Culley v. Marshall

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 601 U. S. Part 2
Pages 377–415
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 9, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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TERM, 2023
377
Syllabus
CULLEY et al. v. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY
GENERAL
OF ALABAMA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 22–585. Argued October 30, 2023—Decided May 9, 2024
Petitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled
over by Alabama police offcers and arrested for possession of mari-
juana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was
stopped by Alabama police and arrested for traffcking methamphet-
amine. In both cases, petitioners' cars were seized under an Alabama
civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car “incident to an arrest”
so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture case. Ala.
Code § 20–2–93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama fled forfeiture com-
plaints against Culley's and Sutton's cars just 10 and 13 days, respec-
tively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceedings were
pending, Culley and Sutton each fled purported class-action complaints
in federal court seeking money damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claim-
ing that state offcials violated their due process rights by retaining
their cars during the forfeiture process without holding preliminary
hearings. In a consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affrmed the
dismissal of petitioners' claims, holding that a timely forfeiture hearing
affords claimants due process and that no separate preliminary hearing
is constitutionally required.
Held: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Proc-
ess Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a
separate preliminary hearing. Pp. 384–393.
(a) Due process ordinarily requires States to provide notice and a
hearing before seizing real property. But States may immediately
seize personal property subject to civil forfeiture when the property (for
example, a car) otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or concealed
before a forfeiture hearing. When a State seizes personal property, due
process requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing. See United
States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 249–250; United States v. $8,850,
461 U. S. 555, 562–565.
The Court's decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann make crystal clear
that due process does not require a separate preliminary hearing to
determine whether seized personal property may be retained pending
the ultimate forfeiture hearing. In $8,850, the Court addressed the
process due when the Customs Service seized currency from an individ-

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LEY v. MARSHALL
Syllabus
ual entering the United States but did not immediately fle for civil
for
feiture of the currency. The Court concluded that a post-seizure
delay “may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner
has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time,” 461
U. S., at 562–563, and prescribed factors for courts to consider in assess-
ing whether a forfeiture hearing is timely. Id., at 564–565. In Von
Neumann, a property owner failed to declare the purchase of his new
car upon driving it into the United States, and a customs offcial seized
the car after determining that it was subject to civil forfeiture. The
plaintiff fled a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in essence, a
request under federal law that the Government exercise its discretion
to forgive the forfeiture—which the Government did not answer for
36 days. The plaintiff sued, arguing that the Government's delay in
answering the remission petition violated due process. The Court re-
jected that claim, broadly holding that due process did not require a
pre-forfeiture-hearing remission procedure in the frst place. See 474
U. S., at 249–250. Instead, Von Neumann held that a timely forfeiture
hearing satisfes due process in civil forfeiture cases, and that $8,850
specifes the standard for when a forfeiture hearing is timely.
Petitioners' argument for a separate preliminary hearing appears to
be a backdoor argument for a more timely forfeiture hearing to allow a
property owner with a good defense to recover her property quickly.
But the Court's precedents already require a timely hearing, and a prop-
erty owner can raise $8,850-based arguments to ensure a timely hearing.
Petitioners' efforts to distinguish Von Neumann on the ground that the
statutory remission procedure in that case was discretionary fail be-
cause that fact played no role in the Court's constitutional analysis.
Petitioners also cannot distinguish the relevant language in Von Neu-
mann as dicta, as the Court ruled for the Government on the ground
that a timely “forfeiture proceeding, without more, provides the postsei-
zure hearing required by due process” in civil forfeiture cases. 474
U. S., at 249. Similarly, petitioners' contention that Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U. S. 319, should govern petitioners' request for a prelimi-
nary hearing fails given that this Court decided $8,850 and Von
Neumann after Mathews.
In addition, petitioners point to the Court's Fourth Amendment deci-
sions in the criminal context to support their contention that a prelimi-
nary hearing is required in the civil forfeiture context. That analogy
fails. Fourth Amendment hearings are not adversarial, and address
only whether probable cause supports the arrestee's detention. See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119–122. Here, petitioners argue that

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as: 601 U. S. 377 (2024)
379
Syllabus
the immediate seizure of personal property requires adversarial prelimi-
nary
hearings, and they assert that those hearings must address their
affrmative defense of innocent ownership. But the Due Process Clause
does not require more extensive preliminary procedures for the tempo-
rary retention of property than for the temporary restraint of persons.
Pp. 384–390.
(b) Historical practice reinforces the Court's conclusions in $8,850 and
Von Neumann that due process does not require preliminary hearings
in civil forfeiture cases. Since the Founding era, many federal and
state statutes have authorized the Government to seize personal prop-
erty and hold it pending a forfeiture hearing, without a separate prelimi-
nary hearing. Petitioners and their amici do not identify any federal
or state statutes that, before the late 20th century, required preliminary
hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Some States have recently enacted
laws requiring preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases, but those
recent laws do not support a constitutional mandate for preliminary
hearings in every State. History demonstrates that both Congress and
the States have long authorized law enforcement to seize personal prop-
erty and hold it until a forfeiture hearing. The absence of separate
preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture proceedings—from the Founding
until the late 20th century—is weighty evidence that due process does
not require such hearings. Pp. 390–392.
Affrmed.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Gorsuch,
J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 393.
Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson,
JJ., joined, post, p. 403.
Shay Dvoretzky argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Parker Rider-Longmaid, Kyser
Blakely, Jeremy Patashnik, and Brian M. Clark.
Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General of Alabama, ar-
gued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were
Steve Marshall, Attorney General, pro se, Robert M. Over-
ing, Deputy Solicitor General, Brad A. Chynoweth, Assistant
Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Brenton M. Smith, As-
sistant Attorney General. Ed R. Haden, Michael P. Taun-
ton, Thomas O. Gaillard, III, William W. Watts, III, and

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380 CUL
LEY v. MARSHALL
Opinion of the Court
H. Edgar Howard fled a brief for respondents City of Sat-
suma,
Alabama, et al.
Nicole Frazer Reaves argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Acting Assistant At-
torney General Argentieri, Principal Deputy Assistant At-
torney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General Feigin,
Ann O'Connell Adams, and Sarah Carroll.*
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
When police seize and then seek civil forfeiture of a car
that was used to commit a drug offense, the Constitution
requires a timely forfeiture hearing. The question here is
whether the Constitution also requires a separate prelimi-
nary hearing to determine whether the police may retain the
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Abram J. Pafford, John W. Whitehead,
David D. Cole, and Jay R. Schweikert; for the Buckeye Institute by Jay
R. Carson and David C. Tryon; for the Constitutional Accountability Cen-
ter by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R. Frazelle; for
the Goldwater Institute et al. by Timothy Sandefur, Deborah J. La Fetra,
and Ilya Shapiro; for the Institute for Justice et al. by Robert Johnson;
and for the Legal Aid Society by Thomas M. O'Brien, Corey Stoughton,
and Philip Desgranges.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Georgia et al. by Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of Georgia, and
Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Treg Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn of
Arkansas, Raúl Labrador of Idaho, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin
Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, John M. Formella
of New Hampshire, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Michelle A. Henry
of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South
Dakota, and Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee; for Wayne County, Michi-
gan, by Davidde A. Stella; and for the International Municipal Lawyers
Association et al. by Gilbert C. Dickey.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc., by Elizabeth Gaudio
Milito; and for Restore the Fourth, Inc., by Mahesha P. Subbaraman.

Cite
as: 601 U. S. 377 (2024)
381
Opinion of the Court
car pending the forfeiture hearing. This Court's precedents
est
ablish that the answer is no: The Constitution requires a
timely forfeiture hearing; the Constitution does not also re-
quire a separate preliminary hearing.
I
Halima Culley loaned her car to her college-aged son. On
February 17, 2019, police offcers in Satsuma, Alabama,
stopped the car while the son was driving, and the offcers
discovered marijuana and a loaded handgun in the car. The
offcers arrested Culley's son and charged him with possess-
ing marijuana. The offcers also seized the car incident to
the arrest.
At about the same time in 2019, Lena Sutton loaned her
car to a friend. On February 21, 2019, police offcers in
Leesburg, Alabama, stopped the car while Sutton's friend
was driving, and the offcers discovered a large amount of
methamphetamine in the car. The offcers arrested Sutton's
friend and charged him with traffcking methamphetamine
and possessing drug paraphernalia. The offcers also seized
the car incident to the arrest.
At the time of the seizures of the two cars, Alabama law
authorized the civil forfeiture of a car used to commit or facil-
itate a drug crime. See Ala. Code § 20–2–93(a)(5) (2015).
Offcers could seize the car “incident to an arrest” so long as
the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture case. § 20–
2–93(b)(1), (c). In the interim before the forfeiture hearing,
the car's owner could recover it by posting bond at double
the car's value. See § 20–2–93(h); § 28–4–287 (2013). At
the forfeiture hearing, the owner could prevail and recover
the car under Alabama's “affrmative defense” for “innocent
owners of property subject to forfeiture.” Wallace v. State,
229 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). That defense
required the owner to show that the owner lacked knowledge
of the car's connection to the drug crime. See Ala. Code
§ 20–2–93(h) (2015).
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LEY v. MARSHALL
Opinion of the Court
The State of Alabama fled a forfeiture complaint against
Cu
lley's car on February 27, 2019, just 10 days after the sei-
zure of the car. But Culley waited six months before an-
swering that complaint. And she waited another year—
until September 21, 2020—before raising an innocent owner
defense in a motion for summary judgment. Soon thereaf-
ter, on October 30, 2020, an Alabama state court granted
Culley's motion and ordered the return of her car.
Sutton similarly moved slowly in her forfeiture proceed-
ing. Alabama brought a forfeiture case against Sutton's car
on March 6, 2019, just 13 days after the seizure of the car.
Sutton initially failed to appear in the case, causing the state
court to enter a default judgment for Alabama. Sutton later
requested that the state court set aside that judgment, and
the state court did so. Sutton then submitted a brief answer
and served discovery requests on Alabama, but Sutton other-
wise took no action until the state court set a date for the
forfeiture trial. On April 10, 2020, three weeks before the
scheduled trial date, Sutton fnally moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that she was an innocent owner. Soon
thereafter, on May 28, 2020, the state court granted her mo-
tion, and she recovered her car.
While those forfeiture cases were ongoing, Culley and Sut-
ton fled purported class-action complaints in federal court.
Culley sued in the U. S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Alabama. Sutton sued in the U. S. District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama. Both sought money
damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that the state of-
fcials violated their due process rights by retaining their
cars during the forfeiture process without holding prelimi-
nary hearings. Culley and Sutton argued that a preliminary
hearing (also referred to as a retention hearing) is required
under the Mathews v. Eldridge due process test, which bal-
ances the private interests at stake, the value of added pro-
cedures, and the burdens on the government from the added
procedures. See 424 U. S. 319, 334–335 (1976).

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Opinion of the Court
The District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
dismissed
Culley's complaint. Culley v. Marshall, Civ. Ac-
tion No. 19–701 (Sept. 29, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a.
Relying on this Court's decisions in United States v. $8,850,
461 U. S. 555 (1983), and United States v. Von Neumann, 474
U. S. 242 (1986), the District Court held that due process
requires a timely forfeiture hearing but not a separate pre-
liminary hearing. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a–46a. The
District Court then assessed the timeliness of Culley's for-
feiture hearing under the four-factor test set forth in $8,850,
which looks to (i) the length of the delay of the forfeiture
hearing, (ii) the reason for the delay, (iii) whether the claim-
ant requested a timely hearing, and (iv) whether the delay
was prejudicial. See id., at 46a–47a (citing $8,850, 461 U. S.,
at 563–565). The District Court concluded that Culley's for-
feiture hearing was timely under those factors because she
played a “signifcant role” in delaying her own case. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
similarly entered summary judgment against Sutton on her
due process claim. Sutton v. Leesburg, Civ. Action No. 20–
91 (Sept. 13, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. The District
Court determined that Sutton's claim depended on whether
she received a timely forfeiture hearing within the meaning
of $8,850. See id., at 66a–70a. The District Court ruled
that Sutton's forfeiture hearing was timely and satisfed due
process, in part because Sutton never asked for an earlier
hearing. See id., at 70a–71a.
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consol-
idated the two cases and affrmed. Culley v. Attorney Gen-
eral, No. 21–13805 etc. (July 11, 2022), App. to Pet. for Cert.
1a–2a. The Court of Appeals agreed with the two district
courts that a timely forfeiture hearing affords claimants due
process and that no separate preliminary hearing is constitu-
tionally required. See id., at 6a–8a. The Court of Appeals
rested its conclusion on circuit precedent, which in turn re-
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384 CUL
LEY v. MARSHALL
Opinion of the Court
lied on this Court's decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann.
See
ibid.
Because of a confl ic t i n the Cour ts of Appea ls over
whether the Constitution requires a preliminary hearing in
civil forfeiture cases, this Court granted certiorari. See 598
U. S. 1243 (2023). Compare App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a–8a
with Ingram v. Wayne County, 81 F. 4th 603, 620 (CA6 2023);
Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F. 3d 40, 44 (CA2 2002).
1
II
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as interpreted by this Court, States ordinarily may not
seize real property before providing notice and a hearing.
See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510
U. S. 43, 62 (1993). But States may immediately seize per-
sonal property (for example, a car) that is subject to civil
forfeiture when the property otherwise could be removed,
destroyed, or concealed before a forfeiture hearing. See
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663,
679–680 (1974).
When States seize and seek civil forfeiture of personal
property, due process requires a timely post-seizure forfeit-
ure hearing. See United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S.
242, 247–250 (1986); United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555,
562–565 (1983). In this case, petitioners Culley and Sutton
do not challenge the timeliness of their forfeiture hearings.
Rather, they argue that the Due Process Clause requires
1
Before the entry of judgment by the Court of Appeals, Alabama
amended its forfeiture laws to allow an innocent owner to request an “ex-
pedited hearing ” “at any time after seizure of property and before entry
of a conviction” in a “related criminal case.” Ala. Code § 15–5–63(3)
(2018); § 20–2–93(l) (Cum. Supp. 2023); see also Ala. Act 2021–497 (effective
Jan. 1, 2022). That amendment did not moot this case because Culley's
and Sutton's requested relief includes money damages against the munici-
palities of Satsuma and Leesburg. See Culley v. Attorney General, No.
21–13805 etc., App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a.
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Opinion of the Court
States to also hold a separate preliminary hearing before the
for
feiture hearing.
A
Culley and Sutton argue that a preliminary hearing is con-
stitutionally necessary to determine whether States may re-
tain seized personal property pending the ultimate forfeiture
hearing. As petitioners envision it, the preliminary hearing
would focus on the “ `probable validity' ” of the forfeiture.
Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F. 3d 40, 48 (CA2 2002) (quoting
Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U. S. 614, 629 (1976)). The
preliminary hearing would be adversarial, the parties could
introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and prop-
erty owners could raise affrmative defenses, including inno-
cent ownership. In essence, the preliminary hearing would
be an earlier version of the forfeiture hearing itself.
Alabama and its amici, including the United States, dis-
agree. They argue that a preliminary hearing is not consti-
tutionally required. To begin, they emphasize that most
States and the Federal Government do not currently provide
preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. So requiring
a preliminary hearing as a matter of constitutional dictate
would necessitate a major change in the States' and the Fed-
eral Government's longstanding practices. Alabama and its
amici also contend that a property owner's post-seizure
rights are already protected by the constitutional require-
ment that the forfeiture hearing be timely. They further
assert that requiring a “hearing before a hearing ” in every
case, as petitioners want, would interfere with important
law-enforcement activities that must occur after the seizure
and before the forfeiture hearing—including identifying and
contacting potential claimants of the property; coordinating
forfeiture proceedings with related criminal investigations
and prosecutions; and ensuring that property is not removed,
destroyed, or put to illegal use before the forfeiture hearing.
Ultimately, we need not reweigh the competing due proc-
ess arguments advanced by the parties because this Court's
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LEY v. MARSHALL
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decisions in United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983), and
U
nited States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242 (1986), already
resolved the issue. After a State seizes and seeks civil for-
feiture of personal property, due process requires a timely
forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate prelimi-
nary hearing.
The dispute in $8,850 arose when the Customs Service
seized currency from an individual entering the United
States, but then waited before fling for civil forfeiture of the
currency. See 461 U. S., at 558–561. The property owner
argued that the delay violated due process. See id., at 562.
This Court concluded that a post-seizure delay “may be-
come so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has
been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful
time.” Id., at 562–563. The Court elaborated that timeli-
ness in civil forfeiture cases must be assessed by “analog[iz-
ing] . . . to a defendant's right to a speedy trial” and consider-
ing four factors: the length of the delay, the reason for the
delay, whether the property owner asserted his rights, and
whether the delay was prejudicial. Id., at 564 (citing Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 (1972)). Those factors are ap-
propriate guides in the civil forfeiture context, the Court ex-
plained, because the factors ensure that “the fexible require-
ments of due process have been met.” 461 U. S., at 564–565.
In Von Neumann, the Court addressed whether a timely
forfeiture hearing, without more, provides the process that
is due in civil forfeiture cases. See 474 U. S., at 249–251.
The property owner there failed to declare the purchase of
his new car upon driving it into the United States. See id.,
at 245. A customs offcial determined that the car was sub-
ject to civil forfeiture and seized it. See ibid. The plaintiff
fled a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in essence, a
request under federal law that the Federal Government ex-
ercise its discretion to forgive the forfeiture. See id., at
245–246. The Government did not respond to that petition
for 36 days. See id., at 246. The plaintiff sued, arguing

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that the Government's 36-day delay in answering the remis-
si
on petition violated due process. See id., at 246–247.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court broadly held that
due process did not require a pre-forfeiture-hearing remis-
sion procedure in the frst place. See id., at 249–251. Cit-
ing $8,850, the Court ruled that a timely “forfeiture proceed-
ing, without more, provides the postseizure hearing required
by due process” to protect the plaintiff 's “property interest
in the car.” 474 U. S., at 249. The Court explained that the
plaintiff 's “right to a forfeiture proceeding ” that meets the
$8,850 timeliness test “satisfes any due process right with
respect to the car.” 474 U. S., at 251. A separate remission
hearing is not “constitutionally required.” Id., at 250.
2
This Court's decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann resolve
this case. As the Court stated in Von Neumann, a timely
forfeiture hearing “satisfes any due process right” with re-
spect to a “car” that has been seized for civil forfeiture. 474
U. S., at 251; see also id., at 249. The Due Process Clause
does not require a separate preliminary hearing.
3
Culley and Sutton's argument for a separate preliminary
hearing appears in many respects to be a backdoor argument
for a more timely hearing so that a property owner with a
good defense against forfeiture can recover her property
more quickly. But the Court's precedents already require a
timely hearing, and a property owner can of course raise
$8,850-based arguments in an individual case to ensure a
timely hearing.
2
At oral argument in Von Neumann, Justice O'Connor asked the United
States whether the “forfeiture proceeding itself provides all the process
that's due” to protect the “property interest in the car.” Tr. of Oral Arg.
in United States v. Von Neumann, O. T. 1985, No. 84–1144, p. 18. The
United States answered, “that is our position.” Ibid.; see also id., at 26–
27. The Court subsequently agreed with that position. See Von Neu-
mann, 474 U. S., at 249–251.
3
In this opinion, we do not address any due process issues related to
civil forfeiture other than the question about a separate preliminary
hearing.
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LEY v. MARSHALL
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Culley and Sutton (echoed by the dissent here) try to
br
ush aside Von Neumann on the ground that the statutory
remission procedure in that case was discretionary. See 474
U. S., at 244, and n. 2 (citing 19 U. S. C. § 1618 (1982 ed., Supp.
III)); see also post, at 410–411 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
But the discretionary nature of the remission procedure
played no role in the Court's constitutional analysis. See
474 U. S., at 249–251. Culley and Sutton also try to charac-
terize the language in Von Neumann as dicta. We disagree.
The Court ruled for the Government in Von Neumann on
the ground that a timely “forfeiture proceeding, without
more, provides the postseizure hearing required by due proc-
ess” in civil forfeiture cases. Id., at 249. No separate pre-
liminary hearing is constitutionally required.
Culley and Sutton also contend that Mathews v. Eldridge
should be the test for deciding when additional process is
due and that, under Mathews, a preliminary hearing would
be required in civil forfeiture cases. 424 U. S. 319 (1976).
But this Court decided $8,850 and Von Neumann after Ma-
thews, yet in those two cases, the Court did not apply the
Mathews test. In any event, there is no good reason to
think that the Mathews balancing test would yield a differ-
ent result here. A timely forfeiture hearing protects the
interests of both the claimant and the government. And an
additional preliminary hearing of the kind sought by peti-
tioners would interfere with the government's important
law-enforcement activities in the period after the seizure and
before the forfeiture hearing.
In arguing that the Constitution requires a preliminary
hearing, Culley and Sutton also point to this Court's Fourth
Amendment decisions in the criminal context. That analogy
is fawed. The Fourth Amendment requires that any person
who is arrested without a warrant be brought before a neu-
tral magistrate within 48 hours, absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U. S. 44, 53, 56–57 (1991). But the Fourth Amendment hear-

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Opinion of the Court
ings are not adversarial, and they address only whether
p
robable cause suppor ts the arrestee's detenti on. See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119–122 (1975). Here, Cul-
ley and Sutton do not request a mere probable cause hearing
of the kind described in Gerstein. Rather, they argue that
the immediate seizure of property requires adversarial pre-
liminary hearings, and they assert that those hearings must
address their “affrmative defense” of innocent ownership.
Wallace v. State, 229 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).
Culley and Sutton therefore contend that the Due Process
Clause requires more extensive preliminary procedures for
the temporary retention of property than for the temporary
restraint of persons. The Due Process Clause does not de-
mand that incongruity. See United States v. Monsanto, 491
U. S. 600, 615–616 (1989).
Finally, the dissent here relies heavily on United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43. See post,
at 412. There, this Court held that the government must
ordinarily provide notice and a hearing before seizing real
property that is subject to civil forfeiture. See 510 U. S., at
62. The Court emphasized that real property, unlike per-
sonal property, “can be neither moved nor concealed” during
the forfeiture process. Id., at 52–53; see also id., at 56–57.
That case did not purport to disturb the rule that the govern-
ment may seize and retain personal property, such as a car,
that is subject to civil forfeiture when the property other-
wise could be removed, destroyed, or concealed before a for-
feiture hearing. See id., at 57 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416
U. S., at 679). And more to the point, that case did not alter
Von Neumann's holding that a timely forfeiture hearing pro-
vides the process that is due following the immediate seizure
of personal property.
In sum, Von Neumann held that a timely forfeiture hear-
ing satisfes due process in civil forfeiture cases, and $8,850
specifed the standard for when forfeiture hearings are
timely. Culley and Sutton have not asked the Court to dis-

390 CUL
LEY v. MARSHALL
Opinion of the Court
card those precedents in this case. And those precedents
make
crystal clear that due process does not require a sepa-
rate preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing.
B
Historical practice reinforces the holdings of $8,850 and
Von Neumann that due process does not require preliminary
hearings in civil forfeiture cases.
Since the Founding era, statutes have authorized the Gov-
ernment to seize personal property and hold it pending a
forfeiture hearing, without a separate preliminary hearing.
For example, the frst federal forfeiture law, the Collection
Act of 1789, authorized the civil forfeiture of ships, goods,
and merchandise involved in suspected violations of the cus-
toms laws. See, e. g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 22–
24, 34, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 42–43, 46; see generally C. Nelson, The
Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 Yale L. J. 2446,
2464–2466 (2016). The Act's forfeiture process began with
the seizure of property by a customs collector. See, e. g.,
§ 25, 1 Stat. 43. The collector then fled a forfeiture action,
which a court would “hear and determine . . . according to
law.” § 36, id., at 47. While that action was pending, the
seized property could “remain in the custody of the collec-
tor.” § 25, id., at 43. A claimant could also recover the
property on bond. See § 36, id., at 47.
The Collection Act did not require a separate preliminary
hearing before the forfeiture hearing. Rather, the forfeit-
ure “trial” supplied the opportunity for the property owner
to challenge the collector's case. Ibid.
In 1790 and 1799, Congress revised and reenacted the Col-
lection Act. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627; Act
of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145. The revised versions of
the Act contained similar forfeiture provisions and likewise
lacked anything resembling a separate preliminary hearing.
See, e. g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, §§ 69, 89, 1 Stat. 678, 695–696;
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§ 49, 67, 1 Stat. 170, 176–177.
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Opinion of the Court
Many state forfeiture statutes from the Founding period
si
milarly did not require a preliminary hearing before the
forfeiture hearing. See, e. g., Act of Apr. 11, 1787, ch. 81, in
2 Laws of the State of New York Passed at the Sessions of
the Legislature Held in the Years 1785, 1786, 1787 and 1788,
Inclusive, pp. 514–515, 517–520 (1886); Act of Oct. 1785,
ch. 14, in 12 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All
the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legisla-
ture, in the Year 1619, pp. 46–47 (1823). For example, a
New York customs statute from that era provided that a
property owner could recover his seized goods by either pre-
vailing at a forfeiture “trial” or executing a “bond” for an
appraised amount. Act of Apr. 11, 1787, at 517–518. The
statute did not allow property owners to challenge the valid-
ity of the seizure through a separate preliminary hearing or
any similar procedure. See id., at 517–520.
In addition, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed
in 1868, Congress did not require preliminary hearings. In
1864, for example, Congress provided that goods seized
under a new revenue law should “remain” in the “care and
custody” of the government “until fnal judgment” in a for-
feiture trial. Act of Mar. 7, 1864, ch. 20, § 2, 13 Stat. 14, 15.
Although that revenue law provided for bond, it did not
grant property owners a right to preliminary hearings. See
ibid. Similarly, in 1866, Congress required that goods and
vessels seized under a new customs law “remain in the cus-
tody” of a customs offcial pending “adjudication by the
proper tribunal.” Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 31, 14 Stat.
178, 186.
Many state forfeiture laws from around the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment likewise did not provide for a pre-
liminary hearing. For example, a New Hampshire statute
required that a state offcial “detain” personal property that
was seized for civil forfeiture until the property was “legally
disposed of ” through either bond or a forfeiture trial. The
General Statutes of the State of New-Hampshire, ch. 249,
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Opinion of the Court
§§ 3, 6–7, pp. 503–504 (1867). Likewise, a Vermont statute
author
ized the seizure of liquor that was intended for sale,
required the seizing offcer to “keep” the liquor “until fnal
action is had thereon,” and limited the conditions in which
a claimant could recover the liquor. The Revised Laws of
Vermont, 1880, § 3818, p. 738 (1881); see § 3827, id., at 740.
Petitioners and their amici do not identify any federal or
state statutes that, before the late 20th century, required
preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. To be sure,
some States have recently enacted laws requiring prelimi-
nary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. See, e. g., Ala. Act
2021–497, p. 9; 2021 Minn. Laws pp. 2064–2065; 2017 Ill. Laws
pp. 6854–6855; 2017 Wis. Laws p. 815; 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws
pp. 856–857; 2001 N. C. Sess. Laws p. 1159. But those re-
cent laws do not support a constitutional mandate for prelim-
inary hearings in every State.
In short, both Congress and the States have long author-
ized law enforcement to seize personal property and hold it
until a forfeiture hearing. The absence of separate prelimi-
nary hearings in civil forfeiture proceedings—from the
Founding until the late 20th century—is weighty evidence
that due process does not require such hearings. Cf. United
States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. 267, 274, 287–288 (1996); Bennis v.
Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 446–448 (1996); Calero-Toledo, 416
U. S., at 680–690. The historical practice in civil forfeiture
proceedings thus reinforces $8,850 and Von Neumann: In
civil forfeiture cases involving personal property such as
cars, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture
hearing but does not require a preliminary hearing.
***
To balance the interests of the government and individuals
in civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the
States and Congress have adopted a wide variety of ap-
proaches. For example, some States require that the for-
feiture hearing occur within a fxed period of time. Others
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require a jury trial. Still others condition civil forfeiture on
a
successful criminal prosecution. And a few now require
preliminary hearings. See Brief for State of Georgia et al.
as Amici Curiae 5–21.
Our decision today does not preclude those legislatively
prescribed innovations. Rather, our decision simply ad-
dresses the baseline protection of the Due Process Clause.
In civil forfeiture cases, the Due Process Clause requires
a timely forfeiture hearing, but does not require a separate
preliminary hearing. We affrm the judgment of the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring.
I agree with the Court that, at a minimum, the Due Proc-
ess Clause requires a prompt hearing in civil forfeiture cases.
Ante, at 384. I agree that no legal authority presented to
us indicates a prompt hearing must necessarily take the form
Ms. Culley and Ms. Sutton suppose. Ante, at 385–386. I
agree, too, that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976),
does not teach otherwise. Ante, at 388. Under its terms,
judges balance “the private and governmental interests at
stake,” Mathews, 424 U. S., at 340, to determine “what proce-
dures the government must observe” when it seeks to with-
hold “benefts” “such as welfare or Social Security,” Nelson
v. Colorado, 581 U. S. 128, 141 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring
in judgment). That test does not control—and we do not
afford any particular solicitude to “governmental inter-
ests”—in cases like this one where the government seeks to
deprive an individual of her private property. But if all that
leads me to join today's decision, I also agree with the dissent
that this case leaves many larger questions unresolved about
whether, and to what extent, contemporary civil forfeiture
practices can be squared with the Constitution's promise of
due process. I write separately to highlight some of them.
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I
The
facts of this case are worth pausing over because they
are typical of many. Halima Culley, a Georgia resident,
bought a 2015 Nissan Altima for her son to use while he was
away studying at the University of South Alabama. App.
58, ¶¶22–24. The car belongs to her and she pays for its
registration and insurance. Ibid., ¶¶25–26. The plan was
for her son to bring the car home during the summer for
the family to share. Id., at 60, ¶37. But before that could
happen, a police offcer in Alabama pulled her son over and
arrested him for possessing marijuana and drug parapherna-
lia. Id., at 59, ¶27. The offcer also took the car. Ibid.,
¶28. Eventually, law enforcement offcials learned that the
Nissan belonged to Ms. Culley, not her son. But instead of
returning it, they initiated civil forfeiture proceedings in the
hope of keeping the vehicle permanently. Ibid., ¶¶30–33.
It took a lawsuit and a 20-month wait for the car to make its
way back to her. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a.
For Alabama, this was business as usual. Often, the
State's law enforcement agencies may take and keep private
property without a warrant or any other form of prior proc-
ess. Ala. Code § 20–2–93(d) (Cum. Supp. 2023). Instead,
only after taking the property must the agency fle a civil
forfeiture action in court. Once there, the agency need
present only a “prima facie” case that the property in
question represents proceeds “traceable” to a drug crime or
property used to “facilitate” one. §§ 20–2–93(b)(3), (b)(5);
Ex parte McConathy, 911 So. 2d 677, 681 (Ala. 2005). If the
agency proves just that much, the burden sometimes shifts
to the property's owner to prove she was an “innocent
owner” who did not know about or consent to the conduct
that caused the property to be taken. §§ 20–2–93(w), (a)(4).
Should the agency prevail in the end, it may keep the
property for its own use or sell it and keep the money.
§ 20–2–93(s).
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Laws like Alabama's exist in many States and at the fed-
era
l level. But as commonplace as these civil forfeiture laws
may be, most are pretty new. As part of the War on Drugs,
in the 1970s and 1980s Congress began enacting sweeping
new civil forfeiture statutes allowing the government to
seize and keep the proceeds of drug crimes and the personal
property used to facilitate them. See S. Cassella, Asset
Forfeiture Law in the United States § 2–4, p. 48 (3d ed. 2022).
Since then, the federal government has extended similar civil
forfeiture rules to most federal offenses. Id., at 49. Today,
it appears, “[w]hite-collar and frearms crimes” now “ac-
coun[t] for larger shares of all [federal] forfeitures than drug
crimes.” L. Knepper, J. McDonald, K. Sanchez, & E. Pohl,
Policing for Proft: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture 26
(3d ed. 2020) (Knepper). Following the federal govern-
ment's lead, many States have adopted similar laws of their
own. See id., at 170–185.
These new laws have altered law enforcement practices
across the Nation in profound ways. My dissenting col-
leagues catalogue a number of examples, see post, at 405–
408 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.), but consider just a few here.
To secure a criminal penalty like a fne, disgorgement of ille-
gal profts, or restitution, the government must comply with
strict procedural rules and prove the defendant's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 363
(1970). In civil forfeiture, however, the government can
simply take the property and later proceed to court to earn
the right to keep it under a far more forgiving burden of
proof. See Knepper 39. In part thanks to this asymmetry,
civil forfeiture has become a booming business. In 2018,
federal forfeitures alone brought in $2.5 billion. Id., at 15.
Meanwhile, according to some reports, these days “up to 80%
of civil forfeitures are not accompanied by a criminal convic-
tion.” Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 14
(Buckeye Brief ).
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Law enforcement agencies have become increasingly de-
pendent
on the money they raise from civil forfeitures. The
federal government shares a large portion of what it receives
with state and local law enforcement agencies that aid its
forfeiture efforts. Dept. of Justice & Dept. of Treasury,
Guide to Equitable Sharing for State, Local, and Tribal Law
Enforcement Agencies 3, 12 (Mar. 2024). At one time or an-
other, “[o]ver 90% of the agencies serving jurisdictions with
populations” above 250,000 have participated in this “equita-
ble sharing ” scheme. E. Jensen & J. Gerber, The Civil For-
feiture of Assets and the War on Drugs: Expanding Criminal
Sanctions While Reducing Due Process Protections, 42
Crime & Delinquency 421, 425 (1996). And it seems that,
when local law enforcement budgets tighten, forfeiture activ-
ity often increases. B. Kelly, Fighting Crime or Raising
Revenue? Testing Opposing Views of Forfeiture 15 (2019).
Not only do law enforcement agencies have strong fnancial
incentives to pursue forfeitures, those incentives also appear
to infuence how they conduct them. Some agencies, for ex-
ample, reportedly place special emphasis on seizing low-
value items and relatively small amounts of cash, hopeful
their actions won't be contested because the cost of litigating
to retrieve the property may cost more than the value of
the property itself. See Knepper 9. Other agencies seem
to prioritize seizures they can monetize rather than those
they cannot, posing for example as drug dealers rather than
buyers so they can seize the buyer's cash rather than illicit
drugs that hold no value for law enforcement. See Buckeye
Brief 7–8.
Delay can work to these agencies' advantage as well. See
Brief for Institute for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 16.
Faced with the prospect of waiting months or years to secure
the return of a car or some other valuable piece of property
they need to work and live, even innocent owners sometimes
“settle” by “paying a fee to get it back.” Knepper 36. Con-
tributing to the inducement to settle is how little proof the
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agencies must produce to win forfeiture, the cost of liti-
gati
on, and the need to appear in court—sometimes, as
Ms. Culley learned, in a different State. And if these tactics
and burdens work against all affected individuals, can it be
any surprise “the poor and other groups least able to defend
their interests” often suffer most? Leonard v. Texas, 580
U. S. 1178, 1180 (2017) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting
denial of certiorari); see post, at 406–407.
II
To my mind, the due process questions surrounding these
relatively new civil forfeiture practices are many. Start
with the most fundamental one. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that no government in this country
may take “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” As originally understood, this promise usually meant
that a government seeking to deprive an individual of her
property could do so only after a trial before a jury in which
it (not the individual) bore the burden of proof. See, e. g., 1
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 134–
135 (1765) (Blackstone); Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2
Dall. 304, 315 (CC Pa. 1795) (Paterson, J.); Wilkinson v.
Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657 (1829) (Story, J.). So how is it that,
in civil forfeiture, the government may confscate property
frst and provide process later?
The answer, if there is one, turns on history. If, as a rule,
the Due Process Clauses require governments to conduct a
trial before taking property, some exceptions are just as
deeply rooted. And for just that reason, these exceptions,
too, may be consistent with the original meaning of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. As this Court has put it, “a
process of law . . . must be taken to be due process of law”
if it enjoys “the sanction of settled usage both in England
and in this country.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516,
528 (1884); see, e. g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 278–280 (1856).
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But can contemporary civil forfeiture practices boast that
k
ind of pedigree? In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), this Court noted that English
and early American admiralty laws allowed the government
to seize a vessel involved in “piratical” or other maritime
offenses and later initiate postdeprivation civil forfeiture
proceedings. Id., at 684. The Court observed that similar
legal rules existed for cases involving “objects used in viola-
tion of the customs and revenue laws.” Id., at 682; see also
K. Arlyck, The Founders' Forfeiture, 119 Colum. L. Rev.
1449, 1466 (2019). After emphasizing the existence of those
traditions, the Court proceeded to uphold the civil forfeiture
of a boat. Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 682, 690. Later and
proceeding on much the same basis, the Court approved vari-
ous aspects of civil forfeiture practice in the context of cus-
toms enforcement actions. See United States v. $8,850, 461
U. S. 555, 562, n. 12 (1983); United States v. Von Neumann,
474 U. S. 242, 249, n. 7 (1986).
These historical traditions suggest that postdeprivation
civil forfeiture processes in the discrete arenas of admiralty,
customs, and revenue law may satisfy the Constitution. But
as the Court stressed in Von Neumann, “the general rule”
remains that the government cannot “ `seize a person's prop-
erty without a prior judicial determination that the seizure
is justifed.' ” Id., at 249, n. 7. And it is far from clear to
me whether the postdeprivation practices historically toler-
ated inside the admiralty, customs, and revenue contexts
enjoy “the sanction of settled usage” outside them. Hur-
tado, 110 U. S., at 528.
The reasons for the law's traditionally permissive attitude
toward civil forfeiture in those three contexts may merit ex-
ploration, too. From a brief look, it seems they were some-
times justifed for reasons particular to their felds. In the
early Republic, for example, once a ship involved in viola-
tions of the Nation's piracy or customs laws slipped port for a
foreign destination, American courts often could not exercise
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jurisdiction over it or its crew, let alone its owners. See R.
W
aples, Proceedings in Rem § 19, p. 22 (1882) (Waples). In
many instances, the law recognized that seizing the ship,
subject to postdeprivation procedures, represented “the only
adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or in-
suring an indemnity to the injured party.” Harmony v.
United States, 2 How. 210, 233 (1844) (Story, J.); see also 3
Blackstone 262 (1768) ( justifying civil forfeiture in customs
cases as necessary “to secure such forfeited goods for the
public use, though the offender himself had escaped the reach
of justice”). But if history sanctions that line of thinking,
it's hard not to wonder: How does any of that support the
use of civil forfeiture in so many cases today, where the gov-
ernment can secure personal jurisdiction over the wrong-
doer? And where seizing his property is not the only ade-
quate means of addressing his offense?
Even supposing some modern civil forfeiture regimes are
able to claim the sanction of history, I wonder whether all
their particulars might. In the past, it seems the govern-
ment could confscate only certain classes of property. So,
for example, admiralty statutes regularly authorized the
government to seize and pursue the civil forfeiture of “the
instrument[s] of the offence,” say, a ship used to engage in
piracy. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 75 (1855); see Har-
mony, 2 How., at 233. But statutes like that did not neces-
sarily mean forfeiture extended to the vessel's cargo, and
courts were loath to assume they did. Id., at 235. Today,
by contrast, civil forfeiture statutes routinely permit govern-
ments to confscate not just instruments used in an offense,
but other “facilitating ” property as well. See supra, at 395.
(In this respect, Alabama's statute is again illustrative.)
And if that difference seems a small one, it is anything but:
It is the difference between being able to confscate the ma-
terials and equipment used to produce an illicit drug and
being able to confscate someone's car after he used it as the
site to conduct a single drug transaction as either buyer or
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seller. See Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 627–
628
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
Even in the areas where the law tolerated civil forfeiture,
earlier generations tempered some of its harshest features.
Courts, for example, ordinarily entertained “overwhelming
necessity” as a defense to “the violation of revenue laws”
that might otherwise justify forfeiture. 1 J. Bishop, Com-
mentaries on the Criminal Law § 697, p. 575 (1856) (Bishop);
see Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch 347, 363 (1808) (Marshall, C. J.)
(“[A] forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which
the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeit-
ure may be employed”). Some statutes permitted the
owner to avoid forfeiture by proving that the violation “pro-
ceeded from accident or mistake.” 1 Stat. 677; see United
States v. Nine Packages of Linen, 27 F. Cas. 154, 157
(No. 15,884) (CC NY 1818); Bishop § 697, at 575; cf. 3 Stat. 183
(no forfeiture of goods from “bona fde purchaser”). Others
empowered the Treasury Secretary himself to afford the
same remedy—and evidence suggests offcials “were exceed-
ingly liberal in their use of the . . . power, granting relief
in the overwhelming majority of cases presented to them.”
Arlyck, 119 Colum. L. Rev., at 1487; see also The Laura, 114
U. S. 411, 414–415 (1885). These days, meanwhile, many
civil forfeiture statutes lack some or all of these mitigating
features. I acknowledge that this Court has suggested an
innocent owner defense is not always constitutionally re-
quired. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 443 (1996); see
id., at 455–457 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing limits to
the Court's holding); id., at 457–458 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(same). But even putting that debate aside, what of early
forfeiture's other ameliorative attributes?
It appears, too, that time was often of the essence in tradi-
tional civil forfeiture practice. So, for example, an early fed-
eral statute permitting forfeiture for nonpayment of internal
duties “enjoined” the “collector” “to cause suits for [forfeit-
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ure] to be commenced without delay, and prosecuted to ef-
fec
t.” 3 Stat. 242. In an admiralty case, Chief Justice Mar-
shall remarked, “If the seizing offcer should refuse to
institute proceedings to ascertain the forfeiture, the district
court may, upon the application of the aggrieved party, com-
pel the offcer to proceed to adjudication, or to abandon the
seizure.” Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1, 10 (1817). And
in many instances owners could recover their property while
the forfeiture proceedings were ongoing by posting a bond.
See, e. g., 3 Stat. 242; United States v. Ames, 99 U. S. 35, 36
(1879); Waples § 81, at 112; ante, at 391. It's another feature
of historic practice that raises questions about current ones
in which even innocent owners can wait for months or years
for forfeiture proceedings to play out.
III
Why does a Nation so jealous of its liberties tolerate ex-
pansive new civil forfeiture practices that have “led to egre-
gious and well-chronicled abuses” ? Leonard, 580 U. S., at
1180 (statement of Thomas, J.). Perhaps it has something
to do with the relative lack of power of those on whom the
system preys. Perhaps government agencies' increasing de-
pendence on forfeiture as a source of revenue is an important
piece of the puzzle. Cf. Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 679 (in-
dicating, over 50 years ago and before the rise of many mod-
ern innovations, that “self-interes[t]” did not motivate the
forfeiture of the vessel at issue). But maybe, too, part of
the reason lies closer to home. In this Nation, the right to
a jury trial before the government may take life, liberty,
or property has always been the rule. Yes, some excep-
tions exist. But perhaps it is past time for this Court to
examine more fully whether and to what degree contempo-
rary civil forfeiture practices align with that rule and those
exceptions.
Really, it's hard not to wonder whether some current civil
forfeiture practices represent much less than a revival of the
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archaic common-law deodand. The deodand required the
for
feiture of any object responsible for a death—say, a knife,
car t, or horse —to the Crown. See 1 Blackstone 290.
Today, the idea seems much the same even if the practice
now sweeps more broadly, requiring almost any object in-
volved in almost any serious offense to be surrendered to the
government in amends.
The hardships deodands often imposed seem more than
faintly familiar, too. Deodands required forfeiture regard-
less of the fault of the owner, himself sometimes the de-
ceased. Not infrequently, the practice left impoverished
families without the means to support themselves, faced not
only with the loss of a loved one but also with the loss of a
horse or perhaps a cart essential to their livelihoods. See 2
F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 472
(1895); E. Burke, Deodand—A Legal Antiquity That May
Still Exist, 8 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 15, 17, 19–20 (1930). Some-
times grieving families could persuade authorities or juries
to forgo a deodand, but often not, and generally the burden
to avoid a deodand was on them. See M. Foster, Crown Law
266 (1762).
As time went on, too, curiously familiar fnancial incentives
wormed their way into the system. Originally, the Crown
was supposed to pass the deodand (literally, a thing given to
God) onto the church “as an expiation for the sou[l]” of the
deceased. 1 Blackstone 290. Over time, though, the Crown
increasingly chose instead to sell off its rights to deodands
to local lords and others. These recipients inevitably wound
up with a strong interest in the perpetuation of the enter-
prise. See id., at 292. Ultimately, the deodand's appeal
faded in England, and this Court has held that it “did not
become part of the common-law tradition of this country.”
Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 682; see id., at 681, n. 19. But
has something not wholly unlike it gradually reemerged in
our own lifetimes?
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*
In
asking the questions I do today, I do not profess a com-
prehensive list, let alone any frm answers. Nor does the
way the parties have chosen to litigate this case give cause
to supply them. But in future cases, with the beneft of full
briefng, I hope we might begin the task of assessing how
well the profound changes in civil forfeiture practices we
have witnessed in recent decades comport with the Constitu-
tion's enduring guarantee that “[n]o person shall . . . be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan and
Justice Jackson join, dissenting.
A police offcer can seize your car if he claims it is con-
nected to a crime committed by someone else. The police
department can then keep the car for months or even years
until the State ultimately seeks ownership of it through civil
forfeiture. In most States, the resulting proceeds from the
car's sale go to the police department's budget. Petitioners
claim that the Due Process Clause requires a prompt, post-
seizure opportunity for innocent car owners to argue to a
judge why they should retain their cars pending that fnal
forfeiture determination. When an offcer has a fnancial in-
centive to hold onto a car and an owner pleads innocence,
they argue, a retention hearing at least ensures that the of-
fcer has probable cause to connect the owner and the car to
a crime.
Today, the Court holds that the Due Process Clause never
requires that minimal safeguard. In doing so, it sweeps
far more broadly than the narrow question presented and
hamstrings lower courts from addressing myriad abuses of
the civil forfeiture system. Because I would have decided
only which due process test governs whether a retention
hearing is required and left it to the lower courts to apply
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that test to different civil forfeiture schemes, I respectfully
dissent.
I
A
Civ
il forfeiture occupies a murky space between criminal
forfeiture and ordinary government deprivations of property.
Criminal forfeiture is part of a defendant's criminal punish-
ment. The government must therefore proceed against the
person (in personam) to obtain someone's property via crim-
inal forfeiture, which generally requires notice of intent to
forfeit the property in a criminal indictment and full criminal
procedural protections for the defendant. At the outset, the
government must typically prove that it has probable cause
to seize the person for a specifc crime and therefore to hold
any property related to that crime. See Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U. S. 103 (1975).
Outside the criminal context, the government usually must
provide a hearing before depriving someone of essential
property. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 264–
266 (1970) (public assistance); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535,
542–543 (1971) (driver's license); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S.
67, 96–97 (1972) (household goods to which a creditor lays a
claim). In some circumstances “the necessity of quick action
by the State” may prevent a predeprivation hearing. Par-
ratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled on other
grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327 (1986). Then,
however, the government must make “availab[le] . . . some
meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the
State's action at some time after the initial [seizure], [to] sat-
isfy the requirements of procedural due process.” 451 U. S.,
at 539.
Civil forfeiture is a hybrid, where prosecutors proceed
against any property (in rem) they believe is connected to a
crime, even when the owner is innocent. Unlike criminal
forfeiture, civil forfeiture proceedings are untethered from
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405
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
any criminal prosecution. In fact, as many as 80% of civil
for
feitures are not accompanied by any ultimate criminal
conviction. Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae
14. Civil forfeiture is unnecessary where the government
pursues criminal forfeiture in an indictment and sustains a
conviction. Only if an offcer seizes property that he be-
lieves is connected to a crime, but does not belong to a de-
fendant charged with that crime, must prosecutors bring
civil forfeiture proceedings outside a criminal case. Even
when the State abandons the prosecution that formed the
basis for the seizure, an innocent property owner can be left
in civil forfeiture proceedings trying to get her property
back.
B
The Federal Government, States, and localities set their
own rules for civil forfeiture, subject only to the limits of the
Due Process Clause. This lack of standardized procedural
safeguards makes civil forfeiture vulnerable to abuse. In 32
States and the federal system, when law enforcement agen-
cies forfeit property, the proceeds go to their own budgets.
Brief for Institute for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 4. As
a result, police agencies often have a fnancial incentive to
seize as many cars as possible and try to retain them. The
forfeiture revenue is not a supplement; many police agencies
in fact depend on cash fow from forfeitures for their budgets.
See, e. g., J. Worrall & T. Kovandzic, Is Policing for Proft?
Answers From Asset Forfeiture, 7 Criminology & Pub. Pol'y
219, 222 (2008) (“[M]ore than 60% of police agencies surveyed
reported dependence on asset forfeiture”). These cash in-
centives not only encourage counties to create labyrinthine
processes for retrieving property in the hopes that innocent
owners will abandon attempts at recovery, they also infu-
ence which laws police enforce, how they enforce them, and
who they enforce them against. See Brief for Buckeye In-
stitute as Amicus Curiae 6–20 (detailing empirical studies
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on the effect of fscal incentives in civil forfeiture on law en-
forcement
decisionmaking).
Police offcers have an incentive to enforce the law in a
way that leads to the recovery of fungible property, like cash
or cars. For example, offcers might pose as drug dealers
instead of buyers in a sting operation, because “it allows po-
lice to seize a buyer's cash rather than a seller's drugs (which
have no legal value to the seizing agency).” E. Blumen-
son & E. Nilsen, Policing for Proft: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 67 (1998). Simi-
larly, police offcers might target low-level drug possession
in cars instead of drug transactions on the street, so that
they can seize the vehicle. In this case, police offcers pulled
over petitioner Halima Tariffa Culley's college-age son while
he was driving a car registered to her, charged him with
possession of marijuana, and seized the car. A police offcer
cannot sell recovered marijuana and a prosecutor's offce
does not ordinarily pursue low-level marijuana offenses.
When a police department can recover the proceeds from a
car civilly forfeited in connection to a low-level marijuana
offense, however, targeting that offense becomes more
appealing.
Moreover, offcers have a fnancial incentive to target mar-
ginalized groups, such as low-income communities of color,
who are less likely to have the resources to challenge the
forfeiture in court. See A. Crawford, Civil Asset Forfeiture
in Massachusetts: A Flawed Incentive Structure and Its Im-
pact on Indigent Property Owners, 35 Boston College J. L. &
Soc. Justice 257, 274–277 (2015) (“[O]ne way for law enforce-
ment agencies to generate profts is to target low-income
parties who are fnancially incapable of challenging sei-
zures”). A 2019 study found that “the seizure of nonnarcotic
property from black and Hispanic arrestees increases with
the size of the [budget] defcit in states where police depart-
ments can retain revenue from seized property.” M. Ma-
kowsky, T. Stratmann, & A. Tabarrok, To Serve and Collect:
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407
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The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement, 48
J
. Legal Studies 189, 208–209.
“[T]hese same groups are often the most burdened by for-
feiture,” because “they are more likely to suffer in their daily
lives while they litigate for the return of a critical item of
property, such as a car.” Leonard v. Texas, 580 U. S. 1178,
1180 (2017) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting denial of
certiorari). For many people, loss of access to a car, even
temporarily, is signifcant. Over 85% of Americans drive to
work. J. Hirsch & P. Jones, Driver's License Suspension for
Unpaid Fines and Fees: The Movement for Reform, 54
U. Mich. J. L. Reform 875, 881 (2021). Unsurprisingly, stud-
ies have found a link between the inability to drive and the
loss of a job. For example, “[i]n New Jersey, 42% of people
lost their jobs after their driver's license was suspended.”
Ibid. Loss of a car not only “takes away one's ability to
commute” but also imposes a barrier to “buy[ing] necessi-
ties, access[ing] healthcare, and visit[ing] family members,
pharmacies, grocery stores, hospitals, and other essential
services.” Ibid.
Given these burdens, low-income communities are also the
most vulnerable to pressure from unchecked prosecutors,
who can use coercive civil forfeiture processes to extract set-
tlement money from innocent owners desperate to get their
property back. See Brief for Institute for Justice et al. as
Amici Curiae 19–20 (detailing examples). In Detroit, to
take one example, car owners recently alleged that Wayne
County seizes vehicles in areas generally associated with
crime and holds on to the vehicles and their contents unless
the owners pay steep redemption fees: $900 for the frst sei-
zure; $1,800 for the second; and $2,700 for the third. See
Ingram v. Wayne Cty., 81 F. 4th 603, 606 (CA6 2023). If the
owner is unwilling or unable to pay this fee, she must either
abandon the vehicle or wait for county prosecutors to decide
whether to initiate forfeiture proceedings. Before such pro-
ceedings are brought, however, the owner allegedly must at-
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tend four or more pretrial conferences during regular work
hours,
during which the owner typically will not get to plead
her case to a judge. Instead, prosecutors will attempt to
persuade her to pay the redemption fee, towing costs, and
storage fees. Missing just one conference allegedly will re-
sult in automatic forfeiture and transfer of title to the
county.
Similarly, in Massachusetts, one investigation found over
500 instances in a single county where law enforcement held
property for a decade or more before offcials fnally com-
menced forfeiture proceedings. S. Datar & S. Dooling, Mas-
sachusetts Police Can Easily Seize Your Money. The DA of
One County Makes It Nearly Impossible To Get It Back,
ProPublica (Aug. 18, 2021), www.propublica.org/ar ticle/
massachusetts-police-can-easily-seize-your-money.-the-da-of-
one-county-makes-it-near-impossible-to-get-it-back. In
other words, those owners had to wait more than a decade
for the chance to explain to a judge why they should get
their property back. In one instance, prosecutors ran a
newspaper notice four years after a seizure, at which point
the property owner had only 20 days to file a claim to avoid
forfeiture. Similar delays have been reported in South Car-
olina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. See Brief for Institute
for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 16 (collecting studies).
In short, law enforcement can seize cars, hold them in-
defnitely, and then rely on an owner's lack of resources to
forfeit those cars to fund agency budgets, all without any
initial check by a judge as to whether there is a basis to hold
the car in the frst place.
II
This Court granted certiorari to address which of its tests
should govern due process challenges that seek a retention
hearing after an offcer seizes a car.
1
Now, the Court
1
See Pet. for Cert. i (“In determining whether the Due Process Clause
requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable
cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so,
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409
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
reaches far beyond that question to hold that people whose
cars
are seized by the police never have a due process right
to a retention hearing. The Court arrives at this conclusion
by relying on two customs cases from the 1980s and histori-
cal practice that purportedly reinforces their application.
Its reasoning is deeply fawed.
A
The majority says that “[t]his Court's decisions in $8,850
and Von Neumann resolve this case.” Ante, at 387. These
cases, however, have little to say about what due process
requires when an innocent owner seeks to retain her car
pending an ultimate forfeiture determination in schemes like
those described above. Instead, the claimants in these cases
argued that the United States Customs Service took too long
to resolve forfeiture proceedings against property seized at
the border as part of the claimants' own alleged violations of
customs law.
In United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 558 (1983), a cus-
toms inspector seized $8,850 in cash from Mary Josephine
Vasquez, who had declared she was carrying less than $5,000.
Vasquez was charged with a felony and a misdemeanor, with
the indictment seeking forfeiture of the $8,850 as part of the
misdemeanor charge. When a jury ultimately convicted
Vasquez of only the felony count, which did not contain the
forfeiture allegations, the Government fnally fled civil for-
feiture proceedings against the cash. Vasquez argued only
that the Government's 18-month delay in fling civil forfeit-
ure proceedings was unconstitutionally long. To evaluate
her claim, the Court borrowed the Barker v. Wingo multifac-
when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the
`speedy trial' test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983)
and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit
or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U. S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits”).
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tor test from the speedy-trial context and held that “the bal-
ance
of factors indicate[d] that the Government's delay . . .
was reasonable” in the circumstances. 461 U. S., at 569; see
id., at 564 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972)). In
so holding, the Court emphasized that the Government had
“diligent[ ly] ” pursued the pending criminal proceedings
against Vasquez. 461 U. S., at 568. Because a conviction on
the misdemeanor count could have rendered civil forfeiture
unnecessary, the Government's delay in fling a civil forfeit-
ure proceeding was understandable. Ibid.
In United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 245
(1986), Von Neumann failed to declare a newly purchased
Jaguar Panther car to customs offcials when he drove it back
to the United States. United States Customs seized the car,
and Von Neumann fled a petition for administrative remis-
sion proceedings the same day. Two weeks later, he posted
a bond and regained possession of the car. Thirty-six days
after he fled his remission petition, Customs resolved it by
reducing Von Neumann's penalty for failure to declare to
$3,600.
Von Neumann argued that the 36-day delay in responding
to his administrative remission petition violated due process.
The Government responded that “due process considerations
do not govern the Secretary's disposition of [administrative]
remission petitions.” Id., at 249. The Court agreed with
the Government. “Implicit in this Court's discussion of
timeliness in $8,850 was the view that the [regular civil] for-
feiture proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure
hearing required by due process to protect Von Neumann's
property interest in [his] car.” Ibid. The administrative
proceedings did not trigger a separate due process right, the
Court continued, because they were discretionary and “not
necessary to a forfeiture determination.” Id., at 250.
The Court then declined to address the argument that the
remission statute “itself creates a property right which can-
not be taken away without due process.” Ibid. “[E]ven if
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411
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
respondent had such a property right,” the Court explained,
“any
due process requirement of timely disposition was more
than adequately provided here.” Ibid. The Court had “al-
ready noted that his right to a forfeiture proceeding meeting
the Barker test satisfes any due process right with respect
to the car and the money.” Id., at 251. Von Neumann had
also failed to show “what prejudice [he] suffered from the
36-day delay in the response” to his remission petition. Id.,
at 250.
The majority takes Von Neumann's imprecise categorical
language out of this vital context to hold that “a timely for-
feiture hearing `satisfes any due process right' with respect
to a `car' that has been seized for civil forfeiture.” Ante, at
387 (quoting Von Neumann, 474 U. S., at 251).
2
In doing so,
it extends the holdings of both Von Neumann and $8,850 to
situations neither Court contemplated. In both, the Gov-
ernment sought to forfeit property tied to the claimants' un-
lawful conduct. The claimants were not, and did not claim
to be, innocent owners of property used for criminal ends
without their knowledge. Unlike petitioners here, neither
the claimant in $8,850 nor the claimant in Von Neumann had
argued that a retention hearing was necessary to test Cus-
toms' justifcation for seizing their property at the outset.
Instead, both argued only that the Government took too long
to resolve their proceedings: in $8,850 through a statutory
process, and in Von Neumann through a discretionary ad-
ministrative one. The majority's reading here improperly
resolves a constitutional challenge that the Court in those
cases had no cause or reason to address.
B
With the sole exception of the Eleventh Circuit, every
court of appeals has rejected Von Neumann's application to
2
Perhaps recognizing that it stretches the reasoning of the opinion, the
majority relies in a footnote on statements made at oral argument. See
ante, at 387, n. 2.

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LEY v. MARSHALL
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
state and county civil forfeiture schemes concerning claim-
ants'
cars.
3
Indeed, this Court has distinguished Von Neu-
mann in contexts where offcers have a fnancial incentive
to seize property and owners may assert innocence of the
underlying crime as a defense. In United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 46 (1993), for exam-
ple, this Court held that the Government must conduct a
predeprivation hearing before it seizes real property con-
nected to criminal conduct through civil forfeiture. Four
years after James Daniel Good pleaded guilty to state
charges based on drugs found in his home, the Federal Gov-
ernment fled civil forfeiture proceedings against his home.
Even though Good did not assert innocence, the Court em-
phasized that proceedings without a predeprivation hearing
created an unacceptable risk of error for property owners
asserting an “innocent owner” defense, because waiting until
the fnal forfeiture hearing “ `would not cure the temporary
deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented.' ”
Id., at 56. Crucial to the Court's reasoning was the fact that
“the Government has a direct pecuniary interest in the out-
come of the proceeding ” when it is entitled to forfeit the
property. Id., at 55–56.
This reasoning applies directly to due process challenges
where police seize the cars of innocent owners and use for-
feiture proceeds to fund department budgets. The narrow
holdings of $8,850 and Von Neumann should not determine
the due process claims of every claimant deprived of access
to her car by state prosecutors on untested grounds for
months or years.
3
See Ingram v. Wayne Cty., 81 F. 4th 603, 616–617 (CA6 2023); Serrano
v. CBP, 975 F. 3d 488, 500 (CA5 2020) (per curiam); Smith v. Chicago, 524
F. 3d 834, 837–838 (CA7 2008), vacated as moot, Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U. S.
87 (2009); Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F. 3d 40, 52, n. 12 (CA2 2002) (Soto-
mayor, J.); cf. Booker v. St. Paul, 762 F. 3d 730 (CA8 2014) (declining to
reference Von Neumann).

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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
III
The
majority's categorical rule that due process never re-
quires a retention hearing also cannot be squared with the
context-specifc analysis that this Court's due process doc-
trine requires. “ `[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fxed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961) (alteration in
original). “[D]ue process is fexible and calls for such pro-
cedural protections as the particular situation demands.”
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972).
The Court granted this case to resolve which of two fexi-
ble due process tests should govern, not to resolve whether
due process ever requires a retention hearing in civil forfeit-
ure schemes. That difference is important. An appropri-
ately context-specifc due process test should not always
yield the same result when applied to different schemes. Of
the six Circuits that have applied the test from Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), to various civil forfeiture
schemes, three have held that due process requires a reten-
tion hearing, Ingram, 81 F. 4th, at 620; Smith v. Chicago, 524
F. 3d 834, 838 (CA7 2008), vacated as moot, Alvarez v. Smith,
558 U. S. 87 (2009); Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F. 3d 40, 67–68
(CA2 2002) (Sotomayor, J.), and three have held that it does
not, Serrano v. CBP, 975 F. 3d 488, 500–502 (CA5 2020)
(per curiam); Booker v. St. Paul, 762 F. 3d 730, 736–737 (CA8
2014); United States v. One 1971 BMW, 652 F. 2d 817, 820–
821 (CA9 1981). That result is consistent with the fexible
dictates of any due process test, which should take into ac-
count all the component parts of an individual scheme.
For instance, petitioners had the right to post a bond to
get back their vehicles, the right to move for summary judg-
ment in the forfeiture proceeding itself, and the opportunity
to seek separate relief under the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure for an illegal seizure. The adequacy of those al-
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ternative procedures was never briefed below because the
only
question was which test should apply. By contrast, the
New York City scheme that the Second Circuit concluded
violated due process lacked all of those procedures. See
Krimstock, 306 F. 3d, at 55, 59–60. Differences in the ade-
quacy of available procedures can and should result in differ-
ent due process outcomes.
Instead of answering the question presented and then re-
manding to the lower court to apply the appropriate test,
the majority instead holds that due process never requires
a retention hearing. The majority acknowledges that “the
States and Congress have adopted a wide variety of ap-
proaches.” Ante, at 392. Yet it prescribes a categorical
constitutional rule for all of them. The Court today ham-
strings federal courts from conducting a context-specifc
analysis in civil forfeiture schemes that are less generous
than the one here.
IV
The majority's holding relates only to retention hearings.
It does not foreclose other potential due process challenges to
civil forfeiture proceedings. See ante, at 387, n. 3. People
who have their property seized by police remain free to chal-
lenge other abuses in the civil forfeiture system. For in-
stance, such claimants could challenge notice of a forfeiture
posted only in a newspaper, the lack of a neutral adjudicator
at an initial hearing, or the standard of proof necessary to
seize a car. Lower courts remain free to apply Mathews to
those claims. See ante, at 388. Due process also still “re-
quires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing,” ante, at 384,
so claimants may continue to challenge unreasonable delays.
4
4
Courts applying the Barker factors to due process challenges of unrea-
sonable delay should not apply a narrower version of that test than the
one this Court articulated in $8,850. The $8,850 Court emphasized that
Barker is a “fexible” test, and “none of [its] factors is a necessary or
suffcient condition for fnding unreasonable delay.” United States v.
$8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 564–565 (1983); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The abuses of many civil forfeiture systems are well docu-
mented.
See, e. g., supra, at 405–408. I commend States
or localities that have adopted retention hearings as a way
of guarding against those abuses. See, e. g., Brief for Legal
Aid Society as Amicus Curiae (detailing the benefts of New
York City's prompt postseizure hearings). Other States and
localities should not view today's decision as precluding them
from following suit and adopting similar measures.
***
The majority today holds that due process never requires
the minimal check of a retention hearing before a police off-
cer deprives an innocent owner of her car for months or
years. Given the diverse schemes adopted by States, some
with adequate safeguards and some without, the Court
should have just answered the question presented. Instead,
it announces a universal rule for all schemes without heeding
the dictates of this Court's due process precedents that re-
quire a scheme-specifc analysis. Because I instead would
have answered the question presented and left lower courts
the fexibility to apply the appropriate test in these myriad
circumstances, I respectfully dissent.
U. S. 514, 533 (1972) (“[T]hese factors have no talismanic qualities; courts
must still engage in a diffcult and sensitive balancing process”). The fac-
tors are merely “guides in balancing the interests of the claimant and the
Government to assess whether the basic due process requirement of fair-
ness has been satisfed in a particular case.” $8,850, 461 U. S., at 565. In
the civil forfeiture context, “the balance of the interests, which depends
so heavily on the context of the particular situation, may differ from a
situation involving the right to a speedy trial.” Ibid., n. 14. Recognizing
that the Barker and Mathews balancing tests have similar aims and fac-
tors, the Government notes that the tests are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20–22.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None