Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1
Pages 140–167
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 21, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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140 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES ex rel.
HEA
TH
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 23–1127. Argued November 4, 2024—Decided February 21, 2025
The E-Rate (short for Education-Rate) program, established under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, subsidizes internet and other telecom-
munications services for schools and libraries across the United States.
To fnance those subsidies, Congress required that telecommunications
carriers pay into a fund (now known as the Universal Service Fund)
that is administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company,
a private not-for-proft corporation. The Company collects and distrib-
utes the resulting pot of money to benefciaries pursuant to regulations
prescribed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In ad-
dition to providing for subsidies, those regulations impose upon carriers
a rule called the “lowest corresponding price” rule, which prohibits
them from charging schools and libraries more than what they would
charge a “similarly situated” non-residential customer. Once an appro-
priate charge is set, a school can obtain its subsidy by paying the carrier
a discounted price and requiring the carrier to seek the remainder from
the Fund, or by paying the carrier full freight and then applying for
reimbursement from the Fund.
Respondent Todd Heath is an auditor of telecommunications bills who
believes that petitioner Wisconsin Bell defrauded the E-Rate program
out of millions of dollars. According to Heath, Wisconsin Bell consist-
ently overcharged schools in violation of the “lowest corresponding
price” rule. Heath brought suit under the False Claims Act (FCA),
which enables private parties to bring civil actions on the Government's
behalf to protect federal programs and funds from fraud. The FCA
imposes civil liability on any person who “knowingly presents, or causes
to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim” as statutorily defned. 31
U. S. C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). In Heath's view, Wisconsin Bell's violations of
the “lowest corresponding price” rule led to reimbursement requests
for amounts higher than the E-Rate program should have paid. The
premise of Heath's suit is that an E-Rate reimbursement request can
give rise to FCA liability because it qualifes as a “claim,” which, as
relevant here, requires the Government to “provide[ ] or ha[ve] provided
any portion of the money” requested. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

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as: 604 U. S. 140 (2025)
141
Syllabus
Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss Heath's suit. In its view, an E-rate
rei
mbursement request can never qualify as a “claim” under the FCA
because the money comes from private carriers and is handled by a
private corporation, meaning the Government does not “provide[ ] any
portion of the money” requested. The District Court and the Seventh
Circuit rejected that argument. The Court of Appeals held that the
Government “provided” E-Rate program funding for two independent
reasons. First, it held that the Government provided all the money in
the program through its regulatory role in the collection and distribu-
tion of contributions. Second and more narrowly, it found that the Gov-
ernment provided some “portion” of E-Rate funding by depositing into
the Fund, in the relevant years, more than $100 million directly from
the U. S. Treasury.
Held: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the
FCA because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “portion”
of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from
the Treasury into the Fund. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The question is
whether the Government “provided”—in ordinary meaning, supplied,
furnished, or made available—any portion of the money sought. While
the parties (mirroring the Seventh Circuit's opinion) discuss two inde-
pendent theories under which the Government potentially “provided”
the requested funds, here it is enough that the Government provided
some E-Rate moneys through the Treasury's own transfer of over $100
million into the Fund. That amount consisted of delinquent contribu-
tions that the FCC and Treasury Department collected from carriers, as
well as civil settlements and criminal restitution payments from Justice
Department activities in response to wrongdoing in the E-Rate pro-
gram. The Government therefore “provided [a] portion of the money”
disbursed from the Fund to reimburse E-Rate program participants.
Wisconsin Bell argues that even the $100 million was provided only
by the carriers, with the Government playing no more than an interme-
diary role. But to start with, Wisconsin Bell mischaracterizes the Gov-
ernment's role. Rather than acting as a passive throughway for the
transmission of the $100 million, it generated that money itself by ex-
tracting it from carriers and by prosecuting wrongdoing in the E-Rate
program. And anyway, a simple intermediary can sometimes also “pro-
vide” things to a recipient—and the Government, even if viewed only
in that light, would do so here. For example, a proctor for an exam
“provides” blue books and pencils to students, even if she has not pur-
chased them herself and has instead gotten them from the school. The
same is true here: The Government “provided” the relevant $100 million
to the Fund by collecting it and routing it through Treasury accounts.

142 WISCONSIN
BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES ex rel.
HEATH
Syllabus
Here, in the years relevant to Heath's FCA suit, the Government
“prov
ided” a “portion of the money requested” for E-Rate subsidies by
collecting, holding, and transferring $100 million by way of the Treasury.
Indeed, those transfers look like most Government spending: Money
usually comes to the Government from private parties, and it then usu-
ally goes out to the broader community to fund programs and activities.
That conclusion is enough to enable Heath's FCA suit to proceed.
Pp. 148–155.
92 F. 4th 654, affrmed and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, in which Kavanaugh, J., joined, and in which
Alito, J., joined as to Part I, post, p. 155. Kavanaugh, J., fled a concur-
ring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 167.
Allyson N. Ho argued the cause for petitioner. With her
on the briefs were Helgi C. Walker, Andrew LeGrand, Ash-
ley E. Johnson, Stephen J. Hammer, and Patrick J. Fuster.
Tejinder Singh argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were David J. Chizewer, Roger A. Lewis,
and Harleen Kaur.
Vivek Suri argued the cause for the United States as ami-
cus curiae urging affrmance. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant At-
torney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart,
Michael S. Raab, Charles W. Scarborough, and Kevin J.
Kennedy.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Center for
Constitutional Responsibility by Steven P. Lehotsky, Andrew B. Davis,
and Karen R. Harned; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America by John P. Elwood and Andrew R. Varcoe; for the DRI–Center
for Law and Public Policy by Mary Massaron; for USTelecom–The Broad-
band Association et al. by Scott H. Angstreich; and for the Washington
Legal Foundation by John M. Masslon II and Cory L. Andrews.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Anti-Fraud
Coalition by Chandra A. Napora; for Professors of Law et al. by Michael
Lieberman and Jamie Crooks; and for the Southern Education Foundation
et al. by Meredith R. Aska McBride.
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143
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
E-Rate (short for Education-Rate) program subsidizes
internet and other telecommunications services for schools
and libraries across the United States. Established under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, the pro-
gram disburses funds—collected from telecommunications
carriers and managed by a private corporation—to cover a
substantial percentage of a school's internet costs. The
funds are payable, under Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) regulations, to either a carrier or a school upon
receipt of a reimbursement request.
This case asks us to decide whether such a request can
count as a “claim” under the False Claims Act (FCA or Act),
31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733. The FCA protects government
funds and programs by imposing civil liability on any person
who knowingly presents a false or fraudulent “claim” as stat-
utorily defned. In the part of the defnition relevant here,
a request for money qualifes as a claim if the Government
“provides or has provided any portion of the money . . . re-
quested.” § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). We hold today that the
E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue satisfy that require-
ment because the Government provided (at a minimum) a
“portion” of the money applied for. In the years in which
those requests were made, the Government transferred more
than $100 million from the Treasury into the pool of funds
used to pay E-Rate subsidies. That is enough to create a
“claim” under the Act, and to allow a suit alleging fraud to
go forward.
I
Congress and the FCC have long worked to ensure that
“all the people of the United States” have access, at reason-
able prices, to telecommunications and information services.
47 U. S. C. § 151; see § 254(b). In keeping with that goal, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to estab-
lish several so-called universal-service programs for popula-
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144 WISCONSIN
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Opinion of the Court
tions
That
or institutions needing improved access. See
statute identifed, for example, consumers in
§ 254.
rural
areas, consumers with low incomes, and—critical here—
elementary schools, secondary schools, and libraries as ap-
propriate recipients of subsidies or other assistance. See
§§ 254(b), (h)(1).
To fnance those measures, Congress required that tele-
communications carriers pay into a fund—now known as the
Universal Service Fund—as FCC regulations prescribe.
See § 254(d). Under those rules, the FCC determines each
quarter the percentage of revenues that a carrier must con-
tribute. See 47 CFR §§ 54.706, 54.709(a) (2023). The FCC,
however, does not manage the Fund's day-to-day operations.
Rather, it has “appointed” the Universal Service Administra-
tive Company, a private not-for-proft corporation, as the
Fund's “Administrator.” § 54.701(a); see App. 34. The Ad-
ministrative Company generally bills and collects contribu-
tions from carriers—though the FCC plays a role in pursu-
ing delinquents. See § 54.702; App. 37– 38, 40– 43; in fra,
at 150. And the Company distributes the resulting pot of
money, as FCC rules provide, to program benefciaries.
See § 54.702(b).
1
Among those benefciaries are public and private schools
and libraries, under what is commonly called the E-Rate pro-
gram. See 47 U. S. C. §§ 254(b)(6), (h)(1)(B); 47 CFR § 54.500
et seq. That program subsidizes between 20 and 90 percent
of a school's total charges for internet and other telecommu-
nications services, with higher percentages for schools in
rural or low-income areas. See §§ 54.505(a)–(c). And the
program protects the value of that subsidy by preventing a
1
The precise relationship between the FCC and the Administrative
Company is in dispute in other litigation. See, e. g., Consumers' Research
v. FCC, 109 F. 4th 743, 750 (CA5) (en banc), cert. granted, 604 U. S. 1029
(2024). The details of that relationship are irrelevant here, and we ex-
press no views on that score. Nor do we comment on any other matter
pertaining to the constitutionality of the universal-service programs.
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Opinion of the Court
carrier from infating its non-discounted prices. Under the
“
lowest corresponding price” rule, a carrier may not charge a
school a higher sticker price than it would charge a “similarly
situated” customer. §§ 54.500, 54.511(b). Once an appro-
priate charge is set, a school can obtain its subsidy in either
of two ways. See § 54.514(c). The school can pay the car-
rier only the discounted price, thus requiring the carrier to
seek the remainder from moneys held in the Fund. Or the
school can pay the carrier full freight and itself apply for
reimbursement.
Respondent Todd Heath is an auditor of telecommunica-
tions bills who believes that petitioner Wisconsin Bell de-
frauded the E-Rate program out of millions of dollars. Ac-
cording to Heath, the carrier fouted the FCC's “lowest
corresponding price” rule for more than a decade (from 2002
to 2015) by charging schools a higher full price than it
charged other, similarly situated customers. And as Heath
notes, overcharges of that kind inevitably lead to overpay-
ments from the Fund. Take a hypothetical example. If the
lowest corresponding price for a service is $1,000 and a
school is entitled to a 60% subsidy, then the E-Rate program
should pay out $600. But if Wisconsin Bell, in violation of
the rule, instead charged the school a full price of $1,500,
then the program would instead confer a subsidy of $900.
(And the school, rather than pay $400, would pay $600.) The
carrier, in Heath's view, thus wrongly amassed revenues at
the E-Rate program's expense.
That accusation is at the heart of a lawsuit Heath brought
against Wisconsin Bell under the FCA. Enacted during the
Civil War to protect federal programs and funds from fraud,
that law enables private parties to bring civil actions on the
Government's behalf, and to share in any monetary recovery.
See United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Re-
sources, Inc., 599 U. S. 419, 424–425 (2023). A defendant is
liable under the Act if it “knowingly presents, or causes to
be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment.” 31
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U. S. C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). In Heath's view, Wisconsin Bell en-
gaged
in that conduct many times over by way of violating
the FCC's “lowest corresponding price” rule. App. 62–82
(complaint). All those violations led to reimbursement re-
quests, by either Wisconsin Bell or a school, for amounts
higher than the E-Rate program should have had to pay.
Plus, all Wisconsin Bell's own requests included a false certi-
fcation (or so Heath alleged) that it had complied with the
program's rules, including the one about pricing.
The premise of Heath's suit is that an E-Rate reimburse-
ment request can give rise to FCA liability because it fts
within the statute's defnition of the term “claim.” That
defnition varies depending on whether a “request or de-
mand” for money is made to a federal employee or agent, or
instead to an “other recipient.” § 3729(b)(2)(A). Assuming
that the Administrative Company—the recipient of E-Rate
reimbursement requests—falls within the “other” rather
than the “agent” category, such a request must meet two
requirements to count as an FCA “claim.”
2
First, the
money requested must be “spent or used on the Govern-
ment's behalf or to advance a Government program or in-
terest.” § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii). And second, the Government
must “provide[ ] or ha[ve] provided any portion of the
money” requested. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The statutory
defnition, though, also offers a caveat: It is immaterial, in
assessing whether those requirements are met, “whether or
not the United States has title to the money” at issue.
§ 3729(b)(2)(A).
3
2
The parties have disputed throughout this litigation whether the Ad-
ministrative Company is actually an “agent” of the United States, and
therefore not subject to the two requirements about to be described. But
our disposition of this case makes that issue immaterial, and we therefore
express no view of its merits. See in fra, at 148, n. 4 (noting the Court of
Appeals' treatment of the question).
3
Congress's most recent amendments to the “claim” defnition (which
included adding the title provision) occurred in 2009, after some of the
disputed reimbursement requests were made. But Wisconsin Bell does
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Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss Heath's suit, arguing that
under
the FCA's defnition an E-Rate reimbursement re-
quest can never qualify as a “claim.” The carrier did not
deny that the money so requested “advance[s] a Government
program,” as the defnition frst requires. That money, after
all, simply is the E-Rate program's subsidy. But Wisconsin
Bell contended that an E-Rate reimbursement request funks
the second requirement, because the Government does not
“provide[ ] any portion of the money” requested. In Wiscon-
sin Bell's view, all the money in the E-Rate program is “pri-
vate,” rather than “federal.” No. 2:08–cv–00724 (ED Wis.,
Nov. 25, 2014), ECF Doc. 97, p. 6. That is because the
money comes from private carriers' contributions, and a pri-
vate corporation handles its collection and disbursement.
See id., at 12–13. “The federal government,” Wisconsin
Bell averred, does not provide “a single penny to the Fund.”
Id., at 12.
After the District Court denied the motion, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that E-Rate reimburse-
ment requests ft the FCA's defnition of “claim.” The Court
of Appeals found two “independent paths” for concluding,
contra Wisconsin Bell, that the Government “provided” E-
Rate program funding. 92 F. 4th 654, 666 (2024). First, the
court held that the Government provided all the money in
the program through its regulatory role in the “collection
and distribution” of contributions—most notably, by initially
not contend that those amendments require separate analysis of the pre-
and post-2009 requests to resolve the issues we address. In discussing
those issues, the carrier cites the current defnition and describes the
amendments (including the title provision) as merely clarifying existing
law. See Brief for Wisconsin Bell 24–25, 39; Reply Brief 5–6. We as-
sume without deciding that its characterization is correct, and thus use
only the FCA's current defnition of “claim.” Cf. Universal Health Serv-
ices, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U. S. 176, 185, n. 1 (2016)
(noting in another FCA case involving both pre- and post-2009 requests
that no party argued and “we thus do not consider[ ] whether pre-2009
conduct should be treated differently”).

148 WISCONSIN
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requiring the carriers to pay into the Fund. Id., at 671; see
i
d., at 669. Second and more narrowly, the court found that
the Government provided some “portion” of E-Rate funding
by depositing into the Fund, in the relevant years, “more
than $100 million directly from the U. S. Treasury.” Id., at
667. That contribution of Treasury money, even if a small
part of the Fund's total, was enough to qualify the E-Rate
reimbursement requests as FCA “claims.” See ibid.
4
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that E-Rate reimbursement requests do not so
qualify—although that court considered only the “broad[er]
view” of how the Government “provides” E-Rate funding.
United States ex rel. Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 759 F. 3d
379, 383–384 (2014) (per curiam); id., at 387–388 (fnding the
FCC's “regulatory supervision” of the program insuffcient
to show that the Government provided E-Rate funds).
We granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over
whether E-Rate reimbursement requests are FCA “claims.”
602 U. S. 1030 (2024). We need reach no further today than
the narrower ($100 million) ground on which the court below
ruled. The requests at issue qualify as claims because, in
the years they were submitted, the U. S. Treasury deposited
money into the Fund for disbursement to those entitled to
E-Rate subsidies.
II
The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue count as
FCA “claims” if the Government “provides or has provided
any portion of the money” requested. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
Is that language satisfed when a school or carrier asks for
E-Rate program funds? Because the Act does not defne
4
Finding yet a third path to the same outcome, the Seventh Circuit also
held that the Administrative Company is an “agent” of the Government.
See 92 F. 4th, at 667–668. As noted above, that conclusion (if correct)
obviates the FCA's requirement that the Government “provide” any part
of the requested money. See supra, at 146, n. 2.
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Opinion of the Court
the word “provides,” we look to its ordinary meaning. To
“prov
ide” means to “supply,” to “furnish,” or to “make avail-
able.” American Heritage Dictionary 1411 (4th ed. 2000); 12
Oxford English Dictionary 713 (2d ed. 1989); see Little Sis-
ters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylva-
nia, 591 U. S. 657, 676 (2020) (defning “provide” the same
way). The question thus becomes whether the Government
supplied, furnished, or made available any portion of the
money here sought.
The parties' arguments on that score mirror the two “inde-
pendent paths” laid out in the Seventh Circuit's opinion. 92
F. 4th, at 666; see supra, at 147–148. Wisconsin Bell and
Heath dispute whether the Government provides all E-Rate
moneys through its regulatory authority over the program,
especially its mandate that carriers contribute to the Fund.
But so too the parties contest whether the Government has
provided some E-Rate moneys through the Treasury's own
transfer into the Fund of over $100 million, to pay for pro-
gram subsidies.
If Heath prevails on either one of those theories, he has
met the FCA's defnition of “claim.” Under that defnition,
providing some funds is just as good as providing all: The
Government, recall, need provide only “any portion” of the
amount requested. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see United States
ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F. 3d 295, 303
(CA4 2009) (“So long as `any portion' of the claim is or will
be funded by U. S. money,” the “full claim satisfes the
defnition”). Wisconsin Bell acknowledges that point, as it
must. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. So if the Government, by
making direct payments, has provided even a small fraction
of the money used to fund E-Rate reimbursements, the ques-
tion presented here is resolved. It is then immaterial
whether the Government, by exercising regulatory control,
provides all the money so used. Even supposing not, the
reimbursement requests are “claims” for payment, and
Heath's suit for fraud can go forward.
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And as the Court of Appeals explained, the Government—
more
specifcally, the U. S. Treasury—has put substantial
money into the Fund to fnance E-Rate subsidies. See 92 F.
4th, at 667. The more than $100 million deposited in the
relevant years came from two sources. About half consisted
of delinquent contributions (plus associated interest and pen-
alties) that the FCC and Treasury Department collected
from carriers after the Administrative Company proved un-
able to do so. Those federal agencies, acting under a law
providing for the collection of sums “owed to the United
States,” placed the money they garnered in Treasury ac-
counts. 31 U. S. C. § 3701(b)(1); see §§ 3711, 3717; App. 35–
38, 40–43. From there, the Treasury made periodic trans-
fers to the Fund for disbursement to program participants.
See id., at 37–38, 42–43. The other half of the $100 million
derived from Justice Department activities. See id., at 38,
43. When that Department learns of wrongdoing in the E-
Rate program, its lawyers may proceed in diverse ways
against the malefactors—maybe under the FCA itself, or
under antitrust laws, or under criminal bans on mail or wire
fraud. Any civil settlements or criminal restitution pay-
ments resulting from those actions go into Treasury ac-
counts. And once again, that money eventually makes its
way to the Fund to bankroll E-Rate subsidies.
So to return to the language of the relevant defnitional
provision: The Government “provided [a] portion of the
money” disbursed from the Fund to reimburse E-Rate pro-
gram participants. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Or to use the syn-
onyms previously offered: The Government supplied funds,
furnished funds, and made available funds for that purpose.
It is a simple matter, as the saying goes, of following the
money. Again, federal agencies accumulated the roughly
$100 million and placed it in the U. S. Treasury—the reposi-
tory for “all monies received by the United States.” K.
Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L. J. 1343, 1356
(1988). And the Treasury later transferred those sums to
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the Fund for use in fulflling E-Rate reimbursement re-
quests.
Or as the Seventh Circuit put the point: Because
the Treasury held and conveyed to the Fund the $100 million,
“quite literally, the Treasury provide[d] money to the E-Rate
program.” 92 F. 4th, at 670.
5
Wisconsin Bell resists that conclusion, arguing that even
the $100 million was provided by, and only by, the carriers.
See, e. g., Brief for Wisconsin Bell 27 (“The E-rate program
is funded entirely by private carriers' contributions”). On
that alternative view, the Government played no more than
an intermediary role: It “merely collected and held” the car-
riers' required payments “pending their return” to “their
rightful owner, the Administrative Company.” Id., at 31.
And “facilitat[ing] the transfer of money,” Wisconsin Bell
says, does not amount to “provid[ing]” money. Id., at 30.
Rather, the deposits that the Treasury put into the Fund
“are no different than” the carriers' “contributions them-
selves.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5; see id., at 23. The former stand
in for the latter, and remain just as private.
5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, although rejecting the
regulatory-control theory of providing funds, never addressed the alterna-
tive, follow-the-money theory just described. See United States ex rel.
Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 759 F. 3d 379, 382–388 (2014) (per curiam);
supra, at 147–148. That omission apparently resulted from the Govern-
ment's litigation choices. Only in the Seventh Circuit—not in the Fifth—
did the Government press the narrower theory and submit supporting
evidence about the Treasury's deposit of moneys into the Fund. Had the
Fifth Circuit seen the same evidence, it may well have responded as the
Seventh did. Indeed, its own analysis suggests as much. For under the
Fifth Circuit's approach, the defnition of “claim” is met “when United
States Treasury dollars fow to the defrauded [program].” Shupe, 759
F. 3d, at 383; see ibid. (noting with approval that “courts have found that
the Government `provides any portion' of the money requested when the
Government has given [a program] even a drop of treasury money”); id., at
388 (concluding that the Government did not provide any of the requested
money because “there are no federal funds involved in the [E-Rate]
program”).

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152 WISCONSIN
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But to start with, Wisconsin Bell mischaracterizes the
Gover
nment's role in bringing the $100 million to the Fund.
The Government was not a passive throughway for the
transmission of E-rate moneys from one private party (the
carrier) to another (the Administrative Company). Nor
were the Government's activities confned to “facilitating ”
such transfers, as Wisconsin Bell would have it. Take frst
the $50 million in delinquent contributions, on which Wiscon-
sin Bell almost wholly focuses. The FCC and Treasury De-
partment extracted those moneys from carriers that, even
after the Administrative Company's entreaties, refused to
pay on schedule. Without the agencies' dunning, the contri-
butions would have come in yet later—or might never have
arrived. (And if no contributions, likely no interest or pen-
alties either.) Still less does the other $50 million—from
settlement and restitution awards—align with Wisconsin
Bell's story. Those awards came from the Justice Depart-
ment's efforts to prosecute wrongdoing in the E-Rate pro-
gram. And the amounts obtained thus refected not the car-
riers' regular contributions but the harms that fraudulent
conduct had imposed on the Fund and its benefciaries. So
the Government, in forwarding those payments to the Fund,
did not serve as a program middleman or facilitator. Rather,
the Government itself generated the moneys it provided.
And anyway, a simple intermediary can sometimes also
“provide” things to a recipient—and the Government, even
if viewed only in that light, would do so here. Wisconsin
Bell assumes that only one entity can provide a thing, so that
if a carrier gave a contribution to the Government to give to
the Fund, then the carrier alone provided the money. But
why not say that both did so—the originator of the money
and the transmitter alike? Consider a perhaps dated exam-
ple used at oral argument. See id., at 13–14. A proctor for
an exam gives out blue books and pencils to students. She
has not purchased them herself; rather, she has gotten them
from the school. It would still be natural to say that she

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Opinion of the Court
(along with the school) has “provided”—has supplied, fur-
nished,
or made available—the booklets and pencils. Simi-
lar real-world examples abound. A bank teller “provides”
an account holder with money, even though the recipient's
employer deposited the relevant funds. A UPS driver “pro-
vides” a person with a package, even though the driver frst
picked up the box from a department store. In each case,
not only the original source but also the middleman (the in-
termediary, transmitter, facilitator, what have you) provides
the thing at issue. And the same is true here. Supposing
that carriers “provided” the relevant $100 million to the
Fund, so too did the Government by collecting it and routing
it through Treasury accounts.
Nothing about the ownership of the $100 million while in
the Treasury matters to that conclusion, in the way Wiscon-
sin Bell at times suggests. In its view, those moneys were
frst owned by private carriers and then owned by the private
Administrative Company—but not owned by the Government
in the interim period when it had “temporary possession.”
Id., at 22. Perhaps. Or perhaps not—the Government (as
well as Heath) takes the opposite view. See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 21–22. The important point here
is that the answer is irrelevant. Consider the examples just
given: No one would say that the proctor or the teller or the
UPS driver does not “provide” (again, supply, furnish, or make
available) the relevant item just because she does not own it
while making the transfer. And so too here. Were there
any doubt, another aspect of the FCA's defnition of the term
“claim” clears it away. Recall that the defnition—including
its provides-the-money requirement—can be met “whether
or not the United States has title to the money” at is-
sue. § 3729(b)(2)(A); see supra, at 146.
6
So as the FCA sees
6
As noted earlier, we assume without deciding that this provision,
enacted in 2009, merely clarifed existing law, and thus that the view it
takes is relevant to the pre-2009, as well as the post-2009, claims in this
case. See supra, at 146–147, n. 3.
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the matter, the technical ownership of the $100 million that
the
Government conveyed to the Fund makes not a whit of
difference. Either way, its transfers can form the basis of
an FCA suit.
Those transfers, indeed, look like most Government
spending—neither more nor less private, neither more nor
less public. Money usually comes to the Government from
private parties—through taxes, fnes, or fees of all kinds.
And then money usually goes out to the broader community,
to fund any number of programs and activities. Between
the time money comes in and the time money goes out, it
sits—as the $100 million here did—in Treasury accounts. In
this broad array of schemes, the funding received may be
more or less earmarked, and it may be disbursed more or
less quickly. But the basic mechanism remains the same.
Money enters and then exits the public fsc; the Government
collects money and then furnishes it for some use. And so
it was here, in the years relevant to Heath's FCA suit. The
Government obtained $100 million in delinquent contribu-
tions, settlement awards, and restitution payments related
to the E-Rate program. It held that money for a time in
the U. S. Treasury. And then it supplied that money to re-
imburse program participants—“provid[ing],” as the FCA
requires, a “portion of the money” requested for schools'
E-Rate subsidies.
III
What we have said above is enough to enable Heath's FCA
suit to proceed. The reimbursement requests at issue qual-
ify as “claims” under the FCA because, in the years they
were made, the Government deposited money into the Fund
to pay for E-Rate subsidies. And all the statute requires is
that those deposits provide “any portion”—not the whole—
of the sums requested. For that reason, we need not ad-
dress the alternative theory that the Government provides
all E-Rate funds by exercising regulatory control over the
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program. Whether or not that is so, Heath can press his
clai
m that, by violating the “lowest corresponding price”
rule, Wisconsin Bell “knowingly present[ed], or cause[d] to
be presented,” a set of “false or fraudulent claim[s] for pay-
ment.” § 3729(a)(1)(A).
If Heath prevails on the merits, issues about damages may
well emerge. At oral argument, the parties forecast their
differences on those issues—including about whether (and, if
so, how) the amount of money the Government deposited
should limit the damages Heath can recover. See, e.g., Tr.
of Oral Arg. 24–26, 29–32, 53–54, 66–68, 93–94. But those
issues were not briefed in this Court, and in any event are a
long way away. We therefore leave them for the courts
below to decide, should it ever become necessary to do so.
For the reasons stated, we affrm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Kavanaugh joins,
and with whom Justice Alito joins as to Part I, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full because it correctly holds
that, for purposes of the False Claims Act (FCA), the Fed-
eral Government “provides” money to the Education Rate
(E-Rate) program when the Government itself collects over-
due contributions, interest, penalties, settlements, and resti-
tution payments, and then transfers that money from U. S.
Treasury accounts into the E-Rate program. See 31 U. S. C.
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The Court saves for another day two
more diffcult questions: First, whether the Government
“provides” the money that it requires private carriers to con-
tribute to the E-Rate program, see ibid.; and second,
whether the E-Rate program's administrator is an agent of
the United States. I express no defnitive views on those
questions today. I write separately only to highlight that
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the Government's positions on these questions might, if ac-
cepted,
have signifcant implications for both the scope of the
FCA and the lawfulness of the E-Rate program.
I
The question presented in this case is whether reimburse-
ment requests submitted to the E-Rate program are “claims”
under the FCA. See § 3729(b)(2). As the Court's opinion
explains, ante, at 146, the defnition of “claim” depends on
the person or entity to whom the request for money is made.
If the request is made to a federal offcer, employee, or agent,
then any request for money qua l i fies as a “clai m. ”
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(i). But, if the request is made to some “other
recipient,” then the request is a “claim” only in limited cir-
cumstances, such as if the Federal Government “provides or
has provided any portion of the money” requested and the
money is to be spent or used “to advance a Government pro-
gram or interest.” § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).
All agree that E-Rate reimbursement requests are made
to the Universal Service Administrative Company (Adminis-
trative Company). The Administrative Company is a pri-
vate not-for-proft corporation whose parent entity, the Na-
tional Exchange Carrier Association (Carrier Association),
is another private not-for-proft corporation. See 47 CFR
§§ 54.5, 69.602 (2023).
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has “ap-
pointed” the Administrative Company as “Administrator” of
the Universal Service Fund (Fund). See § 54.701(a). The
Fund is composed primarily of money from private telecom-
munications carriers. It is undisputed that a federal statute
requires certain carriers to contribute “to the specifc, pre-
dictable, and suffcient mechanisms established by the [FCC]
to preserve and advance universal service.” See 47 U. S. C.
§ 254(d). FCC regulations in turn mandate that certain car-
riers contribute to the Fund on a quarterly basis. 47 CFR
§§ 54.706(a)–(b), 54.709(a). FCC regulations also task the
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Administrative Company with disbursing the money in the
Fund
to benefciaries of the E-Rate program and other uni-
versal service initiatives. § 54.702(b).*
The Government offered us three different paths to fnding
that an E-Rate reimbursement request satisfes the FCA's
defnition of “claim.” First, assuming that the Administra-
tive Company is an “other recipient,” the Government ar-
gued that the Government provides all the money in the
Fund because federal law requires private carriers to con-
tribute to it. Second, the Government contended that even
if it does not provide all the money, it provided at least a
“ `portion' ” of it during the years relevant to this case be-
cause “the [FCC], the Department of the Treasury, and the
Department of Justice collected more than $100 million in
contributions, interest, and penalties from delinquent carri-
ers; held the money in Treasury accounts; and then deposited
the money in the Fund.” Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 7–8. Third, the Government argued that even if it
does not provide any money to the Fund, an E-Rate reim-
bursement request is a “claim” under the FCA because the
Administrative Company—the entity to whom a request for
money is made —is an “agent of the United St ates. ”
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(i).
The Court resolves this case on the second ground alone.
During the years relevant here, the Treasury Department
deposited more than $100 million directly into the Fund. Of
that sum, approximately $50 million came from delinquent
contributions and related interest and penalties, and the
other $50 million came from settlements and restitution
awards obtained by the Justice Department. I understand
the Court to have decided that on the facts of this case—
where the Government itself exercised its power to collect
overdue contributions, interest, penalties, settlements, and
*As the Court's opinion explains, see ante, at 144, n. 1, the nature of the
relationship between the FCC and the Administrative Company is the
subject of ongoing litigation. I express no view on that matter.

158 WISCONSIN
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restitution awards, and then transferred those funds from
U
. S. Treasury accounts into the Fund—the Government
“prov ided” money w ith i n the meani ng of the FCA.
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).
I do not understand the Court to have opined on any other
set of facts. The opinion explains that, in making the trans-
fers at issue here, the Government “was not a passive
throughway.” Ante, at 152. Rather, the FCC and the
Treasury Department used the power of the Government to
“extrac[t]” money from private carriers. Ibid. The Justice
Department, for its part, “prosecute[d] wrongdoing,” and
then obtained settlements and restitution awards. Ibid.
The Court observes that, “[w]ithout the agencies' dunning,”
the money the Government collected would have come later
“or might never have arrived.” Ibid. Thus, that “the Gov-
ernment itself generated the moneys it provided” is an es-
sential component of our decision. Ibid. I do not under-
stand us to have resolved whether the Government would
have “provided” money in the relevant sense,
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii), if it had acted as a “passive throughway”
or a mere “transmitter” or “facilitator,” ante, at 152. I
agree with the Court's resolution of the narrow question be-
fore us, and I am pleased to join in full. The remainder of
this opinion considers issues that the Court does not reach.
II
A
The Government's leading theory in this case was that the
FCA applies to E-Rate reimbursement requests because the
Government provides all the money in the Fund. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 12–16; Tr. of Oral Arg. 85
(asserting that the United States would “prefer to win on
th[is] ground”). It is undisputed that federal law and the
FCC's implementing regulations require private telecommu-
nications carriers to contribute on a quarterly basis to the
Fund. See 47 U. S. C. § 254(d); 47 CFR §§ 54.706(a)–(b),
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54.709(a). According to the Government, because a federal
st
atute compels these contributions, the Government “pro-
vides” all the money that private carriers pay. 31 U. S. C.
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Two Courts of Appeals have considered this argument.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Government in the de-
cision below. It observed that, in deciding whether the
FCA applies to alleged fraud aimed at a particular entity,
“courts have asked whether there is a `suffciently close
nexus' between the defrauded entity or program and the fed-
eral government `such that a loss to the former is effectively
a loss to the latter.' ” 92 F. 4th 654, 669 (2024). The court
concluded that the “high degree of government involvement
in the E-Rate program demonstrates that such a nexus ex-
ists here.” Ibid.
The Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, holding
that the Government's “broad view” is “unsupported by the
cases interpreting the FCA.” United States ex rel. Shupe
v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 759 F. 3d 379, 383 (2014). The Fifth
Circuit explained that courts have traditionally “limited the
FCA's application to instances of fraud that might result in
fnancial loss to the Government.” Id., at 385 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted; emphasis added). And, it observed
that courts have declined to extend the FCA's protections to
programs that “do not receive federal funds” and “have too
tenuous of a relationship to the Government to be considered
a Government entity.” Id., at 384. While acknowledging
that “the FCC retains some oversight and regulation” over
the Administrative Company, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless
concluded that the FCA's protections do not apply to E-Rate
reimbursement requests because the Administrative Com-
pany is “a private corporation owned by an industry trade
group.” Id., at 387.
Critically, both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits recognized
that courts have traditionally interpreted the FCA to cover
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160 WISCONSIN
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eral funding or operate with a “high degree of government
i
nvolvement.” 92 F. 4th, at 669; see also Shupe, 759 F. 3d,
at 383–385. The courts disagreed about whether the rela-
tionship between the Administrative Company and the Fed-
eral Government is suffciently close. But, neither court
posited that the FCA covers fraud against private entities
that lack both federal funding and a “suffciently close nexus”
with the Federal Government. 92 F. 4th, at 669 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
This Court's case law strongly suggests that the FCA does
not cover fraud against purely private entities with purely
private funding sources. We have always assumed that the
FCA does not cover acts directed toward parties that are
not “the Government.” Allison Engine Co. v. United States
ex rel. Sanders, 553 U. S. 662, 669–670 (2008). We have said
that the purpose of the FCA was “to provide for restitution
to the government of money taken from it by fraud.”
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 551
(1943). And, we have repeatedly remarked that the FCA
exists to “ `protect the funds and property of the Govern-
ment.' ” United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health
Resources, Inc., 599 U. S. 419, 424 (2023) (quoting Rainwater
v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592 (1958); emphasis added);
see also United States v. McNinch, 356 U. S. 595, 599 (1958)
(explaining that Congress enacted the FCA because it
“wanted to stop th[e] plundering of the public treasury”);
United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U. S. 228, 233 (1968)
(explaining that a prior version of the FCA extended to “all
fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out
sums of money” (emphasis added)).
Relying on this understanding of the scope of the FCA,
lower courts have determined that a program does not re-
ceive FCA protections unless it receives money that belongs
to the Government or the Government controls the program.
For example, the Eighth Circuit held that false payment re-
quests submitted to a private trust fund created to fnance a
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CERCLA Superfund cleanup project did not qualify as
“clai
ms” under the FCA. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc.,
153 F. 3d 667, 677 (1998). While recognizing that the funds
might not have existed if the Government had not helped
negotiate the trust fund's creation, the court still held that
the Government did not “provide” the funds because none of
the funds came from the Treasury, the Government did not
have access to the trust fund, and the Government did not
control the trust fund's disbursement. Ibid. Similarly, the
Third Circuit refused to apply the FCA to fraudulent legal
bills submitted for approval to a United States Bankruptcy
Court because the Government itself would not suffer any
fnancial loss. Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253
F. 3d 176, 182–184 (2001). The court explained that “the
submission of false claims to the United States government
for approval which do not or would not cause fnancial loss
to the government are not within the purview of the False
Claims Act.” Id., at 184. The Fifth Circuit identifed sev-
eral other examples of courts interpreting the FCA in a simi-
lar way. See Shupe, 759 F. 3d, at 384–385 (collecting cases).
In this case, the Government paid scant attention to the
fact that courts historically have not applied the FCA to
cover fraud on nongovernment entities unless the Govern-
ment itself will face a fnancial loss. Assuming that ap-
proach is correct, it is not obvious to me that the Govern-
ment puts its own funds at risk when it requires private
parties to fund the E-Rate program. Ordinary E-Rate con-
tributions come from private carriers. And, if the carrier
contributions are insuffcient to fund the E-Rate program,
the Administrative Company must turn to private sources of
credit—not the Federal Government—to remedy any budg-
etary shortfall. See 47 CFR § 54.709(c). It is diffcult for
me to see how the loss of ordinary contributions from carri-
ers is necessarily a loss to the Government.
The political branches chose to separate the program from
the public fsc. That choice was made in part to prevent the

162 WISCONSIN
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Thomas, J., concurring
E-Rate program from being “turned into a piggy bank which
can
be raided” “for budgetary gains.” 143 Cong. Rec. 16054
(1997) (statement of Sen. Kerrey); accord, ibid. (statement of
Sen. Daschle). Whatever the merits of that choice, I sus-
pect it might carry consequences for the applicability of the
FCA.
B
Before we accept the Government's theory that the FCA
applies so long as the Government requires one private party
to pay another private party, we ought to grapple with that
argument's implications. If the Government's position is
correct, then the FCA would seem to cover a wide range of
matters until now understood to be outside the scope of the
statute. Consider a few examples.
Federal law authorizes States to withhold federal pay and
retirement benefts “to enforce the legal obligation of the
individual to provide child support.” 42 U. S. C. § 659(a).
This law therefore facilitates a payment from one private
party to another. If this Court were to accept that such a
law is all it takes for the Government to “provid[e]” money
under the FCA, then the FCA would seem to cover false or
fraudulent claims made against a recipient of child-support
payments because a request for money is made to an “other
recipient,” and the money is spent or used to advance a Gov-
ernment “interest.” 31 U. S. C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii). But,
applying the FCA in this context would signifcantly expand
the reach of the statute.
Or, consider a civil judgment for money damages entered
by a federal court. The entry of such a judgment has the
effect of requiring a private party to pay a sum of money to
another private party. If this Court were to hold that the
Government “provides” money for FCA purposes so long as
the Federal Government requires a person to pay a sum of
money to someone else, then it seems possible that the FCA
might cover at least some false or fraudulent requests for
money made to a recipient of money damages. The request
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would be made to an “other recipient” and, at least in some
i
nstances, money damages might be spent or used “to ad-
vance a Government . . . interest.” § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Another example is the individual mandate component of
the Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119. That provision re-
quires individuals to purchase “minimum essential” health
insurance coverage. 26 U. S. C. § 5000A(a). If we were to
accept the Government's broad theory of what it means to
provide money for purposes of the FCA, I am not sure why
the FCA would not cover at least some false or fraudulent
requests for money made to private health insurance compa-
nies whose customers purchased health insurance because of
the individual mandate. A health insurance company ap-
pears to be an “other recipient,” and it is at least plausible
that the money health insurers spend on medical care “ad-
vance[s] a Government program or interest.” 31 U. S. C.
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Perhaps the Government can explain why the FCA sweeps
far broader than has been traditionally understood. Or, per-
haps there are meaningful ways to differentiate these exam-
ples or other reasons why the FCA would not apply even if
this Court accepted the Government's broad theory of what
it means to “provide” money under the FCA. But, the Gov-
ernment has not engaged with or appreciated the drastic
consequences that might follow if this Court were to accept
its primary argument.
I express no defnitive view on the merits of the Govern-
ment's broad theory. I simply note that if this question re-
turns to us, we ought to carefully consider what the Govern-
ment's theory might mean for the scope of the FCA.
III
The Government offered this Court another avenue to
fnding that the FCA applies to E-Rate reimbursement re-
quests. It argued that any request for money made to the
Administrative Company qualifes as a “claim” because the

164 WISCONSIN
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Thomas, J., concurring
Administrative Company is an “agent of the United States.”
§
3729(b)(2)(A)(i). But, if the Government is correct, then
the E-Rate program would seem to run afoul of the Govern-
ment Corporation Control Act (GCCA), 59 Stat. 597.
The GCCA provides that “[a]n agency may establish or
acquire a corporation to act as an agency only by or under a
law of the United States specifcally authorizing the action.”
31 U. S. C. § 9102. In other words, the statute “prohibit[s]
[the] creation of new Government corporations without spe-
cifc congressional authorization.” Lebron v. National Rail-
road Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 390 (1995).
The FCC should be familiar with the GCCA. In the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, Congress directed
the FCC to establish a set of universal service programs.
See 47 U. S. C. § 254. In its frst attempt at carrying out
that statutory command, the FCC instructed the Carrier As-
sociation to create the Administrative Company as an “inde-
pendently functioning not-for-proft subsidiary” that would
“assure signifcant industry-wide representation in the ad-
ministration” of universal service programs. In re Changes
to Bd. of Directors of Nat. Exchange Carrier Assn., Inc., 12
FCC Rcd. 18400, 18401, 18415 (1997) (emphasis added). The
FCC also directed the Carrier Association to create two
freestanding corporations to manage the E-Rate program
and another universal service initiative. Id., at 18430–
18431.
Shortly thereafter, a group of Senators inquired whether
the FCC had exceeded its authority when it directed the
Carrier Association to create private corporations. In re-
sponse to these inquiries, the General Accounting Offce
(GAO), known today as the Government Accountability Of-
fce, conducted an investigation. The GAO did not object to
the FCC's use of the Carrier Association as “a neutral third-
party administrator.” GAO, Testimony Before the Subcom-
mittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protec-
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tion, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives,
TELECOMMUNICA
TIONS: FCC Lacked Authority To
Create Cor porati ons To Admi nister Universa l Service
Programs 2 (GAO/T–RCED/OGC–98–84, 1998). Nor did
it object to the FCC's instruction to create the Adminis-
trative Company—the “independently functioning, not-for-
proft subsidiary” of the Carrier Association. 12 FCC
Rcd., at 18415; see GAO Testimony, at 18–20. But, the
GAO did object to the FCC's attempt to create govern-
ment corporations. Id., at 13. The GAO determined that
the FCC had violated the GCCA by attempting to estab-
lish freestanding corporations to manage certain univer-
sal service programs and “act as its agents in carrying
out functions assigned by statute to the [FCC].” Ibid.
In light of this report, Congress instructed the FCC to “pro-
pose a new structure for the implementation of universal
service programs.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 105–504, p. 87
(1998).
The FCC responded by asking Congress for “specifc stat-
utory authority . . . to create or designate . . . one or more
entities, such as the Universal Service Administrative Com-
pany, to administer the federal universal service support
mechanisms.” Report in Response to Senate Bill 1768 and
Conference Report on H. R. 3579, 13 FCC Rcd. 11810, 11819
(1998). But, Congress refused the agency's request.
Congress's choice left the FCC with the “independently
functioning ” Administrative Company, 12 FCC Rcd., at
18415, but no government corporations to “act as its agents,”
GAO Testimony, at 13. The FCC published a fnal rule ap-
pointing the Administrative Company as the permanent ad-
ministrator of the Universal Service programs. See Final
Rule, Changes to the Board of Directors of the National Ex-
change Carrier Association, Inc., Federal-State Joint Board
on Universal Service, 63 Fed. Reg. 70564–70565, 70572–70573
(1998) (codifed, as amended, at 47 CFR § 54.701).
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The upshot is that the Administrative Company was origi-
na
lly understood to be—and the lawfulness of the E-Rate
program turned upon the Administrative Company being—
an independent, nongovernment entity. To this day, Con-
gress has never passed a law approving the Administrative
Company as a government corporation, nor has it authorized
the FCC to formally label the Administrative Company a
subagency. The Government nevertheless contends before
this Court that the Administrative Company is now an agent
of the United States.
Whether the Administrative Company is in fact an agent
of the United States is a complex question that we do not
resolve today. That determination appears to turn on the
kind and degree of control that the FCC exercises over the
Administrative Company. And, those issues are the subject
of another case that this Court will consider soon. See Con-
sumers' Research v. FCC, 109 F. 4th 743 (CA5) (en banc),
cert. granted, 604 U. S. 1029 (2024). I express no view on
whether the Government's agency argument is correct. I
simply note that if the Government is correct, then it will
need to explain how the E-Rate program's current structure
is compatible with the GCCA. The Government relied on
the independent, nongovernmental nature of the Administra-
tive Company to establish compliance with the GCCA.
Now, the Government asserts that the Administrative Com-
pany is essentially an arm of the FCC. I doubt that the
Government can have it both ways.
IV
The Court resolves this case on a narrow, fact-specifc
ground. In a future case, however, we may need to confront
the Government's other arguments—namely, that the FCA
applies to funds that private parties pay to other private
parties, and that the Administrative Company is an agent of
the United States. If these issues return to us, I hope we
will carefully consider their consequences.
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Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurr
ing.
I join the Court's opinion, which decides a narrow statu-
tory question regarding the scope of the False Claims Act.
That statutory issue arises in the context of a qui tam suit.
The Act's qui tam provisions raise substantial constitutional
questions under Article II. See, e. g., United States ex rel.
Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U. S. 419,
442 (2023) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id., at 449–452
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Those constitutional questions are
not before the Court in this case. But in an appropriate
case, the Court should consider the competing arguments on
the Article II issue.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None