Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L. P.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 595 U. S. Part 2
Pages 178–194
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 24, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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178 OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
Syllabus
UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 20–915. Argued November 8, 2021—Decided February 24, 2022
A valid copyright registration provides a copyright holder with important
legal advantages, including the right to bring a “civil action for infringe-
ment” of the copyrighted work. 17 U. S. C. § 411(a). Petitioner Unicol-
ors, the owner of copyrights in various fabric designs, fled a copyright
infringement action against H&M Hennes & Mauritz (H&M). A jury
found in favor of Unicolors. H&M sought judgment as a matter of law,
arguing that Unicolors could not maintain an infringement suit because
Unicolors knowingly included inaccurate information on its registration
application, rendering its copyright registration invalid. The alleged
inaccuracy stemmed from Unicolors having fled a single application
seeking registration for 31 separate works despite a Copyright Offce
regulation that provides that a single application may cover multiple
works only if they were “included in the same unit of publication.”
H&M argued that Unicolors did not meet this requirement because Uni-
colors had initially made some of the 31 designs available for sale exclu-
sively to certain customers, while offering the rest to the general public.
The District Court determined that because Unicolors did not know
when it fled its application that it had failed to satisfy the “single unit
of publication” requirement, Unicolors' copyright registration remained
valid by operation of the safe harbor provision provided under
§ 411(b)(1)(A). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that it did not
matter whether Unicolors was aware that it had failed to satisfy the
single unit of publication requirement, because the safe harbor excuses
only good-faith mistakes of fact, not law. Unicolors had known the rele-
vant facts, so its knowledge of the law (or lack thereof ) was irrelevant.
Held: Section 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a
mistake of fact; lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an
inaccuracy in a copyright registration under § 411(b)(1)(A)'s safe harbor.
Pp. 184–189.
(a) The Copyright Act provides that a certifcate of registration is
valid, even though it contains inaccurate information, as long as the
copyr ight holder lacked “ knowledge that it was i naccurate. ”
§ 411(b)(1)(A). Case law and the dictionary instruct that “knowledge”
has historically “meant and still means the fact or condition of being
aware of something.” Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Su-

Cite
as: 595 U. S. 178 (2022)
179
Syllabus
lyma, 589 U. S. –––, ––– (internal quotation marks omitted). Nothing
i
n § 411(b)(1)(A) suggests that the safe harbor applies differently simply
because an applicant made a mistake of law as opposed to a mistake of
fact. If Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered
information in its application inaccurate, it could not have included
the inaccurate information “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.”
§ 411(b)(1)(A). Pp. 184–185.
(b) Nearby statutory provisions help confrm that here “knowledge”
refers to knowledge of the law as well as the facts. Registration appli-
cations call for information that requires both legal and factual knowl-
edge. See, e. g., § 409(4) (whether a work was made “for hire”); § 409(8)
(when and where the work was “published”); § 409(9) (whether the work
is “a compilation or derivative work”). Inaccurate information in a reg-
istration may arise from a mistake of law or a mistake of fact. Nothing
in the statutory language suggests that Congress wanted to forgive ap-
plicants—many of whom lack legal training—for factual but not (often
esoteric) legal mistakes. Moreover, had Congress intended a scienter
requirement other than actual knowledge, it would have said so explic-
itly, as it did in other parts of the Copyright Act. Indeed, cases decided
before Congress enacted § 411(b) overwhelmingly concluded that inad-
vertent mistakes on registration certifcates—many of which involved
mistakes of law—neither invalidated copyright registrations nor disal-
lowed infringement actions. The Court fnds no indication that Con-
gress intended to alter this well-established rule when it enacted
§ 411(b). Pp. 185–186.
(c) Those who consider legislative history will fnd indications that
Congress enacted § 411(b) to make it easier, not more diffcult, for non-
lawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations. It did so in part by
“eliminating loopholes” that allowed infringers to exploit mistakes in
the application process to prevent enforcement of otherwise validly reg-
istered copyrights. H. R. Rep. No. 110–617, p. 20. Given this history,
it would make no sense if § 411(b) left copyright registrations exposed
to invalidation based on applicants' good-faith misunderstandings of the
details of copyright law. P. 187.
(d) H&M's remaining arguments are unavailing. First, the Court's
interpretation of the statute will not allow copyright holders to avoid
the consequences of an inaccurate application by claiming lack of knowl-
edge. As in other legal contexts, courts need not automatically accept
a copyright holder's claim that it was unaware of the relevant legal
requirements. Willful blindness may support a fnding of actual knowl-
edge. Additionally, circumstantial evidence may demonstrate that an
applicant was actually aware of, or willfully blind to, legally inaccurate
information. Second, the legal maxim that “ignorance of the law is no
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180 UNICOLORS,
INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.
Syllabus
excuse” does not apply in this civil case concerning the scope of a statu-
tory
safe harbor that arises from ignorance of collateral legal require-
ments. Finally, the “knowledge” question that the parties have argued,
and which the Court decides, was a “subsidiary question fairly included”
in the petition's question presented. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a).
And the Ninth Circuit explicitly addressed the knowledge issue when it
held that Unicolors' “knowledge” of the facts underlying the inaccuracy
on its application was suffcient to demonstrate knowledge under
§ 411(b)(1)(A) without regard to Unicolors' knowledge of the relevant
law. Pp. 187–189.
959 F. 3d 1194, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, and in
which Gorsuch, J., joined, except as to Part II, post, p. 189.
E. Joshua Rosenkranz argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Christopher J. Cariello, Jenni-
fer Keighley, Joseph R. Kolker, Scott Alan Burroughs, Ste-
phen M. Doniger, Trevor W. Barrett, and Thomas M. Bondy.
Melissa N. Patterson argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae supporting petitioner. With her on
the brief were Acting Solicitor General Prelogar, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral Stewart, Daniel Tenny, Stephanie R. Marcus, and
Kevin R. Amer.
Peter K. Stris argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Elizabeth Brannen, Rachana A. Pathak,
Douglas D. Geyser, John Stokes, Staci Jennifer Riordan,
Dale Alfred Hudson, Aaron Michael Brian, Bridget Asay,
and Tillman J. Breckenridge.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Intellectual Property Law Association by Nancy J. Mertzel and Joseph R.
Re; for the American Society of Media Photographers, Inc., et al. by
Thomas B. Maddrey, Darren J. Quinn, and Steven T. Lowe; for the Intel-
lectual Property Law Association of Chicago by Margaret M. Duncan and
Robert H. Resis; and for Intellectual Property Law Professors by Tyler
T. Ochoa, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the California
Fashion Association by Morgan E. Pietz and Jeffrey Lewis; for the Center
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Cite
as: 595 U. S. 178 (2022)
181
Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
A
valid copyright registration provides a copyright holder
with important and sometimes necessary legal advantages.
It is, for example, a prerequisite for bringing a “civil action
for infringement” of the copyrighted work. 17 U. S. C.
§ 411(a). Additionally, a plaintiff in an infringement action
normally cannot obtain an award of statutory damages or
attorney's fees for infringement that occurred prior to regis-
tration. § 412.
To obtain registration, the author of a work must submit
to the Register of Copyrights a copy of the work and an
application. §§ 408, 409. The application must provide in-
formation about the work. § 409. Some of this information
is purely factual, but some of it incorporates legal conclu-
sions. Ibid. If the Register determines that the work is
copyrightable and meets other statutory requirements, she
will issue a certifcate of registration. § 410(a). The infor-
mation on this certifcate refects the information that the
copyright holder provided on the application. Ibid.
Naturally, the information provided on the application for
registration should be accurate. Nevertheless, the Copy-
right Act provides a safe harbor. It says that a certifcate
of registration is valid
“regardless of whether the certifcate contains any inac-
curate information, unless—
“(A) the inaccurate information was included on the
application for copyright registration with knowledge
that it was inaccurate; and
“(B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known,
would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse
registration.” § 411(b)(1) (emphasis added).
for Democracy & Technology et al. by Jonathan L. Williams; for the Na-
tional Retail Federation by Samuel G. Brooks; for the New York Intellec-
tual Property Law Association by Robert L. Raskopf, Mitchell C. Stein,
Robert M. Isackson, and Robert J. Rando; for Professors of Copyright
Law by Roy T. Englert, Jr.; for Victoria Burke by John P. O'Herron; and
for Andrew D. Locton et al. by Edward F. McHale.
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182 UNICOLORS,
INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.
Opinion of the Court
The important point for our purposes is that a certifcate
of
registration is valid even though it contains inaccurate
information, as long as the copyright holder lacked “knowl-
edge that it was inaccurate.” § 411(b)(1)(A).
The question before us concerns the scope of the phrase
“with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit believed that a copyright holder
cannot beneft from the safe harbor and save its copyright
registration from invalidation if its lack of knowledge stems
from a failure to understand the law rather than a failure to
understand the facts. In our view, however, § 411(b) does
not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of
fact. Lack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an
inaccuracy in a copyright registration. We therefore vacate
the Court of Appeals' contrary holding.
I
The petitioner here, Unicolors, owns copyrights in various
fabric designs. App. 50–51. It sued the respondent, H&M
Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. (H&M), for copyright infringement.
959 F. 3d 1194, 1195 (CA9 2020). The jury found in Unicol-
ors' favor, but H&M asked the trial court to grant it judg-
ment as a matter of law. Id., at 1196–1197. H&M argued,
among other things, that Unicolors' registration certifcate
was invalid (and that therefore Unicolors could not sue for
infringement) because it contained inaccurate information.
Id., at 1197–1198; see also § 411(a). Specifcally, H&M ar-
gued that Unicolors' registration certifcate was inaccurate
because Unicolors had improperly fled a single application
seeking registration for 31 separate works. App. 91–92,
170–172. H&M relied on a Copyright Offce regulation,
which provides that a single registration can cover multiple
works only if those works were “included in the same unit
o f publ ica t io n.” Id., at 170 (emphasis added); 37 CFR
§ 202.3(b)(4) (2020). H&M argued that the 31 fabric designs
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as: 595 U. S. 178 (2022)
183
Opinion of the Court
covered by Unicolors' single application (and therefore single
reg
istration) had not been published as a single unit of publi-
cation because Unicolors had initially made some of the de-
signs available for sale exclusively to certain customers,
while other designs were immediately available to the gen-
eral public. App. 170–171. Because the frst statutory re-
quirement for invalidating Unicolors' registration (a knowing
inaccuracy) was satisfed, H&M argued, the District Court
should move to the second requirement and ask the Register
of Copyrights whether it would have refused to register Uni-
colors' copyright if it had been aware of the inaccuracy. Id.,
at 172–173; see also §§ 411(b)(1)(B), (b)(2).
The District Court denied H&M's motion. Id., at 202.
Among other things, it noted that “a registration remains
effective despite containing inaccurate information” if the
registrant included the inaccurate information in the regis-
tration application without “knowledge that it was inaccu-
rate.” Id., at 180–181 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Unicolors did not know that it had failed to satisfy
the “single unit of publication” requirement when it fled its
application, the purported inaccuracy could not invalidate
the registration. Id., at 182.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It agreed with H&M that
Unicolors had failed to satisfy the “single unit of publication”
requirement (because it offered some of the 31 designs exclu-
sively to certain customers). 959 F. 3d, at 1198–1200. But
did Unicolors know about this inaccuracy? In the Ninth
Circuit's view, it did not matter whether Unicolors did or
did not know that it had failed to satisfy the “single unit of
publication” requirement. Id., at 1200. That was because,
in the Ninth Circuit's view, the statute excused only good-
faith mistakes of fact, not law. Ibid. And Unicolors
had known the relevant facts, namely, that some of the 31
designs had initially been reserved for certain customers.
Ibid.
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184 UNICOLORS,
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Opinion of the Court
Unicolors sought certiorari, asking us to review the Ninth
Circuit'
s interpretation of § 411(b)(1)(A). We granted the
petition.
II
A brief analogy may help explain the issue we must decide.
Suppose that John, seeing a fash of red in a tree, says,
“There is a cardinal.” But he is wrong. The bird is not a
cardinal; it is a scarlet tanager. John's statement is inaccu-
rate. But what kind of mistake has John made?
John may have failed to see the bird's black wings. In
that case, he has made a mistake about the brute facts. Or
John may have seen the bird perfectly well, noting all of its
relevant features, but, not being much of a birdwatcher, he
may not have known that a tanager (unlike a cardinal) has
black wings. In that case, John has made a labeling mistake.
He saw the bird correctly, but does not know how to label
what he saw. Here, Unicolors' mistake is a mistake of label-
ing. But unlike John (who might consult an ornithologist
about the birds), Unicolors must look to judges and lawyers
as experts regarding the proper scope of the label “single
unit of publication.” The labeling problem here is one of
law. Does that difference matter here? Cf. United States
v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F. 2d 1131, 1137
(CA9 1982). We think it does not.
Our reasons are straightforward. For one thing, we fol-
low the text of the statute. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard
Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251 (2010). Section 411(b)(1)
says that Unicolors' registration is valid “regardless of
whether the [registration] certifcate contains any inaccurate
information, unless . . . the inaccurate information was in-
cluded on the application for copyright registration with
knowledge that it was inaccurate.” Both case law and the
dictionary tell us that “knowledge” has historically “meant
and still means `the fact or condition of being aware of some-
thing.' ” Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma,
589 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (quoting Webster's Seventh New
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185
Opinion of the Court
Collegiate Dictionary 469 (1967)); see also Black's Law Dic-
ti
onary 888 (8th ed. 2004); New Oxford American Dictionary
938 (def. 2) (2d ed. 2005); Webster's New College Dictionary
625 (3d ed. 2008).
Unicolors says that, when it submitted its registration ap-
plication, it was not aware (as the Ninth Circuit would later
hold) that the 31 designs it was registering together did not
satisfy the “single unit of publication” requirement. If Uni-
colors was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered
the information in its application inaccurate, it did not in-
clude that information in its application “with knowledge
that it was inaccurate.” § 411(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Noth i ng i n the st atutory lang uage suggests that th is
straightforward conclusion should be any different simply
because there was a mistake of law as opposed to a mistake
of fact.
To the contrary, nearby statutory provisions help confrm
that here “knowledge” refers to knowledge of the law as well
as the facts. Registration applications call for information
that requires both legal and factual knowledge. See, e. g.,
§ 409(4) (whether a work was made “for hire”); § 409(8) (when
and where the work was “published”); § 409(9) (whether the
work is “a compilation or derivative work”). Inaccurate in-
formation in a registration is therefore equally (or more)
likely to arise from a mistake of law as a mistake of fact.
That is especially true because applicants include novelists,
poets, painters, designers, and others without legal training.
Nothing in the statutory language suggests that Congress
wanted to forgive those applicants' factual but not their
(often esoteric) legal mistakes.
Other provisions of the Copyright Act confrm that, in this
context, the word “knowledge” means actual, subjective
awareness of both the facts and the law. Those provisions
suggest that if Congress had intended to impose a scienter
standard other than actual knowledge, it would have said so
explicitly. See, e. g., § 121A(a) (safe harbor for entities that
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186 UNICOLORS,
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Opinion of the Court
“did not know or have reasonable grounds to know” that
e
xpor ted works wou ld be used by i nel ig ible persons);
§ 512(c)(1)(A) (safe harbor for internet service providers who
are not actually aware of infringing activities on their sys-
tems and are “not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent”); § 901(a)(8) (“ `notice
of protection' ” requires “actual knowledge . . . or reasonable
grounds to believe” that a “work is protected”); § 1202(b)
(civil remedies for certain acts performed by a person who
knows or has “reasonable grounds to know” that he or she
was facilitating infringement); § 1401(c)(6)(C)(ii) (for pur-
poses of paragraph regarding the “[u]nauthorized use of pre-
1972 sound recordings,” “knowing ” includes one who “has
actual knowledge,” “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth
or falsity of the information,” or “acts in grossly negligent
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information”). The
absence of similar language in the statutory provision before
us tends to confrm our conclusion that Congress intended
“knowledge” here to bear its ordinary meaning. See Nken
v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 430 (2009).
For another thing, cases decided before Congress enacted
§ 411(b) “overwhelming[ly held] that inadvertent mistakes
on registration certifcates [did] not invalidate a copyright
and thus [did] not bar infringement actions.” Urantia
Foundation v. Maaherra, 114 F. 3d 955, 963 (CA9 1997).
Many of those cases involved mistakes of law. See, e. g., id.,
at 961, 963; Billy-Bob Teeth, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 329 F. 3d
586, 591 (CA7 2003); Advisers, Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc., 238
F. 2d 706, 707–708 (CA6 1956) (per curiam). We can fnd
no indication that Congress intended to alter this well-
established rule when it enacted § 411(b). See Davis v.
Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 813 (1989) (“When
Congress codifes a judicially defned concept, it is presumed,
absent an express statement to the contrary, that Congress
intended to adopt the interpretation placed on that concept
by the courts”); see also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 568 U. S. 519, 538 (2013) (similar).
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as: 595 U. S. 178 (2022)
187
Opinion of the Court
Further, those who consider legislative history will fnd
that
history persuasive here. It indicates that Congress
enacted § 411(b) to make it easier, not more diffcult, for non-
lawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations. The House
Report states that its purpose was to “improve intellectual
property enforcement in the United States and abroad.” H.
R. Rep. No. 110–617, p. 20 (2008). It did so in part by “elimi-
nating loopholes that might prevent enforcement of other-
wise validly registered copyrights.” Ibid. The Report
specifcally notes that some defendants in copyright infringe-
ment cases had “argued . . . that a mistake in the registration
documents, such as checking the wrong box on the registra-
tion form, renders a registration invalid and thus forecloses
the availability of statutory damages.” Id., at 24. Con-
gress intended to deny infringers the ability to “exploi[t]
this potential loophole.” Ibid. Of course, an applicant
for a copyright registration—especially one who is not a
lawyer—might check the wrong box on the registration doc-
uments as a result of a legal, as well as a factual, error.
Given this history, it would make no sense if § 411(b) left
copyright registrations exposed to invalidation based on ap-
plicants' good-faith misunderstandings of the details of copy-
right law.
III
H&M argues that our interpretation of the statute will
make it too easy for copyright holders, by claiming lack of
knowledge, to avoid the consequences of an inaccurate appli-
cation. But courts need not automatically accept a copy-
right holder's claim that it was unaware of the relevant legal
requirements of copyright law. We have recognized in civil
cases that willful blindness may support a fnding of actual
knowledge. Intel Corp., 589 U. S., at ––– – –––. Circum-
stantial evidence, including the signifcance of the legal error,
the complexity of the relevant rule, the applicant's experi-
ence with copyright law, and other such matters, may also
lead a court to fnd that an applicant was actually aware of,
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188 UNICOLORS,
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Opinion of the Court
or willfully blind to, legally inaccurate information. See id.,
at
–––.
H&M also argues that our interpretation is foreclosed by
the legal maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.”
See Brief for Respondent 41–43. This maxim “normally ap-
plies where a defendant has the requisite mental state in
respect to the elements of [a] crime but claims to be unaware
of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct.”
Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted). It does not apply in this civil
case concerning the scope of a safe harbor that arises from
ignorance of collateral legal requirements. See ibid.
Finally, H&M claims that neither Unicolors' petition for
certiorari nor the Ninth Circuit's opinion addressed the ques-
tion we decide here. The petition, however, asked us to de-
cide whether a registration may be invalidated under § 411(b)
even though there are no “indicia of fraud . . . as to the work
at issue in the subject copyright registration.” Pet. for
Cert. i. Fraud typically requires “[a] knowing misrepresen-
tation . . . of a material fact.” Black's Law Dictionary 802
(11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). If, as the Ninth Circuit
concluded, § 411(b)(1)(A) does not require “knowledge” of
legal errors, then it does not always require knowledge of
the misrepresentation in the registration application, and
therefore does not require the typical elements of fraud.
Thus, the “knowledge” question that the parties have ar-
gued, and which we decide, was a “subsidiary question fairly
included” in the petition's question presented. See this
Court's Rule 14.1(a).
As to the decision below, the Ninth Circuit wrote that “the
knowledge inquiry is not whether Unicolors knew that in-
cluding a mixture of confned and non-confned designs would
run afoul of the single-unit registration requirements; the
inquiry is merely whether Unicolors knew that certain de-
signs included in the registration were confned and, there-
fore, were each published separately to exclusive custom-
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as: 595 U. S. 178 (2022)
189
Thomas, J., dissenting
ers.” 959 F. 3d, at 1200. In context, we understand this
st
atement to hold that Unicolors' “knowledge” of the facts
that produced the inaccuracy was suffcient to demonstrate
its knowledge of the inaccuracy itself under § 411(b)(1)(A).
Unicolors' knowledge of the relevant law was irrelevant.
The Ninth Circuit therefore explicitly addressed the ques-
tion we here decide.
***
For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins, and
with whom Justice Gorsuch joins as to all but Part II,
dissenting.
A copyright registration is invalid if the registrant in-
cluded materially inaccurate information in its application
“with knowledge that [the information] was inaccurate.” 17
U. S. C. § 411(b)(1)(A). In its petition for certiorari, Unicol-
ors asked us to decide a question on which the Courts of
Appeals were split: whether § 411(b)(1)(A)'s “knowledge” ele-
ment requires “indicia of fraud.” Pet. for Cert. i. Specif-
cally, Unicolors argued that “knowledge” requires “inten[t]
to defraud the Copyright Offce.” Id., at 7.
Yet now, after having “persuaded us to grant certiorari
on this issue,” Unicolors has “chosen to rely on a different
argument in [its] merits briefng.” Visa Inc. v. Osborn, 580
U. S. 993 (2016) (internal punctuation altered). It no longer
argues that § 411(b)(1)(A) requires fraudulent intent and in-
stead proposes a novel “actual knowledge” standard. Be-
cause I would not reward Unicolors for its legerdemain, and
because no other court had, before today, ever addressed
whether § 411(b)(1)(A) requires “actual knowledge,” I would
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
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190 UNICOLORS,
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Thomas, J., dissenting
I
W
e should dismiss this case for the reasons we gave in
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600
(2015), and Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519 (1992). In Shee-
han, we granted review to resolve a Circuit split and decide
whether the Americans with Disabilities Act requires law
enforcement offcers to provide reasonable accommodations
to armed, violent, and mentally ill criminals while arresting
them. 575 U. S., at 608. But after the petitioners' opening
brief “effectively concede[d]” that it may and pressed a nar-
rower, “qualifed” version of the original argument, id., at
609, we dismissed the case for lack of “adversary presenta-
tion” of the question presented, id., at 610. In Yee, the peti-
tioner raised an argument that was not clearly pressed or
passed upon below, that was not the subject of a known cir-
cuit split, and that, in fact, no court in the country had
squarely addressed before. See 503 U. S., at 534, 537–538.
We declined to “be the frst court in the Nation” to decide
the petitioner's novel legal question. Id., at 538.
These considerations counsel dismissal here. First, Uni-
colors has abandoned the actual question presented and now
presses novel arguments in favor of reversal. We took this
case to resolve an apparent split between the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, which has held that § 411(b)(1)(A) requires “deceptive
intent,” Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F. 3d 1024, 1030 (2017), and
the Ninth Circuit, which held below that “there is no such
intent-to-defraud requirement,” 959 F. 3d 1194, 1198 (2020)
(citing Gold Value Int'l Textile, Inc. v. Sanctuary Clothing,
LLC, 925 F. 3d 1140, 1147 (CA9 2019)). Agreeing with the
Eleventh Circuit, Unicolors argued in its petition for certio-
rari that “knowledge” requires “inten[t] to defraud.” Pet.
for Cert. 7. But now, siding with the Ninth Circuit, Uni-
colors contends that a mere “knowing failure” satisfes
§ 411(b)(1)(A). Brief for Petitioner 33, 37 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The United States, as amicus supporting
Unicolors, agrees. See Brief for United States as Amicus
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191
Thomas, J., dissenting
Curiae 25, n. 5. And, obviously, so does H&M. See Brief
for
Respondent 1. Thus, no party or amicus before us sup-
ports the Eleventh Circuit's position. Without “adversary
presentation” on the actual question presented, we should
dismiss. Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 610.
Second, as in Yee, Unicolors' new merits-stage arguments
present novel lega l questi ons. Unicolors clai ms that
“knowledge” in § 411(b)(1)(A) is satisfed only by actual
knowledge (i. e., an applicant subjectively knew of an inaccu-
racy) rather than actual or constructive knowledge (i. e., an
applicant should have known of an inaccuracy). It further
contends that a copyright applicant must actually know that
it is misapplying a legal standard rather than simply misstat-
ing the facts.
It is undisputed that Unicolors raised neither point below.
It is also undisputed that there is no circuit split on either of
Unicolors' new arguments. And it is clear that the Court of
Appeals did not meaningfully consider these questions. It
said nothing about actual versus constructive knowledge, see
959 F. 3d, at 1200, and it merely implied, in a cursory sen-
tence, that § 411(b)(1)(A) requires knowledge of facts and not
law, see ante, at 188–189 (citing 959 F. 3d, at 1200). Other
than this halfway relevant and completely unreasoned state-
ment, the Court cites no other opinion from any court that
interprets § 411(b)(1)(A). Thus, we are the “frst court in
the Nation” to decide the important questions that Unicolors
belatedly presents. Yee, 503 U. S., at 538. I would decline
the invitation to take that imprudent step.
The Court disputes none of this. Instead, it reasons that
Unicolors' new arguments are “ `fairly included' ” in the ques-
tion presented because, even though Unicolors originally
proposed a fraud standard, it now argues for at least an ele-
ment of that standard: actual knowledge of a misrepresenta-
tion. Ante, at 188 (quoting this Court's Rule 14.1(a)).
The Court misapplies Rule 14.1(a). An argument is
“fairly included” only if it raises a “prior question.” Lebron
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192 UNICOLORS,
INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.
Thomas, J., dissenting
v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374,
381
(1995). That is, resolving the new argument must be “a
predicate to an intelligent resolution of the question pre-
sented.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 38 (1996) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Here, to decide whether
§ 411(b)(1)(A) requires fraud, we do not frst need to decide
what kind of knowledge fraud requires. To the contrary, it
makes more sense to establish the correct legal standard be-
fore deciding what satisfes its elements. Cf. Manuel v. Jo-
liet, 580 U. S. 357, 360–361, n. 1 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
This case proves the point: Unicolors effectively concedes
that § 411(b)(1)(A) has no fraudulent-intent requirement and
then asks us to hold that the provision nevertheless requires
actual rather than constructive knowledge, and knowledge
of legal and factual misstatements rather than knowledge of
factual misstatements alone. Evidently, Unicolors can dis-
cern whether the statute requires fraud without addressing
those questions. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held that
§ 411(b)(1)(A) does not require fraud based on its “plain
language.” Gold Value, 925 F. 3d, at 1147. In reaching
that conclusion, the Court of Appeals did not address the
actual-versus-constructive-knowledge issue, and it reserved
the law-versus-fact issue. See ibid. In short, deciding
whether § 411(b)(1)(A) requires a particular element of fraud
is not “prior” to deciding whether fraud is the proper stand-
ard in the frst place.
But even if Unicolors' arguments were “prior” questions,
the Court still misapplies Rule 14.1(a). We are free to ad-
dress “subsidiary question[s]” in deciding “any question pre-
sented.” This Court's Rule 14.1(a) (emphasis added). Put
another way, the subsidiary questions must be “inextricably
linked” to the question under review and necessarily contrib-
ute to that question's resolution. City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation of N. Y., 544 U. S. 197, 214, n. 8 (2005). Here,
though, the Court never answers the ultimate question about
fraud. To provide an incomplete answer to the question

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193
Thomas, J., dissenting
presented disserves the public and our fellow judges. The
Cour
t does not decide the question that has split the Courts
of Appeals, but instead decides a question that no court has
addressed. And by granting review of one question but an-
swering another, we encourage litigants “to seek review of
a circuit confict only then to change the question to one that
seems more favorable.” Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.,
580 U. S. 451, 472 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Yee, 503 U. S., at 536 (parties would be “encouraged to fll
their limited briefng space and argument time with discus-
sion of issues other than the one on which certiorari was
granted”). The result is muddled briefng on questions we
did not agree to resolve, and a ruling that bypasses the ordi-
nary process of appellate review.
II
In this case, the Court's misstep comes at considerable
cost. A requirement to know the law is ordinarily satisfed
by constructive knowledge, cf. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L. P. A., 559 U. S. 573, 584 (2010),
because “actual knowledge of illegality” can be “diffcult or
impossible” to prove, Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135,
162 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet here, the Court
imposes an actual-knowledge-of-law standard that is virtu-
ally unprecedented except in criminal tax enforcement. See
Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 201–203 (1991). And
wh i le the Cour t clai ms the word “ ` knowledge' ” i n
§ 411(b)(1)(A) compels this conclusion, see ante, at 184, that
result is far from certain. In Cheek, this Court required
actual knowledge of law in light of a “willfulness” require-
ment. 498 U. S., at 201–202. A “knowledge” requirement,
by contrast, often encompasses actual and constructive
knowledge. See Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v.
Sulyma, 589 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020). Moreover, as the
Court recognizes, the other knowledge requirements in the
Copyright Act are satisfed by either kind of knowledge.
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194 UNICOLORS,
INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.
Thomas, J., dissenting
See ante, at 185–186. The Court points to no other Copy-
r
ight Act provision that is satisfed by actual knowledge
alone. That the Court reads § 411(b)(1)(A) to be the lone
exception is dubious. That the Court does so without per-
mitting any other court in the country to frst consider the
question is unwise.
***
I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted because Unicolors has abandoned the question pre-
sented and instead proposes novel questions of copyright law
that no other court addressed before today. I respectfully
dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None