Andrew v. White

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86OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
ANDREWv.
WHITE, WARDEN
on
petition forwrit
of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the tenth circuit
No. 23–6573. Decided January 21, 2025
An Oklahoma jury convicted petitioner Brenda Andrew of murdering her
husband and sentenced her to death. Andrew appealed, arguing that
the introduction of irrelevant evidence at trial (about her sex life, extra-
marital affairs, and provocative attire) was so prejudicial as to violate
the Federal Due Process Clause. Despite acknowledging that some evi-
dence introduced against Andrew was irrelevant, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) denied relief on the ground that the trial
court's errors had been harmless. Andrew reiterated her due process
claim in a federal habeas petition, but the District Court denied relief.
A divided Tenth Circuit affirmed on the ground that Andrew had failed
to identify “clearly established federal law governing her claim,” as re-
quired under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA). 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). The majority acknowledged that
Andrew's due process claim relied on Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808,
in which this Court said that the Due Process Clause “provides a mecha-
nism for relief ” when the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence
“renders [a] trial fundamentally unfair,” id., at 825, but concluded that
this statement was not a holding and thus did not reflect “clearly estab-
lished federal law.”
Held: At the time of the OCCA's decision, clearly established federal law
provided that the Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evi-
dence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally
unfair. As relevant here, AEDPA provides that a federal court may
grant habeas relief as to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court
if the state court unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law,
as determined by” this Court. §§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). A petitioner must
show that the state court unreasonably applied the holdings of this
Court's decisions, not mere dicta. See White v. Woodall, 572 U. S. 415,
419. When this Court relies on a legal principle to decide a case, that
principle is a “holding ” of the Court for purposes of AEDPA.
The legal principle on which Andrew relies—that the Due Process
Clause can in certain cases protect against the introduction of unduly
prejudicial evidence at a criminal trial—was indispensable to the
Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee, and was thus a holding of this
Court for purposes of AEDPA. In Payne, this Court considered

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whether to overrule a set of prior cases that had categorically barred
the
introducti
on of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phases
of a capital trial. The Court concluded that a categorical bar was not
necessary to protect defendants because another protection (the Due
Process Clause) remained available to challenge the introduction of evi-
dence “that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamen-
tally unfair.” 501 U. S., at 825 (citingDardenv.Wainwright, 477 U. S.
168, 179–183). Importantly,Paynebroke little new ground in recogniz-
ing that the Due Process Clause protects against the use of unduly prej-
udicial evidence. See,e. g., Donnellyv.DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637;
Caldwellv.Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 338–340;Darden, 477 U. S., at
178–183. If the Tenth Circuit thought itself constrained by AEDPA to
limitPayneto its facts, it was mistaken. General legal principles can
constitute clearly established law for purposes of AEDPA so long as
they are holdings of this Court. SeeLockyerv.Andrade, 538 U. S. 63,
72. Although this Court has not previously relied onPayneto invali-
date a conviction for improperly admitted prejudicial evidence, more-
over, “certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual
permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be be-
yond doubt.”White, 572 U. S., at 427 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see alsoTaylorv.Riojas, 592 U. S. 7, 9 (per curiam) (“ `[A] general
constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply
with obvious clarity to a specific set of facts' ” (quotingHopev.Pelzer,
536 U. S. 730, 741)). Because the Tenth Circuit held that no relevant
clearly established law existed (a ruling the Court reviewsde novo), it
never considered whether the state court's application of that law was
reasonable as to either the guilt or sentencing phase. The case is re-
manded for the Tenth Circuit to do so in the first instance.
Certiorari granted; 62 F. 4th 1299, vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murdering
her husband, Rob Andrew, and sentenced her to death. The
State spent significant time at trial introducing evidence
about Andrew's sex life and about her failings as a mother
and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrelevant. In
a federal habeas petition, Andrew argued that this evidence
had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause.
The Court of Appeals rejected that claim because, it thought,
no holding of this Court established a general rule that the

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Per
Curiam
erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due
process.
That waswrong
. By the time of Andrew's trial,
this Court had made clear that when “evidence is introduced
that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial funda-
mentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 825 (1991).
I
A
On November 20, 2001, Rob Andrew was fatally shot in
his garage. Brenda Andrew, who herself had been shot in
the arm during the incident, told the police that two armed
assailants had committed the shooting. Andrew further ex-
plained that she had separated from her husband and was
now dating James Pavatt, but that she and Rob continued to
see each other as they had two children together.
Pavatt and Andrew traveled to Mexico together after Rob
Andrew's death and soon became suspects in his murder.
Eventually, Pavatt confessed to committing the shooting
with a friend. Pavatt denied that Andrew had been in-
volved. The State thereafter charged both Pavatt and An-
drew with capital murder, and a jury convicted Pavatt and
sentenced him to death.
At Andrew's trial, the prosecution sought to prove that
Andrew had conspired with Pavatt, an insurance agent, to
murder her husband for the proceeds of his life insurance
policy. Among other things, the prosecution elicited testi-
mony about Andrew's sexual partners reaching back two
decades; about the outfits she wore to dinner or during gro-
cery runs; about the underwear she packed for vacation; and
about how often she had sex in her car. At least two of the
prosecution's guilt-phase witnesses took the stand exclu-
sively to testify about Andrew's provocative clothing, and
others were asked to comment on whether a good mother
would dress or behave the way Andrew had. In its closing

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statement, the prosecution again invoked these themes, in-
cludi
ng bydisplay
ing Andrew's “thong underwear” to the
jury, by reminding the jury of Andrew's alleged affairs dur-
ing college, and by emphasizing that Andrew “had sex on
[her husband] over and over and over” while “keeping a boy-
friend on the side.” Tr. 4103, 4124–4125 (July 12, 2004). At
both the guilt and sentencing phases, prosecutors contrasted
Andrew with the victim, whom they asserted had been “com-
mitted to God.”Id., at 4124; see also,e. g., Tr. 4402 (July
14, 2004) (suggesting nothing could mitigate murder of Rob
Andrew because he just “wanted to love God”).
1
B
The jury convicted Andrew and sentenced her to death.
On appeal, Andrew argued that the introduction of irrele-
vant evidence, including evidence “that she had extramarital
sexual affairs with two other men,” that she had “ `come on
1
The dissent recites what it insists was substantial evidence of Andrew's
guilt, contending in the process that this Court “inaccurately portrays”
that evidence. Post, at 98 (opinion of Thomas, J.). In doing so, it pre-
judges the prejudice analysis by characterizing as fact the State's narra-
tive at trial. That narrative, of course, was hotly contested then and re-
mains so now. For example, the defense elicited testimony from multiple
witnesses that Andrew knew on the day of the murder that she was not
the beneficiary on the life insurance policy. The Oklahoma Court of Crim-
inal Appeals (OCCA) held that the court also wrongly excluded evidence
Andrew argued would cast doubt on the theory that she had staged the
shooting, though the OCCA held that exclusion was harmless. Andrew v.
State, 2007 OK CR 23, ¶¶89–92, 164 P. 3d 176, 197. The Court today says
nothing about the strength of the evidence against Andrew because the
issue of prejudice in both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial is
one for the Tenth Circuit to consider on remand. See in fra, at 96. Simi-
larly, the dissent asserts that Andrew falsely accuses the prosecution of
calling her a “slut puppy” in closing argument. Post, at 103, n. 3 (opinion
of Thomas, J.). Whether the prosecution quoted something it believed
Andrew once said to suggest to the jury that Andrew herself was a “slut
puppy,” or simply to recite an alleged abusive phone call, is a question of
fact for the Tenth Circuit to resolve.

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to' ” another witness's sons, and that she had dressed provoc-
atively
at arest
aurant,Andrewv.State, 2007 OK CR 23,
¶¶42–59, 164 P. 3d 176, 190–193, violated Oklahoma law as
well as the Federal Due Process Clause. The OCCA held
that admission of evidence about Andrew's extramarital af-
fairs had been proper because it showed that “[h]er co-de-
fendant was just the last in a long line of men that she se-
duced.” Id., at 192.
2
The OCCA “struggl[ed],” however,
“to find any relevance . . . other than to show [Andrew's]
character” for the remaining challenged evidence. Ibid.
By now, the State “agree[d] that most of this evidence was
irrelevant to any issue in this case.” Ibid. The OCCA
nonetheless denied relief on the ground that the trial court's
errors had been harmless.
Judge Johnson dissented in part. In her view, the “egre-
gious . . . pattern of introducing evidence that ha[d] no pur-
pose other than to hammer home that Brenda Andrew is a
bad wife, a bad mother, and a bad woman . . . trivialize[d]
the value of her life in the minds of the jurors.” Id., at 206–
207.She wou ld therefore have vacated her sentence.
Judge Chapel dissented separately, indicating that he would
have reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
Id., at 208.
2
The dissent asserts that the OCCA held evidence of Andrew's “ `close
personal relationship' ” with two of her affair partners to be relevant be-
cause it gave credence to testimony that Andrew had “ `shared with both
of these men her hatred for Rob Andrew and her wish that he was dead.' ”
Post, at 102 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting 164 P. 3d, at 192). Andrew
never objected to evidence that she had a “close personal relationship”
with these men. In fact, defense counsel stipulated that she had affairs
with them. See, e. g., Tr. 338 (June 18, 2004) (“We're not contesting the
affair. We have never contested the affair with Nunley or Higgins”).
Andrew's claim instead concerned the extensive testimony about how she
flirted with these men, how she dressed around them, and how many times
(and where) she had sex with them. That testimony appears to have no
bearing on Andrew's alleged expressions of hatred for her husband.

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In federal court, Andrew reiterated her claim that the ad-
missi
on ofth
is evidence rendered the guilt and penalty
phases of her trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of due
process. 62 F. 4th 1299, 1312–1313 (CA10 2023). The Dis-
trict Court denied relief. A divided Tenth Circuit affirmed
because, it held, Andrew had failed to cite “clearly estab-
lished federal law governing her claim.”Id., at 1314. The
majority acknowledged that Andrew had cited Payne, in
which this Court said that the Due Process Clause “provides
a mechanism for relief ” when the introduction of unduly
prejudicial evidence “renders [a] trial fundamentally unfair.”
501 U. S., at 825. According to the majority, however, that
had been a “pronouncement,” not a “holding,” of this Court.
62 F. 4th, at 1314. It therefore concluded Andrew had failed
to identify “clearly established federal law governing her
claim,” as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Pena lty Ac t of 1996 (AEDPA).Id., at 1316; 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). As a result, the majority declined to
consider whether the OCCA unreasonably applied Payne,
i. e., whether a fairminded jurist could hold that the admis-
sion of irrelevant evidence about Andrew's demeanor as a
woman was not so prejudicial as to deprive her of a funda-
mentally fair trial. 62 F. 4th, at 1316 (“ `The absence of
clear ly est abl ished federa l law is dispositive under
§ 2254(d)(1)' ” (quoting House v. Hatch, 527 F. 3d 1010, 1018
(CA10 2008))).
In dissent, Judge Bacharach condemned the State's focus
“from start to finish on Ms. Andrew's sex life,” a move he
argued “portrayed Ms. Andrew as a scarlet woman, a mod-
ern Jezebel, sparking distrust based on her loose morals . . .
plucking away any realistic chance that the jury would seri-
ously consider her version of events.” 62 F. 4th, at 1366.
Judge Bacharach therefore would have held that the combi-
nation of evidentiary errors “deprived Ms. Andrew of a fun-
damentally fair trial.” Id., at 1377.

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Per
Curiam
II
A
federalcour
t may grant habeas relief as to a claim adju-
dicated on the merits in state court only if the state court
relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts or un-
reasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by” this Court. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). To
show that a state court unreasonably applied clearly estab-
lished federal law, a petitioner must show that the court un-
reasonably applied “ `the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of
this Court's decisions.' ” White v. Woodall, 572 U. S. 415,
419 (2014) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U. S. 499, 505
(2012)). An unreasonable application, in turn, is one with
which no fairminded jurist would agree. Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 101 (2011).
A
When this Court relies on a legal rule or principle to de-
cide a case, that principle is a “holding ” of the Court for
purposes of AEDPA. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71–
72 (2003) (“[C]learly established Federal law . . . is the gov-
erning legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme
Court at the time the state court renders its decision” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Following these principles,
it is clear that Andrew properly identified clearly established
federal law.
In Payne, this Court considered whether to overrule a set
of prior cases that had categorically barred the introduction
of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phases of a
capital trial. The Court noted that, in many circumstances,
“victim impact evidence serves entirely legitimate pur-
poses,” 501 U. S., at 825, even though in others it could be
prejudicial. It then concluded that a categorical bar was not
necessary to protect against the risk of prejudicial testimony
because “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides a mechanism for relief ” against the introduc-
tion of evidence “that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders

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the trial fundamentally unfair.”Ibid.(citingDardenv.
W
ainwri
ght, 477 U. S. 168, 179–183 (1986)). In light of that
protection, the Court held, it could permit victim impact evi-
dence where appropriate without risking undue prejudice to
defendants. 501 U. S., at 825. In other words, the Court
removed one protection for capital defendants (theper se
bar on victim impact statements) in partbecauseanother
protection (the Due Process Clause) remained available
against evidence that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders
the trial fundamentally unfair. The legal principle on which
Andrew relies, that the Due Process Clause can in certain
cases protect against the introduction of unduly prejudicial
evidence at a criminal trial, was therefore indispensable to
the decision inPayne. That means it was a holding of this
Court for purposes of AEDPA.
Importantly,Paynedid not invent due process protections
against unduly prejudicial evidence. The Court had several
times before held that prosecutors' prejudicial or misleading
statements violate due process if they render a trial or capi-
tal sentencing fundamentally unfair.Donnellyv.DeChris-
toforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974);Caldwellv.Mississippi, 472 U. S.
320, 338–340 (1985);Darden, 477 U. S., at 178–183.Payne
thus broke little new ground in this respect. By the time
of the OCCA's decision in this case, it was clear that the
introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence could, in certain
cases, violate the Due Process Clause.
3
3
The dissent argues that Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62 (1991), shows
otherwise because it left open whether “ `it is a violation of the due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment for evidence that is not rele-
vant to be received in a criminal trial.' ” Post, at 111 (opinion of Thomas,
J.) (quoting Estelle, 502 U. S., at 70). To be sure, this Court did not hold
in Payne that the introduction of all irrelevant evidence violates the Due
Process Clause. Payne established, rather, that due process protects de-
fendants from the introduction of evidence so prejudicial as to affect the
fundamental fairness of their trials. This Court squarely acknowledged
that rule in Estelle, explaining that “the challenged evidence” at issue
there did not warrant relief because it did not “ `so infus[e] the trial with

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Curiam
B
The
Courtof
Appeals nonetheless held thatPayne“merely
established that the Eighth Amendment did not erect a
`per sebar' to the introduction of victim-impact statements
in capital cases.” 62 F. 4th, at 1314 (quotingPayne, 501
U. S., at 827). As just explained, however,Payneexpressly
relied on the availability of relief under the Due Process
Clause to reach that conclusion. This Court has accordingly
appliedPayne's framework to a claim much like Andrew's:
“that the introduction of [prejudicial] evidence” at the sen-
tencing phases “violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”Romanov.Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1, 12
(1994). More recently, the Court relied onPaynein the
same way that Andrew sought to rely on it here: for the
proposition that “the Due Process Clause . . . wards off the
introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that would ren-
der the trial fundamentally unfair.”Kansasv.Carr, 577
U. S. 108, 123 (2016) (quotingPayne, 501 U. S., at 825; inter-
nal quotation marks and alteration omitted). This Court
has also relied on the underlying fundamental fairness prin-
ciple in the jury-impartiality context. SeeRideauv.Louisi-
ana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963);Skillingv.United States, 561
U. S. 358, 379 (2010).
To the extent that the Court of Appeals thought itself con-
strained by AEDPA to limitPayneto its facts, it was mis-
taken. General legal principles can constitute clearly estab-
lished law for purposes of AEDPA so long as they are
holdings of this Court. For example, the Eighth Amend-
ment principle that a sentence may not be grossly dispro-
portionate to the offense is “ `clearly established' under
§ 2554(d)(1),” even though it arises out of a “thicket of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence” and lacks “ `precise contours.' ”
unfairness as to deny due process of law.' ” 502 U. S., at 75 (quotingLi-
senbav.California, 314 U. S. 219, 228 (1941), and citingDonnelly, 416
U. S., at 643). In any event, and as recounted below, this Court has con-
tinued to rely onPayne's fundamental fairness principle sinceEstelle.

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Lockyer, 538 U. S., at 72. Although this Court has not
pre
vi ously
relied onPayneto invalidate a conviction for im-
properly admitted prejudicial evidence, moreover, “ `[c]ertain
principles are fundamental enough that when new factual
permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule
will be beyond doubt.' ”White, 572 U. S., at 427 (quoting
Yarboroughv.Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 666 (2004)); see also
Taylorv.Riojas, 592 U. S. 7, 9 (2020) (per curiam) (“ `[A]
general constitutional rule already identified in the deci-
sional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific con-
duct in question' ” (quotingHopev.Pelzer, 536 U. S. 730, 741
(2002))). The Court of Appeals thus erred by refusing even
to consider whether the OCCA unreasonably applied estab-
lished due process principles to Andrew's case.
The dissent maintains that a reasonable jurist could agree
with the Tenth Circuit's understanding of our precedent.
That assertion conflates the deference federal habeas courts
must extend to a state court's “application of ” this Court's
precedent with the federal courts' independent obligation
to first identify the relevant “clearly established Federal
law.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1);Lockyer, 538 U. S., at 71 (iden-
tifying clearly established law “[a]s a threshold matter”).
A legal principle is clearly established for purposes of
AEDPA if it is a holding of this Court.White, 572 U. S.,
at 419. This Court has no occasion to defer to other federal
courts' erroneous interpretations of its own precedent. Nor
is such double deference necessary to prevent expansion
of federal habeas relief to those who rely on “debatable”
interpretations or extensions of our holdings.Postat 112–
113 (opinion ofThomas, J.). Andrew does not rely on an
interpretation or extension of this Court's cases but on a
principle this Court itself has relied on over the course of
decades.
Because the Tenth Circuit nonetheless held that no rele-
vant clearly established law existed (a ruling this Court
reviewsde novo), it never considered whether the state

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Alito,J
., concurring in judgment
court's application of that law was reasonable. On re-
mand,
the Court
of Appeals should conduct that inquiry
in the first instance. Specifically, the question now is
whether a fairminded jurist reviewing this record could dis-
agree with Andrew that the trial court's mistaken admission
of irrelevant evidence was so “unduly prejudicial” as to ren-
der her trial “fundamentally unfair.”Payne, 501 U. S., at
825.
The Court of Appeals must ask that question separately
for the guilt and sentencing phases. As to each phase, it
might consider the relevance of the disputed evidence to the
charges or sentencing factors, the degree of prejudice An-
drew suffered from its introduction, and whether the trial
court provided any mitigating instructions. Cf.Romano,
512 U. S., at 13. The ultimate question is whether a fair-
minded jurist could disagree that the evidence “so infected
the trial with unfairness” as to render the resulting convic-
tion or sentence “a denial of due process.”Ibid.
***
At the time of the OCCA's decision, clearly established law
provided that the Due Process Clause forbids the introduc-
tion of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal
trial fundamentally unfair. This Court accordingly grants
the petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, vacates the judgment below, and re-
mands the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment because our case law establishes
that a defendant's due-process rights can be violated when
the properly admitted evidence at trial is overwhelmed by a
flood of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence that ren-
ders the trial fundamentally unfair. SeePaynev.Tennes-

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Thomas, J., dissenting
see, 501 U. S. 808, 825 (1991);Romanov.Oklahoma, 512 U. S.
1,
12 (1994);cf
.Rideauv.Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963).
I express no view on whether that very high standard is
met here.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
dissenting.
Our precedent under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) establishes several
rules for identifying clearly established federal law. 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). We have instructed lower courts to
avoid framing our precedents at too high a level of general-
ity; to carefully distinguish holdings from dicta; and to re-
frain from treating reserved questions as though they have
already been answered. The Tenth Circuit followed these
rules. The Court today does not. Instead, it summarily
vacates the opinion below for failing to elevate to “clearly
established” law the broadest possible interpretation of a
one-sentence aside in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808
(1991). In doing so, the Court blows past Estelle v. Mc-
Guire, 502 U. S. 62 (1991), which, months after Payne, re-
served the very question that the Court says Payne re-
solved. And, worst of all, it redefines “clearly established”
law to include debatable interpretations of our precedent.
It is this Court, and not the Tenth Circuit, that has deviated
from settled law. I respectfully dissent.
I
The Court's errors begin with its recitation of the facts.
Contrary to the majority's insinuations, the State presented
“overwhelming evidence” that Andrew participated in the
murder of her husband. See Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR
23, ¶56, 164 P. 3d 176, 192; accord, id., at 207 (A. Johnson, J.,
concurring in result in part and dissenting in part). In fact,
the State presented an “unusually strong evidentiary case,
which leaves little or no doubt that [Andrew] is guilty of the

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Thomas,J
., dissenting
crimes charged, crimes committed after methodical plan-
ni
ng.”Id
., at 206 (Lumpkin, P. J., concurring in result).
The Court inaccurately portrays the State's evidence, the
prosecution's closing arguments, and the reasoning of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA).
A
Brenda Andrew (Andrew) married Robert Andrew (Rob)
in 1984. In February 2000, Rob purchased an $800,000 life
insurance policy through agent Jim Pavatt, with Andrew as
the beneficiary. The Andrews and Pavatt attended the
same church. Pavatt and Andrew both served as Sunday
school teachers. But, by August 2001, they had begun an
affair. The affair caused the Andrews' already strained
marriage to reach a breaking point. Around late September
Andrew initiated divorce proceedings and told Rob to move
out of the house.
One morning in October, Rob discovered that someone had
cut the brake lines in his car. Several hours later, he re-
ceived phone calls from two unknown callers—one of whom
turned out to be Pavatt's adult daughter, Janna Larson—
falsely claiming that Andrew was in the hospital and ur-
gently needed him. Phone records reveal that Pavatt and
Andrew exchanged 82 phone calls that day and more than 50
calls the next day. The next day, Andrew told Rob she had
read in the newspaper about his brake lines being cut, but
no such news story existed. And, around this time, Pavatt
told Larson that Andrew had asked him to kill Rob. Pavatt
later threatened to k i l l her i f she ever revea led th is
information.
After the brake-line incident, Rob sought to remove An-
drew as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, explaining
to another insurance agent that he thought Pavatt and An-
drew were trying to kill him. But, Andrew and Pavatt re-
sorted to fraud to try to prevent this from happening, forging
Rob's signature on a form transferring ownership of the pol-

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Thomas, J., dissenting
icy to Andrew. The policy then became a serious point of
contenti
on in
the divorce proceedings, even though Rob was
only 38 years old and healthy.
The Andrews had two young children who, after their sep-
aration, continued to live with Andrew in the former family
home. Rob would sometimes meet them outside the house
and take them for visitation.
When Rob came to pick up the children for the Thanksgiv-
ing holiday, however, Andrew asked him to come into the
garage to help her light the pilot light of her furnace. As
he started to do so, someone pointed a 16-gauge shotgun at
him from across the garage. Seeing this, Rob turned and
grabbed a trash bag filled with aluminum cans, apparently in
a desperate attempt to protect himself. The perpetrator
shot him through the bag. Reloading the shotgun, the per-
petrator (or an accomplice) then moved within three feet of
Rob, and shot him a second time as he lay on the floor. An-
drew was also shot with a .22-caliber weapon, but suffered
only a superficial wound on her arm.
Andrew called 911 after the shootings, claiming that two
masked men had come into the garage and attacked her and
Rob. She related on the call that Rob was still conscious
and trying to speak. By the time emergency responders ar-
rived, however, he was dead. During the shootings, the
children were in the master bedroom watching television
with the volume turned up high, unaware of what was hap-
pening in the garage. An ambulance then took Andrew to
the hospital, where witnesses described her demeanor as un-
usually calm.
Police discovered substantial evidence linking Andrew and
Pavatt to the murder. Rob owned a 16-gauge shotgun, but
had told friends that Andrew refused to let him take it with
him when he moved out. One witness testified that, eight
days before the murder, he had seen Andrew in a rural area
commonly used for target practice. The witness also said
that later he found 16-gauge shotgun shells at the site. Pa-

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., dissenting
vatt owned a .22-caliber handgun, which he had purchased
about
a weekbefore
the murder. The day of the murder, he
borrowed Larson's car, claiming he would get it serviced for
her. When he returned it the following day, she noticed the
car had not been serviced. And, she found a .22-caliber shell
on the floorboard of her car.
Forensic evidence also undermined Andrew's account that
she had been shot at a distance. Powder burns on her
clothes and body revealed the shot had been fired within two
inches of her arm. An expert witness later testified that
Andrew's injury—a superficial, close-range gunshot wound—
was staged to make it look as if she had been a victim of the
attack and thereby avoid suspicion.
The Andrews' neighbors were out of town on the day of
the murder. When they returned, they found suspicious
items in their home and contacted the police. Police discov-
ered that someone had left a 16-gauge shotgun shell and sev-
eral .22-caliber bullets in the home, both the same brand as
those used in Rob's murder. There was no evidence of a
break-in, but Andrew had a key to their home. Prosecutors
suggested that, after the shooting, Pavatt hid in the home
until police had left the crime scene.
Rather than attend her husband's funeral, Andrew trav-
eled with Pavatt and her children to Mexico. She appar-
ently had no plans to return. Before the trip, Andrew tried
to transfer funds from her account to Larson's, so that Lar-
son could wire money to her and Pavatt. The pair also
asked Larson to help them forge Rob's signature on a docu-
ment granting Andrew permission to take the children
abroad. Andrew abandoned her car in an apartment com-
plex before leaving. She also stopped making payments on
her home. Pavatt researched traveling to Argentina after
hearing that Argentina did not extradite.
Larson, however, cooperated with the FBI and refused to
wire Pavatt or Andrew any money, despite their repeated
requests. When they ran out of money three months later,

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they returned to the United States and were immediately
arrested.
W
hi le
in Mexico, Pavatt wrote a letter addressed to An-
drew's daughter claiming that he and an unnamed “friend”
had killed Rob, and that Andrew had nothing to do with it.
Ante,at 88. He stated he did so because Andrew had told
him four days before the murder that she planned to beg
Rob to take her back after Thanksgiving. This was a pecu-
liar claim, given that hours before the murder Pavatt had
moved his washer and dryer into her home. And, far from
adopting a conciliatory attitude toward Rob, the night before
the murder Andrew had called a friend just to say, “I hate
him. I hate him. I hate him.” Tr. 2662–2663 (July 1,
2004). The friend recalled that the comment “made the
hairs on the back of my neck stand up. She hated that
man.” Id., at 2664.
B
A jury convicted Andrew of capital murder, and she was
sentenced to death. So too was Pavatt in a separate trial.
Sex and marriage were unavoidable issues at Andrew's trial,
and the State introduced a variety of evidence about her sex-
ual behavior. On direct appeal, Andrew challenged some of
the sex-based evidence introduced during the guilt phase of
her trial, arguing that it was irrelevant and unduly prejudi-
cial.
1
Given that “this trial was primarily about the motive
1
As the Court notes, in federal habeas proceedings, Andrew has “reiter-
ated her claim that the admission of this evidence” rendered both her guilt
and penalty phases fundamentally unfair. Ante, at 91. But, Andrew also
objects now to the admission of certain evidence from the penalty phase,
as well as items of guilt-phase evidence she did not challenge on direct
appeal. These challenges fail for lack of exhaustion. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To preserve an evidentiary claim, an Oklahoma defendant
must raise a specific objection when the evidence in question is admitted.
Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶32, 994 P. 2d 61, 68–69. The OCCA will
review on direct appeal only those objections brought to its attention.
Stouffer v. State, 2006 OK CR 46, ¶126, 147 P. 3d 245, 270. Because An-
drew did not raise these new objections in her direct appeal, she has not

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., dissenting
and intent of [Andrew] to kill her husband with the aid of
Pavatt,
” theOCCA
held that much of this evidence, particu-
larly concerning her relationship with Pavatt, was not just
admissible, but “highly relevant” and “probative.”Andrew,
164 P. 3d, at 194. But, not all of it was so. The OCCA rec-
ognized that some evidence, like the sort of outfits Andrew
wore to dinner outings, was not relevant.Id., at 192.
Given “the overwhelming evidence in this case,” however, it
determined that the introduction of the irrelevant evidence
“was harmless.”Ibid.
The Court suggests that the OCCA permitted evidence
of Andrew's two prior affairs simply because it showed she
had a penchant for adultery. Seeante,at 89–90. In reality,
the OCCA concluded that this evidence helped to prove “mo-
tive and intent.”Andrew, 164 P. 3d, at 192. Andrew
had “shared with both of these men her hatred for Rob An-
drew and her wish that he was dead.”Ibid. Evidence that
Andrew had “a close personal relationship” with these
men gave credence to their testimony that she had re-
vealed to them these “intimate details of [her] marriage.”
Ibid.
2
The Court also insinuates that there was something im-
proper about the State's introduction of evidence on An-
drew's “failings as a mother.”Ante,at 87. But, it conven-
iently omits the context. Andrew asserted that she was a
“good mother” as part of her defense in both the guilt and
presented them in state court “in accordance with state procedures,” and
so has not exhausted them. Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U. S. 366,
378 (2022). Because the Court today does not address exhaustion, the
Tenth Circuit is free to do so on remand.
2
Faced with this reasonable holding by the OCCA, the majority insists
that Andrew's claim concerned certain gratuitous details about these af-
fairs rather than the affairs' existence. Ante, at 90, n. 2. The truth is
just the opposite. Andrew's sole argument to the OCCA was that the
fact “[t]hat [she] had once had affairs with these men provided no evidence
of her motive” or “intent” or any other relevant fact. App. to Reply Brief
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penalty phases of her trial. Tr. 62–63 (June 17, 2004); Tr.
4179
(July
14, 2004);Andrew, 164 P. 3d, at 205. In present-
ing evidence to the contrary, the State was simply rebutting
a point that Andrew had placed in issue, as it clearly is enti-
tled to do. See 1 R. Mosteller et al., McCormick on Evidence
§ 191, p. 1188 (8th ed. 2020) (“[O]nce the defendant gives evi-
dence of pertinent character traits to show that he is not
guilty, his claim of possession of these traits . . . is open to
rebuttal”).
During its closing argument, the prosecution did not rely
on any of the sexual evidence that the OCCA would later find
irrelevant.
3
The prosecution's reference to the underwear
Andrew brought to Mexico, see ante, at 88, is no exception.
The OCCA recognized that this evidence bore on Pavatt's
and Andrew's “intentions in fleeing to Mexico,” a key issue
in the case. Andrew, 164 P. 3d, at 194.
Finally, the Court is wrong to imply that the prosecution
drew any kind of “contras[t]” between Rob and Andrew in
terms of religious commitment. Ante, at 89. The prosecu-
tion mentioned Rob's religious faith to emphasize that the
world lost “a fine human being ” when Rob was brutally mur-
dered. Tr. 4401–4402 (July 14, 2004). But, the prosecution
never cast any sort of religious judgment against Andrew.
3
Andrew's briefing before this Court alleges that the prosecution called
her a “ `slut puppy' ” who is not a “ `woman of God' ” during its guilt-stage
closing argument. Pet. for Cert. i, 8, 11, 14 (quoting Tr. 4125 (July
12, 2004)); Pet. for Cert. Reply 5, 13 (same). This accusation—which An-
drew did not make until almost 20 years after her trial—is entirely false.
The prosecutor was not referring to Andrew. Instead, he was recounting
an abusive phone call from Andrew to Rob, during which Andrew base-
lessly “accused [Rob] of having ” an affair with a “slut puppy,” before tell-
ing him that he “can't be a man of God and [Rob's supposed affair partner]
can't be a woman of God because she's sleeping with a married man and
even if you're single that's adultery, what a slut puppy she must be.” Tr.
4125. For all its efforts to portray Andrew sympathetically, even the ma-
joritystopsshortofendorsingheraccusation. Seeante,at
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Tellingly, the Court is unable to cite even one example of the
prosecuti
on condemning
Andrew in religious terms.
The record makes clear that it wasthe defense, not the
prosecution, that repeatedly appealed to the jury's religious
sentiments at sentencing. For example, the defense called
a pastor as a witness, who testified to the importance of
“mercy” as a “biblical” value.Id., at 4333. And, in its clos-
ing, the defense repeatedly quoted the Bible; said that, if Rob
could speak to the jury, he would ask them to “forgive” An-
drew as “Jesus Christ on the cross” forgave His killers; and
concluded with a prayer.Id., at 4429–4430, 4471–4473.
The prosecution simply asked the jury during rebuttal to
ignore the defense's attempts to “guilt trip” them.Id.,
at 4480.
II
The Cour t's lega l ana lysis fares no better.Under
AEDPA, Andrew may obtain federal habeas relief only if the
OCCA's resolution of her due process claim “was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by” the holdings of this
Court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1); seeLockyerv.Andrade, 538
U. S. 63, 71 (2003). This “standard is,” and “was meant to
be,” “difficult to meet.”Harringtonv.Richter, 562 U. S. 86,
102 (2011). It forecloses relief unless all “fairminded ju-
rists” would agree that the OCCA's “decision conflicts with
this Court's precedents.”Ibid.
The Court today asserts that the Due Process Clause for-
bids the admission of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to
render a defendant's trial fundamentally unfair, and holds
that the Tenth Circuit erred in failing to recognize this rule
as clearly established under our precedents. In so holding,
the Court commits the error of “ `framing our precedents at' ”
too “ `high [a] level of generality.' ”Lopezv.Smith, 574 U. S.
1, 6 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Nevada v. Jackson, 569
U. S. 505, 512 (2013) (per curiam)). And, even setting that

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aside, this reading of our precedents is one with which fair-
mi
nded jurists
could easily (and justifiably) disagree.
A
“[H]oldings that speak only at a high level of generality”
“cannot supply a ground for relief ” under AEDPA. Brown
v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 136 (2022). We have repeatedly
cautioned lower courts against “framing our precedents” too
generally. Lopez, 574 U. S., at 6 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see, e. g., Woods v. Donald, 575 U. S. 312, 318–319
(2015) (per curiam); White v. Woodall, 572 U. S. 415, 426
(2014); Nevada, 569 U. S., at 512; Harrington, 562 U. S., at
101; Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. 111, 122 (2009). We
have instead required courts to ask whether our precedents
“establish clearly the specific rule [the prisoner] needs.”
Lopez, 574 U. S., at 6 (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit
heeded our repeated warnings. The majority disregards
them.
Payne “h[e]ld” that “the Eighth Amendment erects no
per se bar” to “the admission of victim impact evidence” in
capital sentencing proceedings. 501 U. S., at 827. But, the
Court included a caveat: “In the event that evidence is intro-
duced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Id., at
825. Significantly, that caveat did not apply in Payne itself.
There, as in “the majority of cases,” the “victim impact evi-
dence serve[d] entirely legitimate purposes.” Ibid.
The Tenth Circuit correctly rejected Andrew's claim that
Payne's caveat clearly established that the admission of any
evidence so prejudicial as to render a trial fundamentally
unfair would violate due process. It held that Payne's brief
discussion of due process only “appl[ied] to scenarios in
which . . . victim impact statements” are “unfairly prejudi-
cial.” 62 F. 4th 1299, 1314 (2023) (internal quotation marks
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Nevertheless, the Court today vacates the Tenth Circuit's
decisi
on, marki
ng the first time it has ever summarily set
aside a lower court decision forfailingto find that a legal
rule is clearly established under AEDPA. Yet, the Court
does not identify a specific on-point holding fromPayne—or
any other decision—that the Tenth Circuit overlooked.
Instead, it faults the Tenth Circuit for failing to distill a
“[g]eneral legal principl[e]” about fairness fromPayne's one-
sentence due process caveat.Ante,at 94. In the process,
the Court does not once mention, much less distinguish, our
many precedents admonishing lower courts not to define
clearly established law too abstractly.
This specificity requirement serves an important function.
Defining clearly established law at an overly high level of
generality makes it virtually impossible to find an unreason-
able application warranting relief. SeeBrown, 596 U. S., at
136. It “is not `an unreasonable application of ' ” a more gen-
eral rule “for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal
rule that has not been squarely established by this Court.”
Knowles, 556 U. S., at 122. “[I]f a habeas court must extend
a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand, then by
definition the rationale was not clearly established at the
time of the state-court decision.”White, 572 U. S., at 426
(internal quotation marks omitted). When a legal rule is
defined at too high a level of generality, it becomes impossi-
ble to apply it to the facts without articulating subsidiary
legal principles that are not themselves clearly established,
leaving no principled basis for granting relief under § 2254(d).
To the extent some courts nonetheless grant relief based
on an overly general principle, they defy AEDPA. As we
have explained, when courts use “a high level of generality”
to “transform even the most imaginative extension of case
law into `clearly established Federal law,' ” they wrongly per-
form ordinary error correction under the guise of applying
§ 2254(d).Nevada, 569 U. S., at 512. Thus, at best, today's
decision will simply create an extra, unnecessary step judges

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must perform before they can deny a habeas claim that is
doomed
to fail.
At worst, it will confuse lower courts into
misapplying AEDPA's standard of review.
Consider Andrew's case. On remand, if the Tenth Circuit
properly applies AEDPA, it still will find that the state court
reasonably applied the principle the Court has identified, no
matter what it thinks of the specific facts of Andrew's trial.
Payneaddressed the use of victim-impact evidence at the
penalty phase of a capital trial. 501 U. S., at 824–825. An-
drew challenges the admission of evidence from her guilt
phase, as well as non-victim-impact evidence from her pen-
alty phase. “[I]t is not uncommon for a constitutional rule
to apply somewhat differently at the penalty phase than it
does at the guilt phase.”White, 572 U. S., at 421. And, a
fairminded jurist could believe that victim-impact evidence
raises unique due process concerns; otherwise, the specific
question whether victim-impact evidence categorically vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment would never have arisen. So,
it would be impossible for the Tenth Circuit to grant Andrew
relief without impermissibly “extend[ing]”Payne's “ration-
ale.”Id., at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Andrew's claim also cannot survive on remand because
Payne's lone sentence on due process does not establish a
test for determining when a trial is so infected by prejudicial
evidence as to be fundamentally unfair. It does not identify
what factors a court should consider, how to weigh them, or
what the gap is between, say, a garden-variety Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 error and a fundamentally unfair trial. To
consider the specific facts of Andrew's trial, the Tenth Circuit
would need to decide these matters for itself. But it would
then by definition be doing more than applying clearly estab-
lished law. SeeKnowles, 556 U. S., at 122.
The Court defends its reliance on a broadly defined rule of
law by citingLockyer, 538 U. S., at 73, which recognized as
clearly established the general principle that grossly dispro-
portionate sentences violate the Eighth Amendment. Ante,

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., dissenting
at 94–95. But, inLockyerthe Court denied relief, so it did
not
carefully
consider the appropriate level of generality at
which to define clearly established law. Indeed, it denied
relief preciselybecauseit had identified a “broad” legal prin-
ciple whose “precise contours” were “unclear.” 538 U. S., at
76–77 (internal quotation marks omitted).Lockyeralso was
an early AEDPA decision. In our many subsequent deci-
sions, we have come to appreciate the need to ask whether
our precedents “establish clearly the specific rule [the pris-
oner] needs.” Lopez, 574 U. S., at 6 (emphasis added).
“[H]oldings that speak only at a high level of generality”
cannot “supply a ground for relief ” under AEDPA. Brown,
596 U. S., at 136.
In an effort to show that remand will not be futile, the
Court observes that clearly established law can apply to
“ ` “new factual permutations.” ' ” Ante, at 95 (quoting
White, 572 U. S., at 427). That is true, so long as one also
keeps in mind White's admonition that AEDPA “does not
require state courts to extend [our] precedent” to any argua-
bly distinct context, as would be necessary to grant Andrew
relief. Id., at 426. The Court attempts to escape White's
strict limitation by invoking Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U. S. 7
(2020) (per curiam), to suggest that a “ `general constitu-
tional rule' ” can be a basis for relief in an “ `obvious' ” case.
Ante, at 95. But, the majority omits that Taylor is a quali-
fied immunity decision, rendering it utterly inapposite. Al-
though both qualified immunity and AEDPA impose de-
manding standards based on “clearly established law,” the
two are meaningfully different. A plaintiff overcomes qual-
ified immunity by identifying case law “finding a [constitu-
tional] violation under similar circumstances,” except that in
“an obvious case . . . a body of relevant case law is not
needed.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 65
(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Taylor, this
Court found that the obviousness exception applied. 592
U. S., at 8–9. AEDPA, by contrast, permits relief only when

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a state-court decision undeniably “conflicts with this Court's
precedents.
”Harr
ington, 562 U. S., at 102.
Regardless of what we think of “the merits of the [due
process] principle” that Andrew asserts, it does not warrant
relief under AEDPA absent a prior Supreme Court holding
that the principle “applies to the circumstances presented in
this case.”Woods, 575 U. S., at 319 (internal quotation
marks omitted). There is no such holding here, and the
Tenth Circuit was right to insist on one.
B
Even setting aside the level-of-generality problem, the
Court is wrong to find a clearly established rule of law. For
at least three reasons, a fairminded jurist could disagree
with the Court's reading of Payne. The Court holds other-
wise only by redefining “clearly established” law to include
debatable interpretations of our precedents.
1
First, a fairminded jurist could conclude that Payne's lone
sentence on due process is not a holding at all. Although
Payne asserted that victim-impact evidence could violate
due process if it was unduly prejudicial, the Court found that
“in this case” the evidence “serves entirely legitimate pur-
poses,” and so declined to disturb the capital sentence under
review. 501 U. S., at 825. The Court's statement that a dif-
ferent case presenting different facts could violate due proc-
ess was thus dicta because it was not “ `necessary to' ” its
“disposition of [the] case.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 663,
n. 4 (2001) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U. S. 44, 67 (1996)); see Stewart v. Winn, 967 F. 3d 534, 539
(CA6 2020) (describing Payne's due process discussion as a
“snippe[t]” of “ `dicta' ”). As we have previously recognized,
because “ `clearly established [f]ederal law' . . . `refers to the
holdings' ” of this Court, Andrew cannot premise her habeas
claim on “a case in which we rejected a due process claim.”

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., dissenting
Metrishv.Lancaster, 569 U. S. 351, 367 (2013) (alteration
i
n orig
inal).
The Court insistsPayne's due process statement was “in-
dispensable” to its disposition, because without the existence
of a due process backstop, thePayneCourt might have de-
termined that a categorical Eighth Amendment bar on
victim-impact evidence is necessary to protect defendants.
Ante, at 93. But, this is hardly the only “reasonable inter-
pretatio[n]” of Payne, which nowhere sets forth the reason-
ing the Court ascribes to it. White, 572 U. S., at 423. The
Court's interpretation makes sense only if we assume that
the Payne Court would have seriously considered holding
victim-impact evidence categorically unconstitutional de-
spite it “serv[ing] entirely legitimate purposes” in “the ma-
jority of cases.” 501 U. S., at 825. That would be a highly
unusual approach to constitutional litigation. Cf. United
States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (requiring that a
law be valid in “no set of circumstances” to be facially uncon-
stitutional). Another reasonable interpretation—and in-
deed, a far more plausible one—is that the Court simply
wanted to make clear that its rejection of a categorical rule
against victim-impact evidence did not rule out future fact-
specific challenges. That kind of dicta is common in cases
rejecting categorical challenges. See, e. g., United States v.
Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 784–785 (2023). A fairminded jurist
need not agree that Payne's single-sentence caveat consti-
tutes a holding.
2
Even if we were to treat Payne's sentence about due proc-
ess as a holding, a fairminded jurist need not read it as
broadly as the Court does. “[G]eneral expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case,
they . . . ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent
suit.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821). This
principle applies with special force when a party claims “a

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single sentence” in an opinion establishes a broad legal prin-
ciple
. SeeArkansas
Game and Fish Comm'nv.United
States, 568 U. S. 23, 35 (2012).
A fairminded jurist could believe that the scope of any
holding established by Payne's cursory discussion of due
process is limited to Payne's analysis. On the majority's
telling, Payne eliminated a categorical Eighth Amendment
prohibition on victim-impact evidence because of the avail-
ability of an alternative due process protection against
such evidence. See ante, at 92–93. Because Payne was not
considering the role of due process vis-à-vis any other kind
of evidence, a fairminded jurist could conclude that any due
process holding laid down by Payne extends only to victim-
impact evidence.
3
Finally, a fairminded jurist could rely on this Court's later
decision in Estelle to conclude that Payne did not establish
any general due process prohibition on the admission of un-
duly prejudicial evidence.
The Court of Appeals in Estelle granted habeas relief on
the ground that the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial
prior-bad-act evidence had helped render the prisoner's trial
“fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.” 502
U. S., at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court
reversed, holding the evidence in question “was relevant to
an issue in the case.” Id., at 70. Having reached this con-
clusion, the Court added that “we need not explore further
the apparent assumption of the Court of Appeals that it is a
violation of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment for evidence that is not relevant to be received
in a criminal trial.” Ibid. That is, the Estelle Court ex-
pressly reserved the very question the majority asserts
Payne resolved. This Court is “hardly in the habit of
reserving separate questions that have already been defi-
nitively answered.” White, 572 U. S., at 424 (citation, al-
teration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

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., dissenting
“fairminded jurists could conclude that [Estelle]'s reserva-
ti
on regarding
” unduly prejudicial evidence “would have
served no meaningful purpose if [Payne] had created [a] rule
against” it already.Ibid.; accord,Kernanv.Cuero, 583 U. S.
1, 8 (2017) (per curiam).
The law has not changed since we decidedEstelle. The
Court cites several decisions postdating and predating
PayneandEstelle, but only for vague, atmospheric support.
Seeante, at 93–94. The Court does not assert that any of
them establishes a general due process rule against unduly
prejudicial evidence. And, the Court does not explain what
work, if any, these citations do in its analysis. Nor could it.
Our decision inRomanov.Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1,
13–14 (1994), cannot move the needle becauseRomano re-
jecteda due process claim. The reference to due process in
Kansasv.Carr, 577 U. S. 108, 123 (2016), also is not a hold-
ing. As inPayne, it is a one-sentence aside in a case reject-
ing an Eighth Amendment claim. Regardless,Carrhas no
possible bearing on this case, as it was decided after the con-
clusion of Andrew's direct appeal. SeeLockyer, 538 U. S.,
at 71–72. So too, the Court's remaining citations are clearly
inapposite, as none involves the admission of evidence. As
the Tenth Circuit correctly recognized, this Court has never
answered the question it reserved inEstelle. 62 F. 4th,
at 1315.
4
Remarkably, the Court does not deny that “a reasonable
jurist could agree” thatPaynedoes not establish the princi-
ple Andrew asserts.Ante,at 95. Instead, it maintains
that the potentially differing views of reasonable, fairminded
jurists do not matter. According to the majority, federal ha-
beas courts have an “independent obligation” to identify the
holdings of this Court.Ibid. Only afterward does “defer-
ence” kick in.Ibid.

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That view is patently wrong. AEDPA requires state
pr
isoners tobase
their claims on “ `clearly established' ” law.
Ibid.(quoting § 2254(d)(1)). A debatable holding does not
clearlyestablish anything.AEDPA permits relief only
when “the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justifica-
tion that there was an error well understood and compre-
hended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.”Harrington, 562 U. S., at 103. If one could
fairly disagree that the rule a prisoner invokes is part of
“existing law,” one could fairly disagree that the state court
erred under existing law.
Our precedents confirm that debatable readings of this
Court's cases cannot be clearly established law. InWhite,
we held thatEstellev.Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), did not
clearly establish the prisoner's asserted rule, because other
“perfectly reasonable interpretations ofEstelle” existed.
572 U. S., at 423. In other words, the prisoner's claim failed
because “fairminded jurists could conclude” thatEstellehad
not “created [the] across-the-board rule” he invoked. 572
U. S., at 424. To find clearly established law in the face of
these reasonable alternative interpretations would “contra-
ven[e] § 2254(d)'s deferential standard of review.”Id., at
423–424. Likewise, inKernan, we reversed after the Ninth
Circuit held that our decision inSantobellov.New York, 404
U. S. 257 (1971), clearly established the rule on which the
prisoner relied. See 583 U. S., at 6–9. Because “ `fair-
minded jurists could disagree' with the Ninth Circuit's read-
ing ofSantobello,” we were “unable to find in Supreme Court
precedent that `clearly established federal law' ” that the
Ninth Circuit had claimed to see.Id., at 7–8. Thus, con-
trary to what the majority says, we have extended “defer-
ence” both at the threshold step of identifying clearly estab-
lished law and at the subsequent step of applying it.Ante,
at 95. A contestable interpretation of precedent cannot be
clearly established law.

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114ANDREW
v.WHITE
Thomas,J
., dissenting
***
Summary
vacatur “is
a rare disposition.”Schweikerv.
Hansen, 450 U. S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
This Court has traditionally reserved it for the uncommon
“situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts
are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error.”
Ibid.Today, however, the Court turns this approach on its
head, steamrolling settled AEDPA principles to set aside
an entirely correct Tenth Circuit decision. I respectfully
dissent.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to reflect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the official United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or filed briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None