Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1
Pages 305–320
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 26, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
305
Syllabus
WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES,
INC
.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 23–971. Argued January 14, 2025—Decided February 26, 2025
Gary Waetzig fled a federal age-discrimination lawsuit against his former
employer Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. He later submitted his
claims for arbitration, and voluntarily dismissed his federal lawsuit
without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). After
losing at arbitration, he asked the District Court to reopen his dismissed
lawsuit and vacate the arbitration award, asserting Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) as the basis for reopening the suit. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits relief from a “fnal judgment, order,
or proceeding.” The District Court reopened the case, fnding that a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a “fnal proceeding ” and
that Waetzig made a mistake when he dismissed his case rather than
seeking a stay. The District Court separately granted Waetzig 's mo-
tion to vacate the arbitration award. The Tenth Circuit reversed.
Held: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a)
counts as a “fnal proceeding ” under Rule 60(b). Pp. 310–320.
(a) The Court does not address Halliburton's argument regarding ju-
risdiction over the motion to vacate. The question whether Rule 60(b)
permits reopening a case that was voluntarily dismissed without preju-
dice is antecedent to jurisdictional questions about the motion to vacate.
The lower courts may address those questions on remand. Pp. 310–311.
(b) Text, context, and history support the conclusion that a Rule 41(a)
voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifes as a “fnal proceeding ”
under Rule 60(b). Pp. 311–320.
(1) A voluntary dismissal is “fnal” because it terminates the case.
This straightforward reading aligns with legal dictionaries from 1946
(when “fnal” frst appeared in the Rule) and is confrmed by Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1946 Amendment to the Rule. The word
“fnal” underscores that Rule 60(b) does not infringe a court's inherent
and distinct power to revise its interlocutory decrees in an ongoing
case.
Halliburton's request to construe “fnal” consistent with jurisdictional
statutes like 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which gives the courts of appeals juris-
diction over appeals from “fnal decisions” of district courts, is unpersua-
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AETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
Syllabus
sive. The fnality concept in appellate jurisdiction serves a distinct pur-
pose
—preventing interlocutory appeals from impairing case resolution
at the trial level. Finality under Rule 60(b) does not play a similar role.
Unlike an appeal fled under the appellate jurisdiction statute, a motion
for relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary, not a matter of statutory
right. Rule 60(b) therefore does not pose the same risk to effcient case
resolution before the trial courts. The Court sees no reason to import
the understanding of fnality that applies in the feld of appellate juris-
diction to the different context of Rule 60(b). Pp. 312–315.
(2) A voluntary dismissal counts as a “proceeding ” under Rule
60(b). Legal dictionaries from 1938 to present suggest that the term
“proceeding ” encompasses all steps in an action's progression. Other
federal rules similarly treat “proceeding ” as including all formal steps
in an action.
Halliburton and the court below assert that the term “proceeding ”
should be read in the context of its neighboring terms “judgment” and
“order.” And because a “judgment” and “order” both involve some ju-
dicial determination of rights, a “proceeding ” should at least involve
some judicial action or conclusive determination of rights. Although it
is true that statutory terms must be read in the context of their neigh-
bors, that rule cuts the other way in this case. The proposed alterna-
tive reading would strip “proceeding ” of independent meaning, as any
judicial determination would already be an “order.” When Rule 60(b)
authorizes relief from a “judgment, order, or proceeding,” the Rule
speaks in an ascending order of generality. The structure of the Rule
suggests that each term should be read as broader than what came be-
fore. Pp. 315–318.
(3) The Court's reading is buttressed by historical context, as Rule
60(b) was modeled after a California statute previously interpreted to
extend to voluntary dismissals without prejudice. See Hall v. Hall, 584
U. S. 59, 72–73 (reading Rule 42(a) in light of “its statutory predeces-
sor”). Pp. 318–319.
82 F. 4th 918, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Vincent Levy argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Kevin D. Benish, Jack L. Millman, Spen-
cer J. Kontnik, Austin M. Cohen, and Aditi Shah.
Matthew D. McGill argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Jonathan C. Bond, Lochlan F.

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Opinion of the Court
Shelfer, Joshua R. Zuckerman, Patrick J. Fuster, and
H
eather F. Crow.*
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a court,
“[o]n motion and just terms,” to “relieve a party . . . from a
fnal judgment, order, or proceeding.” The question in this
case is whether Rule 60(b) permits a district court to reopen
a case that was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice
under Rule 41(a). We hold that such a dismissal counts as
a “fnal judgment, order, or proceeding,” and thus qualifes
for Rule 60(b) relief.
I
A
This case began as an employment dispute. Petitioner
Gary Waetzig is a former employee of respondent Hallibur-
ton Energy Services, Inc. Following his termination, Waet-
zig fled a lawsuit against Halliburton in the U. S. District
Court for the District of Colorado. He alleged that he was
illegally terminated on the basis of his age, in violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat.
602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. In response, Halli-
burton asserted that Waetzig was required to arbitrate his
claim. Waetzig acquiesced and submitted his claims for
arbitration.
At that point, Waetzig could have asked the District Court
to stay his federal lawsuit pending the arbitration proceed-
ings. See 9 U. S. C. § 3; Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472,
476 (2024). Instead, he elected to dismiss the case under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Under that Rule, a
plaintiff may dismiss his case “without a court order” if he
*Steven A. Engel, Michael H. McGinley, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Brian
A. Kulp fled a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America as amicus curiae urging affrmance.
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serves “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party
serves
either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Since Halliburton had not yet served an
answer or moved for summary judgment, Waetzig 's dis-
missal was effective without any court action. And given
that this was the frst time Waetzig had dismissed these
claims, his dismissal was presumptively “without prejudice.”
Rule 41(a)(1)(B). That means that Waetzig had preserved
his right to refle the same claims in the future. Semtek
Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 505 (2001).
Waetzig lost at arbitration. After a telephonic hearing,
the arbitrator issued an award granting summary judgment
in favor of Halliburton. In Waetzig 's view, however, the ar-
bitrator failed to follow various procedural rules required by
the parties' arbitration agreement. To remedy that alleged
error, Waetzig turned back to federal court.
B
Waetzig 's next move was procedurally creative. Instead
of fling a new lawsuit in federal court attacking the validity
of the arbitration award, he returned to the lawsuit that he
had previously dismissed. He fled a motion under the old
docket number and asked the court to reopen that case and
vacate the arbitration award. That move created an obvi-
ous problem: As we already explained, Waetzig 's dismissal
under Rule 41(a) terminated his case. So, in theory, fling a
new motion in the case was impossible. The District Court
was therefore skeptical of Waetzig 's gambit. It issued an
order asking him to show cause that would justify the court's
taking jurisdiction over the motion. In response, Waetzig
asserted that the District Court could reopen the case under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Rule 60(b) permits a court, “[o]n motion and just terms,”
to “relieve a party . . . from a fnal judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding.” A court may do so for six enumerated “reasons,”
including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable ne-
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309
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glect.” See Rule 60(b)(1). The general “purpose” of the
Ru
le, we have said, is “to make an exception to fnality.”
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 529 (2005). The Rule “at-
tempts to strike a proper balance between the conficting
principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that
justice should be done.” 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2851, p. 286 (3d ed. 2012).
Here, the District Court agreed with Waetzig and awarded
Rule 60(b) relief. First, it held that a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice counts as a “fnal proceeding ” and there-
fore falls within the ambit of the Rule. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 55a–56a. Second, it found that Waetzig had com-
mitted a “careless mistake” when he voluntarily dismissed
his case instead of moving for a stay pending arbitration or
administratively closing the case. Id., at 59a. According to
the District Court, Waetzig did so under the false under-
standing that the court would retain jurisdiction over the
arbitration agreement. Ibid. The court thus found that re-
lief was proper under Rule 60(b)(1). Ibid. And after re-
opening the case under that provision,
1
the court issued a
separate order granting Waetzig 's motion to vacate the arbi-
tration award. Id., at 48a.
Halliburton appealed. Among other things, it argued
that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not count
as a “fnal judgment, order, or proceeding,” and therefore
falls outside the reach of Rule 60(b). Brief for Appellant in
No. 22–1252 (CA10, Nov. 14, 2022), ECF Doc. 25, pp. 23–26.
The Tenth Circuit agreed. It reasoned that Waetzig 's vol-
untary dismissal was not a fnal “judgment” or “order” be-
cause the act of dismissal required neither the entry of a
1
The District Court additionally found that relief was warranted under
Rule 60(b)(6), which permits relief for “any other reason that justifes re-
lief.” In the District Court's view, an intervening precedent from our
Court affected Waetzig 's right to refle a new case, justifying relief under
Rule 60(b)(6). App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a–62a (citing Badgerow v. Walters,
596 U. S. 1 (2022)).

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judgment nor the issuance of an order by the court. 82
F
. 4th 918, 921 (2023). The Tenth Circuit then concluded
that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice could not be a
“fnal proceeding ” because, in its view, “a fnal proceeding
must involve, at a minimum, a judicial determination with
fnality.” Id., at 923. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit split
from other Circuits that have considered the issue. See
Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F. 3d 356, 362–363
(CA5 2013) (“[W]e are satisfed that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) volun-
tary dismissal without prejudice qualifes as a `fnal proceed-
ing ' ”); accord, Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F. 3d 586, 589
(CA7 2011).
We granted certiorari to decide whether a Rule 41(a) dis-
missal without prejudice is a “fnal judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding ” under Rule 60(b). 603 U. S. 948 (2024).
II
Before reaching that question, however, we frst address a
preliminary issue related to jurisdiction. Halliburton claims
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Waetzig 's
motion to vacate the arbitration award. In support of its
argument, Halliburton points to this Court's decisions in
Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1 (2022), and Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375 (1994).
We need not address the merits of this argument, however,
because it presents no barrier to our deciding the question
presented. We granted certiorari to decide whether Rule
60(b) permits a court to reopen a case that was voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice. That question is separate
from, and antecedent to, the question whether the District
Court could exercise jurisdiction over Waetzig 's motion to
vacate.
The cases Halliburton cites prove the point. In Bad-
gerow, we addressed the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
consider motions to vacate arbitration awards fled under a
provision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 10(a).
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We held that a plaintiff seeking to vacate an arbitration
award
must point to an “ `independent jurisdictional basis' ”
that would authorize a federal court to decide the matter.
Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 8 (quoting Hall Street Associates,
L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S 576, 582 (2008)). In the
other case, Kokkonen, we suggested that Rule 60(b) cannot
confer jurisdiction upon a federal court where jurisdiction
would not otherwise exist. 511 U. S., at 378. We reasoned
that reopening a case under Rule 60(b) would not automati-
cally confer jurisdiction over a subsequent motion to enforce
a settlement agreement. Ibid. The upshot of our analysis
in Kokkonen was that, even though Rule 60(b) might give a
court the power to reopen a case, the Rule cannot itself serve
as the basis for federal jurisdiction.
Although these cases might bear on the District Court's
jurisdiction over Waetzig 's motion to vacate, they say noth-
ing at all about whether the District Court had the power,
under Rule 60(b), to reopen Waetzig 's case in the frst place.
That power is the focus of our decision today, and it must be
addressed before any subsequent jurisdictional questions is
considered. The procedural history of this case confrms as
much. Before the District Court could rule on Waetzig 's
motion to vacate, it frst needed to reopen his case. Consist-
ent with that understanding, the court issued two separate
orders: frst, an order reopening the case pursuant to Rule
60(b), see App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a, and second, an order
vacating the arbitration award, see id., at 48a. We granted
certiorari to address the District Court's power to issue the
frst order, not its jurisdiction to issue the second. We leave
it to the lower courts to address any subsequent jurisdic-
tional questions on remand.
III
That brings us to the question presented. Rule 60(b) per-
mits a court to “relieve a party . . . from a fnal judgment,
order, or proceeding.” We hold that a Rule 41(a) voluntary

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dismissal without prejudice qualifes as a “fnal . . . proceed-
i
ng ” under Rule 60(b). Text, context, and history support
that interpretation.
A
1
To start, we hold that a voluntary dismissal without preju-
dice is “fnal” under Rule 60(b). In 1946, when the term
“fnal” frst appeared in the Rule, legal dictionaries defned
“fnal” to mean “[d]efnitive; terminating; completed; con-
clusive; last.” Black's Law Dictionary 779 (3d ed. 1933)
(Black's); see Ballentine's Law Dictionary 503 (1930) (“the
end, ultimate, or last”). By way of illustration, Black's Law
Dictionary defned “fnal order” as an order that “terminates
the action itself. ” Black 's 1298. A voluntary dismissal
without prejudice falls comfortably within this defnition.
The dismissal is the “conclusive” and “last” fling on the
docket, and it “complete[s]” the particular lawsuit at issue.
Id., at 779. And, like a “fnal order,” the dismissal “termi-
nates the action itself.” Id., at 1298.
That straightforward reading of “fnal” is confrmed by the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee's Notes, which are “ `a
reliable source of insight into the meaning of a rule.' ” Hall
v. Hall, 584 U. S. 59, 75 (2018) (quoting United States v. Vonn,
535 U. S. 55, 64, n. 6 (2002)). In the Notes accompanying
the 1946 amendments to Rule 60(b), the Committee briefy
explained its reason for adding the term “fnal.” According
to the Committee, the addition of “fnal” clarifed that “inter-
locutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions
of the Rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete
power of the court rendering them to afford such relief from
them as justice requires.” Advisory Committee's 1946 Note
on subd. (b) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60, 28 U. S. C. App.,
p. 289.
The term “fnal” was therefore intended to exclude “inter-
locutory judgments” from the reach of the Rule. And, as
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the Committee Notes explain, that exclusion makes sense.
Ru
le 60(b) relief from interlocutory judgments is unneces-
sary because, with respect to those judgments, “a rehearing
may be sought at any time before [the] fnal decree, provided
due diligence be employed and a revision be otherwise conso-
nant with equity.” John Simmons Co. v. Grier Brothers Co.,
258 U. S. 82, 90–91 (1922). In other words, a court presiding
over a case is always capable of revising an interlocutory
ruling, so long as a revision is “consonant with equity.” Id.,
at 91. The word “fnal” underscores that Rule 60(b) does
not infringe that inherent and distinct power.
After a case is fnally terminated, however, a court no
longer presides, and a party can no longer seek a “rehearing ”
on an interlocutory judgment. Ibid. It is at that point that
a court's power under Rule 60(b) kicks in, permitting the
court to look back at the “fnal” act in a case and provide
relief from that act when appropriate. A voluntary dis-
missal without prejudice is one such “fnal” act. It termi-
nates the case and strips a court of its equitable power to
revise its earlier rulings. At that point, Rule 60(b) is the
appropriate avenue for relief.
A contrary interpretation would place voluntary dismiss-
als without prejudice into a procedural no man's land. Such
dismissals would not be “interlocutory” in the manner that
the Committee Notes discuss because they are outside of a
court's “complete power” over an ongoing case. Nor would
they be “fnal” and thus subject to Rule 60(b). Halliburton
provides no evidence supporting the existence of any third
category. If a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not
“interlocutory,” then it is hard to imagine that it could be
anything but “fnal.”
2
Halliburton nevertheless presses for a narrower defnition
of “fnal.” Specifcally, it asks the Court to construe “fnal”
in Rule 60(b) to mean essentially what it means in jurisdic-
tional statutes like 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which gives the courts

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of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from “fnal decisions” of
distr
ict courts. This grant of appellate jurisdiction can be
traced back to the frst Judiciary Act. See Judiciary Act of
1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. And long before the adoption of Rule
60(b), this Court had developed a rich jurisprudence explain-
ing the meaning of “fnal” as it relates to appellate jurisdic-
tion. See Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, 3–4 (1882)
(citing cases). Halliburton asks us to look to that “ `legal
lineage' ” when interpreting Rule 60(b). Brief for Respond-
ent 22 (quoting Hall, 584 U. S., at 66). Based on that body of
case law, Halliburton contends that a determination is “fnal”
principally when it “ `terminate[s] the litigation between the
parties on the merits of the case.' ” Brief for Respondent
23 (quoting Bostwick, 106 U. S., at 3; alterations in original;
emphasis added).
Contrary to Halliburton's suggestion, however, we do not
fnd this body of case law helpful in interpreting the meaning
of the term “fnal” in Rule 60(b). True, we sometimes look
to legal tradition when interpreting a statutory term, but we
typically do so only when the term is “ `obviously trans-
planted from another legal source.' ” Taggart v. Lorenzen,
587 U. S. 554, 560 (2019) (quoting Hall, 584 U. S., at 73).
Here, there is little reason to think that the term “fnal” in
Rule 60(b) was transplanted from statutes governing the ju-
risdiction of federal appellate courts. In that feld, the con-
cept of fnality plays a distinctive role: It prevents interlocu-
tory appeals from unduly impairing the resolution of civil
and criminal cases at the trial level. Under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1291 and predecessor provisions, a party that loses in the
district court has a “statutory right” to take an appeal from
any “fnal decision.” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U. S. 232,
245, n. 19 (1981). Our decisions defning what the term
“fnal” means in this context have imposed an important
practical limit on such appeals. We have described the f-
nality requirement as “the means for achieving a healthy
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legal system.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323,
326
(1940). Without it, too many trial court rulings could
be appealed, and “ `the orderly progress of a cause' ” would
be halted while the appellate court considered all sorts of
“ `question[s] which ha[ve] happened to cross the path of such
litigation.' ” Ibid. (quoting Segurola v. United States, 275
U. S. 106, 112 (1927)).
Finality under Rule 60(b) does not play a similar role.
Unlike an appeal fled under the appellate jurisdiction stat-
ute, a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary, not
“a matter of statutory right.” Manypenny, 451 U. S., at 245,
n. 19. Further, Rule 60(b) relief is unnecessary when a case
is ongoing because during that time, a court retains jurisdic-
tion to review and modify its decrees. See supra, at 312–
313. Thus, there is no reason to fear that Rule 60(b) will be
abused to bring about a “ `halt in the orderly progress of a
cause.' ” Cobbledick, 309 U. S., at 326 (quoting Segurola, 275
U. S., at 112). And, even if such abuse were possible, Rule
60(b) provides district courts with ample discretion to pre-
vent it. Given these stark contextual differences, it is un-
likely that “fnal” as it appears in Rule 60(b) was trans-
planted from the appellate jurisdiction statute.
We therefore see no reason to import the understanding
of fnality that applies in the feld of appellate jurisdiction.
In the context of Rule 60(b), a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice is “fnal” because it terminates the case.
B
Next, we hold that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice
counts as a “proceeding ” under Rule 60(b).
2
In 1938, when
the term “proceeding ” frst appeared in the Rule, Black's
2
Waetzig additionally contends that a voluntary dismissal without prej-
udice counts as a “judgment.” See Brief for Petitioner 25–29. Because
we hold that such dismissals qualify as proceedings, we need not decide
whether they qualify as judgments for the purposes of Rule 60(b).

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Law Dictionary defned “proceeding ” as: “[T]he form and
manner
of conducting juridical business before a court or ju-
dicial offcer; regular and orderly progress in form of law;
including all possible steps in an action from its commence-
ment to the execution of judgment.” Black's 1430. Other
dictionaries defned the term similarly. See Ballentine's
Law Dictionary, at 1023 (“the form in which actions are
to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in
suits [and] of conducting them . . . ” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Webster's New International Dictionary
1710 (1927) (“[a]ny step or act taken in conducting liti-
gation”). These defnitions suggest that the term “proceed-
ing ” encompasses all steps in an action, including the fling
of papers that are noted on the docket. Even today, Black's
Law Dictionary defnes “proceeding ” as “[t]he regular and
order ly progressi on of a lawsuit, i ncludi ng a ll ac ts
and events between the time of commencement and the
entry of judgment.” Black's 1459 (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis
added).
Other Federal Rules similarly treat “proceeding ” as in-
cluding all formal steps taken in an action. Take, for exam-
ple, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Under that Rule,
a court may stay “further proceedings” in a case until a dis-
covery order is obeyed. Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(iv). In that con-
text, a stay of “proceedings” likely refers to a stay of any
further action in the lawsuit, including further docket flings.
If read otherwise, the stay would be an ineffective sanction
against a party's disobedience. Similarly, Rule 41 permits a
court to “stay the proceedings” until a plaintiff pays the costs
of a previously dismissed action. Rule 41(d)(2). As with
Rule 37, that would be a relatively toothless sanction if “pro-
ceedings” did not encompass all further actions in the case.
Halliburton and the court below offer an alternative def-
nition. They argue that the term “proceeding ” is “ `given
more precise content by the neighboring words with which
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it is associated.' ” Fischer v. United States, 603 U. S. 480,
487
(2024) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285,
294 (2008)). Specifcally, they assert that the term “proceed-
ing ” should be read to include the characteristics of the
terms that come before it: “judgment” and “order.” See
Rule 60(b) (“judgment, order, or proceeding ”). Since a
“judgment” and “order” both involve some judicial determi-
nation of rights, they say, a “proceeding ” should at least in-
volve some judicial action or conclusive determination of
rights. See Brief for Respondent 34–37; 82 F. 4th, at 922–
923.
Although it is true that statutory terms must be read in
the context of their neighbors, that rule cuts the other way
here. To read “proceeding ” to require a judicial determina-
tion would strip it of any independent meaning. Any formal
judicial determination of a party's rights is bound to be an
“order.” See Black's 1298 (defning “order” as “[e]very di-
rection of a court or judge made or entered in writing ”).
So, if the term “proceeding ” covers only judicial determina-
tions, it is hard to imagine what the term “proceeding ”
would encompass that is not already covered by the term
“order.”
Such a limited reading of “proceeding ” is contrary to the
general structure of Rule 60(b). When the Rule authorizes
relief from a “judgment, order, or proceeding,” it speaks in
an ascending order of generality. It starts with the narrow-
est category, “judgments,” and then moves to a broader cate-
gory, “orders.” Any “judgment” will generally involve an
“order,” but not all “orders” are “judgments.” That sug-
gests that each term should be read as broader than what
came before. Just as “order” encompasses and exceeds
“judgment, ” “proceeding ” should encompass and exceed
“order.” It would be odd, therefore, to read “proceeding ”
as covering only those acts that are already covered by the
term “order.”
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Halliburton intuitively grasps this point. To avoid a com-
plete
overlap between “order” and “proceeding,” it tries to
conjure up examples of what might count as a “proceeding ”
under its defnition while not being an “order.” But in doing
so, Halliburton only reinforces the commonsense conclusion
that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a pro-
ceeding. For example, Halliburton suggests that a volun-
tary dismissal with prejudice may qualify as a “proceeding.”
Brief for Respondent 37. But there is no reason why a vol-
untary dismissal with prejudice would count as a “proceed-
ing ” while a voluntary dismissal without prejudice would
not. Both consist in the simple fling of a paper on the
docket. See Rule 41(a)(1)(A). Halliburton contends that
a dismissal with prejudice is different because it “imposes
legal burdens.” Brief for Respondent 37. But a volun-
tary dismissal without prejudice does so as well. For exam-
ple, Waetzig 's dismissal apparently precluded him from
continuing to pursue his claims—not because his dismis-
sal was with prejudice, but because the relevant statute of
limitations had already expired. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11,
19–20.
In sum, the text, context, and structure of Rule 60(b) show
that the term “proceeding ” encompasses all steps taken in
the action, including a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
C
Finally, our reading of Rule 60(b) is buttressed by the his-
torical context in which the Rule was enacted. The original
version of the Rule was based on a then-extant provision in
the California Code of Civil Procedure, § 473. See Advisory
Committee's 1946 Note on subd. (b) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
60. That provision permitted a court to “relieve a party . . .
from a judgment, order, or other proceeding.” Cal. Code
Civ. Proc. § 473 (Deering 1937). And prior to the enactment
of Rule 60(b), the Supreme Court of California had read that
provision to apply to voluntary dismissals. According to the
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Cite
as: 604 U. S. 305 (2025)
319
Opinion of the Court
California court, a plaintiff who “consented to [a] dismissal
to
his injury, under a mistake of fact, excusable under the
terms of the statute, . . . is not barred of relief.” Palace
Hardware Co. v. Smith, 134 Cal. 381, 384, 66 P. 474, 476
(1901). And the California court made clear that the exist-
ence of prejudice was immaterial: “Whether . . . a voluntary
dismissal . . . bars a future action, need not be considered.
If the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the statute, it is not
material whether, in its absence, he could have relief either
at law or in equity.” Id., at 385, 66 P., at 476.
When read in light of this history, it makes sense that Rule
60(b) would likewise extend to voluntary dismissals without
prejudice. The provision was “expressly modeled” after a
statute that ostensibly permitted such relief. See Hall, 584
U. S., at 72–73 (reading Rule 42(a) in light of “its statutory
predecessor”). And although the Rule has been amended
substantially since then, the amendments have always re-
tained the original candidates for relief: judgments, orders,
or proceedings. To be sure, the Rule now specifes that the
judgments, orders, or proceedings must be “fnal.” But, as
we have already explained, the term “fnal” does not exclude
voluntary dismissals without prejudice from the reach of the
Rule. See supra, at 312–315. There is no reason to think,
then, that such dismissals have since escaped the Rule's
coverage.
IV
For the above reasons, a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal
without prejudice counts as a “fnal proceeding ” under Rule
60(b). When the requirements of Rule 60(b) are satisfed, a
district court may relieve a party from such a dismissal and
reopen the case. We express no view on whether that relief
was proper in Waetzig 's case. Nor do we reach the question
whether the court below could exercise jurisdiction over
Waetzig 's motion to vacate the arbitration award. Those
questions are left to the court below on remand, to the extent
the relevant arguments have been preserved.
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320 W
AETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
The judgment of the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the
case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None