Stanley v. City of Sanford

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 606 U. S. Part 1
Pages 46–99
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 20, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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46 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD, FLORIDA
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 23–997. Argued January 13, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025
Karyn Stanley worked as a frefghter for the City of Sanford, Florida,
starting in 1999. When Ms. Stanley was hired, the City offered health
insurance until age 65 for two categories of retirees: those with 25 years
of service and those who retired earlier due to disability. In 2003, the
City changed its policy to provide health insurance up to age 65 only for
retirees with 25 years of service, while those who retired earlier due to
disability would receive just 24 months of coverage. Ms. Stanley later
developed a disability that forced her to retire in 2018, entitling her to
only 24 months of health insurance under the revised policy.
Ms. Stanley sued, claiming the City violated the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act by providing different health-insurance benefts to those who
retire with 25 years of service and those who retire due to disability.
The district court dismissed her ADA claim, reasoning that the alleged
discrimination occurred after she retired, when she was not a “qualifed
individual” under Title I of the ADA, 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a), because she
no longer held or sought a job with the defendant. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affrmed.
Held: The judgment is affrmed.
83 F. 4th 1333, affrmed.
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I and II, concluding that, to prevail under § 12112(a), a plaintiff
must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform
its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the
time of an employer 's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.
Pp. 51–59.
(a) Section 12112(a) makes it unlawful for a covered employer to dis-
criminate against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability in re-
gard to compensation. The parties agree that retirement benefts qual-
ify as “compensation” and assume the City's policy revision constituted
disability-based discrimination. The disagreement centers on whether
§ 12112(a) addresses discrimination against retirees.
A “qualifed individual” is someone “who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that [she] holds or desires.” § 12111(8). Congress's use of
present-tense verbs (“holds,” “desires,” “can perform”) signals that

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47
Syllabus
§ 12112(a) protects individuals able to do the job they hold or seek at
the
time they suffer discrimination, not retirees who neither hold nor
desire a job.
The statute's defnition of “reasonable accommodation”—“job restruc-
turing,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,” and altering
“training materials or policies,” § 12111(9)—makes sense for current em-
ployees or applicants but not for retirees. Section 12112(b)'s examples
of discrimination, such as “qualifcation standards” and “employment
tests,” similarly aim to protect job holders and seekers, not retirees.
Comparing Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 reinforces this reading. Title VII protects “employee[s], ”
§ 2000e(f ), without temporal qualifcation, sometimes covering former
employees. But where Title VII links “employee” to present-tense
verbs, it refers to current employees. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U. S. 337, 341, n. 2, 343. Similarly the ADA's “qualifed individual”
yoked to present-tense verbs suggests current job holders or seekers.
Court precedent supports this interpretation. In Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corporation, the Court noted that a plaintiff 's
assertion she is “ `unable to work' will appear to negate an essential
element of her ADA case,” anticipating that someone may fall outside
§ 12112(a)'s protections if she can “no longer do the job.” 526 U. S. 795,
799, 806. Pp. 51–55.
(b) Ms. Stanley argues that § 12112(a)'s “qualifed individual” require-
ment is a conditional mandate—applicable only if a plaintiff holds or
seeks a job. If neither, she contends, there are no “essential functions”
to perform, making every retiree automatically “qualifed.” The Court
rejects this conceivable-but-convoluted interpretation in favor of the or-
dinary one.
Ms. Stanley's surplusage argument—that the Court's reading renders
§ 12112(b)(5)(A)'s reference to “applicant or employee” meaningless—
also fails. That phrase may still serve a narrowing function, and “[t]he
canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.” Marx v. General
Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385.
Ms. Stanley argues that Title I's broad language allowing “any person
alleging discrimination” to sue makes the “qualifed individual” lan-
guage irrelevant. But the statute protects people, not benefts, from
discrimination—specifcally, qualifed individuals.
Fi na l ly, Ms. St anley i nvokes the ADA's pur pose of eradicati ng
disability-based discrimination. She argues this goal would be best
served by a judicial decision extending Title I's protections to retirees.
But “legislation [does not] pursu[e] its purposes at all costs,” Rodriguez
v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 525–526, and other laws may protect
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48 ST
ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
Syllabus
retirees from discrimination. If Congress wishes to extend Title I to
retirees,
it can do so. Pp. 55–59.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I
and II, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kava-
naugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III,
in which Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Bar-
rett, J., joined, post, p. 66. Sotomayor, J., fled an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, post, p. 74. Jackson, J., fled a dissenting
opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined as to Parts III and IV, except for
n. 12, post, p. 75.
Deepak Gupta argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Eric F. Citron, Robert Friedman, Jenni-
fer D. Bennett, Jessica Garland, and Patricia R. Sigman.
Frederick Liu argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging vacatur. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General
Clarke, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, Tovah R. Calde-
ron, Sydney A. R. Foster, Karla Gilbride, Jennifer S. Gold-
stein, Anne Noel Occhialino, and James M. Tucker.
Jessica C. Conner argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief were Douglas T. Noah and Patricia M.
Rego Chapman.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for AARP et al. by
Louis Lopez, William Alvarado Rivera, and Rebecca Rodgers; for the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
by Harold C. Becker and Matthew Ginsburg; for the Constitutional Ac-
countability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for the
Disability Rights Legal Center et al. by J. Carl Cecere; for the Georgia
Advocacy Offce et al. by Paul Koster; for the International Association of
Fire Fighters by John R. Mooney; and for Main Street Alliance by Brad-
ley Girard, Rachel L. Fried, Robin F. Thurston, and Sunu Chandy.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Center for
Workplace Compliance by Michael J. Eastman; for the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America by Michael E. Kenneally and
James D. Nelson; and for the Local Government Legal Center et al. by
Meaghan VerGow, Amanda Karras, and Erich Eiselt.
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Opinion of the Court
Justice Gorsuch announced the judgment of the Court
and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I and II, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which
Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan
join.
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act bars employ-
ers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualifed individual on
the basis of disability in regard to . . . compensation” and
other matters. 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a). The statute defnes a
“qualifed individual” as “an individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func-
tions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires.” § 12111(8). The question before us concerns
whether a retired employee who does not hold or seek a job
is a “qualifed individual.”
I
Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we
take as true the well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff 's com-
plaint, National Rife Association of America v. Vullo, 602
U. S. 175, 181 (2024), and do not consider evidence beyond
that pleading, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(d); Carter v. Stanton,
405 U. S. 669, 671 (1972) (per curiam). With those con-
straints in mind, we begin by setting out the facts as the
plaintiff, Karyn Stanley, has alleged them.
Ms. Stanley started working as a frefghter for the city of
Sanford, Florida (City), in 1999. At frst, she planned to
serve for 25 years. Complaint in No. 6:20–cv–00629 (MD
Fla.), ECF Doc. 1, ¶¶ 13, 16 (Complaint). Part of the reason
for that had to do with health insurance. At the time the
City hired her, it offered health insurance until age 65 for
two categories of retirees: those who retired with 25 years
of service, and those who retired earlier because of a disabil-
ity. Id., ¶ 19. In 2003, though, the City changed its policy.
Going forward, it said, it would continue to pay for health
insurance up to age 65 for retirees with 25 years of service.
Id., ¶¶ 20–21. But for those who retired earlier due to dis-
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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ability, the City announced, it would now provide health in-
surance
for just 24 months, unless the retiree started receiv-
ing Medicare benefts sooner. Id., ¶ 20. At some point
after the City revised its policy, Ms. Stanley's complaint does
not say when, she began to suffer from an unspecifed disabil-
ity. Id., ¶ 16. And, in 2018, that “disability forced her to
retire” earlier than she had planned. Ibid. Under the
City's revised policy, that meant she was entitled to at most
24 months of health insurance.
Based on these facts, Ms. Stanley brought suit claim-
ing that the City had violated the ADA and a number of
other state and federal laws. Providing different health-
insurance benefts to those who retire with 25 years of serv-
ice and those who retire earlier due to disability, she con-
tended, amounted to impermissible discrimination based on
disability. The City responded by fling a motion to dismiss
Ms. Stanley's complaint for failure to state a claim.
The district court denied that motion in part, allowing
some of Ms. Stanley's claims to proceed. But with respect
to her ADA claim, the district court saw things differently.
Ms. Stanley's complaint, the court observed, alleged that the
City had treated her worse than other similarly situated indi-
viduals because of her disability, App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a–
22a, what is known as a disparate-treatment claim, see Ray-
theon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U. S. 44, 53 (2003). To state
such a claim under the ADA, the court continued, § 12112(a)
required her to allege, among other things, facts suffcient to
show that she was a “qualifed individual” at the time of the
City's alleged discrimination. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a.
But in this case, the court reasoned, the discrimination Ms.
Stanley alleged—reduced healthcare benefts—did not take
place until after she retired. And by that point, she was not
a “qualifed individual” under the ADA because she was not
someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment posi-
tion that such individual holds or desires.” § 12111(8); see
App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a. As a result, the court held, it
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had no choice but to grant the City's motion to dismiss her
AD
A claim. Id., at 26a.
The Eleventh Circuit affrmed. It, too, concluded that
§ 12112(a) does not reach allegations of discrimination
against a retiree “who does not hold or desire to hold an
employment position” that she is capable of performing with
reasonable accommodation. 83 F. 4th 1333, 1337 (2023).
But, the court acknowledged, not every court of appeals
would agree. Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits have said that Title I's antidiscrimination
provision “does not protect people who neither held nor de-
sired a job with the defendant at the time of discrimination.”
Id., at 1341. But the Second and Third Circuits take a dif-
ferent view. As those courts see it, the ADA's defnition of
“qualifed individual” is “ambiguous,” and they have resolved
that ambiguity “in favor of ” extending the statute to reach
retirees like Ms. Stanley. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to resolve the circuits' disagreement
over whether § 12112(a) reaches discrimination against re-
tirees who neither hold nor desire a job whose essential
tasks they can perform with reasonable accommodation.
602 U. S. 1038 (2024).
II
A
The ADA contains fve titles separately addressing em-
ployment, public entities, public accommodations, telecom-
munications, and miscellaneous matters. 104 Stat. 327–328.
Ms. Stanley brought her suit under Title I, which speaks
to employment. Section 12112(a) provides Title I's general
liability rule for disability discrimination. It makes it un-
lawful for a covered employer to “discriminate against a
qualifed individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . .
compensation,” among other things.
The parties disagree about the meaning of this language,
but their dispute is a narrow one. They take as given that
retirement benefts, like those at issue here, qualify as “com-
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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pensation.” See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69,
77
(1984); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 682 (1983). For purposes of our re-
view, we may also assume that the City's revision to its
retirement-benefts plan constituted “discrimina[tion] . . . on
the basis of disability.” The only question that separates
the parties is whether § 12112(a) addresses discrimination
against retirees like Ms. Stanley. She (and two circuits)
think the answer is yes; the City (and several other circuits)
believe otherwise.
To resolve that disagreement, we turn, as we must, to the
statutory terms Congress has given us. Section 12112(a)
tells us that Title I prohibits discrimination against “quali-
fed individual[s].” And a qualifed individual, Title I contin-
ues, is someone “who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that [she] holds or desires.” § 12111(8).
From these directions, one clue emerges immediately.
“[T]o ascertain a statute's temporal reach,” this Court has
“frequently looked to Congress' choice of verb tense.” Carr
v. United States, 560 U. S. 438, 448 (2010). And here, Con-
gress has made it unlawful to “discriminate against” some-
one who “can perform the essential functions of ” the job she
“holds or desires.” Those present-tense verbs signal that
§ 12112(a) protects individuals who, with or without reason-
able accommodation, are able to do the job they hold or seek
at the time they suffer discrimination. Conversely, those
verbs tend to suggest that the statute does not reach retirees
who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an alleged
act of discrimination.
Reinforcing this assessment is the statute's defnition of
“reasonable accommodation.” Title I, recall, prohibits dis-
crimination against an individual who can perform essential
job functions “with or without reasonable accommodation.”
§ 12111(8); see § 12112(a). And a “reasonable accommoda-
tion,” the ADA provides, refers to things like “job restruc-
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turing,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,”
and
altering “training materials or policies.” § 12111(9).
Those kinds of accommodations make perfect sense when it
comes to current employees or applicants. But it is hard to
see how they might apply to retirees who do not hold or seek
a job.
Section 12112(b) conveys a similar message. That provi-
sion offers examples of what constitutes “ `discriminat[ion]
against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability.' ” So,
for instance, subsection (b)(6) defnes discrimination to in-
clude using certain “qualifcation standards, employment
tests or other selection criteria” unless they are “job-related
for the position in question.” Plainly, that mandate aims to
protect jobseekers. But it makes no sense in the context of
retirees who do not seek employment. The same goes for
subsection (b)(7), which requires that “tests concerning em-
ployment . . . accurately refect the skills” and “aptitude” of
an “employee or applicant.” It would be strange for em-
ployers to test the job skills of former employees who do not
plan to return to work. This pattern repeats itself through-
out § 12112(b), underscoring § 12112(a)'s focus on current and
prospective employees—not retirees.
Instructive, too, is the fact that another part of the statute
speaks differently. Where § 12112(a) prohibits certain acts
of employment discrimination against “a qualifed individual,”
§ 12203(a) prohibits retaliation against “any individual” who
opposes a discriminatory act. That Congress used different
language in these two provisions strongly suggests that it
meant for them to work differently. After all, when a docu-
ment uses a term in one place and a materially different term
in another, “ `the presumption is that the different term de-
notes a different idea.' ” Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon,
596 U. S. 450, 458 (2022) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012)).
Further evidence still comes from examining Title I of the
ADA in light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The two
st
atutes share much in common, not least the fact that they
both address employment discrimination. See Mount Lem-
mon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 586 U. S. 1, 4, n. 1 (2018). But the
statutes also bear differences we have found illuminating in
the past. See, e. g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,
Inc., 575 U. S. 768, 773 (2015). And one difference concerns
the class of people the statutes protect. Title VII protects
“employees,” § 2000e–3(a), a term that law defnes without
“any temporal qualifer,” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S.
337, 342 (1997). In keeping with that unqualifed term, Title
VII sometimes bars discrimination against former employ-
ees as well as current ones. Id., at 341. But elsewhere in
Title VII, context clarifes that “the term `employee' refers
unambiguously to a current employee.” Id., at 343. That
is true, for instance, where the statute links the term “em-
ployee” to present-tense verbs like work and has. Id., at
341, n. 2, 343. The upshot? Even if the ADA's reference
to a “qualifed individual,” like Title VII's reference to an
“employee,” might be read in isolation to encompass retirees,
once Congress yokes those kinds of terms to present-tense
verbs—such “holds,” “desires,” and “can perform”—that as-
sumption becomes considerably less plausible.
Beyond all this textual evidence lies our precedent. Con-
struing an earlier version of Title I in Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corp., this Court explained that “[a]n
ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a `qual-
ifed individual with a disability'—that is, a person `who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
sential functions' of her job.” 526 U. S. 795, 806 (1999) (quot-
ing 42 U. S. C. § 12111(8)). Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded, “a plaintiff's sworn assertion” that she is “ `unable to
work' will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA
case.” 526 U. S., at 806. In saying as much, the Court an-
ticipated the possibility that someone may fall outside the
protections of § 12112(a) if she can “ `no longer do the job.' ”
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Id., at 799; accord, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S.
555,
567 (1999).
1
B
Against this evidence of statutory meaning, Ms. Stanley
and the dissent offer several replies. They begin by sug-
gesting that we should interpret § 12112(a)'s “qualifed indi-
vidual” requirement as imposing only a “conditional man-
date.” Brief for Petitioner 28; post, at 87–88 (opinion of
Jackson, J.). As Ms. Stanley and the dissent see it, if a
plaintiff claims discrimination with respect to a job she seeks
or holds, then she must show that she is able to perform that
job's essential functions. Brief for Petitioner 28. But if the
plaintiff neither holds nor desires a job, the argument goes,
then she must make no such showing. In that case, the
plaintiff is necessarily a “qualifed individual,” because it is
impossible for someone to be unqualifed for a nonexistent
position. Id., at 40. Through this series of steps, we are
asked to conclude, every retiree is a “qualifed individual.”
As easy as it may be to imagine a statute like the one Ms.
Stanley and the dissent outline, it bears scant resemblance
to the one Congress enacted. Title I might have said, for
example, that a qualifed individual is one who “can perform
the essential functions of the employment position, if any,
that such individual holds or desires.” See Brief for Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae 9. But nothing like that italicized language appears
in § 12112(a). And even supposing Ms. Stanley's conditional-
mandate theory were a textually permissible way to under-
stand the statute, we do not usually pick a conceivable-but-
1
After Cleveland, Congress amended the ADA so that it no longer
requires a plaintiff to show that she was a qualifed individual “ `with a
disability' ” at the time of the defendant's discrimination. ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 3557 (emphasis added). But this
change in statutory directions does nothing to call into question Cleve-
land's insight that a plaintiff must plead and prove that she was a “quali-
fed individual” when the defendant's discrimination took place.
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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convoluted interpretation over the ordinary one. Wisconsin
C
entral Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. 274, 277 (2018); cf.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 15 (Ms. Stanley acknowledging that her
reading may “not [be] the most intuitive” one).
Separately, Ms. Stanley attempts a surplusage argument.
Brief for Petitioner 32–33, 46. She contends that our inter-
pretation of “qualifed individual” would render meaningless
part of § 12112(b)(5)(A), which defnes discrimination to in-
clude the failure to reasonably accommodate “an otherwise
qualifed individual with a disability who is an applicant
or employee.” (Emphasis added.) After all, Ms. Stanley
suggests, if every “qualifed individual” holds or desires a
job, then § 12112(b)(5)(A)'s reference to “applicant or em-
ployee” performs no real work. To avoid that outcome, she
submits, the class of qualifed individuals must include
retirees.
Diffculties attend this argument as well. To start, our
reading of “qualifed individual” may still leave work for
“applicant or employee” to perform in § 12112(b)(5)(A). It
might be, for example, that the phrase “applicant or em-
ployee” narrows the provision, so that it does not refer to a
“nonapplicant” who desires but does not apply for a job. Cf.
Davoll v. Webb, 194 F. 3d 1116, 1132 (CA10 1999); Daugherty
v. El Paso, 56 F. 3d 695, 699 (CA5 1995). But even if the
phrase “applicant or employee” is redundant, serving only
to underscore that § 12112(b)(5)(A) extends beyond existing
employees to those seeking work, “[t]he canon against sur-
plusage is not an absolute rule.” Marx v. General Revenue
Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385 (2013). And it certainly does not
require us to favor “an unusual meaning that will avoid sur-
plusage” over a more natural one. Scalia & Garner, Reading
Law, at 176.
Perhaps sensing that Title I's defnition of “qualifed indi-
vidual” goes against them, Ms. Stanley and the dissent next
effectively ask us to strike it from the statute. As they
point out, Title I allows “any person alleging discrimination
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on the basis of disability” to sue. § 12117(a). And a plaintiff
may
fle that suit whenever she “is affected by” discrimina-
tion. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Finally, such suits can challenge
discriminatory “compensation. ” § 12112(a); see Brief for
Petitioner 21. Putting this all together, Ms. Stanley and the
dissent reason, this case checks all the boxes: Ms. Stanley
is a “person” suing about discriminatory “compensation” that
“affected” her during retirement. And that is all Title I re-
quires—making “the `qualifed individual' language . . .
largely beside the point.” Id., at 21; see post, at 95–96 (opin-
ion of Jackson, J.).
This argument misapprehends the nature of Title I's pro-
tections. It may be that “retirement benefts are `compen-
sation' protected by the Act.” Brief for Petitioner 21. No
one before us disputes that point. But § 12112(a) does not
protect “compensation” as such. Instead, it bars employers
from “discriminat[ing] against a qualifed individual on the
basis of disability in regard to . . . compensation.” (Empha-
sis added.) In other words, the statute protects people, not
benefts, from discrimination. And the statute also tells us
who those people are: qualifed individuals, those who hold
or seek a job at the time of the defendant's alleged discrimi-
nation. § 12111(8). So rather than resolve anything, this
argument takes us right back to where we started.
2
Failing all else, Ms. Stanley and the dissent ask us to look
beyond text and precedent. Brief for Petitioner 29, 47; post,
at 92–93 (opinion of Jackson, J.). Finding “pure textualism”
insuffciently pliable to secure the result they seek, they in-
voke the statute's “primary purpose” and “legislative his-
2
Seeking to downplay § 12111(8)'s defnition of “qualifed individual” in
yet another way, the dissent suggests it does not “make any sense” to
think Congress used that “provision to moonlight as . . . a temporal re-
striction” on antidiscrimination protections. Post, at 90–91 (opinion of
Jackson, J.). But § 12111(8)'s express terms can hardly be so casually
dismissed. Their day job is to work together with § 12112(a) to defne the
reach of Title I's protections.
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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tory.” Post, at 75, 89–90, 96. As they see it, the ADA's goal
of
eradicating disability-based discrimination would be best
served by a decision extending Title I's protections beyond
those who hold or seek a job to retirees.
But this submission falters, too. For one thing, and as
this Court has “emphasized many times,” what Congress
(possibly) expected matters much less than what it (cer-
t ai nly) enac ted. Pa tel v. Garl and, 596 U. S. 328, 346
(2022). Nobody disputes the ADA's stated ambition to root
out “discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
§ 12101(b)(1). But it is “quite mistaken to assume . . . that
any interpretation of a law that does more to advance a stat-
ute's putative goal must be the law.” Luna Perez v. Sturgis
Public Schools, 598 U. S. 142, 150 (2023) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Legislation is, after all, the art of compro-
mise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms often the
price of passage, and no statute yet known pursues its stated
purpose at all costs.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA
Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). Accordingly, this Court has long recog-
nized that the “textual limitations upon a law's scope” must
be understood as “no less a part of its purpose than its sub-
stantive authorizations.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233,
252 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For another, we cannot say Title I's textual limitations
necessarily clash with the ADA's broader purposes. One
court of appeals, for example, has predicted that judicial in-
novations extending § 12112(a)'s protections to retirees might
“create perverse incentives” by encouraging employers to
reduce retirement healthcare benefts for people with disabil-
ities. Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Retirement Plan of
Pillsbury Co. and AFL-CIO-CLC, 268 F. 3d 456, 458 (CA7
2001). See how that dynamic might play out in this case.
The 24-month health-insurance beneft at issue here bridges
the typical gap between disability retirement and the start
of Medicare eligibility. Brief for Respondent 7 (citing 42
U. S. C. § 426(b)(2)(A)); see Becerra v. Empire Health Foun-
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dation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center, 597 U. S. 424,
428
(2022). Responding to a decision holding that § 12112(a)
addresses discrimination against retirees, the City might
simply delete any reference to disability from its retirement
policy to ensure that it contains no “disability-based distinc-
tion.” Complaint ¶30. The result? Anyone who served
25 years would get subsidized health insurance. Everyone
else, regardless of disability, would get nothing. Cf. App.
42–44.
Whether adopting Ms. Stanley's and the dissent's view of
the statute would encourage outcomes like that is anyone's
guess. But the possibility underscores why Congress's deci-
sion to limit the scope of Title I's antidiscrimination provi-
sion is not necessarily at war with the ADA's broader aims.
Nor, of course, do the law's present limitations preclude fu-
ture legislation from going further. If Congress wishes to
extend Title I to reach retirees like Ms. Stanley, it can. But
the decision whether to do so lies with that body, not this
one. See, e. g., National Pork Producers Council v. Ross,
598 U. S. 356, 382 (2023) (opinion of Gorsuch, J.).
For another thing yet, other avenues may exist for retirees
like Ms. Stanley to seek relief. As her own complaint sug-
gests (but the dissent neglects), a variety of other laws be-
sides Title I of the ADA may protect retirees from discrimi-
nation with respect to postemployment benefts. Complaint
¶1 (alleging claims under state law and the Rehabilitation
Act, and an equal protection claim under Rev. Stat. § 1979,
42 U. S. C. § 1983); see also Brief for Local Government Legal
Center et al. as Amici Curiae 13–14 (discussing state-law
remedies); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198
F. 3d 1104, 1112 (CA9 2000) (discussing other potential reme-
dies). As we discuss below, too, even Title I, with its “quali-
fed individual” limitation, may reach many claims involving
discrimination with respect to retirement benefts.
3
3
In a fnal line of attack, the dissent criticizes us for “reach[ing] out” to
decide whether the ADA addresses discrimination against retirees who
neither hold nor desire a job. Post, at 98–99 (opinion of Jackson, J.). But

60 ST
ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
Opinion of Gorsuch, J.
III
W
e took this case to resolve a circuit split over whether a
retired employee who does not hold or seek a job is a “quali-
fed individual” under Title I. In her merits briefng, Ms.
Stanley invites us to address not just that question but an-
other one, too. Even if § 12112(a) protects only those who
hold or seek a job when a challenged act of discrimination
occurs, she says, we should decide whether her complaint
satisfes that standard. The government, as amicus, joins
in this request. See Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 26–28. Ordinarily, of course, this Court rejects at-
tempts to inject “an entirely new question at the merits
stage.” Post, at 71 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment). But we fnd it proftable to make an
exception in this case, for while taking up Ms. Stanley's addi-
tional question reveals some problems with her pleading, it
also highlights how Title I might provide relief for retirees
like her.
In addressing this additional question, we take as given
the Court's holding above that a plaintiff pursuing a claim
under § 12112(a) must plead and prove that she held or
here is the truth of it. Ms. Stanley petitioned this Court for certiorari,
asking us to resolve a “long-running ” circuit split concerning whether an
individual who “no longer holds or seeks to hold” a job may sue under the
Title I “for discrimination that harms her post-employment.” Pet. for
Cert. 15. After we granted her petition, Ms. Stanley renewed her argu-
ment that she had suffered actionable postemployment discrimination.
Brief for Petitioner 24, 47. The City disagreed. Brief for Respondent
27–36. There is nothing remarkable about this Court resolving that dis-
pute and the question presented. To be sure, after we granted review,
Ms. Stanley's merits briefs sought to inject an additional issue into the
case, now arguing that she also suffered discrimination “while she was
still employed.” Post, at 66 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment). But to suggest that the case before us does not in-
volve a postemployment discrimination, and that the Court “reaches out”
to issue an “ `advisory opinio[n]' ” on the subject, ignores both why we took
this case and the arguments of the parties before us. Post, at 76, 84, 98–
99 (opinion of Jackson, J.).
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sought a job when the defendant discriminated against her
on
the basis of disability. We take as given, too, that unlaw-
ful discrimination can take place at any one of three points
in time: When a defendant “adopt[s]” a “discriminatory . . .
practice,” when an individual “is affected by application of a
discriminatory . . . practice,” or when she “becomes subject
to” such a practice. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). With all that in
mind, we turn to consider whether Ms. Stanley's pleading
states a claim.
Start with the frst option. Unlawful discrimination oc-
curs “when a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice is adopted.” § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Here, Ms. Stanley
alleges that happened in 2003, when the City revised its
health-insurance policy for employees who retire because of
disability. Complaint ¶¶ 20–21. At that point, her allega-
tions show, she was a “qualifed individual,” working as a
frefghter and able to perform the job's essential functions.
See id., ¶¶ 13–15.
The trouble for Ms. Stanley is that § 12112(a) does not pro-
hibit disability-based discrimination in the abstract. In-
stead, it bars an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a
qualifed individual on the basis of disability.” (Emphasis
added.) “ `Discriminate against' means treat worse,” Muld-
row v. St. Louis, 601 U. S. 346, 355 (2024), and “refers to
distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected
individuals,” Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S.
53, 59 (2006). And Ms. Stanley's complaint provides no basis
for inferring that the City's policy injured her in 2003. To
the contrary, her complaint suggests that, when the City frst
issued its policy, she was not disabled and still expected to
complete 25 years of service. See Complaint ¶ 15; see also
Brief for Appellant in No. 22–10002 (CA11), p. 22, n. 5 (Ms.
Stanley representing that she was “unaffected by” the City's
actions as of 2003). So the frst option is off the table for
Ms. Stanley. Even so, it may be available to others who hap-
pen to be retired at the time they sue, if they can plead and
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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prove they were both disabled and “qualifed” when their
e
mployer adopted a discr iminatory retirement-benefits
policy.
4
Turn next to the second option. Unlawful discrimination
also occurs “when an individual is affected by application of
a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.”
§ 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). Ms. Stanley alleges that happened to
her in 2020, when her subsidized health insurance ran out.
Complaint ¶ 26; see also Brief for Petitioner 24 (Ms. Stanley
was “ `affected by application of ' the policy” in “2020 when
. . . she was denied the health care subsidy”); 83 F. 4th, at
1343. By then, however, she had been retired for two years,
could not satisfy the “requirements of ” her job, and was not
seeking employment. Complaint ¶ 16. So this option, too,
cannot help Ms. Stanley. But, once more, it might help oth-
ers who can show that they were affected by a policy change
while they were “qualifed individuals,” even if they happen
to be retired by the time they bring suit.
Now turn to the third option. Unlawful discrimination
takes place when “an individual becomes subject to a dis-
cr i mi natory compensati on decisi on or other prac tice. ”
§ 2000e–5(e)(3)(A). This option might be especially promis-
ing for plaintiffs in Ms. Stanley's shoes. But, for reasons
that take a little unpacking, it cannot form a basis for revers-
ing the Eleventh Circuit's judgment in this particular case.
4
To be clear, not every Title I plaintiff must plead and prove she had
a disability when she suffered discrimination. As we have seen, § 12112(a)
in its present form prohibits discrimination “against a qualifed individual
on the basis of disability.” (Emphasis added.) That provision does not
require a qualifed individual to be disabled. So, for instance, Title I de-
fnes discrimination “on the basis of disability” to include associational
discrimination—that is, discriminating against a qualifed individual “be-
cause of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualifed
individual is known to have a relationship or association.” § 12112(b)(4).
In such cases, it does not matter whether the qualifed individual also
happened to have a disability. The diffculty for Ms. Stanley, however, is
that her complaint does not allege anything along those lines either.
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Recall that Ms. Stanley's complaint does not allege what
her
disability is or when it emerged. As it happens, those
facts came out later, after the district court dismissed her
ADA claim, and after the parties proceeded to discovery and
summary judgment on the remaining counts of her com-
plaint. From this later-developed record, it appears that
Ms. Stanley was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease in 2016.
83 F. 4th, at 1336.
The government argues that these later-developed facts
are suffcient to state a claim. After all, during the 2-year
period between her diagnosis in 2016 and her retirement in
2018, Ms. Stanley was both “an individual with a disability”
and a “qualifed individual” who “could still perform the es-
sential functions of her job.” Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 26–27. During that critical window, too, the
government submits, Ms. Stanley was “subject to” an “alleg-
edly discriminatory benefts policy” that reduced her future
retirement compensation. Id., at 26; see also Brief for Peti-
tioner 25–26; post, at 79–80 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
As promising as that theory may be, however, a number
of case-specifc problems prevent it from helping Ms. Stanley
here. For starters, because this dispute comes to us on a
motion to dismiss, we cannot look beyond the pleadings.
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(d). And her complaint says
nothing about the timing or nature of her diagnosis, nor does
it allege that she worked for any period of time with a dis-
ability. To be sure, a court might, with a little more, draw
a “plausible inference” that Ms. Stanley suffered discrimina-
tion between 2016 and 2018. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S.
662, 682 (2009). So, for instance, if she had alleged that she
developed Parkinson's disease before 2018, or that she
worked for any period with some disability, then her case
could likely proceed. But the complaint before us does not
contain any of those facts.
Even assuming we could overcome that problem, we would
only face another. The Eleventh Circuit held that Ms. Stan-
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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ley had affrmatively disavowed the government's theory.
F
or support, the court pointed to Ms. Stanley's representa-
tion in her brief below that she did “not claim she was im-
pacted by the discriminatory” City policy “during her em-
ployment.” Brief for Appellant in No. 22–10002, at 22. To
be sure, at oral argument Ms. Stanley told the court of ap-
peals otherwise. Recording of Oral Arg. in No. 22–10002
(CA11, Aug. 24, 2023), at 2:45–2:58. And she attempted to
adopt an amicus brief the government submitted to the
Eleventh Circuit, advancing a theory much like the one it
presses here. See Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae in No. 22–10002 (CA11), pp. 11–12. But applying its
own rules of argument preservation, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to pass on the government's theory because Ms.
Stanley had not presented it to the district court and had
“specifcally disclaimed” it in her “own brief ” on appeal. 83
F. 4th, at 1344.
5
Complicating matters further yet, Ms. Stanley has not ex-
pressly asked us to address the Eleventh Circuit's preserva-
tion rules. Nor has she asked us to reconsider our own gen-
eral practice of allowing the courts of appeals to determine
for themselves what arguments they deem properly before
them. See, e. g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471,
487 (2008); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 121 (1976); cf.
Retirement Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 589 U. S. 49, 52–
53 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court of Appeals
may of course determine that under its usual rules of waiver
or forfeiture, it will not consider those arguments”). So
even if Ms. Stanley's complaint contained suffcient facts to
5
While Ms. Stanley disclaimed being “impacted” by the City's policy
during her employment, Justice Jackson believes that Ms. Stanley some-
how still preserved the government's theory that she was “subject to”
discrimination before she retired. Post, at 80–81. The Eleventh Circuit,
however, did not see it that way. Nor does the dissent explain how, con-
sistent with Article III, an individual can challenge a policy that she is
“subject to” but that does not injure (or “impact”) her. See Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 25, n. 5 (acknowledging the injury
requirement).
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sustain the theory the government now advances, and even
i
f she had preserved that theory below, we would still face
serious obstacles to reaching it.
In saying as much, we stress that nothing we say today
prevents future plaintiffs—or perhaps even Ms. Stanley her-
self in a future proceeding—from pursuing a theory along
the lines the government proposes. It is simply that the
theory cannot help Ms. Stanley in the present posture of
this case.
6
*
To sum up, we hold that, to prevail under § 12112(a), a
plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job,
and could perform its essential functions with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged
act of disability-based discrimination. A variety of suits in-
volving retirement benefts might well proceed under that
rule. But, given how this particular case comes to us, we
cannot say that the court of appeals erred in upholding the
dismissal of Ms. Stanley's complaint. The judgment of the
Eleventh Circuit is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
6
One Member of the Court suggests that the government's theory can
save Ms. Stanley's complaint because it “supplies the answer” to this
case. Post, at 79 (Jackson, J., dissenting). But to proceed as Justice
Jackson suggests, we would have to abandon our precedents generally
entrusting questions of issue and argument preservation to the courts of
appeals. We would have to overrule the Eleventh Circuit's waiver ruling
without an express invitation to do so. See post, at 75 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And we would have to fault
the Eleventh Circuit for failing to consider facts outside the pleading
before it. All to address a question that no court passed on below and
that we did not take this case to resolve. The dissent may be willing
to blow past all those complications to reach its chosen destination. But
we do not see how we might. Indeed, we have already gone out of our
way—too far, some of our colleagues would say, see post, at 71–73 (opin-
ion of Thomas, J.)—to address Ms. Stanley's late-raised argument in
order to help future plaintiffs understand how they might avoid her
missteps.

66 ST
ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
Opinion of Thomas, J.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Barrett joins,
concurr
ing in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I write sepa-
rately to express my concern with the increasingly common
practice of litigants urging this Court to grant certiorari to
resolve one question, and then, after we do so, pivoting to an
entirely different question. This case exemplifes the prob-
lem. We granted review to resolve a Circuit split regarding
whether the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) permits
suits by former employees who are no longer able to perform
the essential functions of their jobs at the time of the alleged
discrimination. For the frst time at the merits stage, peti-
tioner Karyn Stanley urged us to decide a different question:
whether Stanley could sue based on discrimination that oc-
curred while she was still employed and able to work. But,
that theory of liability was not passed upon below because
the Eleventh Circuit determined that Stanley had disavowed
it, and Stanley did not seek review of the Eleventh Circuit's
issue-preservation ruling. We ordinarily respect a lower
court's application of its own preservation rules. I therefore
would not opine on the additional question that Stanley
raised for the frst time in earnest at the merits stage.
I
The ADA proh ibits employers from discr i mi nati ng
“against a qualifed individual on the basis of disability in
regard to [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment.” 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a). The statute defnes a “ `qual-
ifed individual' ” as someone who, “with or without reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds or de-
sires.” § 12111(8).
Stanley began working as a frefghter for the city of San-
ford, Florida (City), in 1999. In 2016, Stanley was diagnosed
with Parkinson's disease. And, in 2018, after 19 years of
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service, that “disability forced her to retire” early. Com-
plai
nt in No. 6:20–cv–00629 (MD Fla.), ECF Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 16.
When she retired, Stanley expected to continue receiving the
City's health insurance subsidy until she turned 65. At the
time of her hiring, the City's policy had been to pay a subsidy
until age 65 to employees who retired after 25 years of
service, as well as to employees who retired early because
of disability. But, unbeknownst to Stanley, the City had
changed its policy in 2003. Starting in 2003, the City paid
the full subsidy for retirees with 25 years of service, but for
those who retired earlier due to disability, it provided the
subsidy for a maximum of 24 months.
Stanley sued the City, alleging discrimination under the
ADA. The District Court understood Stanley to have al-
leged harm caused by discrimination that occurred after her
retirement. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a–25a. In ruling on
the City's motion to dismiss, the District Court explained
that to recover under the ADA, an individual must be a
“qualifed individual” at the time of the alleged discrimina-
tion. Id., at 24a. The District Court determined that Stan-
ley was not a “qualifed individual” after her retirement be-
cause she was not someone who could, “with or without
reasonable accommodation,” “perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or de-
sires.” § 12111(8); see id., at 26a. Accordingly, the District
Court dismissed her claim. The Eleventh Circuit affrmed,
reasoning that the ADA “does not protect people who nei-
ther held nor desired a job with the defendant at the time of
discrimination.” 83 F. 4th 1333, 1341 (2023).
In her petition for a writ of certiorari before this Court,
Stanley asked us to resolve an “important and recurring
question”: whether an individual who no longer “ `holds or
desires' ” his job may sue under Title I of the ADA for dis-
crimination with respect to the “ `post-employment distribu-
tion of fringe benefts.' ” Pet. for Cert. 1. In other words,
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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Stanley asked us to decide whether former employees who
suffer
postemployment discrimination can sue under the
ADA. Id., at 15.
Stanley mentioned over two dozen times in her petition
that this question has divided the courts of appeals. In two
Circuits, Stanley explained, a plaintiff need not be a “quali-
fed individual”—that is, someone who “holds or desires” the
employment position at issue—at the time of the alleged dis-
crimination. Id., at 16–18; § 12111(8). In four other Cir-
cuits, however, a plaintiff “must be a qualifed individual at
the time that one is discriminated against to have the right
to sue under the ADA.” Id., at 18–20 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Stanley emphasized that this Circuit split
was “dispositive” in her case, as her suit was “stymied by the
Eleventh Circuit's determination that she wasn't a `qualifed
individual' at the time of the discrimination.” Id., at 3 (em-
phasis added). Stanley described the Circuit split as “ `in-
tractable,' ” “deep,” “well-recognized,” and “persistent.”
Id., at 15, 21. She also conveyed a sense of urgency, tell-
ing us that the Circuit split is “growing,” and unlikely to be
resolved without “this Court's intervention.” Id., at 21.
Stanley's emphasis on the Circuit split was understand-
able, as it is no secret that Circuit splits get our attention.
See this Court's Rule 10(a) (conveying that one of our leading
considerations in deciding whether to grant certiorari is
whether “a United States court of appeals has entered a deci-
sion” that conficts with “the decision of another United
States court of appeals”); see also S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T.
Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Prac-
tice § 4.4, p. 4–11 (11th ed. 2019) (“The Supreme Court often
. . . will grant certiorari where the decision of a federal court
of appeals . . . is in direct confict with a decision of another
court of appeals on the same matter of federal law” (empha-
sis deleted)).
Stanley also emphasized in her petition that the question
dividing the courts of appeals is one of “obvious importance.”
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Pet. for Cert. 33. She conveyed that “[t]he circuit split mat-
ters
for the forty-four million Americans with disabilities
whose rights under the ADA, until the split is resolved, may
depend on their employers' zip codes.” Id., at 30. “[T]he
persistence of the circuit split,” she told us, “means that dis-
abled former employees only in certain parts of the country
can vindicate their rights under the ADA.” Id., at 30–31.
Stanley further assured us that this case would be a good
one for resolving the Circuit split. She told us that her case
“cleanly tees the issue up for this Court's resolution as a pure
question of law with no relevant factual disputes.” Id., at 3.
She reiterated that point in her reply brief at the certiorari
stage, telling us that “[t]his case is a clean vehicle with no
impediments” to settling the Circuit confict once and for all.
Reply to Brief in Opposition 6.
We granted certiorari, adopting the question presented as
framed by Stanley.
1
602 U. S. 1038 (2024). I understood us
to have taken the case to resolve the question that the “cir-
cuits are split over”—that is, whether the ADA permits suits
by former employees who no longer hold or desire their job
at the time the defendant engages in a discriminatory act.
Pet. for Cert. 15 (boldface deleted); § 12111(8). The Elev-
enth Circuit's position on that question was the basis for its
ruling against Stanley below, see 83 F. 4th, at 1341, and Stan-
ley had asked us to take this case to resolve precisely that
question.
But, something changed after this Court granted certio-
rari. In her opening brief on the merits, Stanley told us
that we “need not even reach the court of appeals' erroneous
holding that the [ADA] only prohibits discrimination against
people who currently `hol[d] or desir[e]' a job.” Brief for
1
The question presented reads in full: “Under the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, does a former employee—who was qualifed to perform her
job and who earned post-employment benefts while employed—lose her
right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefts solely be-
cause she no longer holds her job?” Pet. for Cert. i.

70 ST
ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
Opinion of Thomas, J.
Petitioner 17. In other words, according to Stanley, we
need
not resolve the issue that the District Court and the
Eleventh Circuit had decided. Instead, Stanley urged, we
should decide a materially different question: whether Stan-
ley could base her ADA claim on discrimination that alleg-
edly occurred while she was still employed by the City.
Specifcally, Stanley contends that she suffered discrimina-
tion at some point after she was diagnosed with Parkinson's
disease in 2016 but before she retired in 2018. Because
Stanley held and desired to hold her job during this period,
all agree that she was a “ `qualifed individual' ” for at least
some portion of that time. § 12111(8).
The Eleventh Circuit did not opine on the merits of this
theory because it determined that Stanley had expressly dis-
avowed it in her brief before that court. 83 F. 4th, at 1344
(explaining that Stanley “affrmatively conceded” in her ini-
tial brief that she did not suffer discrimination at any point
“ `during her employment' ”). The court acknowledged that
Stanley had attempted to raise this theory at oral argument.
Id., at 1343. And, the court acknowledged that the United
States had raised this theory in its brief as amicus curiae,
and that Stanley had attempted to adopt that amicus argu-
ment. Id., at 1344. But, applying its issue-preservation
rules, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Stanley had not
properly presented this alternative theory. Id., at 1343–
1344.
For the frst time in her opening merits brief before this
Court, Stanley asked us to reconsider the Eleventh Circuit's
application of its rules. She argued that “[n]othing supports
the assertion” that she conceded her alternative theory
below. Brief for Petitioner 24. In her view, she “repeat-
edly argued” in her Eleventh Circuit brief that she suffered
discrimination while employed by the City. Id., at 24–25.
2
2
Appearing as amicus curiae in support of Stanley, the United States
endorsed Stanley's new approach to this case. Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 26–28. Like Stanley, the United States took issue with
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As I see it, Stanley's conduct amounts to a bait-and-switch.
She
urged this Court to grant certiorari to resolve a Circuit
split on one specifc legal question. After we agreed to re-
solve that question, she redirected us to a materially differ-
ent question. Ante, at 60 (plurality opinion) (acknowledging
that “[w]e took this case to resolve a circuit split,” but Stan-
ley invites us to address “another” question).
II
I do not join Part III of the Court's opinion because I
would not opine on the merits of a new theory that Stanley
did not develop at the certiorari stage.
Redirecting this Court's focus to an entirely new question
at the merits stage is diffcult to square with this Court's
Rules. Our Rule 14.1 requires a petitioner to set forth the
questions it would like this Court to decide in the petition
for a writ of certiorari. “Only the questions set out in the
petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the
Court.” Rule 14.1(a). Thus, our rules prevent us from
reaching any question that is not “ `fairly included' ” in the
question presented. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki
Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27, 31 (1993) (per
curiam).
3
Redirecting our focus to a different question is also highly
disruptive to our deliberative process, as it often leads to a
the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that Stanley had “ `disclaimed' ” her al-
ternative theory of liability below. Id., at 27. And, like Stanley, the
United States urged us to focus on Stanley's new theory of liability, rather
than the one the Eleventh Circuit addressed. Id., at 28–29.
3
To be sure, when read in isolation, the question presented on page i of
Stanley's petition might be read to include the question whether Stanley
could base an ADA claim on discrimination that allegedly occurred while
she was still employed. But, when read in the context of the petition as
a whole, it is clear that Stanley was asking us to resolve the Circuit split
she repeatedly identifed: whether an employee who is no longer a “quali-
fed individual” under the ADA may sue for “discrimination that harms
her post-employment.” Pet. for Cert. 15 (emphasis added).
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lack of adversarial briefng. We take seriously the need for
adversar
ial briefng. For example, when no party defends
the judgment below, we ordinarily appoint counsel to offer
argument and briefng in support of that judgment. E. g.,
Martin v. United States, 605 U. S. 395 (2025). The absence
of briefng on the legal issue before us may complicate or
even thwart our efforts to resolve it. See, e. g., City and
County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600, 610
(2015) (dismissing a question presented as improvidently
granted in part due to a lack of “adversarial briefng ”).
Moreover, redirecting our focus to a different question has
the effect of undermining this Court's efforts to manage its
merits docket. We receive thousands of petitions each year,
and the vast majority of those petitions raise issues of deep
importance to the parties involved in those cases. “To use
our resources most effciently,” we must confne our review
to “those cases that will enable us to resolve particularly
important questions.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 536
(1992); accord, U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S., at 33. If we
were “to entertain questions not presented in the petition
for certiorari, much of this effciency would vanish, as parties
who feared an inability to prevail on the question presented
would be encouraged to fll their limited briefng space and
argument time with discussion of issues other than the one
on which certiorari was granted.” Yee, 503 U. S., at 536.
We have reached issues outside the question presented
“ `only in the most exceptional cases,' ” when required by con-
siderations of “urgency” or “economy.” Id., at 535. I do
not object to going beyond the question presented in such
circumstances. But, there is nothing exceptional about
Stanley's case. To start, had she been more transparent at
the certiorari stage, I doubt this Court would have granted
review of her alternative question. See this Court's Rule
10. Stanley's new theory of liability is that she can base her
ADA claim on discrimination that allegedly occurred while
she was still employed by the City. To address that theory,
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however, we would frst need to decide whether the Eleventh
Circuit
erroneously applied its own issue-preservation rules
and erred in concluding that Stanley had disclaimed this the-
ory below. Stanley did not petition for review of the Elev-
enth Circuit's issue-preservation determination. And, I
doubt that we would have agreed to review the factbound
application of uncontested Eleventh Circuit precedents. “A
petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual fndings or the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” Ibid.
Even if this Court were willing to bypass the Eleventh
Circuit's issue-preservation determination, it is unlikely that
we would have agreed to opine on the merits of Stanley's
alternative theory in the frst instance. Neither the District
Court nor the Eleventh Circuit passed on whether Stanley
could base her claim on events that occurred while she was
still employed. That no court has decided this question is
reason enough for us to decline to do so. We are “a court of
review, not of frst view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S.
709, 718, n. 7 (2005). We thus ordinarily wait to see if “the
crucible of adversarial testing . . . , along with the experience
of our thoughtful colleagues on the district and circuit
benches, [can] yield insights (or reveal pitfalls) we cannot
muster guided only by our own lights.” Maslenjak v.
United States, 582 U. S. 335, 354 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment).
In all events, our usual practice is to respect and leave
undisturbed a lower court's issue-preservation determination
when that determination is not itself under review. Single-
ton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 121 (1976). I see no reason to
depart from that practice here.
***
Stanley asked this Court to grant certiorari to resolve a
discrete Circuit split. After we agreed to do so, she asked
us to resolve an entirely different legal question. I do not
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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fnd it “proftable” to reward Stanley's bait-and-switch in
these
circumstances. Ante, at 60 (plurality opinion).
I encourage litigants before this Court to remain focused
on the questions presented in the petition for a writ of certio-
rari—and only those questions—after this Court grants cer-
tiorari. Redirecting us to a different legal question at the
merits stage can be disruptive, ineffcient, and unfair to all
involved. Of course, Stanley is not the frst litigant to resist
the question presented before this Court. I hope, however,
that this Court and future parties will take seriously the
obligation to adhere to the question presented.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join Parts III and IV, except footnote 12, of the dissent
because, in my view, Title I's prohibition on disability dis-
crimination does not cease the day an employee retires. As
Justice Jackson explains, when an employer makes a dis-
criminatory change in postemployment benefts that a re-
tiree earned while qualifed and employed, the employer dis-
criminates against the person in her capacity as a qualifed
individual. See post, at 95–96; Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 29–32. Because the Court eschews that
common-sense understanding of the statutory text, I also re-
spectfully dissent in part.
Notwithstanding the Court's error on that question, at
least fve Justices (four in the plurality and Justice Jackson
in dissent) agree that plaintiffs in Lt. Stanley's shoes can
plead disability discrimination if they were “ `subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice' ”
while a qualifed individual within the majority's understand-
ing of that term. See ante, at 62 (plurality opinion); see post,
at 79–80, and n. 4 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Stanley and those in her “ `shoes' ” could recover because,
“[b]efore retiring, Lt. Stanley had a disability, was a qualifed
individual who performed the essential functions of her job
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despite that disability, and was subjected to an allegedly dis-
cr
iminatory policy based on her disability”). That remains
true even if the employee does not fle her lawsuit until after
she retires, as long as she was subject to a discriminatory
policy while both disabled and a qualifed individual. See
Brief for Respondent 30 (agreeing that a former employee
need not be a “ `qualifed individual' at the time of the
lawsuit”).
There is good reason to think that Stanley herself was sub-
ject to the allegedly discriminatory policy at issue here while
she was both disabled and employed. See ante, at 63 (plu-
rality opinion); post, at 79–80 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Yet
I ultimately agree with the plurality that this theory “cannot
form a basis for reversing the Eleventh Circuit's judgment in
this particular case,” ante, at 62, especially because Stanley
herself did not ask this Court to review the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's holding that she had forfeited this theory before that
court, ante, at 64–65 (plurality opinion). Because Part III
nevertheless makes clear that Title I may well provide relief
for retirees like Stanley, I join that portion of Justice Gor-
such's opinion.
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins
as to Parts III and IV, except for footnote 12, dissenting.
Retirement benefts are essential building blocks of the
American Dream. Workers typically earn these benefts on
the job and reap the rewards after leaving the workforce.
Congress has long understood that, by enabling workers to
retire with dignity, independence, and security, retirement
benefts are a critical aspect of job-related compensation.
Thus, no one seriously disputes that the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 42 U. S. C. § 12101
et seq., prohibits disability discrimination with respect to re-
tirement benefts. Unfortunately, however, by viewing this
case through the distorted lens of pure textualism, the Court
misperceives those protections today.

76 ST
ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
Jackson, J., dissenting
As I understand today's holding, the Court has decided
that
if a worker who has earned retirement benefts leaves
the workforce (as expec ted) and is then discr i mi nated
against with respect to the provision of those earned benefts
because she is disabled, Title I offers no protection. To get
to this counterintuitive conclusion, the Court relies on Title
I's “qualifed individual” defnition—a provision designed to
protect employers from having to employ those who cannot
do the work, not to cut off the rights of those who already
fnished it. Making matters worse, the Court has to extend
itself to reach this stingy outcome, because the case before
us does not present a scenario involving discrimination that
took place only postemployment.
In short, the Court overlooks both the actual facts pre-
sented in this case and the clear design of the ADA to render
a ruling that plainly counteracts what Congress meant to—
and did—accomplish. I respectfully dissent.
I
Congress passed and President George H. W. Bush
signed the ADA into law 35 years ago. This landmark legis-
lation's overarching aim was “to assure equality of opportu-
nity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
suffciency” for the millions of Americans with disabilities.
§ 12101(a)(7). Thus, Congress designed the ADA as a
“comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of ”
disability discrimination that would “provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination”
against disabled Americans. §§ 12101(b)(1), (2).
Title I of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in
the employment context. It protects against disability dis-
crimination with respect to the provision of, among other
things, “fringe benefts,” “employee compensation,” and
“other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”
§§ 12112(a), (b)(2). Section 12112(a) sets forth Title I's gen-
eral prohibition, which states: “No covered entity shall dis-
criminate against a qualifed individual on the basis of dis-
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ability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compen-
sation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment.” Section 12112(b) then provides spe-
cifc examples of discrimination that Title I prohibits.
As the ADA made its way through Congress, employers
worried that the bill would require them to hire and retain
individuals who—even with reasonable accommodations—
cou ld not satisfy a job's demands. T itle I's qua l i fied-
individual provision was Congress's response to that con-
cer n. See H. R. Rep. No. 101– 485, pt. 2, p. 55 (1990).
Borrowing similar language from § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 29 U. S. C. § 794, Congress inserted
the “qualifed individual” phrase into Title I's general prohi-
bition, and it elsewhere defned a “qualifed individual” as
one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.” § 12111(8). The
point of inserting this defnition and relying on it in the ADA
was simply and solely “to reaffrm that [Title I] does not
undermine an employer's ability to choose and maintain qual-
ifed workers.” H. R. Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, at 55.
Today, however, the Cour t t akes T itle I's qua l i fied-
individual defnition out of context and assigns it an addi-
tional function: to act as a strict temporal limit on the reach
of Title I's protections. That is, the Court reads the
qualifed-individual provision to mean that only those who
hold or desire a job when alleged discrimination occurs can
claim Title I's protection. See ante, at 65. It is on that
ground that the Court concludes that Lt. Karyn Stanley—a
now-retired frefghter suffering from Parkinson's disease—
cannot make out a Title I claim against her former employer
for (assumed) disability discrimination relating to retirement
benefts that she earned in the line of duty.
In my view, for the reasons explained below, the Court is
wrong twice over. It should not have used this case to make
any pronouncements about the viability of a Title I discrimi-
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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nation claim that arises after an employee retires. And it
misreads
Title I to introduce a time-related limitation that
appears nowhere in the statute Congress wrote.
II
A
Because this case arises from a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of Lt. Stanley's complaint, we are
required to “accept as true all the factual allegations in h[er]
complaint.” Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. 357, 360, n. 1 (2017).
We must also assess Lt. Stanley's complaint “as a whole,”
credit all “plausibl[e]” allegations, and “draw reasonable in-
ferences” in her favor. National Rife Association of
America v. Vullo, 602 U. S. 175, 194 (2024).
Like the majority, I will start by assuming that what Lt.
Stanley alleges to be discriminatory conduct by the city of
Sanford, Florida (City), in fact violated the ADA. Ante, at
52. Doing so, what follows are the facts.
Lt. Stanley was employed as a frefghter by the Sanford
Fire Rescue Department for just shy of two decades. Com-
plaint in No. 6:20–cv–00629 (MD Fla.), ECF Doc. 1, p. 2, ¶ 4.
She started in 1999 and was promoted to Lieutenant in 2005.
Id., at 3, ¶¶ 13–15. Lt. Stanley remained continuously em-
ployed in that position until November 2018, when she was
forced to take disability retirement due to her physical dis-
ability. Ibid., ¶ 16.
1
Notably, while Lt. Stanley was still employed, the City
changed its disability-retirement policy. At the time Lt.
Stanley was hired, the City's policy was to pay for disabled
retirees' health insurance until retirees turned 65 years old.
Id., at 4, ¶ 19. In 2003, the City changed that policy to offer
1
Although not alleged in Lt. Stanley's complaint, the summary-
judgment record on her non-ADA claims refects that she was diag-
nosed with Parkinson's disease in 2016. See 83 F. 4th 1333, 1336 (CA11
2023).
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a maximum of 24 months of healthcare coverage for disabled
retirees.
Ibid., ¶ 20. This change meant that Lt. Stanley
was subject to the new policy from 2003 onward, including
the period from when she became disabled (while she was
still employed) until she retired. Ibid.
Lt. Stanley's complaint alleges that the City's “taking
away” of the prior disability-insurance policy denied disabled
retirees like her “equal access to health insurance.” Id., at
8, ¶ 37. She further alleges that the new 24-month coverage
policy violates the ADA in and of itself. Ibid. All agree
that, under the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 123 Stat. 5, an
unlawful employment practice occurs when a plaintiff “be-
comes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A).
2
Based on the facts Lt. Stanley alleges, the Fair Pay Act
framework supplies the answer to the question presented in
this case.
3
Before retiring, Lt. Stanley had a disability, was
a qualifed individual who performed the essential functions
of her job despite that disability, and was subject to an alleg-
edly discriminatory policy based on her disability, insofar as
the City changed its retirement-benefts package in a manner
that disadvantaged disabled retirees. See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 26–27. Thus, it made no sense for
the City to argue for dismissal of Lt. Stanley's ADA claim
(as it did) on the ground that she was not a qualifed individ-
ual at the relevant time.
On the facts as alleged in her complaint, the City subjected
Lt. Stanley to the discriminatory policy during her employ-
2
“[A]n unlawful employment practice” also occurs under the Fair Pay
Act “when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is
adopted” or “when an individual is affected” by it. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–
5(e)(3)(A).
3
That question is: “Under the [ADA], does a former employee—who was
qualifed to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefts
while employed—lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect
to those benefts solely because she no longer holds her job? ” Pet. for
Cert. i.
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ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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ment, not only after she retired.
4
So
, Lt. Stanley was per-
forming the essential functions of her job at the preretire-
ment point at which she became disabled and was subjected
to the new policy. This made her a qualifed individual, not-
withstanding the City's counterfactual contention.
B
1
The Court has decided not to resolve this case on that
straightforward ground. A plurality of the Court says, in-
stead, that “case-specifc problems prevent [those facts] from
helping [Lt.] Stanley here.” Ante, at 63. Even setting
aside the plurality's failure to accept Lt. Stanley's plausible
factual allegations and to draw reasonable inferences in her
favor, I disagree with its analysis of the “case-specifc prob-
lems.” In my view, none of the plurality's concerns pre-
cludes this Court from resolving this case based on the
factual allegations in Lt. Stanley's complaint.
First, the plurality says Lt. Stanley's complaint does not
allege her diagnosis, its timing, and whether she had the dis-
ability while she was still working. See ibid. But her com-
plaint tells us that she had a disability and eventually had to
retire because of it. This is enough to draw a “plausible
inference” that she worked with a disability and was thus
subject to the discriminatory policy some time before retir-
ing. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 682 (2009).
Second, the plurality claims that, in the proceedings below,
Lt. Stanley “affrmatively disavowed” the argument that she
was discriminated against while still working. Ante, at 64.
Not so. All she said was that she did “ `not claim she was
impacted by the discriminatory' City policy `during her em-
4
Accordingly, I agree fully with the plurality's conclusion that § 2000e–
5(e)(3)(A) “might be especially promising for plaintiffs in [Lt.] Stanley's
shoes.” Ante, at 62.
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ployment.' ” Ibid. (quoting Brief for Appellant in No. 22–
10002
(CA11), p. 22; emphasis added). But whether some-
one was impacted (affected) by a policy is distinct from
whether they were subject to it. See § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A).
Third, the plurality contends that, in “applying its own
rules of argument preservation, the Eleventh Circuit de-
clined to pass” on Lt. Stanley's “theory” that she was dis-
criminated against during her employment, and that this
Court did not grant certiorari to decide whether that assess-
ment was correct. Ante, at 64–65. But Lt. Stanley's “the-
ory” was merely a response to the City's argument that her
complaint failed to state a claim. Moreover, the allegation
that the relevant discriminatory act took place while she was
still on the job tees up the question we did grant certiorari
to address: “Under the [ADA], does a former employee—who
was qualifed to perform her job and who earned post-
employment benefts while employed—lose her right to sue
over discrimination with respect to those benefts solely be-
cause she no longer holds her job?” Pet. for Cert. i (empha-
sis added). Lt. Stanley maintains that she states a claim for
discrimination under the ADA with respect to retirement
benefts she earned while working despite the fact that she
no longer holds the job. The question presented neither
states nor suggests that the employer's act of discrimination
took place only after Stanley retired.
5
And, to the extent
such timing is even relevant, answering the question Lt.
Stanley actually presented in light of her contention that the
5
Indeed, as quoted, the actual question presented asks whether Lt.
Stanley “lose[s] her right to sue over discrimination with respect to [re-
tirement] benefts solely because she no longer holds her job.” Pet. for
Cert. i (emphasis added). But, no matter, says the majority; from the
outset, it chooses to answer an entirely different query: “whether a retired
employee who does not hold or seek a job is a `qualifed individual.' ”
Ante, at 49. That shift is telling. Even as the majority extols the virtues
of textualism, it has completely rewritten the text of the question that
Stanley actually presented, presumably to reach its desired result.

82 ST
ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
Jackson, J., dissenting
discrimination occurred while she was still working is the
only
framing that is actually consistent with the facts alleged
in Lt. Stanley's complaint.
2
What is more, “[o]ur traditional rule is that `[o]nce a fed-
eral claim is properly presented, a party can make any argu-
ment in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the
precise arguments they made below.' ” Lebron v. National
Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 379 (1995)
(quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992); second
alteration in original). And, here, nobody disputes that Lt.
Stanley preserved the claim that the City discriminated
against her in violation of the ADA by changing her retire-
ment benefts. Lt. Stanley's contention that she was subject
to the allegedly discriminatory policy while she was still an
employee “is—at most—`a new argument to support what
has been [her] consistent claim.' ” Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310, 331 (2010) (quoting
Lebron, 513 U. S., at 379).
If the traditional rule applies anywhere, it should be in a
case of this nature. This claim was brought by a disabled
frefghter suffering from Parkinson's who has consistently
maintained that the City's change to its retirement-benefts
policy (implemented while she was an employee) discrimi-
nates against disabled benefciaries. If we extend leniency
to professional advocacy organizations when they craft alle-
gations, see, e. g., Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 331, it seems
only fair to extend that same grace to those with limited
resources to game out long-term litigation strategies.
6
6
Only time will tell whether the Court is as eager to apply today's strin-
gent argument-preservation approach to major corporations and profes-
sional advocacy organizations as it is to use this line of reasoning to dis-
miss the claims of a retired frefghter suffering from Parkinson's. Cf.
Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U. S. 100, 145 (2025)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, it bears noting that this case comes to us on
re
view of a complaint, which need only plead facts suffcient
to support a claim, not comprehensive legal theories. See
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 530 (2011). If we were
reviewing a summary judgment or trial record developed on
Lt. Stanley's district-court legal theories, the plurality might
have a point. But, at the pleading stage, a legal claim rises
or falls based on the facts—not theories—alleged.
If all that were not enough, the case record here estab-
lishes that Lt. Stanley tried below to make the point that
the discriminatory act she was complaining of occurred dur-
ing her employment, once the City made timing an issue.
For instance, Lt. Stanley's opening brief to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit incorporated the Government's amicus brief, which ar-
gued that, contrary to what the City had asserted, Lt. Stan-
ley had suffered the alleged discrimination while employed.
Brief for Appellant in No. 22–10002, at viii, 10; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 22–10002, pp. 5, 11–
21; see also Reply for Appellant in No. 22–10002, pp. 4–13.
Lt. Stanley and the Government also made this point repeat-
edly to the Eleventh Circuit at oral argument. Recording
of Oral Arg. in No. 22–10002 (Aug. 24, 2023), at 0:35–5:50,
6:00–7:30, 8:20–9:20.
It is true that, instead of accepting the facts as Lt. Stanley
alleged them (and as the Federal Rules and our precedents
require), the Eleventh Circuit rejected Lt. Stanley's and the
Government's attempts to set the record straight about the
timing question. But it is odd, to say the least, that Lt.
Stanley is now being penalized for her thwarted earlier at-
tempts to assert that the City's discriminatory actions oc-
curred while she was still an employee—especially when she
might have been able to make that point here if she had
skipped saying this to the Eleventh Circuit entirely and had
pointed it out to us in the frst instance. Cf. Citizens
United, 558 U. S., at 331 (holding that parties can make any

84 ST
ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
Jackson, J., dissenting
argument in this Court to support their claim, even one not
raised
below).
7
3
Regardless of how the Eleventh Circuit handled the alle-
gations in this case, in my view, we need to remember that
our Court's role is to decide what the law is for the entire
Nation. That reach carries with it the heightened responsi-
bility to tether the legal principles we pronounce to the facts
of the case before us, lest we not only create unfairness for
particular parties but also allow a poor vehicle to drive us—
and the law—astray. Considering questions of law divorced
from the actual facts raises doubts about our authority under
Article III. See, e. g., Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.
75, 89 (1947) (“[F]ederal courts established pursuant to Arti-
cle III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions”).
It also risks error, because it is far more diffcult to correctly
address legal issues on facts that do not implicate the ques-
tion presented.
The discrepancy between real life and our legal decision-
making matters in concrete and demonstrable ways. A re-
tiree who alleges disability discrimination that frst occurs
only after they have retired is in a materially different posi-
tion from one who was subjected to that same discriminatory
action during her employment. See Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 11 (“When an employer makes a discrimi-
natory change in a plaintiff 's post-employment benefts, it
retroactively alters the plaintiff 's terms or conditions of em-
7
One might even argue that our decision to grant certiorari in the frst
place signaled our decision to set aside the alleged forfeiture problem,
which the City had asserted in its brief in opposition. Brief in Opposition
30–31. Lt. Stanley, the Government, and knowledgeable observers would
be forgiven for reasonably presuming that the Court had “necessarily con-
sidered and rejected” this purported obstacle to its review when we opted
to grant Lt. Stanley's petition. Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 670, n. 2 (2010); see also United States v. Williams,
504 U. S. 36, 40 (1992).
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ployment and changes the compensation she earned as an
employee
performing the essential functions of her job—that
is, as a qualifed individual”). Whether or not Title I covers
that circumstance does not answer whether a plaintiff like
Lt. Stanley—who did not suffer a retroactive change to
her terms and conditions of employment, but was instead
subjected to the allegedly discriminatory policy while em-
ployed—can sue.
When we realized that Lt. Stanley's case does not present
a circumstance of discrimination that occurs only after one's
employment ends, we had two reasonable options. We could
have applied our traditional rule, allowing Lt. Stanley to
make all arguments in support of her claim, and then consid-
ered how the alleged facts of her case fare under the law as
we understand it. Alternatively, we could have dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and awaited
a true case of postemployment discrimination to decide that
question. Instead, the Court chooses door number three: to
close its eyes to what Lt. Stanley actually alleges and use
her case nonetheless to answer an important legal question
that does not arise from the facts in her complaint. Thus,
in this of all cases, the Court abandons “its considered prac-
tice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent ques-
tions.” Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
325 U. S. 450, 461 (1945); cf. McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U. S.
414, 429 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution
gives us the authority to decide real cases and controversies;
we do not have the right to simplify or otherwise change the
facts of a case in order to make our work easier or to achieve
a desired result”).
I think plowing forward to make new pronouncements of
law when the alleged facts do not implicate the rule we are
announcing is a mistake. That Lt. Stanley suffered discrim-
ination during her employment is not a disposable “theory.”
It is the only lens through which we can accurately—and
properly—view her case.

86 ST
ANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD
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III
The
second misstep that the Court makes in this case is to
construe Title I of the ADA to allow employers to engage in
postemployment discrimination. The text of the statute it-
self says nothing—zero—about the preemployment or post-
employment timing of an act of disability discrimination.
Nevertheless, the Court homes in on one isolated provision
(the qualifed-individual defnition), detaches it from its place
in the overall scheme, and converts it into a strict limitation
on the temporal reach of Title I's protection.
In my view, settled law requires a different path. We
should have followed the method this Court employed when
it addressed a comparable question of statutory interpre-
tation in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337 (1997).
There, we held that “employees” in Title VII covers former
employees. Id., at 346. To reach that conclusion, we ana-
lyzed the text, context, and purposes of the provisions at
issue. Applied here, those indicators confrm that Title I
prohibits disability discrimination in the postemployment
payout of benefts earned during an employee's tenure.
A
Robinson frst says to consider whether the statute's text
supplies “a plain and unambiguous” answer to the question
of what the statute allows. Id., at 340. The “inquiry must
cease” at text alone only “if the statutory language is unam-
biguous and `the statutory scheme is coherent and consist-
ent.' ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter-
prises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 240 (1989)). Title I's text and
overall scheme do not foreclose—much less unambiguously
so—retirees' ability to sue over discrimination in the postem-
ployment payout of benefts they earned on the job.
Consider frst what Title I's text does not say. Title I
does not categorically exclude former employees or retirees
from the ADA's protection. Nor does it explicitly carve out
postemployment discrimination as nonactionable. Nothing
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in the statute actually says that one must currently hold or
desire
a job to obtain protection from the forms of disability
discrimination that Title I prohibits. And Title I does not
place a temporal limit on the reach of its protections.
What the text of Title I does plainly convey is broad pro-
tection for workers against disability discrimination with
respect to job-related benefts. Section 12112(a)'s general
prohibition bars disability discrimination “in regard to” both
“employee compensation” and “other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” Section 12112(b)(2) also spe-
cifcally prohibits disability discrimination by “an organiza-
tion providing fringe benefts to an employee of the covered
entity.” As I explain in Part IV, infra, those terms capture
deferred compensation that workers earn during employ-
ment and then receive during retirement.
So where does the majority fnd its purported temporal
limit on Title I's protections? Almost exclusively in the
st atute's qua l i fied-i ndiv idua l defi niti on. Reca l l that
§ 12112(a) prohibits disability discrimination against a “quali-
fed individual,” which § 12111(8) defnes as “an individual
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can per-
form the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires.” Based on the text and
tense of this provision, the majority concludes that Title I
offers no protection to an individual who does not presently
hold or desire a job. See ante, at 52–53. It reaches that
result by reading the qualifed-individual defnition to apply
equally to two scenarios. See ante, at 55–56. The frst sce-
nario is where someone seeks to keep or obtain a job, but
fnds that aspiration stymied by disability discrimination.
The second scenario is where someone previously had a job
(for which they were qualifed), but suffers postemployment
discrimination in the payout of job-related benefts.
The false equivalence of these two very different scenarios
fuels the majority's effort to sustain a textualist case for a
temporal limitation. But nothing in the text compels it. It
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is perfectly permissible to read the qualifed-individual def-
niti
on as setting a conditional mandate: If a plaintiff relies
on Title I regarding a job she seeks to obtain or hold, then
she must be able to perform the essential functions of that
job. Brief for Petitioner 3. Conditional mandates like this
appear in daily life. Imagine seeing a sign that reads: “To
live in this apartment building, you must be able to clean up
after the pets that you own.” Ibid. No one would read
that rule as requiring tenants to own pets; rather, it is a
conditional mandate that applies if tenants have pets. Ibid.
8
Read that way, the qualifed-individual mandate operates
to protect employers from having to extend employment to
those who cannot do a job. See Part III–B, infra. It says
nothing about the time at which the alleged discrimination
must occur relative to one's period of employment.
9
The majority runs in a series of textualist circles, attempt-
ing to fnd the explicit temporal limit it seeks in the qualifed-
individual defnition's text. But it comes up short of any-
thing to confrm that the qualifed-individual defnition is an
8
Lt. Stanley offers another example from an actual statute, which pro-
vides that NASA “shall make one annual award” to “[t]he amateur astron-
omer . . . who in the preceding calendar year discovered the intrinsically
brightest near-Earth asteroid.” 51 U. S. C. § 30902(c)(3)(A); see Brief for
Petitioner 36. It then defnes “amateur astronomer” as “an individual
whose employer does not provide any funding, payment, or compensation
to the individual for the observation of asteroids.” § 30902(b)(1). Does
an unemployed astronomer qualify? Of course. In context, the “amateur
astronomer” defnition imposes a conditional mandate that applies if an
individual is employed.
9
The majority responds that Congress could have written Title I dif-
ferently to make the conditionality of the qualifed-individual mandate
clearer. See ante, at 55–56. But critiques of that sort cut both ways: If
Congress had wanted to restrict all of Title I's protections to only those
who hold or desire a job (as opposed to retirees), it surely could have made
that explicit too. See, e. g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341
(1997) (“That the statute could have expressly included the phrase `former
employees' does not aid our inquiry. Congress also could have used the
phrase `current employees' ”).
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Jackson, J., dissenting
expression of Congress's temporal limit on all of Title I.
And
the reality is that Title I's text contains neither an ex-
press prohibition against nor authorization for retiree law-
suits challenging postemployment discrimination. Because
text alone does not supply an unambiguous answer, Robin-
son's framework tells us to proceed to understand the con-
text in which the “qualifed individual” defnition appears in
Title I, as well as the point of that provision—i. e., what,
exactly, Congress designed that defnition to do.
B
Congress incorporated the qualifed-individual provision
into Title I of the ADA to address a particular problem. Its
legislative history makes clear that, by adding this provision,
Congress simply “intend[ed] to reaffrm that [Title I] does
not undermine an employer's ability to choose and maintain
qualifed workers.” H. R. Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, at 55.
Congress was responding to businesses' concerns that pro-
tecting disabled workers would mean requiring employers to
hire employees whose disabilities could threaten “the health
or safety of others,” damage “property,” or prevent the com-
pletion of the work. Id., at 56. Could a jewelry store in
search of a security guard require “[m]obility and dexterity”
from an applicant? Ibid. Or, if a job involved lifting 50-
pound boxes, could an employer require applicants to be able
to lift that much weight? Id., pt. 3, at 36.
Congress added the qualifed-individual provision to make
clear that the answer to these and similar questions was yes.
Ibid. It explained that, “[a]s with other civil rights laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment,” Title I would not
“limit the ability of covered entities to choose and maintain a
qualifed workforce.” Id., at 35–36. Employers could “hire
and employ employees who can perform the job” and use
“job-related criteria” in making those determinations. Id.,
at 36. In other words, Congress designed the provision to
“ensure that employers can continue to require that all ap-
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plicants and employees, including those with disabilities,
are
able to perform the essential, i. e., the non-marginal func-
tions of the job.” Id., pt. 2, at 55.
The “qualifed” aspect of Title I's protection thus recog-
nizes that, in certain situations, employers may lawfully dis-
criminate against applicants and current employees based on
disability. Specifcally, employers may do so if disability
renders someone unable to perform the essential functions
of a job that she holds or desires. And that makes perfect
sense when a plaintiff seeks Title I's protection with respect
to hiring, promotion, or fring determinations. E. g., Cleve-
land v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U. S. 795, 806
(1999) (wrongful-discharge plaintiff had to show she could
“ `perform the essential functions' of her job”).
A retiree seeking to remedy discrimination as to the pay-
out of benefts already earned on the job, by contrast, does
not trigger the concerns that motivated Congress to craft a
qualifed-individual metric. See, e. g., Castellano v. New
York, 142 F. 3d 58, 68 (CA2 1998) (“Where the alleged dis-
crimination relates to the provision of post-employment ben-
efts, rather than to hiring, promotion, or fring, Congress's
expressed concern about qualifcations is no longer impli-
cated”). Unlike allowing disability discrimination against
someone who is or seeks to be in the workforce but cannot
do the job, authorizing disability discrimination against a
retiree who was in the workforce, but has now left it, has
nothing to do with the problem Congress was addressing
when it imposed the conditions in the qualifed-individual
defnition.
The long and short of it is that the qualifed-individual pro-
vision's function is to protect employers from having to hire
and maintain employees who cannot do the work. That pro-
vision is not designed to serve as a temporal limit that extin-
guishes the rights of those who already did the work and
have now left the job. Nor does it make any sense—given
Title I's overall scheme—for the qualifed-individual provi-
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Jackson, J., dissenting
sion to moonlight as such a temporal restriction. If Con-
gress
had wanted the qualifed-individual defnition to do the
work of cutting off discrimination claims that arise after re-
tirement, it easily could have said so.
C
It is clear, then, that the majority has commandeered Title
I's qualifed-individual defnition and used it to steer today's
legal analysis through wholly inapposite terrain. Doing this
not only diverges from Congress's design but also leads to
anomalous results. That is, even as the majority assumes
that Title I protects retirement benefts, it adopts an inter-
pretation that severely undermines those protections, ren-
dering them null just when they matter most. Worse still,
the majority's reading of this statute counteracts the objec-
tive of the qualifed-individual provision—the very provision
on which the majority's holding turns.
Under the majority's logic, if an employer cuts off an em-
ployee's entitlement to retiree health benefts (because of
their disability) one day before they retire, the employee can
sue. But if the employer waits until one day after that em-
ployee's retirement (assuming the employee no longer de-
sires the job they held), Title I offers them no protection.
Imagine a janitor who is deaf. She works decades at a
school, performing all essential functions of her job. During
that time, she earns retirement benefts, including postem-
ployment health insurance and a pension. After she retires,
the school cuts off her employer-provided retirement benefts
on the ground that “it was always a nuisance to have to ac-
commodate her all those years”—i. e., because of her deaf-
ness. Does Title I protect her against this blatant disability
discrimination? Per today's holding, the majority says no.
Even though the school has taken away job-related benefts
that the janitor earned during her working years, she is out
of luck because—the majority reasons—Title I's protections
are limited only to those who hold or desire a job.
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Arbitrariness abounds. If the retired janitor remains
able
to perform the essential functions of her job, and if she
still wants to work, then she can bring a Title I suit to chal-
lenge the school's discrimination in the payout of retirement
benefts she already earned. But if she can no longer per-
form the essential functions of her job, or if she simply no
longer desires a job, then she cannot. See Brief for AFL–
CIO as Amicus Curiae 5. But why would Congress hinge
the retired janitor's protection against discrimination in the
benefts she earned while working on whether she wants and
can perform a job in the future? While she was working,
she could perform the essential functions of her job and
thereby earned the benefts in question—isn't that what mat-
ters in any coherent and consistent scheme designed to pro-
tect against disability discrimination?
10
It is illogical to conclude that, while Congress wanted to
protect against discrimination with respect to retirement
benefts, it crafted a statute that implicitly cuts off those pro-
tections the moment a worker last clocks out. Holding as
much allows employers to evade Title I's retirement-beneft
protections by bait and switch. They need not refrain from
discrimination; all they have to do is wait.
IV
Rather than unfastening the qualifed-individual defnition
from the objective that compelled it and construing that pro-
vision to limit the broad protections that the ADA confers,
I would adopt the statutory reading most consistent with the
10
The majority's blinkered focus leads to other oddities too. What if
the retired janitor can no longer perform her janitorial work, but she takes
on a lighter job with a different employer? Without question, she “can
perform the essential functions of the [new] employment position that [she]
holds.” 42 U. S. C. § 12111(8). Given that she currently holds a job, can
she now (even under the majority's reading) sue her former employer for
its disability discrimination with respect to her retirement benefts? Fol-
lowing the majority's textualism to its logical conclusion, the answer sud-
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overall design of Title I. Congress passed the ADA to pro-
tec
t people with disabilities, and it crafted Title I, in particu-
lar, to provide disabled workers with meaningful protections
against disability discrimination in the provision of job-
related retirement benefts. To properly evaluate the in-
tended scope of Title I's protections, courts need to situate
its provisions within that broader context.
A
At our best, this Court has appreciated the ADA's “broad
mandate” and “sweeping purpose” for remedying “wide-
spread discrimination against disabled individuals.” PGA
TOUR, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U. S. 661, 674–675 (2001). We
have called the statute's “ `comprehensive character' ” one of
its “ `most impressive strengths.' ” Id., at 675. And we
have seen it as Congress designed it—“ `a milestone on the
path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society.' ” Ibid.
Reading Title I to prohibit postemployment discrimination
in the provision of retirement benefts (as I do) aligns with
the broader purposes of the ADA. Retirement benefts are
an essential aspect of the “equality of opportunity, full partic-
ipation, independent living, and economic self-suffciency”
that the ADA promotes. § 12101(a)(7). They are also one
of “those opportunities for which our free society is justif-
ably famous,” and Congress wanted to ensure that disabled
Americans could enjoy them, too. § 12101(a)(8).
In other words, Title I's protections encourage disabled
Americans to enter the workforce and have an equal oppor-
tunity to earn all that a good job brings to workers and their
families. Retirement benefts are a key piece of that pie.
Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae 19 (describing retire-
ment benefts as a key factor in workers' job-related deci-
sions). After all, workers often decide whether to enter the
workforce, and when to leave, based on the terms of such
benefts. Protecting disabled Americans' right to receive all
that they earned during their working years—free from dis-
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ability discrimination in retirement—is essential to a faithful
appl
ication of Congress's handiwork.
The majority skips past these anchoring objectives; it
hasti ly assumes Congress wanted to confer protec ti on
against job-related disability discrimination (to include dis-
crimination related to the provision of retirement benefts),
ante, at 57, but then treats the many provisions of the ADA
that demonstrate this congressional purpose as irrelevant to
an interpretation of Title I's reach, ante, at 57–58. In my
view, Congress's clear aims are not so easily avoided.
A comprehensive look at Title I reveals its protection of
retirement benefits i n at least three places. Sec ti on
12112(a)'s general prohibition bars disability discrimination
“in regard to” both “employee compensation” and “other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Addi-
tionally, § 12112(b)(2) prohibits disability discrimination by
“an organization providing fringe benefts to an employee of
the covered entity.” Legislative history reinforces that
Congress inserted these phrases into Title I to protect pen-
sions, health insurance, and other benefts that employers
promise to give their employees upon retirement. See H. R.
Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, at 54–55 (noting that Title I covers
“the range of employment decisions,” including those con-
cerning “fringe benefts available by virtue of employment”);
see also id., pt. 3, at 36 (prohibiting adoption of different
“benefts” for disabled employees); id., at 38 (“[E]mployers
may not deny health insurance coverage completely to an
individual based on the person's . . . disability”).
Congress also crafted Title I knowing that courts had con-
strued these terms in similar statutes to include retirement
benefts. This Court had held, for example, that a “beneft
need not accrue before a person's employment is completed
to be a term, condition, or privilege of that employment rela-
tionship.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 77
(1984). It had thus made clear that “[p]ension benefts”
“qualify as terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
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Jackson, J., dissenting
even though they are received only after employment termi-
nates.
” Ibid. Five Justices had also reasoned that “[t]here
is no question that the opportunity to participate in a de-
ferred compensation plan constitutes a `conditio[n] or privi-
leg[e] of employment,' and that retirement benefts constitute
a form of `compensation.' ” Arizona Governing Comm. for
Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans
v. Norris, 463 U. S. 1073, 1079 (1983) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, White, Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in
judgment in part) (footnote omitted). And the Court had
further clarifed that “[a] beneft that is part and parcel of
the employment relationship may not be doled out in a dis-
criminatory fashion.” Hishon, 467 U. S., at 75.
B
This backdrop highlights not only that Congress viewed
retirement benefts to be a protected form of employee com-
pensation, but also how Congress intended for this particular
form of protection from disability discrimination to operate.
To be specifc: Retirement benefts are not payments to retir-
ees for something they do postemployment (i. e., when they
neither have nor desire a job). Rather, as we held in an
analogous context just before the ADA's passage, “retire-
ment benefts are deferred compensation for past years of
service rendered.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury,
489 U. S. 803, 808, 810 (1989) (interpreting statute that con-
sented to state “ `taxation of pay or compensation for per-
sonal service as an offcer or employee of the United States' ”
to cover federal retirement benefts, because they are com-
pensation for service as a federal employee). Thus, as we
recognized in Davis, although workers receive these benefts
after they retire, workers earn these benefts as employees—
during their employment. Ibid.
If an employer alters the payout of benefts based on an
employee's disability after that individual's employment
ends—say, by reducing pension benefts—the employer has
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discriminatorily changed the terms and conditions of employ-
ment
that the individual was subject to while working.
11
The retiree earns those benefts as an employee; therefore,
the postemployment adverse action retroactively discrimi-
nates against that previously qualifed individual. See Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 29–32. So, even as-
suming (as the majority does) that the individual's qualif-
cations are apposite to this particular scope-of-coverage
question (but see Part III–A, supra), the individual could
perform the job's essential functions when it mattered—
when the individual earned the benefts.
The Government proffers an illustrative hypothetical.
Imagine “a statute prohibiting airlines from discriminating
against a `qualifed passenger' in the `terms, conditions, or
privileges of carriage' and defning a `qualifed passenger' to
mean someone who `meets the carrier's eligibility require-
ments for the fight on which the passenger is fying or seeks
to fy.' ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31.
What happens if the airline discriminates against the individ-
ual in the handling of their baggage at their destination,
after they debark? The majority would say, too bad—the
individual is no longer a “qualifed passenger.” But I would
read the statute in context, as the Government does: The
individual was qualifed during the relevant period; the dis-
crimination relates to their act of fying with the airline as a
passenger; and this is the type of discrimination that the
statute was designed to stop. This reading follows from the
text, context, and primary purpose of the statute—it renders
the provision in question part of a coherent and consistent
overall scheme.
So it is here. A retiree who worked and earned benefts
as a qualifed individual, then suffered discrimination at the
11
This is not what happened here, of course. Lt. Stanley was subject
to the discriminatory policy that she now challenges while she was still
working. Yet the consequence of the majority's broad holding is that the
retiree I describe above would have no recourse under Title I.
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payout stage for those benefts in retirement, is covered by
T
itle I's protections. On such facts, fairly interpreted, the
employer has “discriminate[d] against a qualifed individual
. . . in regard to . . . employee compensation.” § 12112(a).
That is precisely what Title I prohibits.
C
Waving off Congress's broader objectives, the majority
notes that legislation does not “pursu[e] its stated purpose at
all costs.” Ante, at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This common rejoinder attacks a strawman. Looking to a
statute's purposes helps us to understand—not override—
that statute's text. And while legislators may not pursue
their purposes “at all costs,” such calibrations and the com-
promises they refect do not make legislative purposes irrele-
vant to a full and fair evaluation of what a statutory provi-
sion means, as the majority suggests.
Too often, this Court closes its eyes to context, enactment
history, and the legislature's goals when assessing statutory
meaning. I cannot abide that narrow-minded approach. If
a statute's text does not provide a clear answer to a question,
it is not our role to keep twisting and turning those words
until self-confrmatory observations solidify our “frst blush”
assumptions. Robinson, 519 U. S., at 341.
12
12
The majority's contention that I reject “ `pure textualism' [as] insuff-
ciently pliable to secure the result [I] seek,” ante, at 57, stems from an
unfortunate misunderstanding of the judicial role. Our interpretative
task is not to seek our own desired results (whatever they may be). And,
indeed, it is precisely because of this solemn duty that, in my view, it is
imperative that we interpret statutes consistent with all relevant indicia
of what Congress wanted, as best we can ascertain its intent. A method-
ology that includes consideration of Congress's aims does exactly that—
and no more. By contrast, pure textualism's refusal to try to understand
the text of a statute in the larger context of what Congress sought to
achieve turns the interpretive task into a potent weapon for advancing
judicial policy preferences. By “fnding ” answers in ambiguous text, and
not bothering to consider whether those answers align with other sources
of statutory meaning, pure textualists can easily disguise their own prefer-

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Courts should remember that “[l]egislation has an aim; it
seeks
to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to
effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government.”
F. Frankfurter, Some Refections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 538–539 (1947). Viewing a statute's
text in light of its aims allows us to “carr[y] out Congress'
likely intent in enacting the statutory provision before us.”
Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Educa-
tion, 550 U. S. 81, 93 (2007). Crucially, this keeps us to our
proper role as judges in a democratic system. See United
States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542
(1940) (courts' role in interpreting statutes is “to construe
the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress”).
Here, instead of rendering Title I's retirement-beneft pro-
tections an empty promise by adopting a reading “destruc-
tive of [its] purpose,” the Court should have adopted the
reading that is not only plainly text-based but is also “more
consistent with the broader context of [Title I] and the pri-
mary purpose of ” its protections. Robinson, 519 U. S., at
346. In my view, in the absence of any clear temporal limi-
tation on the scope of Title I, the best interpretation would
permit those who were qualifed enough to earn benefts
while working to seek a remedy for postemployment dis-
crimination in the payout of those benefts.
***
Disabled Americans who have retired from the workforce
simply want to enjoy the fruits of their labor free from dis-
crimination. Congress plainly protected their right to do so
when it crafted Title I. Yet, the Court ignores that right
today. It reaches out to cut off postemployment protection
against disability discrimination in a case that does not re-
ences as “textual” inevitabilities. So, really, far from being “insuffciently
pliable,” I think pure textualism is incessantly malleable—that's its pri-
mary problem—and, indeed, it is cert ai nly somehow always flexible
enough to secure the majority's desired outcome.

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Jackson, J., dissenting
quire us to decide that question; seizes upon the inapposite
text
of the qualifed-individual defnition; and converts that
text into a temporal limit it was never designed to be.
Worse still, by doing all this, the Court renders meaningless
Title I's protections for disabled workers' retirement benefts
just when those protections matter most.
It is lamentable that this Court so diminishes disability
rights that the People (through their elected representa-
tives) established more than three decades ago. Even so,
there is hope for a legislative intervention to fx the mistake
the Court has made. Americans with disabilities have
proven time and again that they can overcome long odds in
fghting for their own equality. When that happens, my one
wish would be for this Court to stay out of their way.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None