City of Tahlequah v. Bond

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 595 U. S. Part 1
Pages 9–14
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
October 18, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
9
Syllabus
CITY OF TAHLEQUAH, OKLAHOMA, et al. v. BOND,
as
special administrator of the ESTATE OF
ROLLICE, DECEASED
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the tenth circuit
No. 20–1668. Decided October 18, 2021
Three police offcers responded to a 911 call from Dominic Rollice's ex-
wife, Joy, who requested assistance because Rollice was in her garage,
intoxicated, and would not leave. Joy met the responding offcers out
front and led them to the side entrance of her garage. There, the off-
cers encountered Rollice and began speaking with him from the door-
way. Offcer Girdner asked if he could pat Rollice down for weapons;
Rollice refused. Police body-camera video captured what happened
next. Offcer Girdner took a step toward the doorway, causing Rollice
to take a step back, turn around, and walk toward the back of the garage
where his tools were hanging over a workbench. Offcer Girdner fol-
lowed, with the other offcers close behind. The offcers stated that
they ordered Rollice to stop, but he instead kept walking. He then
grabbed a hammer from over the workbench and turned to face the
offcers. Rollice grasped the hammer as if preparing to swing a base-
ball bat, and the offcers responded by backing up, drawing their guns,
and yelling at Rollice to drop the hammer. He did not. Rollice instead
took a few steps to his right, coming out from behind a piece of furniture
so that he had an unobstructed path to Offcer Girdner. He then raised
the hammer back behind his head and took a stance as if he was about
to throw the hammer or charge at the offcers. In response, Offcers
Girdner and Vick fred their weapons, killing him.
Rollice's estate fled suit against, among others, Offcers Girdner and
Vick, alleging that the offcers were liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, for
violating Rollice's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive
force. The District Court granted the offcers' motion for summary
judgment, concluding that the offcers' use of force was reasonable and,
even if not, that qualifed immunity prevented the case from going fur-
ther. The Tenth Circuit reversed based on the panel majority's applica-
tion of Tenth Circuit precedent.
Held: The offcers are entitled to qualifed immunity from suit. The doc-
trine of qualifed immunity shields offcers from civil liability if their
conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

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10 CITY
OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND
Per Curiam
Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231. Qualifed immunity protects “all but the
plai
nly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 63 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). A clearly established rule is not one merely suggested by then-
existing precedent; the rule's contours must be so well defned that a
reasonable offcer would know that his conduct was unlawful in the situ-
ation confronted. Ibid. The Tenth Circuit contravened those settled
principles here. None of the decisions on which the Court of Appeals
relied comes close to establishing that the offcers' conduct was unlawful.
Neither the panel majority nor the respondent has identifed a single
precedent fnding a Fourth Amendment violation under similar circum-
stances. The offcers were thus entitled to qualifed immunity. Given
that conclusion, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether the
offcers violated the Fourth Amendment, or whether recklessly creating
a situation that requires deadly force can itself violate the Fourth
Amendment.
Certiorari granted; 981 F. 3d 808, reversed.
Per Curiam.
On August 12, 2016, Dominic Rollice's ex-wife, Joy, called
911. Rollice was in her garage, she explained, and he was
intoxicated and would not leave. Joy requested police as-
sistance; otherwise, “it's going to get ugly real quick.” 981
F. 3d 808, 812 (CA10 2020). The dispatcher asked whether
Rollice lived at the residence. Joy said he did not but ex-
plained that he kept tools in her garage.
Offcers Josh Girdner, Chase Reed, and Brandon Vick re-
sponded to the call. All three knew that Rollice was Joy's
ex-husband, was intoxicated, and would not leave her home.
Joy met the offcers out front and led them to the side
entrance of the garage. There the offcers encountered Rol-
lice and began speaking with him in the doorway. Rollice
expressed concern that the offcers intended to take him to
jail; Offcer Girdner told him that they were simply trying
to get him a ride. Rollice began fdgeting with something
in his hands and the offcers noticed that he appeared ner-
vous. Offcer Girdner asked if he could pat Rollice down for
weapons. Rollice refused.

Cite
as: 595 U. S. 9 (2021)
11
Per Curiam
Police body-camera video captured what happened next.
As
the conversation continued, Offcer Girdner gestured with
his hands and took one step toward the doorway, causing
Rollice to take one step back. Rollice, still conversing with
the offcers, turned around and walked toward the back of
the garage where his tools were hanging over a workbench.
Offcer Girdner followed, the others close behind. No offcer
was within six feet of Rollice. The video is silent, but the
offcers stated that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice
kept walking. He then grabbed a hammer from the back
wall over the workbench and turned around to face the off-
cers. Rollice grasped the handle of the hammer with both
hands, as if preparing to swing a baseball bat, and pulled it
up to shoulder level. The offcers backed up, drawing their
guns. At this point the video is no longer silent, and the
offcers can be heard yelling at Rollice to drop the hammer.
He did not. Instead, Rollice took a few steps to his right,
coming out from behind a piece of furniture so that he had
an unobstructed path to Offcer Girdner. He then raised the
hammer higher back behind his head and took a stance as if
he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the offcers.
In response, Offcers Girdner and Vick fred their weapons,
killing Rollice.
Rollice's estate fled suit against, among others, Offcers
Girdner and Vick, alleging that the offcers were liable under
42 U. S. C. § 1983, for violating Rollice's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from excessive force. The offcers moved
for summary judgment, both on the merits and on qualifed
immunity grounds. The District Court granted their mo-
tion. Burke v. Tahlequah, 2019 WL 4674316, *6 (ED Okla.,
Sept. 25, 2019). The offcers' use of force was reasonable, it
concluded, and even if not, qualifed immunity prevented the
case from going further. Ibid.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-
versed. 981 F. 3d, at 826. The Court began by explaining
that Tenth Circuit precedent allows an offcer to be held lia-
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12 CITY
OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND
Per Curiam
ble for a shooting that is itself objectively reasonable if the
offcer
's reckless or deliberate conduct created a situation re-
quiring deadly force. Id., at 816. Applying that rule, the
Court concluded that a jury could fnd that Offcer Girdner's
initial step toward Rollice and the offcers' subsequent “cor-
nering ” of him in the back of the garage recklessly created
the situation that led to the fatal shooting, such that their
ultimate use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Id., at
823. As to qualifed immunity, the Court concluded that
several cases, most notably Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F. 3d 837
(CA10 1997), clearly established that the offcers' conduct
was unlawful. 981 F. 3d, at 826. This petition followed.
We need not, and do not, decide whether the offcers vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment in the frst place, or whether
recklessly creating a situation that requires deadly force can
itself violate the Fourth Amendment. On this record, the
offcers plainly did not violate any clearly established law.
The doctrine of qualifed immunity shields offcers from
civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009). As we have explained, qualifed
immunity protects “ `all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.' ” District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475
U. S. 335, 341 (1986)).
We have repeatedly told courts not to defne clearly estab-
lished law at too high a level of generality. See, e.g., Ash-
croft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 742 (2011). It is not enough
that a rule be suggested by then-existing precedent; the
“rule's contours must be so well defned that it is `clear to a
reasonable offcer that his conduct was unlawful in the situa-
tion he confronted.' ” Wesby, 583 U. S., at 63 (quoting Sau-
cier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001)). Such specifcity is
“especially important in the Fourth Amendment context,”
where it is “sometimes diffcult for an offcer to determine
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Cite
as: 595 U. S. 9 (2021)
13
Per Curiam
how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will
apply
to the factual situation the offcer confronts.” Mul-
lenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Tenth Circuit contravened those settled principles
here. Not one of the decisions relied upon by the Court of
Appeals—Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F. 3d 1204 (CA10
2019), Hastings v. Barnes, 252 Fed. Appx. 197 (CA10 2007),
Allen, 119 F. 3d 837, and Sevier v. Lawrence, 60 F. 3d 695
(CA10 1995)—comes close to establishing that the offcers'
conduct was unlawful. The Court relied most heavily on
Allen. But the facts of Allen are dramatically different
from the facts here. The offcers in Allen responded to a
potential suicide call by sprinting toward a parked car,
screaming at the suspect, and attempting to physically wrest
a gun from his hands. 119 F. 3d, at 841. Offcers Girdner
and Vick, by contrast, engaged in a conversation with Rol-
lice, followed him into a garage at a distance of 6 to 10 feet,
and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. We can-
not conclude that Allen “clearly established” that their con-
duct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was
unlawful.
The other decisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals
are even less relevant. As for Sevier, that decision merely
noted in dicta that deliberate or reckless preseizure conduct
can render a later use of force excessive before dismissing
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 60 F. 3d, at 700–701.
To state the obvious, a decision where the court did not even
have jurisdiction cannot clearly establish substantive consti-
tutional law. Regardless, that formulation of the rule is
much too general to bear on whether the offcers' particular
conduct here violated the Fourth Amendment. See al-Kidd,
563 U. S., at 742. Estate of Ceballos, decided after the
shooting at issue, is of no use in the clearly established in-
quiry. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 200, n. 4
(2004) (per curiam). And Hastings, an unpublished deci-
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14 CITY
OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND
Per Curiam
sion, involved offcers initiating an encounter with a poten-
tia
lly suicidal individual by chasing him into his bedroom,
screaming at him, and pepper-spraying him. 252 Fed.
Appx., at 206. Suffce it to say, a reasonable offcer could
miss the connection between that case and this one.
Neither the panel majority nor the respondent has identi-
fed a single precedent fnding a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion under similar circumstances. The offcers were thus
entitled to qualifed immunity.
The petition for certiorari and the motions for leave to fle
briefs amici curiae are granted, and the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
p. 14, line 6, “have” is replaced with “has”