Sanchez v. Mayorkas

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 593 U. S. Part 2
Pages 409–419
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 7, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
409
Syllabus
SANCHEZ et ux. v. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF
H
OMELAND SECURITY, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 20–315. Argued April 19, 2021—Decided June 7, 2021
Petitioner Jose Santos Sanchez is a citizen of El Salvador who challenges
the denial of his application to become a lawful permanent resident
(LPR) of the United States. Sanchez entered the United States unlaw-
fully in 1997. In 2001, the Government granted him Temporary Pro-
tected Status (TPS). The TPS program allows foreign nationals of a
country designated by the Government as having unusually bad or dan-
gerous conditions to live and work in the United States while the condi-
tions last. See § 1254a. In 2014, Sanchez applied under § 1255 of the
immigration laws to obtain LPR status. Section 1255 provides a way
for a “nonimmigrant”—a foreign national lawfully present in this coun-
try on a temporary basis—to obtain an “[a]djustment of status” to LPR.
8 U. S. C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv-
ices determined Sanchez ineligible for LPR status because he entered
the United States unlawfully. Sanchez successfully challenged that de-
cision before the District Court, which reasoned that Sanchez's TPS
required treating him as if he had been lawfully admitted to the country
for purposes of his LPR application. The Third Circuit reversed, fnd-
ing Sanchez's unlawful entry into the country precluded his eligibility
for LPR status under § 1255, notwithstanding his TPS.
Held: A TPS recipient who entered the United States unlawfully is not
eligible under § 1255 for LPR status merely by dint of his TPS. Section
1255 provides that eligibility for LPR status generally requires an “ad-
mission” into the country— defned to mean “the lawful entry of the
alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration offcer.” § 1101(a)(13)(A). Sanchez did not enter lawfully.
And his TPS does not eliminate the effect of that unlawful entry. Sec-
tion 1254a(f )(4) provides that a TPS recipient who applies for permanent
residency will be treated as having nonimmigrant status—the status
traditionally and generally needed to invoke the LPR process under
§ 1255. But that provision does not aid the TPS recipient in meeting
§ 1255's separate admission requirement. Lawful status and admission
are distinct concepts in immigration law, and establishing the former
does not establish the latter. Sanchez resists this conclusion, arguing
that the statute's directive that a TPS recipient “shall be considered . . .

410 SANCHEZ
v. MAYORKAS
Syllabus
as a nonimmigrant” for purposes of § 1255 means he must also be consid-
ered
as admitted. But the immigration laws nowhere state that admis-
sion is a prerequisite of nonimmigrant status. So there is no reason
to interpret the TPS provision's conferral of nonimmigrant status as
including a conferral of admission. In fact, contrary to Sanchez's posi-
tion, there are immigration categories in which individuals have non-
i mmigrant st atus w ithout admissi on. See, e. g., §§ 1101(a)(10),
1101(a)(15)(U), 1182(d)(14). Thus, when Congress confers nonimmi-
grant status for purposes of § 1255, but says nothing about admission,
the Court has no basis for ruling an unlawful entrant eligible to become
an LPR. Pp. 414–419.
967 F. 3d 242, affrmed.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Amy Mason Saharia argued the cause for petitioners.
With her on the briefs were Jaime W. Aparisi, Lisa S. Blatt,
and A. Joshua Podoll.
Michael R. Huston argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Prelo-
gar, Acting Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy
Solicitor General Gannon, and Jeffrey S. Robins.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the District of
Columbia et al. by Karl A. Racine, Attorney General of the District of
Columbia, Loren L. Alikhan, Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Prin-
cipal Deputy Solicitor General, and Mark S. Wigley and Samson J. Schatz,
Assistant Attorneys General, by Maura Healey, Attorney General of Mas-
sachusetts, David C. Kravitz, Deputy Solicitor General, and Abigail B.
Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Xavier Becerra of California, William
Tong of Connecticut, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illi-
nois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Dana Nessel
of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Gurbir
S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, Letitia James
of New York, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylva-
nia, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., of Ver-
mont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, and Robert W. Ferguson of Washing-
ton; for the American Immigration Lawyers Association et al. by Reedy
C. Swanson, Charles Roth, and Amalia Wille; for Human Rights Watch
et al. by Rishi N. Zutshi; for Immigration Law Professors by Ethan D.
Dettmer and Andrew J. Wilhelm; for Members of Congress by Elizabeth
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 593 U. S. 409 (2021)
411
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
P
etitioner Jose Santos Sanchez entered this country un-
lawfully from El Salvador. Years later, because of unsafe
living conditions in that country, the Government granted
him Temporary Protected Status (TPS), entitling him to stay
and work in the United States for as long as those conditions
persist. Sanchez now wishes to become a lawful permanent
resident (LPR) of the United States. The question here is
whether the conferral of TPS enables him to obtain LPR
status despite his unlawful entry. We hold that it does not.
I
Section 1255 of the immigration laws provides a way for a
“nonimmigrant”—a foreign national lawfully present in this
country on a designated, temporary basis—to obtain an
“[a]djustment of status” making him an LPR. 8 U. S. C.
§ 1255 (boldface deleted); see § 1101(a)(15) (listing classes of
nonimmigrants, such as students and tourists). Under that
section, a nonimmigrant's eligibility for such an adjustment
to permanent status depends (with exceptions not relevant
here) on an “admission” into this country. And an “admis-
sion” is defned as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immi-
gration offcer.” § 1101(a)(13)(A). The admission—or, to
use the defnitional phrase, “lawful entry”—requirement ap-
B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for Oxfam America by Emily Johnson
Henn; for the Service Employees International Union et al. by Erica C.
Lai and Nicole G. Berner; for Alan Morrison et al. by Jennifer Keighley,
Mark S. Davies, and Thomas M. Bondy; and for 22 Cities et al. by Marga-
ret L. Carter, Daniel R. Suvor, Leslie J. Girard, Farimah Faiz Brown,
Jessica M. Scheller, Lyndsey M. Olson, Christopher J. Caso, Dennis J.
Herrera, Peter S. Holmes, Arturo G. Michel, and William C. Fosbre.
Christopher J. Hajec fled a brief for the Immigration Reform Law Insti-
tute as amicus curiae urging affrmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Harvard TPS Coalition by
Sameer Ahmed; and for the National Immigration Litigation Alliance et al.
by Joel W. Nomkin and Mary Kenney.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
412 SANCHEZ
v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
pears in two pertinent provisions of § 1255. One states that
a
nonimmigrant may become an LPR only if he has been
“inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.”
§ 1255(a). And another states that a nonimmigrant who
has previously worked without authorization in the United
States may become an LPR only if his presence here is “pur-
suant to a lawful admission.” § 1255(k)(1); see § 1255(c)(2).
1
A separate provision of immigration law establishes the
TPS program, which provides humanitarian relief to foreign
nationals in the United States who come from specifed coun-
tries. See § 1254a. The Government may designate a coun-
try for the program when it is beset by especially bad or
dangerous conditions, such as arise from natural disasters or
armed conficts. The country's citizens, if already present
in the United States, may then obtain TPS. That status
protects them from removal and authorizes them to work
here for as long as the TPS designation lasts. A person's
unlawful entry into the United States will usually not pre-
clude granting him TPS. See § 1254a(c)(2)(A)(ii); 8 CFR
§ 244.3 (2020). And relevant here, the TPS provision states:
“[F]or purposes of adjustment of status under section 1255,”
a person given TPS “shall be considered as being in,
and mai nt ai ni ng, lawfu l st atus as a noni mmigrant. ”
§ 1254a(f )(4).
Jose Santos Sanchez is a citizen of El Salvador who has
lived in the United States for more than two decades. He
entered th is country unlawfu l ly i n 1997—w ithout “ i n-
spection and authorization by an immigration offcer.”
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). Once here, he worked without legal au-
1
Section 1255(k)'s requirement of a lawful admission, unlike § 1255(a)'s,
applies even i f the noni mmigrant has been paroled i nto the United
States—that is, received temporary permission to enter the country “for
urgent humanitarian reasons or signifcant public beneft.” 8 U. S. C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A). So a nonimmigrant who has worked without authoriza-
tion cannot rely on his parolee status (if any) to become an LPR.

Cite
as: 593 U. S. 409 (2021)
413
Opinion of the Court
thorization. In 2001, the Government designated El Salva-
dor
under the TPS program after a series of devastating
earthquakes. Sanchez obtained TPS that year, and has held
it ever since. In 2014, he applied under § 1255 for an adjust-
ment to LPR status.
2
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
denied Sanchez's LPR appl icati on. Under § 1255, the
agency stated, Sanchez was ineligible for LPR status be-
cause he had not been lawfully admitted to the United
States. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. And in the agency's
view, his TPS provided no way around that bar. “Recipients
of TPS,” the agency reasoned, “must still meet the threshold
requirement” of a lawful entry. Id., at 46a. Or said other-
wise: “A grant of TPS does not cure a foreign national's entry
without inspection or constitute an inspection and admission
of the foreign national,” as demanded by § 1255. Ibid.
Sanchez challenged the decision. The District Court
granted summary judgment in his favor, relying on the stat-
utory mandate that a TPS recipient “shall be considered as”
having “lawful status as a nonimmigrant” for purposes of
applying to become an LPR. See Santos Sanchez v. John-
son, 2018 WL 6427894, *4 (D NJ, Dec. 7, 2018) (citing
§ 1254a(f )(4); emphasis deleted). According to the court,
that provision requires treating TPS recipients “as though
[they] had been `inspected and admitted.' ” Ibid. But the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that
“a grant of TPS does not constitute an `admission' into the
United States.” Sanchez v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of Home-
land Security, 967 F. 3d 242, 252 (2020). The court observed
that “admission” and “status” are separate concepts in immi-
gration law. Id., at 246. So, the court concluded, providing
2
Sonia Gonzalez, Sanchez's wife, is also a petitioner here. She claims
LPR status derivatively, under a provision “entitl[ing her] to the same
status” as her husband. § 1153(d). We therefore focus on her husband's
application.
Page Proof Pending Publication

414 SANCHEZ
v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
a person with nonimmigrant status (as the TPS provision
does)
does not mean admitting him (as § 1255 requires).
See ibid.
We granted certiorari, 592 U. S. ––– (2021), to resolve a
Circuit split over whether a TPS recipient who entered the
country unlawfully can still become an LPR.
3
We now af-
frm the Third Circuit's decision that he cannot. The TPS
program gives foreign nationals nonimmigrant status, but it
does not admit them. So the conferral of TPS does not make
an unlawful entrant (like Sanchez) eligible under § 1255 for
adjustment to LPR status.
II
Section 1255, applied according to its plain terms, prevents
Sanchez from becoming an LPR. There is no dispute that
Sanchez “entered the United States in the late 1990s unlaw-
fully, without inspection.” Brief for Petitioners 13. But as
earlier described, § 1255 requires an LPR applicant like San-
chez to have entered the country “lawful[ly],” with “inspec-
tion”—that is, to have been admitted. § 1101(a)(13)(A); see
supra, at 411–412. Indeed, § 1255 imposes an admission re-
quirement twice over. Its principal provision states that an
applicant for LPR status must have been “inspected and ad-
mitted or paroled into the United States.” § 1255(a). And
another provision says that a person who has worked with-
out authorization in the country—as Sanchez did for several
years—may become an LPR only if his presence in the
United States is “pursuant to a lawful admission.”
§ 1255(k). Sanchez has never claimed that he can, without
3
Compare Sanchez v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 967
F. 3d 242, 245 (CA3 2020) (case below) (holding that such a person cannot
do so); Nolasco v. Crockett, 978 F. 3d 955, 959 (CA5 2020) (same); Serrano
v. United States Atty. Gen., 655 F. 3d 1260, 1265–1266 (CA11 2011) (per
curiam) (same), with Velasquez v. Barr, 979 F. 3d 572, 578 (CA8 2020)
(holding that he can); Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F. 3d 954, 958 (CA9 2017)
(same); Flores v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 718
F. 3d 548, 553–554 (CA6 2013).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 593 U. S. 409 (2021)
415
Opinion of the Court
aid from the TPS provision, satisfy those demands for admis-
si
on.
4
A straightforward application of § 1255 thus supports
the Government's decision to deny him LPR status.
And nothing in the conferral of TPS changes that result.
As noted earlier, a TPS recipient is “considered as being in,
and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant” for the pur-
pose of becoming an LPR. § 1254a(f )(4); see supra, at 412.
That provision ensures that, in applying for permanent resi-
dency, a TPS recipient will be treated as having nonimmigrant
status—even if, like Sanchez, he really does not. See
§ 1101(a)(15) (not including TPS recipients among the desig-
nated classes of “nonimmigrants”). It thus guarantees that
every TPS recipient has the status traditionally and generally
needed to invoke § 1255's adjustment process. See § 1255
(titled “[a]djustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of per-
son admitted for permanent residence” (boldface deleted)).
But the provision does not aid the TPS recipient in meeting
§ 1255's independent legal-entry requirement. Lawful sta-
tus and admission, as the court below recognized, are distinct
concepts in immigration law: Establishing one does not nec-
essarily establish the other. See supra, at 413–414. On the
one hand, a foreign national can be admitted but not in lawful
status—think of someone who legally entered the United
States on a student visa, but stayed in the country long past
graduation. On the other hand, a foreign national can be in
lawful status but not admitted—think of someone who en-
tered the country unlawfully, but then received asylum.
The latter is the situati on Sanchez is in, except that he
4
The Government notes that Sanchez was treated as “paroled” when he
returned from an authorized trip abroad after obtaining TPS. See Brief
for Respondents 15, n. 5. But Sanchez has never claimed that this treat-
ment made him eligible to adjust to LPR status under § 1255(a). That is
probably because the argument could not have mattered: § 1255(k) stands
as an independent prohibition on his invoking the LPR process. See
supra, at 412, n. 1. We express no view on whether a parole of the kind
Sanchez received enables a TPS recipient to become an LPR absent any
other bar in § 1255.
Page Proof Pending Publication

416 SANCHEZ
v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
received a different kind of lawful status. The TPS statute
per
mits him to remain in the country; and it deems him in
nonimmigrant status for purposes of applying to become an
LPR. But the statute does not constructively “admit” a
TPS recipient—that is, “consider[ ]” him as having entered
the country “after inspection and authorization.” § 1254a(f )
(4); § 1101(a)(13)(A). And because a grant of TPS does not
come with a ticket of admission, it does not eliminate the
disqualifying effect of an unlawful entry.
Sanchez resists this conclusion by asserting an “indis-
soluble relationship between admission and nonimmigrant
status.” Reply Brief 2 (emphasis in original). While con-
ceding that some forms of status (e. g., asylum) do not require
admission, Sanchez contends that nonimmigrant status al-
ways does: “One cannot obtain lawful nonimmigrant status
without admission.” Ibid. In support of that claim, San-
chez points to § 1184 of the immigration laws, entitled “[a]d-
mission of nonimmigrants.” And he asserts that it is impos-
sible to “identif[y] any category of individuals who are lawful
nonimmigrants but are not admitted—because no such cate-
gory exists.” Brief for Petitioners 20. So (Sanchez con-
cludes) when the law provides that a TPS recipient shall be
“considered . . . as a nonimmigrant” for purposes of § 1255, it
is necessarily saying that he shall also be considered as
admitted.
But to begin with, § 1184 does not (as Sanchez contends)
require admission for nonimmigrant status. That provision
states that “[t]he admission to the United States of any alien
as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such
conditions as the [Secretary of Homeland Security] may by
regulations prescribe.” § 1184(a)(1). The section also pro-
vides that a foreign national is “presumed to be an immi-
grant until” he establishes “at the time of application for ad-
mission” that “he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status.”
§ 1184(b). Section 1184 thus regulates the process for ad-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 593 U. S. 409 (2021)
417
Opinion of the Court
mitting foreign nationals as nonimmigrants. Suppose a for-
eig
n national wants to be admitted to the United States as a
university student—a kind of nonimmigrant. He should
look to § 1184 (among other provisions) to fnd out what that
will entail—what he must show and what that showing will
entitle him to. Why, though, does that matter? No one de-
nies that most foreign nationals obtain nonimmigrant status
through an admission. So there is naturally a section in the
immigration laws that specifes how that process works.
But nothing in § 1184 (or any other section) states that ad-
mission is a prerequisite of nonimmigrant status—or other-
wise said, that the former is a necessary incident of the lat-
ter. And that is what Sanchez needs. For without such an
“indissoluble” link, Reply Brief 2, there is no reason to view
the TPS provision's conferral of nonimmigrant status as also
a conferral of admission.
In fact, individuals in two immigration categories have
what Sanchez says does not exist: nonimmigrant status with-
out admission. The frst category is for “alien crewmen”—
foreign nationals who serve on board a vessel or aircraft.
§ 1101(a)(10). They receive nonimmigrant status when their
vessel or aircraft “land[s]” in the United States. § 1101(a)
(15)(D)(i). But still the law provides that they are not “con-
sidered to have been admitted.” § 1101(a)(13)(B). The sec-
ond category is for foreign nationals who have been the
victim of a serious crime in the United States and
can assist with the investigation. Those individuals may
receive nonimmigrant status even if they entered the coun-
try unlawfully—so even if they were not admitted. See
§§ 1101(a)(15)(U), 1182(d)(14). And § 1255 specifcally recog-
nizes that possibility. That section makes these so-called
“U” nonimmigrants eligible for LPR status if they were
either “admitted into the United States” or “otherwise pro-
vided nonimmigrant status.” § 1255(m)(1). There could
scarcely be a plainer statement of the daylight between non-

418 SANCHEZ
v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
immigrant status and admission (except maybe for the alien
crewmen
provision). And that plain statement comes in a
provision expressly enabling some unlawful entrants to ad-
just to LPR status. So when Congress does not speak in
that manner—when it confers status, but says nothing about
admission, for purposes of § 1255—we have no basis for rul-
ing an unlawful entrant eligible to become an LPR.
Sanchez objects that if the TPS provision confers only non-
immigrant status for § 1255, it accomplishes precious little.
See Reply Brief 11–13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. Less than he
would like, of course: It would not make him, or other TPS
recipients who entered the country unlawfully, LPR-eligible.
But some TPS recipients will beneft from the TPS provi-
sion's conferral of nonimmigrant status for purposes of
§ 1255. Recall that the provision gives all TPS recipients
the status typically required to invoke § 1255—that is, non-
immigrant status. See supra, at 415. Some TPS recipients
need exactly that assistance—without needing a construc-
tive admission. Consider, for example, a foreign national
who entered the country legally on a tourist visa, but stayed
on for several months after the visa's expiration. He can
satisfy § 1255's requirement of admission, but he founders in
showing nonimmigrant status. The TPS provision relieves
that diffculty and enables him to become an LPR. Con-
gress, of course, could have gone further, by deeming TPS
recipients to have not only nonimmigrant status but also a
lawful admission. Legislation pending in Congress would
do just that. See American Dream and Promise Act of 2021,
H. R. 6, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., § 203, p. 29 (introduced Mar.
3, 2021) (amending § 1254a(f )(4) so that a TPS recipient shall
be considered “as having been inspected and admitted into
the United States, and” as being in, and maintaining, lawful
status as a nonimmigrant” (emphasis added)). But even
without that amendment, the statute does something—and
this Court does not get to say that the something it does is
not enough.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 593 U. S. 409 (2021)
419
Opinion of the Court
III
Sec
tion 1255 generally requires a lawful admission before
a person can obtain LPR status. Sanchez was not lawfully
admitted, and his TPS does not alter that fact. He therefore
cannot become a permanent resident of this country. We
affrm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
Page Proof Pending Publication