Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 595 U. S. Part 2
Pages 398–410
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 23, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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398 OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
Syllabus
WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE et al. v. WISCONSIN
ELECTIONS
COMMISSION et al.
on application for stay and injuctive relief
No. 21A471. Decided March 23, 2022
The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to hear an original action brought
by a group of Wisconsin voters seeking to remedy malapportionment in
Wisconsin's State Assembly and Senate districts. The court invited the
parties and intervenors—including the Wisconsin Legislature and the
Governor—to propose maps that both minimized changes from the cur-
rent maps and complied with legal requirements of the State Constitu-
tion, the Federal Constitution, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).
The court issued a decision selecting the Assembly and Senate maps
that the Governor had proposed. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections
Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N. W. 2d 402. The Gover-
nor's Assembly map intentionally created seven majority-black dis-
tricts—one more than the current map—which the Governor argued
was necessary for compliance with the VRA. In adopting the Gover-
nor's map, the court explained that it could not “say for certain” that
the additional majority-black district was required by the VRA,
but concluded that the Governor's map complied with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because there were “good reasons” to think that the
VRA “may” require it. Id., at 658, 659, 971 N. W. 2d, at 418, 419.
Applicants ask this Court either to grant an emergency stay or to con-
strue their application as a petition for certiorari and to reverse the
decision below.
Held: The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is reversed as to
the selection of the Governor's State Assembly and Senate maps, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. The Wisconsin court erred in its application of decisions of
this Court regarding the relationship between the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal protection and the VRA. Under the Equal Protection
Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race “cannot be
upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state
interest.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 904. This Court has as-
sumed that complying with the VRA is a compelling interest and held
that if race is the predominant factor motivating the placement of voters
in or out of a particular district, the State bears the burden of showing
that the design of that district withstands strict scrutiny. Cooper v.
Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 292. When a State invokes § 2 of the VRA to

Cite
as: 595 U. S. 398 (2022)
399
Per Curiam
justify race-based districting, the State must show a strong basis
i
n evidence for concluding that the statute required its action. Ibid.
Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court erred in its efforts to apply
Cooper's understanding of what the Equal Protection Clause requires.
Whether the court viewed the Governor or itself as the state mapmaker
who must satisfy strict scrutiny, the court's application of Cooper was
fawed. The Governor failed to carry his burden as he provided insuf-
fcient evidence or analysis to support his claim that the VRA required
the seven majority-black districts that he drew. Similarly, the court
failed to satisfy strict scrutiny itself, for three reasons. First, the court
erroneously believed that it had to conclude only that the VRA might
support race-based districting—not that the statute required it. But
the Court's precedent instructs otherwise. In Cooper, for example, the
Court explained that “race-based districting is narrowly tailored . . . if
a State had `good reasons' for thinking that the Act demanded such
steps.” 581 U. S., at 301 (emphasis added). Second, the court fell short
in its application of the analytical framework this Court provided in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46–51, to demonstrate a § 2 violation.
Rather than carefully evaluating evidence at the district level, as re-
quired, the court relied on generalizations to reach the conclusion that
the preconditions to demonstrating a § 2 violation identifed in Gingles
were satisfed. Third, the court improperly reduced Gingles' totality-
of-circumstances analysis to the single factor of proportionality, an
approach the Court rejected in Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997,
1020–1021. In sum, this Court's VRA precedents ask a question not
answered below: whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add a
seventh majority-black district would deny black voters equal political
opportunity. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's strict-scrutiny analysis
did not comply with this Court's equal protection jurisprudence and its
judgment cannot stand.
Certiorari granted; 2022 WI 14, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N. W. 2d 402, reversed
and remanded.
Per Curiam.
Because of population shifts revealed by the 2020 decen-
nial census, Wisconsin's State Assembly and Senate districts
are no longer equally apportioned. The Wisconsin Legisla-
ture passed new maps to fx the problem, but the Governor
vetoed them. At an impasse, the legislature and the Gover-
nor turned to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which had al-
ready agreed to hear an original action brought by a group
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400 WISCONSIN
LEGISLATURE v. WISCONSIN
ELECTIONS COMM'N
Per Curiam
of voters seeking to remedy the malapportionment. Rather
than
attempt to draw new maps itself, the court invited the
parties and intervenors—including the legislature and the
Governor—to propose maps that complied with the State
Constitution, the Federal Constitution, and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 52
U. S. C. § 10301 et seq., and that otherwise minimized changes
from the current maps.
On March 3, the court issued a decision selecting the As-
sembly and Senate maps that the Governor had proposed.
Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, 400
Wis. 2d 626, 971 N. W. 2d 402. (Because the State Constitu-
tion requires three Assembly districts to be nested within
each Senate district, the court analyzed and selected the
maps as a unit. Id., at 644–645, 971 N. W. 2d, at 411.) The
Governor's Assembly map intentionally created seven major-
ity-black districts—one more than the current map.
1
The
Governor argued that the addition of a seventh majority-
black district was necessary for compliance with the VRA.
In adopting the Governor's map, the court explained: “[W]e
cannot say for certain on this record that seven majority-
Black assembly districts are required by the VRA.” Id., at
658, 971 N. W. 2d, at 418. It nevertheless concluded that the
Governor's map complied with the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because there were “good
reasons” to think that the VRA “may” require the additional
majority-black district. Id., at 659, 971 N. W. 2d, at 419.
The legislature and the voters who initiated the state-
court proceeding now seek relief from that decision. They
argue that the court selected race-based maps without suff-
1
The Governor's map accomplished this addition by reducing the black
voting-age population in the other six majority-black districts. The black
voting-age populations in the Governor's seven districts all cluster be-
tween 50.1% and 51.4%, compared to the current six districts' range of
51% to 62%. See 2022 WI 14, ¶87, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 674–675, 971 N. W. 2d
402, 426 (Ziegler, C. J., dissenting).
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as: 595 U. S. 398 (2022)
401
Per Curiam
cient justifcation, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause
. They ask this Court either to grant an emergency
stay or to construe their application as a petition for certio-
rari and reverse the decision below.
We agree that the court committed legal error in its appli-
cation of decisions of this Court regarding the relationship
between the constitutional guarantee of equal protection and
the VRA. We accordingly construe the application for stay
presented to Justice Barrett and by her referred to the
Court as a petition for certiorari, grant the petition, reverse
the imposition of the Governor's State Assembly and Senate
maps, and remand to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Summarily cor-
recting the error gives the court suffcient time to adopt
maps consistent with the timetable for Wisconsin's August
9th primary election.
***
Under the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that
sort voters on the basis of race “ `are by their very nature
odious.' ” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 643 (1993). Such
laws “cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to
achieving a compelling state interest.” Miller v. Johnson,
515 U. S. 900, 904 (1995). We have assumed that complying
with the VRA is a compelling interest. Cooper v. Harris,
581 U. S. 285, 292 (2017). And we have held that if race is
the predominant factor motivating the placement of voters
in or out of a particular district, the State bears the burden
of showing that the design of that district withstands strict
scrutiny. Ibid. Thus, our precedents hold that a State can
satisfy strict scrutiny if it proves that its race-based sorting
of voters is narrowly tailored to comply with the VRA.
Ibid.
A State violates § 2 of the VRA “if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes lead-
ing to nomination or election in the State or political subdivi-
sion are not equally open to participation by members of [a
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402 WISCONSIN
LEGISLATURE v. WISCONSIN
ELECTIONS COMM'N
Per Curiam
minority group] in that its members have less opportunity
than
other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”
52 U. S. C. § 10301(b). We have construed § 2 to prohibit the
distribution of minority voters into districts in a way that
dilutes their voting power. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U. S. 30, 46–51 (1986). In Gingles, we provided a framework
for demonstrating a violation of that sort. First, three “pre-
conditions” must be shown: (1) The minority group must be
suffciently large and compact to constitute a majority in a
reasonably confgured district, (2) the minority group must
be politically cohesive, and (3) a majority group must vote
suffciently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minor-
ity group's preferred candidate. Id., at 50–51.
If the preconditions are established, a court considers the
totality of circumstances to determine “whether the political
process is equally open to minority voters.” Id., at 79; see
also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1011–1012 (1994)
(satisfying the Gingles preconditions is necessary but not
suffcient to show a § 2 violation; “courts must also examine
other evidence in the totality of circumstances”). We have
identifed as relevant to the totality analysis several factors
enumerated in the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments
to the VRA, as well as “whether the number of districts in
which the minority group forms an effective majority is
roughly proportional to its share of the population in the
relevant area.” League of United Latin American Citizens
v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 426 (2006) (LULAC).
We said in Cooper that when a State invokes § 2 to justify
race-based districting, “it must show (to meet the `narrow
tailoring ' requirement) that it had `a strong basis in evidence'
for concluding that the statute required its action.” 581
U. S., at 292. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that
the Governor's intentional addition of a seventh majority-
black district triggered the Equal Protection Clause and that
Cooper's strict-scrutiny test must accordingly be satisfed.
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as: 595 U. S. 398 (2022)
403
Per Curiam
Accepting those conclusions, we hold that the court erred in
its
efforts to apply Cooper's understanding of what the Equal
Protection Clause requires.
It is not clear whether the court viewed the Governor or
itself as the state mapmaker who must satisfy strict scrutiny,
but the court's application of Cooper was fawed either way.
If the former, the Governor failed to carry his burden. His
main explanation for drawing the seventh majority-black dis-
trict was that there is now a suffciently large and compact
population of black residents to fll it, Brief for Intervenor-
Respondent Evers i n John so n v. Wisco n sin El ec t io n s
Comm'n, No. 2021AP1450–OA (Wis. Sup. Ct., Dec. 15, 2021),
p. 14—apparently embracing just the sort of uncritical
majority-minority district maximization that we have ex-
pressly rejected. De Grandy, 512 U. S., at 1017 (“Failure to
maximize cannot be the measure of § 2”). He provided al-
most no other evidence or analysis supporting his claim that
the VRA required the seven majority-black districts that he
drew. See 400 Wis. 2d, at 676–677, 686–689, 971 N. W. 2d, at
427–428, 432–433 (Ziegler, C. J., dissenting). Strict scrutiny
requires much more. See Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. –––, –––
(2018) (“[W]here we have accepted a State's `good reasons'
for using race in drawing district lines, the State made a
strong showing of a preenactment analysis with justifable
conclusions”). If the Wisconsin Supreme Court was review-
ing whether the Governor satisfed strict scrutiny, it erred
by adopting his maps.
If, on the other hand, the court sought to shoulder strict
scrutiny's burden itself, it fared little better. First, it mis-
understood Cooper's inquiry. The court believed that it had
to conclude only that the VRA might support race-based dis-
tricting—not that the statute required it. See 400 Wis. 2d,
at 658, 659, 971 N. W. 2d, at 418, 419 (“[W]e cannot say for
certain on this record that seven majority-Black assembly
districts are required by the VRA,” but “we see good rea-
sons to conclude a seventh majority-Black assembly district

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ELECTIONS COMM'N
Per Curiam
may be required” (emphasis added)). Our precedent in-
str
ucts otherwise. Thus in Cooper we explained, for exam-
ple, that “race-based districting is narrowly tailored . . . if a
State had `good reasons' for thinking that the Act demanded
such steps.” 581 U. S., at 301 (emphasis added). And we
concluded that “experience gave the State no reason to think
that the VRA required” it to move voters based on race.
Id., at 303 (emphasis added). That principle grew out of the
more general proposition that “the institution that makes the
racial distinction must have had a `strong basis in evidence'
to conclude that remedial action was necessary, `before it em-
barks on an affrmative-action program.' ” Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U. S. 899, 910 (1996) (some emphasis added).
To be sure, we said in Cooper that States have “ `breathing
room' ” to make reasonable mistakes; we will not fault a
State just because its “compliance measures . . . may prove,
in perfect hindsight, not to have been needed.” 581 U. S.,
at 293. But that “leeway” does not allow a State to adopt a
racial gerrymander that the State does not, at the time of
imposition, “judg[e] necessary under a proper interpretation
of the VRA.” Id., at 306.
Second, the court's analysis of Gingles' preconditions fell
short of our standards. As we explained in Cooper, “[t]o
have a strong basis in evidence to conclude that § 2 demands
. . . race-based steps, the State must carefully evaluate
whether a plaintiff could establish the Gingles preconditions
. . . in a new district created without those measures.” 581
U. S., at 304. Rather than carefully evaluating evidence at
the district level, the court improperly relied on generaliza-
tions to reach the conclusion that the preconditions were sat-
isfed. See id., at 305, n. 5 (a “generalized conclusion fails to
meaningfully . . . address the relevant local question”
whether the preconditions would be satisfed as to each
district).
The court's entire discussion of the frst precondition was
to say that “it is undisputed” and “the parties' submissions

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as: 595 U. S. 398 (2022)
405
Per Curiam
demonstrate” that seven suffciently large and compact
major
ity-black districts could be drawn. 400 Wis. 2d, at 654,
971 N. W. 2d, at 416. Similarly, its discussion of the second
precondition consisted of nothing but the statement that
“[e]xperts from multiple parties analyzed voting trends and
concluded political cohesion existed; no party disagreed.”
Ibid., 917 N. W. 2d, at 417. And while the court did cite one
specifc expert report for the third precondition—calculating,
based on eight previous races, how often white voters in the
Milwaukee area defeat the preferred candidate of black vot-
ers—it made virtually no effort to parse that data at the
district level or respond to criticisms of the expert's analysis.
Id., at 655, 971 N. W. 2d, at 417; see id., at 689–693, 971 N. W.
2d, at 433–435 (Ziegler, C. J., dissenting).
2
Third, the court improperly reduced Gingles' totality-of-
circumstances analysis to a single factor. The court ac-
knowledged the Senate factors but concluded that they had
no role to play in its analysis. 400 Wis. 2d, at 656–657, and
n. 28, 971 N. W. 2d, at 417–418, and n. 28. Instead, it focused
exclusively on proportionality. See id., at 656–659, 971
N. W. 2d, at 417–419. We rejected just that approach in De
Grandy, explaining that “[n]o single statistic provides courts
with a shortcut to determine whether a set of single-member
districts unlawfully dilutes minority voting strength.” 512
U. S., at 1020–1021; see also id., at 1026 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (“The Court . . . makes clear that proportionality is
never dispositive. Lack of proportionality can never by it-
self prove dilution, for courts must always carefully and
searchingly review the totality of the circumstances”).
2
That sole piece of cited record evidence came from an intervenor who
argued that the Governor's map violated the VRA. 400 Wis. 2d, at 677,
694, 971 N. W. 2d, at 427–428, 436 (Ziegler, C. J., dissenting); Response
Brief for Intervenor-Petitioner Black Leaders Organizing for Communi-
ties et al. in Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n, No. 2021AP1450–
OA (Wis. Sup. Ct., Dec. 30, 2021), pp. 7–20. The court did not acknowl-
edge or respond to that argument.

406 WISCONSIN
LEGISLATURE v. WISCONSIN
ELECTIONS COMM'N
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The question that our VRA precedents ask and the court
fai
led to answer is whether a race-neutral alternative that
did not add a seventh majority-black district would deny
black voters equal political opportunity. Answering that
question requires an “ ` “intensely local appraisal” ' of the
challenged district.” LULAC, 548 U. S., at 437. When the
Wisconsin Supreme Court endeavored to undertake a full
strict-scrutiny analysis, it did not do so properly under our
precedents, and its judgment cannot stand.
***
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is re-
versed as to the selection of the Governor's State Assembly
and Senate maps, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. On remand, the
court is free to take additional evidence if it prefers to recon-
sider the Governor's maps rather than choose from among
the other submissions. Any new analysis, however, must
comply with our equal protection jurisprudence.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan joins,
dissenting.
The Court's action today is unprecedented. In an emer-
gency posture, the Court summarily overturns a Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision resolving a confict over the State's
redistricting, a decision rendered after a 5-month process in-
volving all interested stakeholders. Despite the fact that
summary reversals are generally reserved for decisions in
violation of settled law, the Court today faults the State Su-
preme Court for its failure to comply with an obligation that,
under existing precedent, is hazy at best.
When the Wisconsin Legislature and executive were un-
able to agree on reapportioned electoral maps following the
2020 census, the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted a voter
petition to ensure that maps were in place before the 2022
elections. The court announced the criteria that it would
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as: 595 U. S. 398 (2022)
407
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
use to select maps (namely, that it would seek to minimize
changes
from the 2011 maps while accounting for population
shifts) and permitted any party to intervene and submit
maps for consideration. See Johnson v. Wisconsin Elec-
tions Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶81, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 671, 967
N. W. 2d 469, 493.
1
The court ultimately rejected the State
Assembly map submitted by the Wisconsin Legislature (ap-
plicants here) in favor of the map submitted by the Governor
because it found the Governor's map “vastly superior” under
its announced “least change” criteria. Johnson v. Wiscon-
sin Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 14, ¶¶26, 29, 400 Wis. 2d
626, 644–645, 646, 971 N. W. 2d 402, 411, 412.
The court proceeded to a preliminary analysis of whether
the Equal Protection Clause or the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA) precluded it from adopting the Governor's map, which
increased the number of majority-Black Assembly districts
in Milwaukee from six to seven based on changes in popula-
tion.
2
The court noted that the parties before it had all “ap-
peared to assume the VRA requires at least some majority-
Black districts in the Milwaukee area” and that there had
been no dispute that the preconditions in Thornburg v. Gin-
gles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986) (for assessing whether race-conscious
districting is required in order to avoid diluting minority vot-
ing power) were satisfed, aside from an undeveloped refer-
ence at oral argument. 400 Wis. 2d, at 655, 971 N. W. 2d, at
417. The court stressed, however, that no Equal Protection
Clause or VRA claim was before it and that adjudicating
such claims would require a fuller record and a closer assess-
ment. It concluded that neither the Equa l Protec ti on
Clause nor the VRA clearly foreclosed adopting the Gover-
nor's map in the frst instance, id., at 658, 971 N. W. 2d, at
418, but left open the possibility that a “standard VRA
1
Before this Court, applicants do not challenge this process.
2
The court found that the Black voting age population in the Milwaukee
area had increased 5.5% since the last census, while the White voting age
population had decreased 9.5%. 2022 WI 14, ¶48, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 658,
971 N. W. 2d 402, 418.

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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
claim” could be “brought after the adoption of new districts,”
i
d., at 653, n. 24, 971 N. W. 2d, at 416, n. 24.
Applicants now assert that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
misapplied this Court's precedents in its preliminary assess-
ment of whether the Governor's map violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The Court agrees and summarily reverses.
In doing so, however, the Court assumes the answers to mul-
tiple questions that our precedent leaves uncertain.
In its brief discussion of equal protection and the VRA,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court presumed that the framework
summarized in this Court's decision in Cooper v. Harris, 581
U. S. 285 (2017), governed in this posture. The Court tacitly
accepts that assumption. Ante, at 402–403. Cooper, how-
ever, arose in a starkly different posture. Cooper outlines
the specific, burden-shif ting procedure for adjudicating
claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause “[w]hen a
voter sues state offcials for drawing . . . race-based lines.”
581 U. S., at 291. That framework requires that the plaintiff
frst “prove that race was the predominant factor motivating
the legislature's decision to place a signifcant number of vot-
ers within or without a particular district.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). If the court fnds that “racial
considerations predominated over others,” the burden then
“shifts to the State to prove that its race-based sorting of
voters” satisfes strict scrutiny. Id., at 292. The State can
meet that burden by showing that “it had a strong basis in
evidence” for concluding that the VRA required its actions,
a standard that “gives States breathing room to adopt rea-
sonable compliance measures that may prove, in perfect
hindsight, not to have been needed.” Id., at 293 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
3
It is far from clear whether this
burden-shifting framework should also apply in the unusual
3
The other precedents on which the Court relies arose in analogous
postures. See Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. ––– (2018); League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399 (2006); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U. S. 899 (1996); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997 (1994); Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986).

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as: 595 U. S. 398 (2022)
409
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
circumstance where, as here, a state court is adopting a map
i
n the frst instance with no Equal Protection Clause claim
before it.
Even accepting the assumption that this framework con-
trols, it remains unclear how a court in the posture below
should apply it. Again, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
selecting a map itself, not adjudicating a subsequent chal-
lenge in the manner that Cooper and other cases have ad-
dressed. The court accepted an original action to supervise
the redistricting and, with the input of the parties, designed
its own process for doing so: accepting proposed maps from
litigants rather than “craft[ing its] own map” and determin-
ing to “choose the maps that best conform[ed] with [its] di-
rectives,” even if those maps were “imperfect,” rather than
“modify[ing]” the lines they drew. 400 Wis. 2d, at 634–635,
971 N. W. 2d, at 406. Although the Governor reported that
he considered race in drawing his Assembly map, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court selected the Governor's map because
it scored best on a race-neutral “least change” metric. Id.,
at 635, 971 N. W. 2d, at 407. Our precedents offer no clear
answers to the question whose motives should be analyzed
in these circumstances (the four justices who selected the
map based on the “least change” criteria, the Governor, or
some combination) or how. The Court does not purport to
answer this question.
The Court also faults the Wisconsin Supreme Court for
failing to scrutinize each of the Gingles preconditions inde-
pendently after the parties agreed that some majority-Black
districts needed to be drawn in Milwaukee. Ante, at 404–
405.
4
But courts generally are not mandated to investigate
“ `undisputed' ” and nonjurisdictional issues. Ante, at 404.
4
Applicants proposed a map with fve majority-Black districts and a
sixth with less than a majority. The court below noted concern that appli-
cants' map might violate the VRA by “packing ” minority voters into a
“small number of districts to minimize their infuence in the districts next
door.” 400 Wis. 2d, at 659, 971 N. W. 2d, at 419 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The Court points to no precedent requiring a court conduct-
i
ng a malapportionment analysis to embark on an independ-
ent inquiry into matters that the parties have conceded or
not contested, like the Gingles preconditions here.
This Court's intervention today is not only extraordinary
but a lso unnecessary. The Wisconsi n Supreme Cour t
rightly preserved the possibility that an appropriate plaintiff
could bring an equal protection or VRA challenge in the
proper forum. 400 Wis. 2d, at 653, n. 24, 971 N. W. 2d, at
416, n. 24. I would allow that process to unfold, rather than
further complicating these proceedings with legal confusion
through a summary reversal. I respectfully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None