger strict scrutiny if a school fails to provide advance
notice and the opportunity to opt out of any such exposure?
The majority offers no principled basis easily to distinguish
those cases from this one.
Hard questions might arise, too, from a school's efforts to
encourage mutual respect or to prevent bullying. If a stu-
dent calls a classmate a “sinner” for not wearing a headcov-
ering or coming out as gay, how can a teacher respond with-
out “under mi ni ng ” that ch i ld's relig i ous bel iefs? Can
parents litigate the content of teacher responses and impose
scripts or opt-out policies for everyday interactions designed
to foster tolerance and civility? Again, the majority gives
no guidance.
C
One thing is clear, however: The damage to America's pub-
lic education system will be profound. Over 47 million stu-
dents attend K–12 public schools in the United States, with
nearly 17 million in elementary school. See Dept. of Com-
merce, J. Fabina, E. Hernandez, & K. McElrath, U. S. Census
Bureau, School Enrollment in the United States: 2021, p. 2
(2023). These students and their parents adhere to a wide
range of religious beliefs, and the range of curricular topics,
from science to literature to music and theater, covered in
public schools is similarly vast. Against that backdrop, re-
quiring schools to provide advance notice and the opportu-
nity to opt out of every book, presentation, or feld trip
where students might encounter materials that confict with
their parents' religious beliefs will impose impossible admin-
istrative burdens on schools.
Consider, frst, the diffculties of providing adequate ad-
vance notice. There are more than 370 distinct religious
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groups in this country,
9
and
as the majority points out, Mont-
gomery County is the “ `most religiously diverse county' ” in
the Nation. Ante, at 531. Under the majority's test, school
administrators will have to become experts in a wide range
of religious doctrines in order to predict, in advance, whether
a parent may object to a particular text, lesson plan, or
school activity as contrary to their religious beliefs. The
scale of the problem is only compounded by the majority's
conclusion that even “subtle” and implicit messages con-
tained in children's books can trigger notice and opt-out obli-
gations. Ante, at 552. If a parent objects to all material
and interactions that support “nontraditional gender roles,”
for instance, how are schools workably to deduce what books
might cross the line? Or take the parents' request in this
very case: How should a school go about identifying “any
other instruction related to family life or human sexuality
that violates the [p]arents' or their children's religious be-
liefs” in addition to the fve Storybooks at issue here? ECF
Doc. 23, at 1. Those in the majority will apparently “know
it when [they] see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to pornography).
Of course, school districts are currently free to publish in-
formation about their curricula. As one group of amici rep-
resenting over 10,000 school district leaders and advocates
and an association of 25 state school board associations at-
tests, however, “it would be an extreme and overly broad
burden to force all school districts in the country” to provide
the extensive notifcation regime that the majority's test
would require. Brief for School Superintendents Associa-
tion et al. as Amici Curiae 15 (Brief for AASA); see also
Brief for National Education Association et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 21–29 (explaining that “endless administrative confu-
sion” would result from petitioners' requested notice man-
date). Such a regime, amici warn, would force school
9
See C. Grammich et al., 2020 U. S. Religion Census: Religious Congre-
gations & Adherents Study 7 (2023).
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administrators and teachers “to divert their already limited
resources
and time to ensure full compliance” with these new
“parental notifcation rights.” Brief for AASA 15.
Managing opt outs will impose even greater administra-
tive burdens. At present, the vast majority of States that
allow parents to opt students out of instruction limit that
right to a specifc course or single curricular unit, rather than
permitting opt outs for certain themes or particular materi-
als. See id., at 10–14, and n. 10 (collecting state statutes).
That approach ensures that opt outs can be “administered
centrally” in a way that “reduce[s the] burden on teachers
and principals” and “minimizes interruption o[f] classroom
instruction for other students.” Id., at 14.
Establishing a new constitutional right to opt out of any
instruction that involves themes contrary to anyone's reli-
gious beliefs will create a nightmare for school administra-
tors tasked with felding, tracking, and operationalizing
highly individualized and vaguely defned requests for par-
ticular students, as this Board learned. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. 606a–607a.
Opt outs will not just affect classroom instruction, either.
Teachers will need to adjust homework assignments to ex-
clude objectionable material and develop bespoke exams for
students subject to different opt-out preferences. See Brief
for Justin Driver et al. as Amici Curiae. Schools will have
to divert resources and staff to supervising students during
opt-out periods, too, which could become a signifcant drain
on funding and staffng that is already stretched thin. See
Brief for AASA 15–16.
Worse yet, the majority's new rule will have serious chill-
ing effects on public school curricula. Few school districts
will be able to afford costly litigation over opt-out rights or
to divert resources to administering impracticable notice and
opt-out systems for individual students. The foreseeable re-
sult is that some school districts may strip their curricula
of content that risks generating religious objections. See

618 MAHMOUD
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Brief for Justin Driver et al. as Amici Curiae 22. In the
current
moment, that means material representing LGBTQ
students and families, like the Storybooks here, will be
among the frst to go, with grave consequences for LGBTQ
students and our society. See Brief for State of Maryland
et al. as Amici Curiae (discussing the importance of efforts
l ike MCPS's i n combati ng harassment agai nst LGBTQ
youth). Next to go could be teaching on evolution, the work
of female scientist Marie Curie, or the history of vaccines.
In effect, then, the majority's new rule will hand a subset
of parents a veto power over countless curricular and admin-
istrative decisions. Yet that authority has long been left to
democratically elected state and local decisionmakers, not in-
dividual parents and courts. This Court has repeatedly rec-
ognized the wisdom of that regime, including in Yoder itself.
See 406 U. S., at 235 (underscoring the “obvious fact that
courts are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-
equipped to determine the `necessity' of discrete aspects of
a State's program of compulsory education”); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 42 (1973)
(recognizing that “educational policy” is an “area in which
this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience
counsels against premature interference with the informed
judgments made at the state and local levels”); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public
education in our Nation is committed to the control of state
and local authorities”).
At present, States and localities across the Nation have
adopted a patchwork of different policies governing school
material related to gender and sexuality and parental opt-
out rights. For instance, some States mandate, while others
forbid, instruction on sexual orientation. See Brief for
AASA 5–6, and nn. 4–8 (collecting state statutes). Statutes
governing opt-out policies are equally diverse. See id., at
10–14, and nn. 10–22. Tellingly, however, only a handful of
States have permitted opt-out rights for all material that a
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parent fnds objectionable, see id., at 13–14, and nn. 20–21,
and
even some of those States have required that the parents
and school agree upon an alternative lesson plan that the
parent will fund, id., at 13, and n. 20. Today's decision will
thus usher in a sea change in the law, shifting the primary
locus of decisionmaking on these diffcult and often contested
policy issues from democratically elected offcials to judges.
There is also real reason to think that the democratic proc-
ess and local mechanisms for parental advocacy were work-
ing here. Three of the seven MCPS Board members were
voted out during the most recent election, see ABC 7 News,
K. Lynn, Montgomery County Voters Elect New School
Board Members in Signifcant Shift (Nov. 12, 2024), https://
wjla.com/news/ local/montgomery-county-voters-elect-new-
school-board-members-education-association-president-
david-stein-leadership-rita-montoya-laura-stewart-natalie-
zimmerman-accountability-maryland-dmv, and two of the
seven books to which the parents originally objected are no
longer in use, see Brief for Respondents 8. Parents, addi-
tionally, remain free to raise objections to specifc material
through the multilevel appeal system established by Board
and state policies in Maryland, see supra, at 599, which the
parents in this case apparently never tried to pursue.
The Court today subverts Maryland's functioning demo-
cratic process, whistling past decades of precedent that rec-
ognizes the primacy and importance of local decisionmaking
in this area of law. Members of this Court have oft and
recently called for deference to the democratic process in
other contexts. See, e. g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health
Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 269 (2022) (decrying decisions
that “wrongly remov[e] an issue from the people and the
democratic process”); United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U. S.
495, 510 (2025) (“ `[T]he Constitution presumes that even im-
provident decisions will eventually be rectifed by the demo-
cratic processes' ” (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 440 (1985))); Grants Pass v. John-
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son, 603 U. S. 520, 556 (2024) (objecting that “[i]nstead of
encourag
ing `productive dialogue' and `experimentation'
through our democratic institutions, courts have frozen in
place their own `formulas' by `fat' ” and “interfered with `es-
sential considerations of federalism,' taking from the people
and their elected leaders diffcult questions traditionally
`thought to be the[ir] province' ”). Yet today, it seems, those
principles do not apply to the Government when it designs
curricula for a free public education.
10
D
Unwilling to acknowledge the implications of its ruling,
the majority insists that it has not announced a new “ `expo-
sure' ” theory of free exercise violations. Ante, at 555–556.
The record in this case goes “far beyond mere `exposure,' ”
the majority claims, because “the storybooks unmistakably
convey a particular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and
gender,” and because the “Board has specifcally encouraged
teachers to reinforce this viewpoint and to reprimand any
children who disagree.” Ibid.
The majority, however, makes clear that reading aloud the
books is suffcient under its test. The Court mandates that
the schools “notify [petitioners] in advance whenever one of
the books in question or any other similar book is to be used
in any way and to allow [petitioners] to have their children
excused from that instruction.” Ante, at 569 (emphasis
added). The Court could only issue such a directive if any
instructional use of the books in class, including merely read-
ing them aloud, would prove intolerably “ `hostile' ” to reli-
10
Having refused to apply “the Bill of Rights and the doctrine of judicial
review [to] protect individuals who cannot obtain legislative change,” ante,
at 563, in several recent decisions, see, e. g., Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 231, 269;
Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 510, 525, the Court now asserts it has no choice
but to play school board here. Of course, our precedent requires just the
opposite result. See supra, at 601–605.
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gious beliefs under the majority's test. Ante, at 554.
11
In-
deed,
if the problem arose from the teacher guidance, rather
than exposure to the books themselves, the Court could (and
should) simply issue an injunction mandating the opportu-
nity to opt out of the specifc teacher statements deemed
objectionable. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,
512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994) (“[An] injunction [should be] no
broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals”).
As a result, what it comes down to under the majority's
test is that students will hear or read the text of books that
“convey a particular viewpoint” that is “contrary to the reli-
gious principles” that a parent wishes to instill in their child.
Ante, at 552, 555–556. That is mere exposure to objection-
able ideas in its clearest form.
12
The majority, in any event, badly misreads the Board's
teacher guidance. Far from directing teachers to “accuse
[students] of being `hurtful' when they express a degree of
religious confusion,” ante, at 555; see also ante, at 589
(Thomas, J., concurring), the guidance is plainly designed to
foster mutual civility and “respect.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
628a.
That purpose is clear throughout the materials. For in-
stance, the guidance suggests that, in response to a child's
statement that, “[b]eing . . . gay, lesbian, queer, etc[.] is
11
Petitioners conceded that they have no objection “to the books being
on the shelf or available in the library.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. The Court's
injunctive relief can thus only cover use of the books as part of “instruc-
tion” in the classroom. Ante, at 569. The injunction therefore should
not be read to prohibit schools from placing the books on shelves or in
libraries.
12
Despite stating that the age of the child matters to its “threat” analy-
sis earlier in the opinion, see ante, at 549, the majority declines to limit
the injunctive relief that it orders based on the age of the students in-
volved. The majority thus fails to put its age-based test into practice,
treating 5-year-old kindergarteners and 11-year-old ffth graders identi-
cally when it comes to reading Uncle Bobby's Wedding.
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wrong and not allowed in my religion,” a teacher could re-
spond:
“I understand that is what you believe, but not every-
one believes that. We don't have to understand or support
a person's identity to treat them with respect and kindness.
. . . In any community, we'll always fnd people with beliefs
different from our own and that is okay—we can still show
them respect.” Ibid.
That recommended response is careful to respect the reli-
gious views of students, while still encouraging civility and
“kindness” toward others. Ibid. Those values, moreover,
are precisely what the parents in this case say they endorse.
See, e. g., id., at 529a (“We . . . believe that all humans . . .
must be respected, regardless of the person's faith, race, eth-
nic origin, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, or social
status”); id., at 536a (“We frmly reject that any student
should be bullied or harassed for any reason, and we teach
our son to treat all others with kindness and respect”); id.,
at 543a (“We believe that all persons should be treated with
respect and dignity regardless of religion, race, sex, ethnic-
ity, gender identity, sexua l or ient ati on, or other
characteristics”).
To the extent students make comments that may be hurt-
ful to classmates in the room, the guidance recommends
teachers discourage such behavi or. If a student says,
“That's so gay,” the guidance suggests a teacher may re-
spond: “Regardless of how it's intended, using gay to de-
scribe something negative refects a long history of prejudice
against LGBTQ+ people, so please don't use it in that way.
. . . You may not have meant to be hurtful, but when you
use the word `gay' in any way outside of its defnition, it's
disrespectful.” Id., at 634a (emphasis added). Similarly, if
a child says, “That's weird. He can't be a boy if he was born
a girl,” the guidance encourages teachers to respond: “That
comment is hurtful; we shouldn't use negative words to talk
about peoples' identities.” Id., at 630a (emphasis added).
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The majority reads these portions of the guidance to direct
teachers
to “accuse [students] of being `hurtful' when they
express” “confusion” based on their religious views. Ante,
at 555 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 630a). The majority
only reaches that conclusion, however, by omitting portions
of the student commentary to which the teachers are re-
sponding in the guidance. See id., at 630a, 634a (omitting
“[t]hat's so gay” and “[t]hat's weird”). Those excised state-
ments, the majority should presumably agree, could be hurt-
ful to students in the classroom and thus warrant discourage-
ment. Ibid.
Comments like that, moreover, are sadly not uncommon in
the Nation's school system today. In a recent study, “the
overwhelming majority” of LGBTQ students reported hear-
ing homophobic language used by their peers, including
“that's so gay,” “dyke,” “faggot,” and “tranny.” J. G. Kos-
ciw, C. Clark, & L. Menard, GLSEN, The 2021 National
School Climate Survey: The Experiences of LGBTQ+ Youth
in Our Nation's Schools xv–xvi (2022). Over two-thirds of
LGBTQ students, moreover, reported feeling unsafe at
school because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
Ibid. Numerous other studies have found similar trends.
See Brief for State of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae 7–8,
and nn. 7–17 (collecting additional studies).
The Board's guidance to teachers thus simply seeks to an-
ticipate the kinds of diffcult interactions that might arise in
response to greater inclusivity toward LGBTQ students.
13
If that is suffcient to render classroom instruction “coer-
cive,” ante, at 554, then mutual tolerance and respect may
no longer have a place in public schools.
14
13
The majority apparently misses the foregoing in claiming that the
dissent “ignores” the Board's teacher guidance. Ante, at 556.
14
Justice Thomas views the Board's LGBTQ-inclusive program as
designed to enforce “ideological conformity.” Ante, at 588 (concurring
opinion). If there is any conformity that the Board seeks to instill, it is
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The majority and concurrence also draw on news articles
about
comments that a Board member apparently made to
reporters. See ante, at 539 (majority opinion); ante, at 588–
589 (opinion of Thomas, J.). All Members of the majority
have recognized before, however, that “statements by indi-
vidual legislators” and members of similar decisionmaking
entities are not appropriately attributed to the entire body.
NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 307 (2017); see also
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 692 (2018); Dobbs, 597 U. S.,
at 253–254 (“Even when an argument about legislative mo-
tive is backed by statements made by legislators who voted
for a law, we have been reluctant to attribute those motives
to the legislative body as a whole. `What motivates one leg-
islator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily
what motivates . . . others to enact it' ”). The statement by
this individual Board member, apparently made outside any
offcial proceeding, should not be treated differently, particu-
larly in light of the Board's consistent commitment to foster-
ing mutual respect and civility, refected in its offcial policies
and guidance. See, e. g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 581a–589a,
669a–675a.
15
universal acceptance of kindness and civility. Justice Thomas can claim
otherwise only by attributing to the Board a few selectively excerpted
statements of individual Board members. See in fra this page, and n. 15.
That approach is inconsistent with the views Justice Thomas has taken
elsewhere. See ibid.
15
The majority and concurrence describe the Board member as “sug-
gest[ing] that the objecting parents were comparable” to “ ` “white su-
premacists” ' ” and “ ` “xenophobes.” ' ” Ante, at 539 (majority opinion);
ante, at 589 (opinion of Thomas, J.). The full quote, however, indicates
the member intended to express concern about the potential administra-
tive implications of having to accommodate opt-out requests from other
hypothetical parents. See E. Espey, Parents, Students, Doctors React to
MCPS Lawsuit Targeting LGBTQ+ Storybooks, Bethesda Magazine, June
2, 2023, https:// bethesdamagazine.com/2023/06/02/parentsstudents-doctors-
react-to-mcps-lawsuit-targeting-lgbtq-storybooks (“Do [the petitioners] re-
alize it would be an impossible disruption to the school system if teachers
had to screen the content they plan to teach every day and send out notices
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Lastly, the majority is, of course, right to observe that not
a
ll parents can afford to send their children to private reli-
gious schools or to provide for homeschooling. See ante, at
560–561. Yet for public schools to function, it is inescapable
that some students will be exposed to ideas and concepts
that their parents may fnd objectionable on religious
grounds. Indeed, this Court has long recognized that real-
ity. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 591 (1992) (observing
students may be “expos[ed]” or “subjected during the course
of their educations to ideas deemed offensive and irreli-
gious”). To presume that public schools must be free of all
such exposure is to presume public schools out of existence.
IV
Not content to invent a new standard for free exercise bur-
dens, the majority goes on to consider an issue beyond the
question presented and unaddressed by the Fourth Circuit
below: whether the alleged burden in this case is “constitu-
tionally permitted.” Ante, at 563.
That decision runs roughshod over the Court's procedural
practices. “As a general rule,” this Court “do[es] not decide
issues outside the questions presented by the petition for
certiorari,” Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198, 205 (2001),
and it is fundamental to this Court's role in our Nation's judi-
cial system that “we are a court of review, not of frst view.”
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).
The majority's exercise in judicial maximalism is not with-
out cost to our precedent, either. The majority recognizes,
as it must, that “the government is generally free to place
incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as it does
so pursuant to a neutral policy that is generally applicable.”
Ante, at 564. That bedrock principle of free exercise doctrine
ensures that “ `professed doctrines of religious belief ' ” are
not “ `superior to the law of the land,' ” for an “individual's
so white supremacists could opt out of civil rights content and xenophobes
could opt out of stories about immigrant families”).
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religious beliefs [may not] excuse him from compliance with
an
otherwise valid law” or policy (in this case, the Board's
generally applicable rule against opt outs based on any rea-
son). Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.
v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878–879 (1990). The majority never-
theless proceeds to announce that “the character of the bur-
den” in this case “requires [it] to proceed differently.” Ante,
at 564. Smith, the Court claims, “recognized Yoder as an
exception to the general rule,” and “the burden in this case
is of the exact same character as the burden in Yoder.”
Ante, at 564–565.
The problem for the majority is that this is not what Smith
said. Smith recognized that “[t]he only decisions in which
we have held that the First Amendment bars application of
a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitu-
tional protections.” 494 U. S., at 881. Only in such “hybrid
situation[s]” does the Court set aside its neutral and gener-
ally applicable inquiry. Id., at 882. Yoder, the Smith Court
explained, was such a hybrid rights case because the parents
relied on both their substantive due process rights to “direct
the education of their children” and the Free Exercise
Clause. 494 U. S., at 881, and n. 1 (discussing Yoder). Here,
however, the Court's analysis makes no mention of substan-
tive due process rights or the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. It instead asserts, simply, that “the burden
in this case is of the exact same character as the burden in
Yoder.” Ante, at 565. But saying so does not make it so.
To the contrary, as detailed above, the burden asserted in
this case is vastly different from that identifed in Yoder.
See supra, at 605–609.
Finally, the Court's application of strict scrutiny itself only
underscores the folly of its new approach. Under strict
scrutiny, the government bears the burden of demonstrating
that its policy “advances `interests of the highest order' and
is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.” Fulton v.

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Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 541 (2021) (quoting Church of
Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546
(1993)). The Court acknowledges that schools “have a `com-
pelling interest in having an undisrupted school session con-
ducive to the students' learning.' ” Ante, at 566 (quoting
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 119 (1972)). It
concludes the Board's policy permitting no opt outs, however,
is not narrowly tailored to that interest. Ante, at 566–569.
The Court notes that the Board permits opt outs from the
“Family Life and Human Sexuality” program, a discrete
health-education unit that MCPS offers in accordance with
Maryland law. See ante, at 567; Code of Md. Regs., tit. 13A
§§ 04.18.01(C)(1)(c), (D)(2) (2019). “If the Board can struc-
ture the `Family Life and Human Sexuality' curriculum to
more easily accommodate opt outs, it could structure instruc-
tion concerning the `LGBTQ+-inclusive' storybooks simi-
larly,” the Court asserts. Ante, at 567.
That misguided assessment illustrates perfectly why
judges should not be tasked with second-guessing questions
of school administration. The Court assumes, with no “spe-
cialized knowledge and experience” in the feld of “educa-
tional policy,” Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 42, that MCPS can
simply create a new unit of instruction on these particular
Storybooks and thereby resolve any undue administrative
burdens from managing opt outs. Ante, at 567; see also
ante, at 590–592 (Thomas, J., concurring) (making this same
point). What the majority elides, however, is that its ruling
is not limited to a set of fve storybooks. It applies, ex-
pressly, to “any other similar book,” ante, at 569, an amor-
phous category the Court declines to defne, but which will
presumably include all other books that contain “subtle”
messages on gender and sexuality, even not involving
LGBTQ characters, that the parents here (and others in the
future) might fnd objectionable, ante, at 552.
The logic of the Court's ruling will also apply to countless
other topics, interactions, and activities that may confict
with a parent's religious preferences. What of the parent
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who wants his child's curriculum stripped of any mention of
women
working outside the home, sincerely averring that
such activity conficts with the family's religious beliefs? It
blinks reality to suggest that the simple solution for schools
is to create new discrete units of instruction to cover any set
of material to which a parent objects. The Court's analysis
thus refects, all too well, the “obvious fact that courts are
not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to de-
termine the `necessity' of discrete aspects of a State's pro-
gram of compulsory education.” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 235.
16
What is more, the point of the Board's program is to en-
sure that diverse groups of students are represented in read-
ing materials across the curriculum. The Board cannot ac-
complish that purpose simply by consolidating all books
involving LGBTQ characters into a single inclusivity hour
and allowing opt outs, as the majority appears to believe.
Ante, at 567. That approach would emphasize difference
rather than sameness and foster exclusion rather than inclu-
sion. The point of inclusivity is to use books representing a
diversity of identities and viewpoints the same way one
might use any other book, communicating that one's LGBTQ
16
Justice Thomas goes yet further. He argues that the strict scrutiny
analysis should require schools to identify a “history and tradition” of
teaching the relevant subject or material. Ante, at 581 (concurring opin-
ion); see ante, at 581–584 (faulting the Board for failing to demonstrate a
history and tradition of “LGBTQ+-inclusive” teaching). That approach
fails to appreciate the constantly evolving nature of education. Classes
on computer literacy, robotics, and flm studies, to take just a few exam-
ples, are modern developments. In the early 19th century, moreover, “the
common curriculum usually included a handful of elementary subjects,”
such as “reading, writing, and arithmetic.” W. Reese, America's Public
Schools 28 (2005). Under Justice Thomas's test, it appears, schools may
have no compelling interest in teaching anything beyond those topics. It
is not clear, either, how far back Justice Thomas would have courts look.
Should courts limit their inquiry to the founding era or the 19th century
for guidance on which topics schools have a suffciently compelling interest
in teaching for purposes of this “history and tradition” test? It is incon-
ceivable that learning should be shackled to a moment in time.
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classmates should be treated in the same manner as anyone
else
.
***
Today's ruling threatens the very essence of public educa-
tion. The Court, in effect, constitutionalizes a parental veto
power over curricular choices long left to the democratic
process and local administrators. That decision guts our
free exercise precedent and strikes at the core premise of
public schools: that children may come together to learn not
the teachings of a particular faith, but a range of concepts
and views that refect our entire society. Exposure to new
ideas has always been a vital part of that project, until now.
The reverberations of the Court's error will be felt, I fear,
for generations. Unable to condone that grave misjudg-
ment, I dissent.
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APPENDIX
App
. to Pet. for Cert. 279a, 281a–305a
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 525, line 2: “us” is changed to “this Court”
p. 526, line 19: “Md. Educ. Code Ann.” is inserted after “afford.”
p. 535, line 4: “to” is deleted
p. 542, line 6 from bottom: “her” is inserted before “parents”
p. 553, line 18: “to” is deleted
p. 587, n. 5, line 2 from bottom: “as the” is changed to “as a”
p. 606, line 15: “the” is inserted before “eighth”
p. 614, line 19: “other” is deleted
p. 620, line 5 from bottom: “permit” is changed to “allow”