Dunn v. Reeves

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 594 U. S. Part 2
Pages 731–757
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July 2, 2021
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TERM, 2020
731
Syllabus
DUNN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT
OF
CORRECTIONS v. REEVES
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
No. 20–1084. Decided July 2, 2021
After receiving a death sentence for his murder conviction, Reeves sought
state postconviction relief. Reeves argued that he was categorically
exempt from execution by reason of intellectual disability and that his
counsel should have hired an expert to develop mitigation evidence
along those lines. After a hearing in state court that produced confict-
ing expert testimony as to Reeves' IQ scores and his adaptive function-
ing, the trial court denied relief. As relevant here, the Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals affrmed and rejected Reeves' claim that counsel
should have hired an expert to develop mitigating evidence of intellec-
tual disability. Stressing the strategic nature of the decision to hire an
expert, the court looked to the record to assess the reasons for defense
counsel's actions. But Reeves had not called his counsel to testify or
presented other evidence. The state court observed that the lack of
evidence impeded Reeves' efforts to prove that his counsel acted unrea-
sonably and that Reeves could not overcome the presumption of effec-
tiveness courts must afford to trial counsel. Reeves next sought fed-
eral habeas review. The District Court denied relief, but the Eleventh
Circuit reversed in part. The Eleventh Circuit held that Reeves' law-
yers were constitutionally defcient for not developing more evidence of
intellectual disability and that this failure might have changed the out-
come of the trial. The panel explained that it owed no deference to the
“unreasonable” decision of the Alabama court because “a per se rule
that the petitioner must present counsel's testimony” to prevail on an
ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim was clearly contrary to federal
law. 836 Fed. Appx. 733, 744–747.
Held: The Eleventh Circuit erred in characterizing the Alabama court's
case-specifc analysis as a “categorical rule” that any prisoner will al-
ways lose an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim if he fails to
call and question trial counsel concerning his or her actions and reason-
ing. A federal court may grant habeas relief only if a state court vio-
lated “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). The Alabama
court did not violate clearly established federal law when it rejected
Reeves' claim that his attorneys should have hired an expert. Strate-

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732 DUNN
v. REEVES
Syllabus
gic decisions—including whether to hire an expert—are entitled to a
“strong
presumption” of reasonableness. Harrington v. Richter, 562
U. S. 86, 104. The burden of rebutting this presumption “rests squarely
on the defendant,” and “the absence of evidence cannot overcome [it].”
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. S. 12, 22–23. Even if there is reason to think
that counsel's conduct “was far from exemplary,” a court still may not
grant relief if “[t]he record does not reveal” that counsel took an ap-
proach that no competent lawyer would have chosen. Id., at 23–24.
This analysis is “doubly deferential” when, as here, a state court has
decided that counsel performed adequately. Id., at 15. In more con-
crete terms, a federal court may grant relief only if every “ `fairminded
juris[t]' ” would agree that every reasonable lawyer would have made a
different decision. Richter, 562 U. S., at 101. Reeves' determination
not to offer testimony or other evidence from his lawyers is particularly
signifcant given the “range of possible reasons [Reeves'] counsel may
have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S.
170, 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is not a case in which
a lawyer “failed to uncover and present any evidence of [Reeves'] mental
health or mental impairment, [or] his family background.” Porter v.
McCollum, 558 U. S., 30, 40 (per curiam). Counsel's initial enthusiasm
to collect Reeves' records and obtain funding hardly indicates profes-
sional neglect and disinterest. Given that the Alabama court was enti-
tled to reject Reeves' claim if trial counsel had any “possible reaso[n]
. . . for proceeding as they did,” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 196 (internal
quotation marks omitted), the Alabama court reasonably concluded that
the incomplete evidentiary record doomed Reeves' belated efforts to
second-guess his attorneys. The Eleventh Circuit characterized the
state court's decision as having applied a categorical rule that any pris-
oner will always lose if he fails to call and question trial counsel regard-
ing his or her actions and reasoning. 836 Fed. Appx., at 744. But the
state court prefaced the quote on which the Eleventh Circuit focused
with an important qualifer—“In this case.” Reeves v. State, 226 So. 3d,
711, 749. The state court's analysis refects a case-specifc approach,
not a blanket rule. The state court's observation that the record in this
particular case happened to be defcient “because Reeves failed to call
his counsel to testify” does not constitute an absolute bar in every case
where other record evidence might fll in the details. Id., at 751.
Rather the state court determined that the facts of this case did not
merit relief. The Alabama court twice recognized that there can be
instances of “per se defcient performance,” but it simply concluded that
here counsel's choice regarding experts involved a strategic decision
entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. That conclusion was not
contrary to clearly established law, particularly given applicable prece-

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733
Per Curiam
dent from this Court and the Eleventh Circuit for the proposition that
a
silent record cannot discharge a prisoner's burden of proof. E. g., Tit-
low, 571 U. S., at 15, 22–24.
Certiorari granted; 836 Fed. Appx. 733, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
Willie Johnson towed Matthew Reeves' broken-down car
back to the city after fnding Reeves stranded on an Alabama
dirt road. In payment for this act of kindness, Reeves mur-
dered Johnson, stole his money, and mocked his dying
spasms. Years after being convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death, Reeves sought state postconviction relief,
arguing that his trial counsel should have hired an expert to
develop sentencing-phase mitigation evidence of intellectual
disability. But despite having the burden to rebut the
strong presumption that his attorneys made a legitimate
strategic choice, Reeves did not call any of them to testify.
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief,
stressing that lack of evidence about counsel's decisions im-
peded Reeves' efforts to prove that they acted unreasonably.
Reeves v. State, 226 So. 3d 711, 750–751 (2016).
On federal habeas review, the Eleventh Circuit held that
this analysis was not only wrong, but indefensible. In an
unpublished, per curiam opinion that drew heavily on a dis-
sent from denial of certiorari, the Eleventh Circuit reinter-
preted the Alabama court's lengthy opinion as imposing a
simple per se prohibition on relief in all cases where a pris-
oner fails to question his counsel. Reeves v. Commissioner,
Ala. Dept. of Corrections, 836 Fed. Appx. 733, 744–747 (2020)
(per curiam). It was the Eleventh Circuit, however, that
went astray in its “readiness to attribute error.” Woodford
v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). Federal
habeas courts must defer to reasonable state-court decisions,
28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), and the Alabama court's treatment of
the spotty record in this case was consistent with this
Court's recognition that “the absence of evidence cannot
overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell
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734 DUNN
v. REEVES
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within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Bur
t v. Titlow, 571 U. S. 12, 23 (2013) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted).
I
In November 1996, Reeves and some friends decided to
“go out looking for some robberies.” Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at
719 (internal quotation marks omitted). The group's initial
target was a drug dealer in a nearby town, but their car
broke down and left them stranded on the side of the road.
A few hours later, however, Johnson happened to drive by in
his truck and offered to tow the disabled vehicle to Reeves'
house.
After they arrived, Reeves, who was riding in the bed of
the truck, stuck a shotgun through the rear window of the
cab and shot Johnson in the neck. As Johnson sat slumped
in the driver's seat “bleeding heavily and making gagging
noises,” Reeves directed the rest of the group to “go through
Johnson's pockets to get his money.” Id., at 720 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Throughout the rest of the day,
Reeves repeatedly “brag[ged] about having shot Johnson,”
boasting that the murder “would earn him a `teardrop,' a
gang tattoo acquired for killing someone.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). And at a party that night,
Reeves invented a dance in which he “pretend[ed] to pump
a shotgun” and “jerk[ed] his body around in a manner mock-
ing the way that Willie Johnson had died.” Ibid. (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Alabama charged Reeves with murder and appointed
counsel for him. His attorneys took several steps to develop
mitigating evidence, including exploring the possibility that
Reeves was intellectually disabled. For example, they ob-
tained extensive records of Reeves' educational, medical, and
correctional history. Counsel also requested funding to hire
a neuropsychologist, Dr. John Goff, to evaluate Reeves
and prepare mitigation evidence. And when the trial court
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735
Per Curiam
initially rejected that request, counsel successfully sought
reconsiderati
on.
After the court granted funding, Reeves' attorneys man-
aged to acquire additional mental-health records from the
State, including documents related to a pretrial competency
evaluation that featured a partial administration of an IQ
test.
1
The totality of the evidence refected that Reeves had
a troubled childhood, suffered from numerous behavioral dif-
fculties, and was within the “borderline” range of intelli-
gence. While in school—before being expelled for violence
and misbehavior—he had been referred to special services
for emotional confict and behavioral issues. But Reeves'
records also showed that he had previously been denied spe-
cial educational services for intellectual disability. Counsel
also learned that Reeves had attended classes and earned
certifcates in welding, masonry, and automotive mechanics.
And the psychologist who initially evaluated Reeves later
opined that he was not intellectually disabled.
At some point before trial, Reeves' attorneys apparently
elected to pursue other mitigation strategies instead of hir-
ing Dr. Goff. The record does not reveal the exact reason
for this decision—likely because Reeves did not ask them to
testify. The record does show, however, that counsel pre-
sented a holistic mitigation case. For example, counsel
called several witnesses at sentencing—including Reeves'
mother and the psychologist who performed the competency
evaluation—and elicited testimony about Reeves' turbulent
childhood, neglectful family, and educational diffculties.
The jury, however, recommended a death sentence.
Reeves later sought postconviction relief in state court,
alleging almost 20 theories of error. Relevant here, he as-
1
Around the same time, one of Reeves' attorneys withdrew from the
case, explaining that Reeves “ha[d] been combative, argumentative[,] and
ha[d] totally refused to assist [the attorney] in any manner.” Electronic
Case Filing in No. 1:17–cv–00061 (SD Ala.) (ECF), Doc. 23–1, pp. 3, 78.
Another attorney replaced him.
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serted that he was categorically exempt from execution by
reason
of intellectual disability, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U. S. 304 (2002), or at the very least that counsel should have
hired Dr. Goff to develop mitigation along those lines for use
at sentencing, see Porter v. McCollum, 558 U. S. 30 (2009)
(per curiam). At a 2-day hearing in state court, Reeves
called two experts, including Dr. Goff. The doctor con-
cluded that Reeves was intellectually disabled, explaining
that the so-called Flynn Effect—a controversial theory in-
volving the infation of IQ scores over time—required adjust-
ing Reeves' score downward into the 60s.
2
Dr. Goff also
cited a number of behavioral assessments that supposedly
showed Reeves' shortcomings in adaptive functioning. For
its part, the State offered the expert testimony of Dr. King,
who administered his own evaluation and concluded that
Reeves was not intellectually disabled. In fact, Dr. King
pointed out that Reeves had a leadership role in a drug-
dealing group and earned as much as $2,000 a week.
Despite Reeves' focus on his attorney's performance, he
did not give them the opportunity to explain their actions.
Although all three of his lawyers apparently were alive and
available, Reeves did not call them to testify.
The trial court denied relief, and the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals affrmed. First, it agreed that Reeves
had failed to prove that he was actually intellectually dis-
abled and thus exempt from execution. Reeves, 226 So. 3d,
at 744. The court specifcally addressed Dr. Goff 's reliance
on the Flynn Effect, reiterating that this approach “has not
been accepted as scientifcally valid by all courts” and was
2
According to some proponents of this theory, the Flynn Effect posits
that IQ scores increase “by approximately 0.3 points per year,” which in
turn “requires that the IQ test be `normed' periodically so that the mean
score on the test stays the same” and “that 0.3 points be deducted from
[a] full-scale IQ score achieved on an IQ test for each year since the test
was last normed.” Reeves v. State, 226 So. 3d 711, 730 (Ala. Crim. App.
2016).
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Per Curiam
“not settled in the psychological community.” Id., at 739
(
internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, even Dr. Goff
had “admitted that he did not use the `Flynn Effect' for over
20 years after it was frst discovered.” Ibid.
Second, the court rejected Reeves' claim that counsel
should have hired an expert to develop mitigating evidence
of intellectual disability. Stressing that an attorney's deci-
sion not to hire an expert is “typically [a] strategic decisio[n]”
that will “not constitute per se defcient performance,” the
court looked to the record to assess the “reasoning behind
counsel's actions.” Id., at 750, 751 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In this case, the court observed, “the record [was]
silent as to th[ose] reasons” “because Reeves failed to call
his counsel to testify.” Id., at 751 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Hence, he could not overcome the “presumption
of effectiveness” that courts must afford to trial counsel.
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reeves sought certiorari, which we denied over a dissent.
Reeves v. Alabama, 583 U. S. 979 (2017) (opinion of Soto-
mayor, J.). The dissent acknowledged that the “absence of
counsel's testimony may make it more diffcult for a defend-
ant to meet his burden” of proving defcient performance,
but still would have reversed and remanded because it un-
derstood the Alabama court to have applied “a categorical
rule that counsel must testify in order for a petitioner to
succeed on a federal constitutional ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim.” Id., at 980, 986. Although the dissent cited
no decision in which this Court reprimanded a state court
for taking that approach, it reasoned that such a rule was
contrary to decisions in which this Court had “found defcient
performance despite [attorney] testimony, based on review of
the full record.” Id., at 986.
3
3
We note that this dissent—unlike the Eleventh Circuit—considered the
case before it entered the exceedingly deferential posture of federal ha-
beas review. Moreover, the dissent did not conclude that Reeves was
entitled to relief on the merits of his claim, but instead would have “re-
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Reeves next sought federal habeas review. The District
Cour
t denied relief, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed in
part. Like every court before it, the Eleventh Circuit frst
rejected Reeves' claim that he was intellectually disabled.
836 Fed. Appx., at 741. But, it held that his lawyers were
constitutionally defcient for not developing more evidence
of intellectual disability and that this failure might have
changed the outcome of the trial.
In reaching that result, the Eleventh Circuit explained
that it owed no deference to the “unreasonable” decision of
the Alabama court. § 2254(d). Quoting at length from the
earlier dissent from denial of certiorari, the panel reasoned
that “a per se rule that the petitioner must present counsel's
testimony” was clearly contrary to federal law. Id., at 744–
747. And, to demonstrate that the Alabama court had ap-
plied such a rule, the Eleventh Circuit excised a single state-
ment from a lengthy block quote: “ `[T]o overcome the strong
presumption of effectiveness, a [state] petitioner must, at his
evidentiary hearing, question trial counsel regarding his . . .
actions and reasoning.' ” Id., at 744 (emphasis deleted).
The Eleventh Circuit then reasoned that the state court
surely must have imposed this “categorical rule” because its
opinion also said that Reeves' “ `failure to call his attorneys
to testify was fatal to his claims.' ” Ibid. (emphasis deleted;
brackets omitted). But that quote was not quite complete;
the original sentence reads, “In this case, Reeves's failure to
call his attorneys to testify is fatal to his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 749 (empha-
sis added).
II
This case presents a simple question: Did the Alabama
court violate clearly established federal law when it rejected
mand[ed] so that the [Alabama court] could explain why, given the full
factual record, Reeves' counsel's choices constituted reasonable perform-
ance.” 583 U. S., at 990.
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Reeves' claim that his attorneys should have hired an
exper
t?
In answering this question, we owe deference to both
Reeves' counsel and the state court. As to counsel, we have
often explained that strategic decisions—including whether
to hire an expert—are entitled to a “strong presumption”
of reasonableness. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 104
(2011). Defense lawyers have “limited” time and resources,
and so must choose from among “ `countless' ” strategic op-
tions. Id., at 106–107. Such decisions are particularly dif-
fcult because certain tactics carry the risk of “harm[ing] the
defense” by undermining credibility with the jury or dis-
tracting from more important issues. Id., at 108.
The burden of rebutting this presumption “rests squarely
on the defendant,” and “[i]t should go without saying that
the absence of evidence cannot overcome [it].” Titlow, 571
U. S., at 22–23. In fact, even if there is reason to think that
counsel's conduct “was far from exemplary,” a court still may
not grant relief if “[t]he record does not reveal” that counsel
took an approach that no competent lawyer would have cho-
sen. Id., at 23–24.
This analysis is “doubly deferential” when, as here, a state
court has decided that counsel performed adequately. Id.,
at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sexton v.
Beaudreaux, 585 U. S. 961, 968 (2018) (per curiam) (defer-
ence is “near its apex” in such cases). A federal court may
grant habeas relief only if a state court violated “clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
This “wide latitude” means that federal courts can correct
only “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice sys-
te[m].” Richter, 562 U. S., at 102, 106 (internal quotation
marks omitted). And in reviewing the work of their peers,
federal judges must begin with the “presumption that state
courts know and follow the law.” Woodford, 537 U. S., at 24.
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740 DUNN
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only if every “ `fairminded juris[t]' ” would agree that every
reasonable
lawyer would have made a different decision.
Richter, 562 U. S., at 101.
A straightforward application of these principles reveals
the extent of the Eleventh Circuit's error. We start, as we
must, with the case as it came to the Alabama court.
Reeves had fled a 100-plus-page brief alleging manifold er-
rors, including several theories of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 749–750, and n. 16. Many of
these attacked basic strategic choices, including his current
argument that counsel should have hired Dr. Goff to develop
additional evidence of intellectual disability. Yet, despite
Reeves' determination to fnd fault with his lawyers, he of-
fered no testimony or other evidence from them.
That omission was particularly signifcant given the
“range of possible reasons [Reeves'] counsel may have had
for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S.
170, 196 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is
not a case in which a lawyer “failed to uncover and present
any evidence of [Reeves'] mental health or mental impair-
ment, [or] his family background.” Porter, 558 U. S., at 40
(emphasis added). Counsel's initial enthusiasm to collect
Reeves' records and obtain funding hardly indicates profes-
sional neglect and disinterest.
Rather, we simply do not know what information and con-
siderations emerged as counsel reviewed the case and refned
their strategy. The attorneys may very well have pored
over the voluminous evidence in their possession—including
those obtained after their funding request—and identifed
several reasons that a jury was unlikely to be persuaded by
a claim of intellectual disability. After all, although Reeves'
records suggested that his intelligence was below average,
they also indicated that he was not intellectually disabled.
E. g., Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 729. Counsel might also have been
concerned about the evidence of Reeves' history of violence,
criminal past, and behavior problems, ibid., and concluded
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that presenti ng these charac ter istics a longside a fu l l-
throated
intellectual-disability argument would have con-
vinced the jury that Reeves “was simply beyond rehabilita-
tion,” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 201. Or, counsel may have
uncovered additional evidence confrming their concerns
about an intellectual-disability strategy. Perhaps Reeves
informed them, as he later did Dr. King, that he was savvy
enough to earn thousands of dollars a week in a drug-dealing
operation where he had a leadership role. 226 So. 3d, at 736.
Or, counsel may well have further investigated Dr. Goff
and decided that his debatable methodologies would under-
mine credibility with a local jury—possibly a prescient choice
given that every single court to consider the issue has re-
jected Reeves' claim of intellectual disability. In fact,
around the time that counsel were formulating their trial
strategy, Dr. Goff was already performing questionable eval-
uations. See, e. g., King v. Apfel, 2000 WL 284217, *2 (SD
Ala., Feb. 29, 2000) (Dr. Goff 's 1996 evaluation of a Social
Security claimant was “unsupported by the medical evi-
dence,” and “everything else in the record [was] counter
to [his] extreme fndings” (emphasis added)); Small v.
Apfel, 2000 WL 1844727, *3, n. 5 (SD Ala., Oct. 17, 2000)
(“[Dr.] Goff 's [1998] conclusions regarding defcits in adap-
tive behavior are not only mere guesses . . . but also suffer
from a lack of support in the record”). It is not unreason-
able for a lawyer to be concerned about overreaching.
Simply put, if the attorneys had been given the chance to
testify, they might have pointed to information justifying the
strategic decision to devote their time and efforts elsewhere.
Yet, Reeves—possibly pursuing a strategy of his own—
declined to put that testimonial evidence before the Alabama
court. So given that the Alabama court was entitled to re-
ject Reeves' claim if trial counsel had any “possible reaso[n]
. . . for proceeding as they did,” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 196
(internal quotation marks omitted), it surely was not obliged
to accept Reeves' blanket assertion on an incomplete eviden-
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tiary record that “[n]o reasonable strategy could support
counsel'
s failure,” ECF Doc. 23–29, at 81.
Rather than defer to this commonsense analysis, the Elev-
enth Circuit took a path that we have long foreclosed:
“mischaracterization of the state-court opinion.” Woodford,
537 U. S., at 22. As explained above, the Alabama court rea-
sonably concluded that the incomplete evidentiary record—
which was notably “silent as to the reasons trial counsel . . .
chose not to hire Dr. Goff or another neuropsychologist”—
doomed Reeves' belated efforts to second-guess his attor-
neys. Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 751. The Eleventh Circuit,
however, recharacterized this case-specifc analysis as a “cat-
egorical rule” that any prisoner will always lose if he fails
to call and question “trial counsel regarding his or her
actions and reasoning.” 836 Fed. Appx., at 744 (emphasis
deleted; internal quotation marks omitted).
We think it clear from context that the Alabama court did
not apply a blanket rule, but rather determined that the facts
of this case did not merit relief. As an initial matter, the
Alabama court twice recognized that there can be instances
of “per se defcient performance.” Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at
750–751. It simply concluded that here, counsel's choice re-
garding experts involved a strategic decision entitled to a
presumption of reasonableness. Ibid. Moreover, other
portions of the opinion's lengthy recitation of the law (which
the Eleventh Circuit omitted) belie a categorical approach.
In particular, the court twice said that it would consider “ `all
the circumstances' ” of the case, and it qualifed its suppos-
edly categorical rule by explaining that “counsel should or-
dinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions
before being denounced as ineffective.” Id., at 744, 747
(emphasis added; some internal quotation marks omitted).
Other parts of the opinion yield the same interpretation.
For example, the court devoted almost nine pages to discuss-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel. That would have been

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Per Curiam
a curious choice for a “busy state cour[t]” if a single sentence
apply
ing a per se rule could have suffced. Johnson v.
Williams, 568 U. S. 289, 298 (2013) (state courts need not
even “discuss separately every single claim”). Within that
lengthy discussion, the court individually mentioned many of
Reeves' specifc theories, including his current intellectual-
disability argument. Moreover, that the court in a foot-
note summarily rejected different ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims for procedural reasons further weighs against
imputing a per se rule for the theories that the court dis-
cussed in the body of its opinion. Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 749–
750, n. 16.
Even more important, the actual analysis of the claim at
issue here refects a case-specifc approach. The court did
not merely say, as the Eleventh Circuit wrongly suggested,
that Reeves' “ `failure to call his attorneys to testify was
fatal to his claims.' ” 836 Fed. Appx., at 744 (brackets omit-
ted). Rather, the opinion prefaced this quote with an impor-
tant qualifer—“In this case.” Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 749
(emphasis added). And sure enough, the court proceeded to
explain why Reeves could not prevail “in this case”—because
“the record [was] silent as to the reasoning behind counsel's
actions.” Id., at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To be sure, the record in this particular case happened to be
defcient “because Reeves failed to call his counsel to testify.”
Ibid. But, this unremarkable observation of cause and ef-
fect in light of the facts before the court was hardly an abso-
lute bar in every case where other record evidence might fll
in the details. And, it certainly was not contrary to clearly
established law given that this Court and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit have made the same observation that a silent record
cannot discharge a prisoner's burden. E. g., Titlow, 571
U. S., at 15, 22–24; Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F. 3d 1194,
1218 (CA11 2001) (noting that “the record [was] silent as to
why trial counsel did not pursue a motion to suppress the

744 DUNN
v. REEVES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
evidence,” and that “habeas counsel did not inquire as to trial
counsel'
s reasons for not raising such a claim”).
4
***
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for a writ
of certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer dissents.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan joins,
dissenting.
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984),
courts must assess a defendant's claim that his attorney
failed to provide constitutionally effective assistance “in
light of all the circumstances.” Id., at 690. No single type
of evidence is a prerequisite to relief. Therefore, as the ma-
4
Today's dissent suggests that a more recent decision—State v. M. D. D.,
324 So. 3d 425 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020)—illustrates that Alabama courts
understand Reeves to announce a per se rule. Post, at 750, 752, and n. 4
(opinion of Sotomayor, J.). But that case does the exact opposite. In
M. D. D., the petitioner alleged that his attorney should have called a
medical expert at trial, yet he did not have the attorney testify at the
postconviction hearing. M. D. D., 324 So. 3d, at 431–433. The Alabama
court denied relief after examining the evidence and identifying a “sound,
strategic reason for not calling [the expert] to testify.” Id., at 436 (dis-
cussing a possible downside to having the expert testify); see also ibid.
(explaining, in the alternative, why the petitioner suffered no prejudice).
Notably, the court did so after citing Reeves and quoting the same lan-
guage that the dissent claims represents a per se rule. Compare id., at
434–435 (“[A] Rule 32 petitioner must, at his evidentiary hearing, question
trial counsel regarding his or her actions and reasoning. . . . In this case,
the failure to have trial counsel testify is fatal to [the petitioner's] claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel” (emphasis deleted; internal quotation
marks omitted)), with post, at 745, 749. Again, it would have been
strange for a busy Alabama court to devote pages to rejecting a claim if
a categorical bar would have suffced.
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jority implicitly acknowledges, a per se rule that a habeas
petiti
oner's claim fails if his attorney did not testify at an
evidentiary hearing is fatly incompatible with Strickland.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama applied pre-
cisely such a rule in this case. When respondent Matthew
Reeves raised several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC)
claims in state postconviction proceedings, the court stated,
in no uncertain terms (and underlined for emphasis), that “to
overcome the strong presumption of effectiveness, a Rule 32
petitioner must, at his evidentiary hearing, question trial
counsel regarding his or her actions and reasoning.” Reeves
v. State, 226 So. 3d 711, 748 (2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Applying that rule “[i]n this case,” the court held
that “Reeves's failure to call his attorneys to testify is fatal
to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id., at
749. Reeves then sought habeas relief in federal court.
Based on the state court's clear holding, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit properly determined that the state
court's use of the per se rule was an unreasonable application
of Strickland. Reeves v. Commissioner, Ala. Dept. of Cor-
rections, 836 Fed. Appx. 733, 744 (2020) (per curiam).
Through linguistic contortion, the Court today rescues the
state court's decision by construing it not to apply a per se
rule at all. Based on that implausible reading, the Court
summarily reverses the Eleventh Circuit's grant of relief.
The lengths to which this Court goes to ensure that Reeves
remains on death row are extraordinary. I respectfully
dissent.
I
A
In 1998, Reeves was convicted of capital murder for a bru-
tal crime he committed when he was 18 years old. By a
vote of 10 to 2, a divided jury recommended that Reeves be
sentenced to death, and the trial court accepted that
recommendation.
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During his trial, Reeves was initially represented by
two
attorneys, Blanchard McLeod and Marvin Wiggins.
Reeves' counsel moved for the appointment of a neuropsy-
chologist, Dr. John Goff, to conduct an intellectual disability
evaluation. When the motion was denied, Reeves' counsel
sought rehearing. They explained that they had collected
“hundreds of pages of psychological, psychometric and be-
havioral analysis material relating to [Reeves].” Electronic
Case Filing in No. 1:17–cv–00061 (SD Ala.) (ECF), Doc. 23–
1, p. 74. That material, McLeod had represented in court,
was “exceptionally pertinent” to Reeves' penalty phase de-
fense. ECF Doc. 23–3, at 96. Counsel stated that retain-
ing “a clinical neuropsychologist” like Dr. Goff was “the only
avenue open to the defense to compile this information . . .
and present [it] in an orderly and informative fashion to the
jury.” ECF Doc. 23–1, at 74–75. The state court granted
the request and provided funding to hire Dr. Goff. Id., at
81. Around the same time, McLeod was replaced by an-
other attorney, Thomas Goggans. 836 Fed. Appx., at 736.
Reeves' new team, Goggans and Wiggins, failed to follow
through on hiring a neuropsychologist. As Dr. Goff later
testifed, in the more than three months between his appoint-
ment and the penalty phase trial, Reeves' attorneys “just
never called.” ECF Doc. 23–24, at 68. They also never
hired any other neuropsychologist to review the evidence
and evaluate Reeves for intellectual disability. 836 Fed.
Appx., at 748. Instead, on the day of the penalty phase trial,
counsel contacted Dr. Kathleen Ronan, a clinical psychologist
who had previously evaluated Reeves for competence to
stand trial and his mental state at the time of the offense.
ECF Doc. 23–26, at 82–84. She had never evaluated Reeves
for intellectual disability, and she had not spoken with
Goggans or Wiggins until “the day that [she] testifed.” Id.,
at 84.
Dr. Ronan informed Reeves' counsel that her prior evalua-
tion would not serve their purposes. Ibid. As she later ex-

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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
plained, assessing Reeves for intellectual disability “was not
w
ithin the scope of [her] evaluation.” Ibid. Had she been
hired to conduct such an assessment, she would have
administered a full IQ test and conducted other evaluations
designed to diagnose intellectual disability. Id., at 85–87.
Instead, Dr. Ronan had only administered part of an IQ test
and found that Reeves' verbal IQ “was not in a level that
they would call him [intellectually disabled].” ECF Doc.
23–8, at 155; see also ECF Doc. 23–26, at 85. An expert for
the State later administered a full IQ test, however, showing
that Reeves' IQ was well within the range for intellectual
disability. Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 737; ECF Doc. 23–25, at
24; ECF Doc. 23–24, at 26.
Nevertheless, Reeves' counsel called Dr. Ronan to testify.
The only other witnesses counsel called were Reeves' mother
and a police detective. The entire penalty phase trial lasted
just one and a half hours. ECF Doc. 23–14, at 154. Re-
viewing the record, the trial judge found that “[t]he only
evidence that [he could] consider in mitigation of this off-
ense . . . is the evidence of [Reeves'] age and [his] youth-
fulness.” ECF Doc. 23–8, at 212. Concluding that such
limited evidence would not outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances, the court sentenced Reeves to death. Ibid.
B
In 2002, Reeves fled a motion for state postconviction re-
lief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (known
as a Rule 32 petition). Reeves alleged that his trial counsel
had been constitutionally ineffective in several ways, includ-
ing by failing to hire a neuropsychologist to evaluate him for
intellectual disability.
The state court held a 2-day evidentiary hearing on
Reeves' claims. Reeves called Dr. Goff to testify. At the
request of Reeves' postconviction counsel, Dr. Goff had re-
viewed Reeves' mental health and school records and admin-
istered “a battery of tests designed to assess Mr. Reeves'

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IQ, cognitive abilities, and adaptive functioning.” 836 Fed.
Appx.,
at 737. Dr. Goff found that Reeves' IQ scores were
71 and 73,
1
showing that Reeves “has signifcantly subaver-
age intellectual functioning,” and that he “has signifcant
defcits in multiple areas of adaptive functioning.” Ibid.
These defcits manifested before Reeves turned 18 years old.
ECF Doc. 23–24, at 25–26, 65–67. Based on his fndings,
Dr. Goff concluded that Reeves is intellectually disabled.
836 Fed. Appx., at 737. Dr. Goff testifed that “had
Mr. Reeves' trial counsel asked him to evaluate Mr. Reeves
years earlier for the purpose of testifying at trial, he would
have performed similar evaluations and reached the same
conclusions.” Ibid.
Reeves' trial counsel did not testify at the Rule 32 hearing.
At the beginning of the hearing, the State had declared that
it intended to call Goggans and Wiggins to “explain why they
did certain things and maybe why they didn't do certain
things.” ECF Doc. 23–24, at 14. But at the conclusion of
the hearing, the State “decided not to call trial counsel.”
ECF Doc. 23–25, at 86.
The state court denied Reeves' motion for postconviction
relief. On appeal, Reeves argued that the lower court had
“erred in ignoring substantial evidence in support of [his
IAC claim] on the basis that he did not call counsel to testify.”
ECF Doc. 23–29, at 45. In response, the State argued that
because “Reeves failed to call either of his trial attorneys to
testify concerning their decision to call Dr. Ronan rather
than Dr. Goff,” the lower court “properly presumed that they
acted reasonably.” Id., at 199–200.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama agreed with
the State, rejecting Reeves' contention that “testimony from
counsel is not necessary to prove any claim of ineffective
1
Reeves' IQ scores were even lower after accounting for the Flynn
Effect. ECF Doc. 23–24, at 43–46. Dr. Goff concluded that Reeves' IQ
fell within the intellectual disability range even without such an adjust-
ment. Id., at 44, 99.

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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
assistance of counsel.” Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 747. That ar-
g
ument, the court reasoned, “fail[ed] to take into account the
requirement that courts indulge a strong presumption that
counsel acted reasonably, a presumption that must be over-
come by evidence to the contrary.” Ibid. (emphasis in origi-
nal). The court then specifed what that evidence must be:
“ `[T]o overcome the strong presumption of effectiveness, a
Rule 32 petitioner must, at his evidentiary hearing, question
trial counsel regarding his or her actions and reasoning.' ”
Id., at 748 (emphasis in original; quoting Stallworth v. State,
171 So. 3d 53, 92 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013)). The court cited
over half a dozen cases supporting that per se rule. See 226
So. 3d, at 748. It then applied the rule to Reeves, explaining
that “[i]n this case, Reeves's failure to call his attorneys to
testify is fatal to his claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.” Id., at 749.
Reeves fled a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking re-
view of the state court's decision, which this Court denied.
I dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan.
We pointed out that the state court had applied a per se rule
“that counsel must testify in order for a petitioner to succeed
on a federal constitutional ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.” Reeves v. Alabama, 583 U. S. 979, 980 (2017). Even
the State did not defend the constitutionality of such a rule.
See ibid.
C
Reeves then fled a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28
U. S. C. § 2254. The District Court denied Reeves' petition
and his motion for reconsideration. See 2019 WL 1938805,
*11 (SD Ala., May 1, 2019). The Eleventh Circuit reversed
in relevant part. It read the state appellate court's decision
to “trea[t] Mr. Reeves' failure to call his counsel to testify as
a per se bar to relief—despite ample evidence in the record
to overcome the presumption of adequate representation.”
836 Fed. Appx., at 744. In so doing, the state court “unrea-
sonably applied Strickland.” Ibid. The Eleventh Circuit
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accordingly reviewed Reeves' claim de novo and found that
Ree
ves had proved ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., at
747–753.
The Eleventh Circuit was not alone in interpreting the
state court's decision to apply a “categorical rule.” Id., at
744. Less than a month earlier, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals of Alabama (the same court that had issued the deci-
sion in question) denied another defendant's IAC claim.
Once again, the court stated its per se rule: “[T]o overcome
the strong presumption of effectiveness, a Rule 32 petitioner
must, at his evidentiary hearing, question trial counsel re-
garding his or her actions and reasoning.” State v. M. D. D.,
324 So. 3d 425, 434 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted; emphasis deleted). In support, the court
cited its prior decision in Reeves, which it summarized as
“holding that [a] Rule 32 petitioner had failed to prove his
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel
because he did not call his trial or appellate counsel to testify
at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing.” Id., at 435. As in
Reeves' case, the court in M. D. D. held that “the failure to
have trial counsel testify is fatal to M. D. D.'s claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel.” Ibid.
2
The State petitioned this Court to review the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Reeves. Despite the Alabama court's
plain embrace of a per se rule, the State accused the Elev-
enth Circuit of too “readily attributing error to the state
court” by interpreting its decision to “purportedly creat[e]
and us[e] this per se rule.” Pet. for Cert. i. On that basis,
the State asked this Court to reverse summarily the Elev-
enth Circuit. Id., at 30.
II
The sole question presented in this case is whether the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama applied a categorical
2
The state court separately held that relief was not warranted be-
cause the court could conceive of a sound strategic reason for counsel's
actions and because M.D.D. failed to show prejudice. See State v.
M. D. D., 324 So. 3d 425, 435–437 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).
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rule that Reeves' failure to call his attorneys to testify was
fat
al to his IAC claim as a matter of law. No one disputes
that such a rule would be an “unreasonable application” of
Strickland and its progeny. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1); see also
ante, at 733, 742; Pet. for Cert. 1. Under those decisions, no
single type of evidence, such as counsel's testimony, is a pre-
requisite to relief.
3
See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470,
478 (2000) (describing Strickland's “circumstance-specifc
reasonableness inquiry”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362,
391 (2000) (explaining that “the Strickland test `of necessity
requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence' ”).
The Court of Criminal Appeals improperly applied such a
per se rule here. It began by invoking Reeves' burden “to
present evidence” suffcient to overcome the “strong pre-
sumption that counsel acted reasonably.” Reeves, 226 So.
3d, at 751 (emphasis deleted). It then ignored all of the evi-
dence that Reeves' counsel had acted unreasonably, including
Dr. Goff 's description of the evaluation he would have con-
ducted, Dr. Ronan's warning that her testimony was no sub-
stitute for an actual intellectual disability assessment, and
trial counsel's repeated representations about the necessity
of hiring Dr. Goff to conduct such an evaluation.
The court held that none of this evidence mattered because
trial counsel did not testify: “[B]ecause Reeves failed to call
his counsel to testify, the record is silent as to the reasons
trial counsel . . . chose not to hire Dr. Goff or another neuro-
psychologist.” Ibid. The court treated that fact as “fatal”
to Reeves' claim. Id., at 749. Because Reeves could not
establish the subjective “reasoning behind counsel's actions,
the presumption of effectiveness [was] suffcient to deny re-
3
As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, this Court has found defcient per-
formance without any testimony from trial counsel. See Reeves v. Com-
missioner, Ala. Dept. of Corrections, 836 Fed. Appx. 733, 751 (2020)
(per curiam) (discussing Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100 (2017)). This Court
has also found defcient performance when counsel testifed and “at-
tempt[ed] to justify their [actions] as refecting a tactical judgment.”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 521 (2003).

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lief.” Id., at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
M
. D. D., 324 So. 3d, at 435 (explaining that the court denied
Reeves relief “because he did not call his trial . . . counsel
to testify”).
4
III
In reviewing habeas petitions, “federal judges must begin
with the `presumption that state courts know and follow the
law.' ” Ante, at 739 (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S.
19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). But when state courts contra-
vene this Court's precedents, federal courts cannot turn a
blind eye. Here, it is hard to see how the state court could
have been any clearer in applying a per se rule that undisput-
edly violates Strickland.
4
The Court has no answer to the explicit description in M. D. D. of the
state court's reasoning in Reeves. Instead, the Court collapses the state
court's alternative holdings in M. D. D., confating the state court's applica-
tion of the per se rule requiring counsel's testimony with the state court's
separate reasons for denying relief. Ante, at 744, n. 4. It is true, as the
Court notes, that the state court “examin[ed] the evidence and identif[ied]
a sound, strategic reason” for counsel's actions “after citing Reeves and
quoting the same language that the dissent claims represents a per se
rule.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). What the Court fails to
mention is that the state court frst concluded that the per se rule applied
in Reeves was suffcient, on its own, to deny relief. M. D. D., 324 So. 3d,
at 435 (“In this case, the failure to have trial counsel testify is fatal to
M. D. D.'s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,” because “where the
record is silent as to the reasoning behind counsel's actions, the presump-
tion of effectiveness is suffcient to deny relief ” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Only after announcing this holding did the state court sepa-
rately offer two additional, independent reasons for denying relief, ex-
plaining that “[f]urther,” there was a “sound, strategic reason” for coun-
sel's actions, and “[m]ore[o]ver,” an examination of the record showed that
M. D. D. had failed to demonstrate prejudice. Id., at 436. Contrary to
the Court's suggestion, these alternative holdings formed no part of the
state court's discussion of Reeves or application of the per se rule. The
Court rewrites yet another state-court decision in service of its efforts to
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A
The
Court declares that it is “clear from context that the
Alabama court did not apply a blanket rule, but rather deter-
mined that the facts of this case did not merit relief.” Ante,
at 742. The problem is that the “facts of this case” make no
appearance in the state court's discussion. See Reeves, 226
So. 3d, at 749–751. This Court thus searches for some sign
(any sign) that the state court implicitly assessed the facts
of the case.
The Court frst points to two statements at the beginning
of the state court's analysis in which it “said that it would
consider `all the circumstances' of the case.” Ante, at 742.
But after perfunctorily citing the Strickland standard, the
state court never actually followed through on its obligation
to consider the evidence. Its analysis began and ended with
counsel's failure to testify. See Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 750–
751. State courts cannot insulate their decisions from scru-
tiny by quoting the proper standard and then ignoring it.
In a similar vein, this Court seizes upon the state court's
quotation from an earlier case stating that trial “ `counsel
should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his
actions before being denounced as ineffective.' ” Ante, at
742. This, the Court claims, “belie[s] a categorical ap-
proach.” Ibid. The state court, however, expressly over-
rode that formulation of the rule, stating that the court
“[s]ubsequently” held that IAC petitioners “ `must' ” question
trial counsel. Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 747–748 (emphasis in
original). It relied on that rule to reject Reeves' claim.
Id., at 748–749.
The Court also cites the length of the state court's opinion
as purported proof that the court conducted a fact-specifc in-
quiry. Ante, at 742–743. But what matters is the state
court's reasoning, not the length of its opinion. The state
court did not spend “almost nine pages” conducting a detailed
“case-specifc” analysis. Ibid. The vast majority of the
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state court's discussion instead consists of a list of Reeves'
IA
C allegations and lengthy block quotes of general legal
standards. See Reeves, 226 So. 3d, at 744–750. When the
court fnally turned to the facts of this case, it explicitly
barred relief only “because Reeves failed to call his counsel
to testify.” Id., at 751.
Finally, the Court latches on to three words, “[i]n this
case,” insisting that they prove that the state court merely
concluded that trial counsel's testimony was critical to
Reeves' IAC claim “[i]n this case.” Ante, at 743 (quoting 226
So. 3d, at 749; emphasis deleted). But in using the phrase
“[i]n this case,” the state court was not addressing the evi-
dentiary record. It was analogizing Reeves' case to the
many cases it had just cited for the proposition that “ `a Rule
32 petitioner must, at his evidentiary hearing, question trial
counsel regarding his or her actions and reasoning.' ” Id.,
at 748–749 (emphasis in original). It then concluded that
“Reeves's failure to call his attorneys to testify” in this case
was similarly “fatal to his claims.” Id., at 749. If the state
court had meant to weigh the evidence in the record, it would
have. It did not. This Court is putting words in the state
court's mouth that the state court never uttered, and which
are fatly inconsistent with what the state court did say.
B
Finding no relevant factual analysis in the state court's
decision, this Court attempts its own, speculating as to what
Reeves' counsel might have said had they been called to tes-
tify. See ante, at 740–742. For instance, the Court imagines
that “counsel may have uncovered additional evidence con-
frming their concerns about an intellectual-disability strat-
egy.” Ante, at 741.
5
The Court also insinuates that Reeves
5
The Court hypothesizes that “[t]he attorneys may very well have pored
over the voluminous evidence in their possession—including those ob-
tained after their funding request—and identifed several reasons that a
jury was unlikely to be persuaded by a claim of intellectual disabili-

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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
may have strategically declined to call his trial counsel to
avoid
harmful testimony. Ibid. But if counsel's testimony
would have been damaging to Reeves' claim, one would have
expected the State to call counsel to testify. Yet the State
expressly declined to do so, despite having counsel available
to testify. See ECF Doc. 23–25, at 85–86.
The Court's eagerness to invent scenarios harmful to
Reeves' claim stems from its apparent belief that “the Ala-
bama court was entitled to reject Reeves' claim if trial coun-
sel had any `possible reaso[n] . . . for proceeding as they did.' ”
Ante, at 741 (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, 196
(2011)). That view has no basis in this Court's precedent.
Pinholster did not hold that an IAC claim fails if a court can
imagine any possible reason for counsel's actions. No claim
could ever survive such a standard. One can always imag-
ine some unsubstantiated reason for what trial counsel did.
Pinholster instead stated that, to assess whether counsel's
conduct was reasonable, courts must “entertain the range of
possible reasons” for counsel's actions in light of the events
and evidence actually established in the record. Id., at 196
ty.” Ante, at 740 (noting evidence indicating that Reeves' “intelligence
was below average,” but he was not intellectually disabled, and Reeves'
“history of violence, criminal past, and behavior problems”). But counsel
already knew of these concerns when they moved for Dr. Goff 's appoint-
ment. For instance, several months before counsel fled their initial mo-
tion, they received a report from Dr. Ronan's guilt-phase evaluation detail-
ing these issues. See ECF Doc. 23–13, at 61–63, 65. It is hard to see
how counsel's later request for the records underlying that evaluation
could have signifcantly changed their calculus. See ante, at 735; ECF
Doc. 23–1, at 88. Moreover, even if counsel had discovered additional evi-
dence related to Reeves' intellectual disability, there would still be a need
for an expert to evaluate the evidence in its totality. Indeed, Reeves'
counsel argued to the state court that, given the volume of evidence, they
needed the assistance of a qualifed expert to properly “compile” and “cor-
relate” the information and evaluate Reeves. Id., at 74–75; see ECF Doc.
23–3, at 91 (counsel arguing that they required Dr. Goff 's assistance be-
cause “the amount of material that we have received through discovery
. . . is beyond our ability to deal with”).
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(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's specula-
ti
ons about what may have occurred after Dr. Goff 's appoint-
ment are pure conjecture.
In any case, the Court's guesswork is beside the point be-
cause it was not the basis for the state court's decision.
When a state court gives a reasoned explanation for its deci-
sion, federal habeas courts must review that decision on its
own terms. See Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U. S. 122, 125 (2018)
(“In that case, a federal habeas court simply reviews the spe-
cifc reasons given by the state court and defers to those
reasons if they are reasonable”). Here, the state court re-
lied solely on the mere fact that Reeves' counsel did not tes-
tify. That is the only reason subject to our review, and it
plainly contravenes Strickland.
Even as the Court attempts to save the state court's de-
cision, it erroneously embraces the state court's flawed
assumption that IAC claims require direct evidence of the
subjective “ `reasoning behind counsel's actions.' ” See ante,
at 743. “Strickland, however, calls for an inquiry into the
objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not coun-
sel's subjective state of mind.” Harrington v. Richter, 562
U. S. 86, 110 (2011). “A convicted defendant making a claim
of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions
of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of
reasonable professional judgment. The court must then de-
termine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identi-
fed acts or omissions were outside the wide range of profes-
sionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U. S., at
690. This inquiry must be conducted “[e]ven assuming ” that
counsel acted “for strategic reasons,” Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U. S. 510, 527 (2003), and even if counsel does not testify. Cf.
Buck, 580 U. S., at 119 (“No competent defense attorney
would introduce such evidence about his own client”). “ `In
any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the perform-
ance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was rea-
sonable considering all the circumstances.' ” Hinton v. Ala-
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bama, 571 U. S. 263, 273 (2014) (per curiam). This Court
si
mply cannot escape the fact that the state court failed to
conduct the necessary inquiry.
***
Today's decision continues a troubling trend in which this
Court strains to reverse summarily any grants of relief to
those facing execution. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 592
U. S. ––– (2021) (emergency vacatur of stay and reversal);
Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U. S. 111 (2020) (per curiam) (summary
vacatur); Dunn v. Ray, 586 U. S. ––– (2019) (emergency vaca-
tur of stay). This Court has shown no such interest in cases
in which defendants seek relief based on compelling show-
ings that their constitutional rights were violated. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Precythe, 593 U. S. ––– (2021) (denying certio-
rari); Whatley v. Warden, 593 U. S. ––– (2021) (same); Ber-
nard v. United States, 592 U. S. ––– (2020) (same). In
Reeves' case, this Court stops the lower court from granting
Reeves' petition by adopting an utterly implausible reading
of the state court's decision. In essence, the Court turns
“deference,” ante, at 739, into a rule that federal habeas re-
lief is never available to those facing execution. I respect-
fully dissent.
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