Arellano v. McDonough

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 598 U. S. Part 1
Pages 1–14
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
January 23, 2023
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2022
ARELLANO v. McDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 21–432. Argued October 4, 2022—Decided January 23, 2023
This case concerns the effective date of an award of disability compensa-
tion to a veteran of the United States military. Approximately 30 years
after Adolfo Arellano's honorable discharge from the Navy, Arellano ap-
plied to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for disability compen-
sation based on his psychiatric disorders. A VA regional offce granted
Arellano service-connected disability benefts after fnding that his dis-
orders resulted from trauma that he suffered while serving on an air-
craft carrier. Applying the default rule in 38 U. S. C. § 5110(a)(1), the
VA assigned an effective date of June 3, 2011—the day that the agency
received his claim—to Arellano's disability award. Arellano appealed,
arguing that his award's effective date should be governed by an excep-
tion in § 5110(b)(1), which makes “[t]he effective date of an award
of disability compensation . . . the day following the date of the veteran's
discharge or release if application therefor is received within one year
from such date of discharge or release.” Alleging that he had been
too ill to know that he could apply for disability benefts, Arellano main-
tained that this exception's 1-year grace period should be equit-
ably tolled to make his award effective on or about the day after
his discharge from military service in 1981. The VA's Board of Veter-
ans' Appeals denied Arellano's request, and the Court of Appeals
1
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
2 AREL
LANO v. McDONOUGH
Syllabus
for Veterans Claims affrmed. The Federal Circuit affrmed the
judg
ment.
Held: Section 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 6–14.
(a) Equitable tolling “effectively extends an otherwise discrete limita-
tions period set by Congress” when a litigant diligently pursues his
rights but extraordinary circumstances prevent him from bringing a
timely action. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10. The Court
presumes that federal statutes of limitations are subject to equitable
tolling. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–
96. But this presumption is rebutted if equitable tolling is inconsistent
with the statutory scheme. Here, the Secretary of the VA argues that
§ 5110(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations and that, even if it were, any
applicable presumption in favor of equitable tolling is rebutted by the
statutory text and structure. The Court need not decide whether
§ 5110(b)(1) is a statute of limitations. Even assuming that the excep-
tion sets a limitations period, there exists “good reason to believe that
Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350.
Section 5110(b)(1) operates as a limited exception to § 5110(a)(1)'s de-
fault rule, which states that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be
fxed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than
the date of receipt of application therefor.” The default rule applies
“[u]nless specifcally provided otherwise in this chapter”—a clause indi-
cating that Congress enumerated an exhaustive list of exceptions, with
each confned to its specifc terms. According to the terms of the excep-
tion in § 5110(b)(1), “[t]he effective date of an award of disability compen-
sation to a veteran shall be the day following the date of the veteran's
discharge or release if application therefor is received within one year
from such date of discharge or release.” Equitably tolling this provi-
sion would depart from the terms that Congress “specifcally pro-
vided.” § 5110(a)(1).
The structure of § 5110—which sets out 16 exceptions that explain
when various types of benefts qualify for an effective date earlier than
the default—reinforces Congress's choice to set effective dates solely as
prescribed in the text. These exceptions do not operate simply as time
constraints, but also as substantive limitations on the amount of recov-
ery due, a structure strongly indicating that “Congress did not intend
courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, `equitable' exceptions
into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. That
many of the specifc exceptions refect equitable considerations height-
ens the structural inference, as does the fact that Congress generally
capped retroactive benefts at roughly one year. When, as here, Con-

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 598 U. S. 1 (2023)
3
Syllabus
gress has already considered equitable concerns and limited the relief
avai
lable, “additional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.” United
States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48–49. Although hard and fast limits
on retroactive benefts can create harsh results, Congress has the power
to choose between rules, which prioritize effciency and predictability,
and standards, which prioritize optimal results in individual cases. Cf.
Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352–353. Congress opted for rules in this stat-
utory scheme, and an equitable extension of § 5110(b)(1)'s 1-year grace
period would disrupt that choice. Pp. 6–12.
(b) Arellano sees § 5110(b)(1) as a simple time limit and therefore a
classic case for equitable tolling. But § 5110(b)(1) cannot be understood
independently of § 5110(a)(1), which makes the date of claim receipt the
effective date “[u]nless specifcally provided otherwise in this chapter.”
This language is an instruction to attend to specifcally enacted language
to the exclusion of general, unenacted carveouts. Arellano relies on a
separate exception in § 5110(b)(4)—which makes disability pension bene-
fts retroactive in certain cases where permanent and total disability pre-
vents a veteran from applying for an award at the time of disability
onset—to argue that Congress wanted traditional principles of equitable
tolling to apply to § 5110(b)(1). To the contrary, § 5110(b)(4) demon-
strates that Congress had on its radar the possibility that disability could
delay an application for benefts and still Congress did not explicitly ac-
count for that possibility in § 5110(b)(1). Young v. United States, 535
U. S. 43, distinguished. Finally, Arellano contends that the nature of the
subject matter—veterans' benefts—counsels in favor of tolling because
providing benefts to veterans is a context in which individualized equities
are paramount. But the nature of the subject matter cannot overcome
statutory text and structure that foreclose equitable tolling. Pp. 12–14.
1 F. 4th 1059, affrmed.
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
James R. Barney argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Kelly S. Horn.
Sopan Joshi argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, and Deputy
Solicitor General Stewart.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Constitutional
Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for
Disabled American Veterans et al. by Amy F. Odom, Robert V. Chisholm,

4 AREL
LANO v. McDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
Th
is case concerns the effective date of an award of dis-
ability compensation to a veteran of the United States mili-
tary. The governing statute provides that the effective date
of the award “shall not be earlier” than the day on which the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) receives the veteran's
application for benefts. But the statute specifes 16 excep-
tions, one of which is relevant here: If the VA receives the
application within a year of the veteran's discharge, the ef-
fective date is the day after the veteran's discharge. We
must decide whether this exception is subject to equitable
tolling, a doctrine that would allow some applications fled
outside the 1-year period to qualify for the “day after dis-
charge” effective date. We hold that the provision cannot
be equitably tolled.
I
A
The United States offers benefts to any veteran who suf-
fers a service-connected disability. 38 U. S. C. §§ 1110, 1131.
A veteran seeking these benefts must fle a claim with the
VA. § 5101(a)(1)(A). “A regional offce of the VA then de-
termines whether the veteran satisfes all legal prerequi-
sites, including the requirement that military service caused
or aggravated the disability.” George v. McDonough, 596
U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2022). If the regional offce grants the
application, it assigns an “effective date” to the award, and
payments begin the month after that date. §§ 5110(a)(1),
and Zachary Stolz; and for Military-Veterans Advocacy Inc., et al. by Mel-
anie L. Bostwick, Cesar A. Lopez-Morales, John B. Wells, and Harvey
Weiner.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Edgewood Veterans et al. by Liam
J. Montgomery, Charles L. McCloud, Diane Boyd Rauber, William A.
Rivera, Leonard J. Sel fon, and Linda E. Blauhut; for the Federal Circuit
Bar Association by Nicholas F. Giove, Jonathan A. Herstoff, and Aakruti
G. Vakharia; and for the National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium
by Angela K. Drake.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 598 U. S. 1 (2023)
5
Opinion of the Court
5111(a)(1). If the effective date precedes the date on which
the
VA received the claim, the veteran receives retroactive
benefts.
Section 5110 dictates how this date is calculated. The de-
fault rule is that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be
fxed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be
earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.”
§ 5110(a)(1). This rule applies “[u]nless specifcally provided
otherwise in this chapter.” Ibid. Sixteen exceptions in
§ 5110 “provid[e] otherwise,” including one specifying that
“[t]he effective date of an award of disability compensation to
a veteran shall be the day following the date of the veteran's
discharge or release if application therefor is received within
one year from such date of discharge or release. ”
§ 5110(b)(1). On its face, this exception allows up to one
year of retroactive benefts. But if the VA can treat an ap-
plication fled more than one year after discharge as if it
had been fled within the statutory window, a veteran could
potentially recover decades' worth of retroactive payments.
B
Adolfo Arellano served in the Navy from 1977 until his
honorable discharge in 1981. Approximately 30 years later,
the VA received Arellano's application for disability compen-
sation based on his psychiatric disorders. A VA regional
offce found that Arellano's disorders resulted from trauma
that he suffered while serving on an aircraft carrier that
collided with another ship. So the regional offce granted
Arellano benefts for his service-connected disabilities—
schizoaffective disorder bipolar type with posttraumatic
stress disorder. It assigned an effective date of June 3,
2011, the day that the VA received his claim.
Arellano appealed the regional offce's decision to the VA's
Board of Veterans' Appeals. He acknowledged that he did
not submit an application for benefts until June 2011. But
he argued that the regional offce should have equitably
Page Proof Pending Publication

6 AREL
LANO v. McDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
tolled § 5110(b)(1)'s 1-year timeline to make his award effec-
tive
as of the day after his discharge from service in 1981 or,
at the latest, January 1, 1982. In support of equitable toll-
ing, Arellano alleged that he had been too ill to know that
he could apply for service-connected disability benefts. The
Board denied Arellano's request for equitable tolling, and the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affrmed.
The en banc Federal Circuit affrmed the judgment unani-
mously but divided equally on the supporting rationale.
Half the court, adhering to Circuit precedent, maintained
that § 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. 1 F. 4th
1059, 1086 (2021) (Chen, J., concurring in judgment); see An-
drews v. Principi, 351 F. 3d 1134 (2003). The other half,
rejecting Circuit precedent, reasoned that § 5110(b)(1) is sub-
ject to equitable tolling but that tolling was unwarranted on
the facts of Arellano's case. 1 F. 4th, at 1099 (Dyk, J., con-
curring in judgment).
We granted certiorari to resolve which side had the better
interpretation of the statute. 595 U. S. ––– (2022).
II
Equitable tolling “effectively extends an otherwise dis-
crete limitations period set by Congress.” Lozano v. Mon-
toya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10 (2014). In practice, it “pauses
the running of, or `tolls,' a statute of limitations when a liti-
gant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraor-
dinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely
action.” Ibid. The doctrine “is a traditional feature of
American jurisprudence and a background principle against
which Congress drafts limitations periods.” Boechler v.
Commissioner, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022). Consistent with
this jurisprudential backdrop, we presume that federal stat-
utes of limitations are subject to equitable tolling. Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990).
The Irwin presumption, however, is just that—a presump-
tion. It can be rebutted, and if equitable tolling is inconsist-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 598 U. S. 1 (2023)
7
Opinion of the Court
ent with the statutory scheme, courts cannot stop the clock
for
even the most deserving plaintiff. John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 137–138 (2008);
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48–49 (1998).
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs advances two reasons
why § 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. The frst
would head tolling off at the pass: He argues that § 5110(b)(1)
is not a statute of limitations, so the presumption is wholly
inapplicable. See Lozano, 572 U. S., at 13–14 (“[W]e have
only applied” Irwin's presumption “to statutes of limita-
tions”). Rather than extinguishing a tardy claim (the func-
tion of a statute of limitations), § 5110(b)(1) caps the award
for a successful claim (a different function). Brief for Re-
spondent 18–22. That it does so with reference to the time
of fling, the Secretary says, does not convert it into a statute
of limitations. Id., at 21. In any event, the Secretary adds,
equitable tolling is at odds with the statutory text and struc-
ture—so even assuming that § 5110(b)(1) sets a limitations
period, the presumption is rebutted.
We need not address the Secretary's frst argument be-
cause the second is straightforward. The presumption is re-
butted if “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did
not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997). In this case,
there is very good reason to draw that conclusion. Section
5110 contains detailed instructions for when a veteran's
claim for benefts may enjoy an effective date earlier than
the one provided by the default rule. It would be inconsist-
ent with this comprehensive scheme for an adjudicator to
extend effective dates still further through the doctrine of
equitable tolling.
1
1
Equitable tolling, a judicial doctrine, is typically applied by courts.
See Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 158–159
(2013). In this case, Arellano posits that the VA would apply the doctrine
in the frst instance. Reply Brief 18–19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 16–17. The
Secretary counters that the doctrine is not presumptively available to
Page Proof Pending Publication

8 AREL
LANO v. McDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
A
St
art with the text. Section 5110(b)(1) operates as a lim-
ited exception to § 5110(a)(1)'s default rule, which states that
“the effective date of an award . . . shall be fxed in accord-
ance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the
date of receipt of application therefor.” The default applies
“[u]nless specifcally provided otherwise in this chapter”—a
clause indicating that Congress enumerated an exhaustive
list of exceptions, with each confned to its specifc terms.
§ 5110(a)(1). According to the terms of the exception in
§ 5110(b)(1), “[t]he effective date of an award of disability
compensation to a veteran shall be the day following the date
of the veteran's discharge or release if application therefor
is received within one year from such date of discharge or
release.” Equitably tolling this provision would depart
from the ter ms that Congress “speci fica l ly prov ided. ”
§ 5110(a)(1).
The structure of § 5110 reinforces Congress's choice to set
effective dates solely as prescribed in the text. The statute
sets out detailed instructions that explain when various
types of benefts qualify for an effective date earlier than
the default. There are 16 such exceptions—and equitable
tolling is not on the list. See §§ 5110(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3),
(b)(4)(A), (c), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (f ), (g), (h), (i), ( j), (k), (l), (n).
Notably, these exceptions do not operate simply as time con-
straints, but also as substantive limitations on the amount of
recovery due. See, e. g., § 5110(g) (“In no event shall [an]
award or increase [under this paragraph] be retroactive for
more than one year from the date of application therefor or
the date of administrative determination of entitlement,
agencies because they possess no equitable power unless Congress grants
it to them—which, he says, Congress has not done here. Brief for Re-
spondent 32–35. We need not settle this dispute. Our conclusion that
the presumption is rebutted means that no adjudicator, whether an agency
or a court, may equitably toll the effective date.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 598 U. S. 1 (2023)
9
Opinion of the Court
whichever is earlier”). We stated in Brockamp that an “ex-
pl
icit listing of exceptions” in a statute containing “detail”
and describing “not only procedural limitations, but also sub-
stantive limitations on the amount of recovery” strongly in-
dicated that “Congress did not intend courts to read other
unmentioned, open-ended, `equitable' exceptions into the
statute that it wrote.” 519 U. S., at 352. So too here. If
Congress wanted the VA to adjust a claimant's entitlement
to retroactive benefts based on unmentioned equitable fac-
tors, it is diffcult to see why it spelled out a long list of
situations in which a claimant is entitled to adjustment—
and instructed the VA to stick to the exceptions “specifcally
provided.” § 5110(a)(1).
That many of the specifc exceptions refect equitable con-
siderations heightens the structural inference. Several, in-
cluding § 5110(b)(1), apply when the event triggering the
entitlement to benefts is disability or death—both circum-
stances in which prompt fling could be challenging for a vet-
eran or her survivors. See §§ 5110(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(4)(A), (d);
cf. Lozano, 572 U. S., at 10 (noting that equitable tolling may
be appropriate when a person diligently pursues her rights
but an “extraordinary circumstance prevents [her] from
bringing a timely action”). One permits an earlier effective
date for the award of benefts to a veteran's child, a claimant
typically dependent on others for prompt fling. § 5110(e)(1).
Still others permit retroactive benefts when facts change
or new evidence emerges. See § 5110(h) (permitting retro-
active benefts when actual income would increase a pen-
sion that had been awarded based on anticipated income);
§ 5110(i) (permitting retroactive benefts when “any disal-
lowed claim is readjudicated and thereafter allowed on
the basis of new and relevant evidence resulting from the
correction of ” certain military records). Yet despite its at-
tention to fairness, Congress did not throw the door wide
open in these circumstances or any other. In all but one
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
10 AREL
LANO v. McDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
instance, Congress capped retroactive benefts at roughly
one
year.
2
This pattern matters. That Congress accounted for equi-
table factors in setting effective dates strongly suggests that
it did not expect an adjudicator to add a broader range of
equitable factors to the mix. And its decision to consist-
ently cap retroactive benefts strongly suggests that it did
not expect open-ended tolling to dramatically increase the
size of an award. When Congress has already considered
equitable concerns and limited the relief available, “addi-
tional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.” Beggerly,
524 U. S., at 48–49.
Section 5110(b)(4), another disability-related exception to
the defau lt r u le, i l lustrates the poi nt. Reca l l that
§ 5110(b)(1), the exception at issue here, adjusts the effective
date of disability compensation to the day after a veteran's
discharge from the military, so long as the VA receives the
claim within one year of discharge. Arellano contends that
his claim, fled 30 years after discharge, should relate back
to the date of discharge because his disability prevented him
2
Thirteen of the exceptions, including § 5110(b)(1), allow an effective
date up to one year before the application-receipt date. See, e. g.,
§ 5110(b)(3) (“The effective date of an award of increased compensation
shall be the earliest date as of which it is ascertainable that an increase
in disability had occurred, if application is received within one year from
such date” (emphasis added)). Two exceptions contemplate the possibility
that the effective date of an award might stretch up to one day short of
13 months before the application-receipt date. See §§ 5110(d) (“The effec-
tive date of an award of death compensation, dependency and indemnity
compensation, or death pension for which application is received within
one year from the date of death shall be the frst day of the month in
which the death occurred”), (e)(1). The only one offering more than 13
months of retroactive benefts concerns the death of an active-duty serv-
icemember. This provision permits an award of death compensation to
be effective as of the month of death, no matter how long ago the death
occurred—but still, retroactive benefts are permitted only if the VA re-
ceives the application within one year of the military's entry of a report
or fnding of the servicemember's death. § 5110( j).

Cite
as: 598 U. S. 1 (2023)
11
Opinion of the Court
from fling earlier than he did. But § 5110(b)(4), which ap-
pl
ies to disability pensions rather than disability compensa-
tion, expressly accounts for this very concern: It makes pen-
sion benefts retroactive to the date of permanent and total
disability if the disability prevented the veteran from apply-
ing for an award at the time of onset. §§ 5110(b)(4)(A), (B).
The possibility that disability could cause delay was there-
fore on Congress's radar; still, Congress did not explicitly
account for it in § 5110(b)(1). Moreover, while Arellano
posits an open-ended grace period for § 5110(b)(1), § 5110(b)
(4)(A) imposes a restrictive one: It applies only “if the vet-
eran applies for a retroactive award within one year” of “the
date on which the veteran became permanently and totally
disabled.” Why would Congress allow an unlimited grace
period for an equitable concern unmentioned in § 5110(b)(1)
when it established a limited grace period for the same con-
cern explicitly mentioned in § 5110(b)(4)? Tolling § 5110(b)(1)
would single it out for special treatment; enforcing its terms
keeps it consistent with the statutory scheme.
The most compelling argument for equitable tolling is that
hard and fast limits on retroactive benefts can create harsh
results. The statutory default ties the start of benefts
to the application-receipt date, a choice that incentivizes
promptness and disfavors retroactive awards. The excep-
tions granting a 1-year grace period soften that choice in
specifed circumstances, yet there are situations in which eq-
uity's fexible, open-ended approach would be more generous
to a deserving claimant. With this in mind, Congress could
have designed a scheme that allowed adjudicators to maxi-
mize fairness in every case. But Congress has the power to
choose between rules, which prioritize effciency and predict-
ability, and standards, which prioritize optimal results in in-
dividual cases. Cf. Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352–353 (observ-
ing that “Congress decided to pay the price of occasional
unfairness in individual cases . . . in order to maintain a more
workable tax enforcement system”). Congress opted for
Page Proof Pending Publication

12 AREL
LANO v. McDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
rules in this statutory scheme, and an equitable extension of
§
5110(b)(1)'s 1-year grace period would disrupt that choice.
B
Arel lano contests a l l of th is. Laser focused on
§ 5110(b)(1), he argues that the provision's unadorned text
contains none of the specifc, technical language that might
otherwise rebut the presumption of equitable tolling. In ad-
dition, he emphasizes that there are “zero express exceptions
to § 5110(b)(1)'s one-year clock,” which he describes as “fatal”
to the Secretary's position. Reply Brief 14. As Arellano
sees it, § 5110(b)(1) is a simple time limit and therefore a
classic case for equitable tolling.
If § 5110(b)(1) stood alone, there might be something to
Arellano's argument. (Again, assuming that § 5110(b)(1) is
a limitations period to which the Irwin presumption ap-
plies.) But § 5110(b)(1) cannot be understood independently
of § 5110(a)(1), which makes the date of receipt the effective
date “[u]nless specifcally provided otherwise in this chap-
ter.” Arellano insists that the Secretary overreads “unless”
by treating it as a signal that the enacted exceptions are
exclusive. Brief for Petitioner 31–32. But the clause says
more than “unless”—it says that the default applies “[u]n-
less specifcally provided otherwise.” § 5110(a)(1) (emphasis
added). That is an instruction to attend to specifcally
enacted language to the exclusion of general, unenacted
carveouts. While Arellano claims to seek an equitable ex-
ception to a general rule, he actually seeks an equitable ex-
ception to an exception to a general rule. Structurally, that
is a heavy lift. Moreover, § 5110(b)(1) is nestled within a list
of 15 other exceptions to § 5110(a)(1)'s default rule, and, as
we have already explained, the presence of this detailed,
lengthy list raises the inference that the enumerated excep-
tions are exclusive.
Arellano also resists the proposition that the express ac-
counting for disability-caused delay in § 5110(b)(4) hurts his
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 598 U. S. 1 (2023)
13
Opinion of the Court
case. On the contrary, he insists that it works in his favor.
Citi
ng Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43 (2002), he main-
tains that an express tolling provision does not displace the
presumption of tolling but rather demonstrates that a stat-
ute incorporates traditional equitable principles. Brief for
Petitioner 37–38. According to Arellano, Congress's silence
in § 5110(b)(1) merely shows that it wanted those traditional
pr inciples to apply at full strength. Ib id.; Reply Brief
19–20.
We disagree. Section 5110(b)(4) does not help Arellano;
for the reasons we have already explained, it illustrates why
equitably tolling § 5110(b)(1) is incongruent with the statu-
tory scheme. Young is inapposite. There, we concluded
that an “express tolling provision” for a time limit in a bank-
ruptcy statute supported equitable tolling of a different time
limit in the same statute. 535 U. S., at 53. But that was
largely because the express tolling provision authorized toll-
ing where equity would not otherwise have permitted it.
Ibid. As a result, we interpreted the express tolling provi-
sion to “supplemen[t] rather than displac[e] principles of equi-
table tolling.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Here, however,
§ 5110(b)(4) does not authorize tolling that equity would not
otherwise have allowed. If anything, its conditional and
narrow applicability limits tolling that might otherwise have
occurred. Though Arellano makes a valiant effort to turn a
negative into a positive, § 5110(b)(4) remains an obstacle to
his interpretation.
Finally, Arellano contends that “the `nature of the underly-
ing subject matter' ”—veterans' benefts—counsels in favor
of tolling here. Brief for Petitioner 33–34. To support this
proposition, he invokes Brockamp, which considered
whether courts can equitably toll time limits for fling tax-
refund claims. 519 U. S., at 348. After holding that the
statute's text and structure rebutted the Irwin presumption,
we observed that the “nature of the underlying subject
matter—tax collection—underscore[d] the linguistic point.”
Page Proof Pending Publication

14 AREL
LANO v. McDONOUGH
Opinion of the Court
Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. “Tax law, after all, is not nor-
ma
lly characterized by case-specifc exceptions refecting in-
dividualized equities.” Ibid. By contrast, Arellano argues,
providing benefts to veterans is a context in which individu-
alized equities are paramount. See King v. St. Vincent's
Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 220–221, n. 9 (1991) (“[P]rovisions for
benefts to members of the Armed Services are to be con-
strued in the benefciaries' favor”).
If the text and structure favored Arellano, the nature of
the subject matter would garnish an already solid argument.
But the nature of the subject matter cannot overcome text
and structure that foreclose equitable tolling. Brockamp
turned to the “nature of the underlying subject matter” only
to “underscor[e] the linguistic point.” 519 U. S., at 352.
Arellano, however, lacks the linguistic point. This is not a
case in which competing interpretations are equally plausi-
ble; it is one in which Congress's choice is evident.
3
***
We hold that § 5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling
and affrm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
3
We resolve only the applicability of equitable tolling to § 5110(b)(1).
We do not address the applicability of other equitable doctrines, such as
waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None