Thompson v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 2
Pages 408–422
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T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 21, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
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408 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 23–1095. Argued January 14, 2025—Decided March 21, 2025
Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from one bank.
After the bank failed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) became responsible for collecting the outstanding loans. Dur-
ing a call with the FDIC's loan servicer, Thompson disputed the
$269,120.58 balance shown on his invoice (which consisted of the $219,000
Thompson had borrowed plus interest), stating that he had “no idea
where the 269 number comes from” and that he “borrowed . . . $110,000.”
Thompson made similar statements in a later call with FDIC contrac-
tors. Thompson was later charged with violating 18 U. S. C. § 1014,
which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” to infuence
the FDIC's action on any loan. A jury found Thompson guilty, and he
moved for acquittal, arguing that his statements were not false because
he had in fact borrowed $110,000, even though he later borrowed more.
The courts below concluded that they did not need to reach that argu-
ment because they read § 1014 to also criminalize misleading statements,
and Thompson's statements were at least misleading.
Held: Section 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state-
ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.
Pp. 413–418.
(a) The statutory text criminalizes “false statement[s]” but does not
use the word “misleading.” False and misleading are two different
things. A misleading statement can be true, and a true statement is
not false. Given that, it is signifcant that the statute uses only the
word “false,” which means “not true.” Adding “any” before “false
statement” does not transform the scope of the statute. A statute that
applies to “any false statement” does not cover all misleading state-
ments, only the “false” ones. While the Government argues that
“false” and “misleading ” have long been considered synonyms, the over-
lap between false statements and misleading ones is beside the point.
The only relevant question under the text of § 1014 is whether the state-
ment—even if misleading, deceitful, or some other adjective—is also
“false.” Pp. 413–415.
(b) Statutory context confrms that § 1014 does not cover all mislead-
ing statements. Many other statutes, including other criminal statutes
in Title 18, expressly prohibit both “false” and “misleading ” statements.

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Syllabus
Interpreting “false” in § 1014 to include “misleading ” would make the
i
nclusion of “misleading ” in those statutes superfuous. Further, when
§ 1014 was enacted in 1948, none of the 11 predecessor provisions con-
solidated into § 1014 used the word “misleading,” while many other
statutes from the same period used the phrase “false or misleading.”
Historical context thus confrms that when Congress intended to cover
all misleading statements, “it knew how to do so.” Custis v. United
States, 511 U. S. 485, 492. Pp. 415–416.
(c) Precedent supports the Court's reading of § 1014. In United
States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, the Court held that § 1014 does not incor-
porate a materiality requirement because the statute does not “so much
as mention materiality,” whereas many other statutes do. Id., at 490,
492. The same logic suggests that § 1014 does not reach all misleading
statements. In Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, the Court re-
versed a conviction under § 1014 for depositing several bad checks, on
the basis that the defendant's conduct “did not involve the making of a
`false statement' ” because “a check is not a factual assertion at all, and
therefore cannot be characterized as `true' or `false.' ” Id., at 284.
That logic shows that a conviction under § 1014 requires at least two
things: (1) the defendant made a statement, and (2) that statement can
be characterized as “false” and not “true.” Section 1014 does not cover
a statement rendered misleading by virtue of a material omission unless
that statement can be characterized as “false” and not “true.” Finally,
the Court's decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, does not sup-
por t the Gover nment, as Kay did not suggest that misleadi ng
statements were independently unlawful under § 1014's predecessor.
Pp. 416–417.
(d) The right question under § 1014 is whether Thompson's state-
ments were false, and the Court agrees that at least some context is
relevant to that determination. The Court remands for the Seventh
Circuit to determine whether a reasonable jury could fnd that Thomp-
son's statements were false. Pp. 417–418.
89 F. 4th 1010, vacated and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito,
J., post, p. 418, and Jackson, J., post, p. 421, fled concurring opinions.
Chris Gair argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs was Stuart Banner.
Caroline A. Flynn argued the cause for the United States.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Prin-

410 TH
OMPSON v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
cipal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Argentieri, Dep-
u
ty Solicitor General Feigin, and Sofa M. Vickery.*
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000
from the same bank. Later, Thompson told the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that he had “borrowed
. . . $110,000” from the bank. Thompson was indicted under
18 U. S. C. § 1014 for making “false statement[s]” to the
FDIC. Thompson argued that his statements were not false
because he had in fact taken out a loan for $110,000 just as
he said. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit
held that they did not need to consider that argument. In
their view, the prohibition in § 1014 against “false state-
ment[s]” extends to misleading ones as well, and Thompson's
statements were at least misleading in failing to mention the
additional loans. The question presented is whether § 1014
criminalizes statements that are misleading but not false.
I
A
Between 2011 and 2014, Patrick Thompson took out three
loans from the Washington Federal Bank for Savings.
Thompson frst borrowed $110,000 in 2011 to make an equity
contr ibuti on to a law fir m. Thompson then borrowed
$20,000 from the Bank in 2013 and another $89,000 in 2014,
resulting in a total loan balance of $219,000. In 2017, the
Bank failed, and the FDIC became responsible for collecting
the Bank's outstanding loans. As part of that process, the
FDIC's loan servicer—Planet Home Lending—sent Thomp-
son an invoice in February 2018 listing a balance due of
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the National Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Steven F. Molo, Eugene A. Soko-
loff, and Jeffrey T. Greene; and for Joel S. Johnson, pro se.
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$269,120.58, which consisted of the $219,000 Thompson had
borrowed
plus interest.
On February 23, 2018, Thompson called the customer serv-
ice line of Planet Home Lending. During the call, which was
recorded, Thompson told the customer service agent that he
had “no idea where the 269 number comes from.” App. 52.
Thompson said, “I borrowed the money, I owe the money—
but I borrowed . . . I think it was $110,000.” Id., at 56.
Thompson agreed with the agent that he was claiming a “dis-
crepancy,” and said that he was “disput[ing]” the balance
listed on the invoice. Id., at 53, 61. The agent told Thomp-
son that Planet Home Lending would research the issue.
Id., at 62.
On March 1, 2018, Thompson received a call from two
FDIC contractors. The call was not recorded, but the con-
tractors took notes. According to those notes, Thompson
mentioned borrowing $110,000 for “home improvement.”
Id., at 138.
Thompson and the FDIC ultimately agreed to settle
Thompson's debt for $219,000—the principal amount of his
loans.
B
Thompson was later charged with two counts of violat-
ing 18 U. S. C. § 1014. That statute prohibits “knowingly
mak[ing] any false statement or report . . . for the purpose of
infuencing in any way the action of . . . the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation . . . upon any . . . loan.” Count one
of the indictment alleged that on the February 23 phone call,
Thompson “falsely stated he only owed . . . $110,000 to [the
Bank] and that any higher amount was incorrect, when [he]
then knew he had received $219,000.” App. 4. Count two
alleged that on the March 1 phone call, Thompson “falsely
stated that he only owed $110,000 to [the Bank], that any
higher amount was incorrect, and that these funds were for
home improvement, when [he] then knew he had received
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OMPSON v. UNITED STATES
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$219,000 from [the Bank] and the $110,000 was paid to a law
fr
m as [his] capital contribution.” Id., at 5.
The jury found Thompson guilty on both counts. He
moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing that a “conviction
for false statements cannot be sustained where, as here, the
alleged statements are literally true, even if misleading.”
Defendant's Post-Trial Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and
for New Trial in No. 1:21–cr–00279 (ND Ill., Mar. 17, 2022),
ECF Doc. 154, p. 7. Thompson argued that his statements
about borrowing $110,000 were literally true because he had
in fact borrowed that amount of money from the Bank, even
though he later borrowed more. Id., at 10–11.*
The District Court denied Thompson's motion. It found
that “the Seventh Circuit does not require literal falsity in
Section 1014 cases.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a (citing
United States v. Freed, 921 F. 3d 716, 723 (CA7 2019)). The
District Court acknowledged that “Thompson's argument
would have more traction” in the Sixth Circuit, where “a
Section 1014 conviction cannot rest on material omissions or
implied misrepresentations.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a (cit-
ing United States v. Kurlemann, 736 F. 3d 439 (CA6 2013)).
But the District Court concluded that Thompson had “failed
to direct the Court to a Supreme Court case or Seventh Cir-
cuit case that holds that a Section 1014 conviction requires a
literally false statement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a. The
District Court therefore found it unnecessary to “address the
Government's argument that Thompson's statements were
literally false,” because “literal falsity is not required to sus-
tain a Section 1014 conviction.” Id., at 56a.
The Seventh Circuit affrmed. Like the District Court,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that it “need not decide
whether Thompson's statements were literally true because
his argument runs headfrst into [Seventh Circuit] prece-
*Thompson did not argue that his alleged statement about “home im-
provement” was a true statement. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 28 (“That is
a false statement.”).
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dent.” 89 F. 4th 1010, 1016 (2024). According to the panel,
the
Seventh Circuit had “already decided [in Freed] that
§ 1014 criminalizes misleading representations.” Ibid. The
panel found that Thompson's statements were misleading be-
cause “the implication of his statements was that he owed
[the Bank] no more than $110,000.” Id., at 1017. The panel
acknowledged the Sixth Circuit's contrary holding in United
States v. Kurlemann, 736 F. 3d 439, but it concluded that
it was bound by Seventh Circuit precedent. 89 F. 4th, at
1017–1018.
We granted certiorari to determine whether § 1014 crimi-
nalizes statements that are misleading but not false. 603
U. S. 948 (2024).
II
A
We start with the text. Section 1014 criminalizes “know-
ingly mak[ing] any false statement or report.” It does not
use the word “misleading.” Yet false and misleading are
two different things. A misleading statement can be true.
See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Comm'n of Ill., 496 U. S. 91, 102 (1990) (noting that a “state-
ment, even if true, could be misleading ”). And a true state-
ment is obviously not false. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511
U. S. 1, 10 (1994) (“[T]o suppose that the same proposition is
both true and false . . . is manifestly absurd.” (quoting 1
Works of James Wilson 519 (J. Andrews ed. 1896))). So basic
logic dictates that at least some misleading statements are
not false.
The Government agrees with this principle, and even sug-
gested an example at oral argument: If a tennis player says
she “won the championship” when her opponent forfeited,
her statement—even if true—might be misleading because
it could lead people to think she had won a contested match.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 69. The Government also agreed at oral
argument with another example: If a doctor tells a patient,

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OMPSON v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
“I've done a hundred of these surgeries,” when 99 of those
patients
died, the statement—even if true—would be mis-
leading because it might lead people to think those surgeries
were successful. Id., at 71.
Given that some misleading statements are also true, it is
signifcant that the statute uses only the word “false.” If
that word means anything, it means “not true,” both today
and in 1948 when the statute was enacted. Black's Law Dic-
tionary 742 (12th ed. 2024) (“Untrue <a false statement>”);
id., at 721 (4th ed. 1951) (“Not true”). Just as a matter of
plain text, then, a statement that is misleading but true is
by defnition not a “false statement.”
Adding “any” before “false statement” does not change
that result. Contra, Brief for United States 19–20. Cer-
tainly, “any” has an “expansive meaning.” Department of
Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U. S. 125,
131 (2002) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5
(1997)). But “[e]xpansive, yes; transformative, no.” Free-
man v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012). A
statute that applies to “any Ford owner” does not cover all
car owners, because the car must still be a Ford. So too a
statute that applies to “any false statement” does not cover
all misleading statements, because the statement must still
be false. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U. S. 398, 400
(1998) (defning “ `any' false statement” as “a false statement
`of whatever kind' ” (quoting Gonzales, 520 U. S., at 5; empha-
sis added)).
The Government wisely agrees that “false” means “not
true.” Brief for United States 14. But, dictionary in hand,
the Government notes that “false” can also mean “deceitful.”
Id., at 15 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 748 (3d ed. 1933);
alterations omitted). And, thesaurus in the other hand, the
Government adds that “false and misleading have long been
considered synonyms.” Brief for United States 26 (citing
Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms 327, 549–550 (1942)).
Absent from the Government's account, however, is the fact
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that some misleading statements are not false, as the Gov-
er
nment acknowledged at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg.
68. Given that fact, the Government's textual arguments
simply point out the “substantial overlap” between the two
terms. Brief for United States 26. That overlap is beside
the point. Certainly, the statute's prohibition on “false
statement[s]” could reach some statements that are “mis-
lead[ing],” “deceitful,” “deceptive,” or “mendacious,” id., at
15, but only because those particular statements are also
false. Regardless of whether other adjectives apply, the
only relevant question according to the text of the statute is
whether the statement is “false.”
B
Statutory context confrms that § 1014 does not cover all
misleading statements. Again, the statute uses the word
“false.” It does not use “misleading.” Many other statutes
do, including other criminal statutes in Title 18 of the U. S.
Code. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1038(a) (“convey false or mis-
leading information”); § 1365(b) (“renders materially false or
misleading the labeling of . . . a consumer product”); § 1515(b)
(“making a false or misleading statement”); see also Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84–85, as amended, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77q(a)(2) (prohibiting obtaining property through “any un-
true statement of a material fact” or “any omission” that
renders a statement “misleading ”). Interpreting the word
“false” to include “misleading ” would make the inclusion of
“misleading ” in those statutes superfuous. See Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court will
avoid a reading which renders some words altogether
redundant.”).
Context from the time of enactment of § 1014 further con-
frms that the statute does not reach all misleading state-
ments. As we explained in a previous case, “Congress origi-
nally enacted § 1014 as part of its recodifcation of the federal
criminal code in 1948.” United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482,
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OMPSON v. UNITED STATES
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492 (1997). Eleven of the thirteen provisions brought to-
gether
by § 1014 prohibited “false” statements, and none
used the word “misleading,” see 7 U. S. C. §§ 1026(a), 1514(a)
(1946 ed.); 12 U. S. C. §§ 596, 981, 1122, 1138d(a), 1248, 1312,
1441(a), 1467(a) (1946 ed.); 15 U. S. C. § 616(a) (1946 ed.).
These predecessor statutes were all enacted in the decades
prior to 1948. Many other statutes enacted in the same pe-
riod used the phrase “false or misleading.” See, e. g., Perish-
able Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, § 2(4), 46 Stat. 532;
Public Utility Act of 1935, § 16(a), 49 Stat. 829; Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 602(a), 52 Stat. 1054. The
language of these other statutes shows that when Congress
intended to cover all misleading statements, “it knew how to
do so.” Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485, 492 (1994).
C
Precedent supports our reading of the text. For example,
in United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, we held that § 1014
does not incorporate a materiality requirement because the
statute does not “so much as mention materiality,” whereas
many other statutes do. Id., at 490, 492. The same logic
suggests that § 1014 does not reach a l l misleadi ng
statements.
Our decision in Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279
(1982), is also instructive. The defendant in that case depos-
ited several bad checks, then was convicted under § 1014 on
the theory that he falsely represented having more money
than he had. See id., at 283. We reversed the conviction
because the defendant's “course of conduct did not involve
the making of a `false statement' ” for the “simple reason”
that “a check is not a factual assertion at all, and therefore
cannot be characterized as `true' or `false.' ” Id., at 284.
That logic shows that a conviction under § 1014 requires at
least two things: (1) the defendant made a statement, and (2)
that statement can be characterized as “false” and not
“true.” The dissent in Williams observed that this reason-
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ing “would apply equally to material omissions.” Id., at 296
(
opinion of Marshall, J.). Precisely so. If a material omis-
sion renders a statement misleading, § 1014 still does not
cover that statement unless it can be characterized as “false”
and not “true.” A statement that is true but misleading
does not ft the bill.
The Government contends that one of our precedents
points in the opposite direction. In Kay v. United States,
303 U. S. 1 (1938), this Court described a predecessor statute
to § 1014 as “secur[ing] protection against false and mislead-
ing representations,” even though that statute used only the
word “false.” Id., at 7 (emphasis added); see also id., at 3,
n. 1. Indeed, as the Government points out, this Court used
the word “misleading ” (or “mislead”) several times through-
out the opinion. Id., at 6, 7, 8. But nearly every time the
word appears, it describes a person's intent while making
a false statement, not the statement itself. See id., at 5–6
(“making false statements with intent to mislead”); id., at 6
(“falsely with intent to mislead”); id., at 7 (“false statements
designed to mislead”). And in describing the statute as “se-
cur[ing] protections against false and misleading representa-
tions,” the Court used the word “and” rather than “or.” Id.,
at 7; see also id., at 8. Kay thus did not suggest that
misleading statements were independently unlawful under
§ 1014's predecessor. Instead, the Government's argument
about Kay again comes down to the overlap between false
and misleading. Cer tainly, a statute that cr imina l izes
“false” statements also criminalizes statements that are both
false and misleading, or false statements made with intent
to mislead. But the question before us is whether such a
statute also criminalizes statements that are misleading but
not false. The answer to that question must be no.
III
The Government argues that we should affrm on the al-
ternative basis that Thompson's statements were false. But
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OMPSON v. UNITED STATES
Alito, J., concurring
neither the District Court nor the Seventh Circuit answered
that
question, and “we are a court of review, not of frst
view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).
Our holding shows, however, that this question is the right
one to ask under § 1014. And as the litigation before us has
clarifed, even Thompson agrees that “[c]ontext obviously
matters in determining whether a statement is false.”
Reply Brief 7. Thompson concedes, for example, that if he
“had made his statement in response to a question like `did
you borrow $269,000?,' ” then “his statement, in context,
would have been false.” Id., at 9. We agree with the par-
ties that at least some context is relevant to determining
whether a statement is false under § 1014. We leave for re-
mand the question whether a reasonable jury could fnd that
Thompson's statements in this case were false.
***
In casua l conversati on, people use many over lappi ng
words to describe shady statements: false, misleading, dis-
honest, deceptive, literally true, and more. Only one of
those words appears in the statute. Section 1014 does not
criminalize statements that are misleading but true. Under
the statute, it is not enough that a statement is misleading.
It must be “false.”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to sum-
marize my understanding of the decision. Five aspects of
today's decision are most important.
First, the Court holds that 18 U. S. C. § 1014 criminalizes
only those statements that are “false.” Other related stat-
utes refer to both “false” and “misleading ” statements. But
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Alito, J., concurring
§ 1014 does not, so we assume the omission was intentional.
See
Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U. S. 8, 14 (2019) (“Congress has
shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language”).
The decision below, which held that § 1014 applies to merely
“misleading representations,” 89 F. 4th 1010, 1016 (CA7
2024), was therefore erroneous.
Second, as used in § 1014, the term “false” means “not
true.” Ante, at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted).
That is what it means in ordinary speech. See, e. g., Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary 819 (1976) (“not
corresponding to truth or reality: not true”); Random House
Dictionary of the English Language 695 (2d ed. 1987) (“not
true or correct; erroneous”). Neither party advocates giv-
ing “false statement” a specialized or term-of-art reading,
and the Court rightly declines to do so. Accordingly, “false
statement” in § 1014 bears its ordinary meaning.
Third, in considering whether a statement is “false,”
judges and juries must view the statement in “the context
in which it is made.” United States v. Briggs, 592 U. S. 69,
72 (2020). That is how people generally evaluate the truth
or falsity of a statement. Cf. Deal v. United States, 508 U. S.
129, 132 (1993) (discussing the “fundamental principle . . . of
language” that “the meaning of a word” or statement “cannot
be determined in isolation”). And since § 1014 uses the ad-
jective “false” in the ordinary sense of the term, the same
approach applies.
In ordinary speech, we do not regard a statement as true
or false based solely on the literal or semantic meaning of
its words viewed in isolation. Two examples illustrate this
principle. Start with an example adapted from the parties'
briefs. See Brief for United States 16; Reply Brief 8–9.
After noticing that a plate of 12 fresh-baked cookies has only
crumbs remaining, a mother asks her daughter, “Did you eat
all the cookies?” If the child says “I ate three” when she
actually had all 12, her words would be literally true in isola-
tion but false in context. The child did eat three cookies
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OMPSON v. UNITED STATES
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(then nine more). In context, however, the child is implic-
itly
saying that she ate only three cookies, and that is false.
Consider another example, adapted from a law-review arti-
cle by Professor Richard Fallon. See The Statutory Inter-
pretation Muddle, 114 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269, 272 (2019). Par-
ents James and Rachel are talking about their teenage son
Alex. James enlists Alex to help rake leaves, but Alex is
distracted and does little work. Afterwards, James tells
Rachel: “As usual, Alex was a big help.” Taken literally, his
statement is false. But if James and Rachel have often spo-
ken about Alex's unwillingness to help with household
chores, Rachel would understand that James's statement was
ironic and that James actually meant Alex was no help at all.
So, in context, James's statement is actually true.
Petitioner readily acknowledges that falsity must be
judged in context. See Reply Brief 7–8; Tr. of Oral Arg.
6–7. Courts should keep this important point in mind in
future § 1014 cases.
Fourth, as used in ordinary speech, the terms “false” and
“misleading ” may “overlap.” Ante, at 415. A statement
that might in ordinary speech be casually described as “mis-
leading ” may actually be misleading and false when viewed
in context. Because there is no clear line demarcating state-
ments that are false in context from those that are merely
misleading, there is no reason why a court should make any
reference to misleading statements in a § 1014 case. It was
error for the Court of Appeals to hold that § 1014 applies to
“misleading ” statements, and it would likewise be wrong for
a court to instruct a jury that it must acquit if it fnds that
a charged statement is misleading. The pattern jury in-
structions used in the various Circuits avoid this problem,*
*Most Circuits simply have the trial judge instruct the jury, in relevant
part, that it must fnd the defendant “made a false statement.” E. g.,
Model Crim. Jury Instr. § 15.41 (CA9 2022); Pattern Crim. Jury Instr.
§ 2.48 (CA10 2025). Some Circuits also have the judge add that “[a] state-
ment is `false' if it was untrue when made.” E. g., Pattern Crim. Jury
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Jackson, J., concurring
and our decision in this case does not necessitate any
change
.
Finally, the question that the Seventh Circuit must ad-
dress on remand is narrow. Although the Court of Appeals
affrmed petitioner's conviction on the ground that his state-
ments were “misleading,” the trial judge gave no such in-
struction to the jury. Petitioner did not object to the judge's
§ 1014 instructions below, and he does not challenge them
here. Instead of basing his request for reversal on instruc-
tional error, he moved after trial for a judgment of acquittal
based on insuffcient evidence. See Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 29(c). Thus, the applicable test on remand is whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Gov-
ernment, any rational fnder of fact could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that petitioner's statements were false in
context. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318–319
(1979); United States v. Armbruster, 48 F. 4th 527, 531
(CA7 2022).
With these observations, I join the Court's opinion.
Justice Jackson, concurring.
I agree with the Court's conclusion that 18 U. S. C. § 1014
criminalizes only false statements. Ante, at 418. I write
separately to note that the pre-verdict instructions the Dis-
trict Court provided to the jury in this case did not say oth-
erwise. That is, while the lower courts may have misunder-
stood the scope of § 1014, the jury was properly instructed
that it could fnd Thompson guilty only if the prosecution
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson “made the
charged false statement[s].” App. 157–158. For count two,
the jury specifcally found that Thompson made all of the
statements alleged. Id., at 160. Moreover, and impor-
Instr. § 4.18.1014 (CA1 2024); Model Crim. Jury Instr. § 6.18.1014 (CA8
2023). And it appears that none of the pattern jury instructions mentions
“misleading ” statements. See 2 L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury
Instructions–Criminal ¶37.03 (2024).
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422 TH
OMPSON v. UNITED STATES
Jackson, J., concurring
tantly, the jury was not advised that § 1014 “criminalizes
misleadi
ng representations,” 89 F. 4th 1010, 1016 (CA7 2024),
as was mistakenly required by the Seventh Circuit precedent
the Court rejects today.
Thus, in my view, there is little for the Seventh Circuit
to do on remand but affrm the District Court's judgment
upholding the jury's guilty verdict. Whether Thompson's
statements were, in fact, false is a question for the jury—
and here, one the jury has already answered. At most, then,
the Seventh Circuit can properly assess whether any reason-
able jury could have found that Thompson's statements satis-
fed § 1014's falsity element. On this record, I think that
legal issue is not subject to reasonable debate.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None