San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L. P.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 593 U. S. Part 2
Pages 330–344
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 27, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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330 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, on behalf of itself
and
all other similarly situated TEXAS MUNIC-
IPALITIES v. HOTELS.COM, L. P., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 20–334. Argued April 21, 2021—Decided May 27, 2021
The City of San Antonio—acting on behalf of a class of 173 Texas
municipalities—was awarded a multi-million dollar judgment in Federal
District Court against a number of popular online travel companies
(OTCs) over the calculation of hotel occupancy taxes. To prevent exe-
cution on that judgment pending appeal, the OTCs obtained supersedeas
bonds securing the judgment. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 62. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals determined that the OTCs had not underpaid on
their taxes. In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
39(d), the OTCs fled with the circuit clerk a bill of costs seeking appel-
late docketing fees and printing costs, which were taxed without objec-
tion. The OTCs then fled a bill of costs in the District Court seeking
more than $2.3 million in costs—primarily for premiums paid on the
supersedeas bonds that are listed in Rule 39(e) as “taxable in the district
court for the beneft of the party entitled to costs.” San Antonio ob-
jected and urged the District Court to exercise its discretion to decline
to tax all or most of those costs. The District Court held that it had
no discretion to deny or reduce those costs under Circuit precedent.
The Court of Appeals affrmed, reasoning that the District Court lacked
discretion to deny or reduce appellate cost awards.
Held: Rule 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals'
allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that Rule. Pp. 336–344.
(a) Rule 39 creates a cohesive scheme for taxing appellate costs that
gives discretion over the allocation of appellate costs to the courts of
appeals. Rule 39(a) sets out default rules for cost allocation based on
the outcome of an appeal and provides that these default rules apply
unless the court “orders otherwise.” Nothing in the broad language of
Rule 39(a) suggests that a court of appeals may not divide up costs in
such an order. Quite the opposite, Rule 39(a)(4) suggests that a court
of appeals may apportion costs based on each party's relative success
when the results of the appeal are something other than complete af-
frmance or reversal. Rule 39(e) points in the same direction; it ad-
dresses appellate costs taxable in the district court for the beneft of

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Syllabus
“the party entitled to costs” under the rule (not to a party entitled to
seek
costs). The court of appeals' determination that a party is “enti-
tled” to a certain percentage of costs would mean little if the district
court could take a second look at the equities. San Antonio contends
that the plain text of subsection (e) providing for costs “taxable in the
district court” vests district courts with discretion over cost allocations,
but that interpretation reads too much into the term “taxable” and ig-
nores the history of the Rule. The real work done by the phrase “tax-
able in the district court” is in specifying the court in which these costs
are to be taxed. Pp. 336–340.
(b) The Court is not persuaded that applying the plain text of Rule
39 will create the problems that San Antonio envisions. First, award-
ing costs incurred prior to appeal is different from taxing appellate
costs. Limiting a district court's discretion to allocate appellate costs
will not cause confusion with the equitable discretion district courts
exercise with respect to certain costs incurred in the district court that
are customarily taxed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).
Second, there is no evidence to suggest that appellate courts have strug-
gled to allocate appellate costs due to factual disputes better handled
by the district court. And nothing in the Court's decision should be
read to cast doubt on the approach taken by some courts of appeals to
delegate this responsibility to the district court. See, e. g., Emmeneg-
ger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 324 F. 3d 616, 626. Third, it makes sense
for the district court to tax the costs in Rule 39(e) because those costs
relate to events in that court. This process requires more than a “min-
isterial order,” as San Antonio would have it, because the district court
will ensure that the amount of appellate costs requested is “correct,” 28
U. S. C. § 1924, and that the cost submissions otherwise comply with the
relevant rules and statutes. Finally, that the current rules and rele-
vant statutes could specify more clearly the procedure that a party
should follow to obtain review of their objections to Rule 39(e) costs in
the court of appeals does not mean that a district court can reallocate
those costs. A simple motion “for an order” under Rule 27 should suf-
fce to seek an order under Rule 39(a), and the Court does not foreclose
parties from raising their arguments through other procedural vehicles.
Pp. 340–344.
959 F. 3d 159, affrmed.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Daniel L. Geyser argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Gary Cruciani and Steven D. Wolens.

332 SAN
ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.
Opinion of the Court
David B. Salmons argued the cause for respondents.
W
ith him on the brief were Michael E. Kenneally, Thomas
M. Peterson, Elizabeth B. Herrington, Anne Marie Seibel,
Michael James Bentley, and David Keltner.*
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Civil litigation in the federal courts is often an expensive
affair, and each party, win or lose, generally bears many of
its own litigation expenses, including attorney's fees that
are subject to the so-called American Rule. Baker Botts
L. L. P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U. S. 121, 126 (2015). But
certain “costs” are treated differently. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 39 governs the taxation of appellate
“costs,” and the question in this case is whether a district
court has the discretion to deny or reduce those costs. We
hold that it does not and therefore affrm the judgment
below.
I
A
There is a longstanding tradition of awarding certain costs
other than attorney's fees to prevailing parties in the federal
courts. Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 377,
and n. 3 (2013); see, e. g., Winchester v. Jackson, 3 Cranch
514 (1806). Today, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39
sets out the procedure for assessing and taxing costs relating
to appeals. Subdivision (a) provides a series of default rules
that govern “unless the law provides or the court orders oth-
erwise.” Under these default rules:
*Br iefs of amic i cur i ae urg ing reversa l were filed for the United
States by Acting Solicitor General Prelogar, Acting Assistant Attorney
Gene ra l Bo yn t o n, De pu ty So l i c i t o r Gene ra l Ganno n, An tho ny A.
Yang, and Charles W. Scarborough; and for the National Association of
Counties et al. by Richard A. Simpson, Lisa E. Soronen, and F. Andrew
Hessick.
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“(1) if an appeal is dismissed, costs are taxed against
the
appellant, unless the parties agree otherwise;
“(2) if a judgment is affrmed, costs are taxed against
the appellant;
“(3) if a judgment is reversed, costs are taxed against
the appellee;
“(4) if a judgment is affrmed in part, reversed in part,
modifed, or vacated, costs are taxed only as the court
orders.”
The remaining subdivisions of the Rule deal with related
issues. Subdivision (b) limits costs for or against Federal
Government litigants to those “authorized by law.” Subdi-
vision (c) directs the courts of appeals to fx a maximum rate
for taxing the costs of briefs, appendices, and (where applica-
ble) the original record. Subdivision (d) provides the proce-
dure for seeking certain appellate costs, fling objections to
those costs, and preparing an itemized statement of costs
for insertion in the mandate. And subdivision (e) lists four
categories of “costs on appeal” that “are taxable in the dis-
trict court for the beneft of the party entitled to costs under
this rule.”
This case concerns one of the categories of costs that are
taxable in the district court under subdivision (e): “premiums
paid for a bond or other security to preserve rights pending
appeal.” Fed. Rule App. Proc. 39(e)(3). These costs arise
because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally stay
the execution or enforcement of a district court judgment
for only 30 days after its entry. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 62(a).
Unless a further stay is granted, the prevailing party can
attempt to execute on that judgment while an appeal is pend-
ing. See 12 J. Moore, D. Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, &
C. Varner, Moore's Federal Practice § 62.02 (3d ed. 2020). To
prevent complications arising from pre-appeal enforcement
of judgments, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b) provides
that a party “may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other
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334 SAN
ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.
Opinion of the Court
security.” These bonds are often called supersedeas bonds,
track
ing the name of a traditional writ that was used to stay
the execution of a legal judgment. See, e. g., Hardeman v.
Anderson, 4 How. 640, 642 (1846) (issuing a “writ of superse-
deas to stay execution on the judgment”). “A supersedeas
bond is a contract by which a surety obligates itself to pay a
fnal judgment rendered against its principal under the con-
ditions stated in the bond.” 13 A Cyclopedia of Federal Pro-
cedure § 62.19 (3d ed. Supp. 2021).
B
The cost dispute before us arises out of litigation between
the city of San Antonio—acting on behalf of a class of 173
Texas municipalities—and a number of popular online travel
companies (OTCs). In 2006, San Antonio alleged that the
OTCs had been systematically underpaying hotel occupancy
taxes by calculating them using the wholesale rate that the
OTCs negotiated with hotels rather than the retail rate that
consumers paid for hotel rooms. After a jury trial, the Dis-
trict Court entered a judgment of approximately $55 million
in favor of the class.
The OTCs quickly sought to secure supersedeas bonds to
stay the judgment. They negotiated with San Antonio over
the terms of the bonds, and the city ultimately supported the
OTCs' efforts to stay the judgment with supersedeas bonds
totaling almost $69 million, an amount that was calculated to
cover the judgment plus 18 months of interest and further
taxes. The District Court approved the bonds, which were
subsequently increased at San Antonio's urging to cover
what grew to be an $84 million judgment after years of post-
trial motions.
The OTCs eventually appealed, and the Court of Appeals
held that the OTCs had not underpaid the hotel occupancy
taxes. Its mandate stated: “[T]he judgment of the District
Court is vacated and rendered for OTCs.” App. 100. In
accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(d),
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the OTCs fled a bill of costs with the Circuit Clerk and re-
quested
$905.60 to cover the appellate docket fee and the
cost of printing their briefs and appendix. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 28a–30a. These items were taxed without objection.
See Rule 39(d)(2).
1
Back in the District Court, the OTCs fled a bill of costs
for more than $2.3 million. The lion's share of these costs
were supersedeas bond premiums. San Antonio objected,
urging the District Court to exercise its discretion and de-
cline to tax all or most of those costs. The city argued,
among other things, that the OTCs should have pursued al-
ternatives to a supersedeas bond and that it was unfair for
San Antonio to bear the costs for the entire class rather than
just its proportional share of the judgment. The District
Court thought San Antonio had made “some persuasive ar-
guments.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a. But based on Circuit
precedent, the court held that it lacked discretion “regarding
whether, when, to what extent, or to which party to award
costs of the appeal” and that “its sole responsibility [was]
to ensure that only proper costs are awarded.” Id., at 17a
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court ultimately
taxed costs of just over $2.2 million.
San Antonio appealed, and this time the Court of Appeals
affrmed. 959 F. 3d 159 (CA5 2020). It reasoned that its
earlier decision had “reversed” the District Court's judg-
ment within the meaning of Rule 39(a)(3) and that it had not
departed from the default allocation under that Rule. Id.,
at 164–165.
2
And the Court of Appeals held that the Dis-
trict Court was compelled to award the disputed costs to the
OTCs. Id., at 166–167.
1
Rule 39 has been amended since the Court of Appeals issued its frst
decision in this case. The changes are not material for our purposes here,
so for simplicity we cite the current version of the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure unless otherwise noted.
2
San Antonio does not challenge these features of the court's decision,
see, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 2, and we do not address them.
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ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.
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San Antonio sought this Court's review. We granted cer-
ti
orari, 592 U. S. ––– (2021), and now affrm.
II
We hold that Rule 39 does not permit a district court to
alter a court of appeals' allocation of the costs listed in subdi-
vision (e) of that Rule.
A
Rule 39 creates a cohesive scheme for taxing appellate
costs. As noted, it sets out default rules that are geared to
fve potential outcomes of an appeal: dismissal, affrmance,
reversal, affrmance in part and reversal in part, and vacatur.
Each of these default rules tracks the “venerable presump-
tion that prevailing parties are entitled to costs.” Marx,
568 U. S., at 377.
These default rules give way, however, when “the court
orders otherwise.” Rule 39(a). The parties agree that this
reference to “the court” means the court of appeals, not the
district court, see Brief for Petitioner 17–18; Brief for
Respondents 20–21, and we agree with that interpretation.
In the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which “govern proce-
dure in the United States courts of appeals,” Rule 1(a)(1),
references to a “court” are naturally read to refer to a
court of appeals unless the text or context clearly indicates
otherwise.
The parties do not agree, however, on what the court of
appeals has the power to “orde[r].” San Antonio thinks that
the appellate court may say “who can receive costs (party A,
party B, or neither)” but lacks “authority to divide up costs.”
Reply Brief 5. So, the city argues, the district court must
have the discretion to do that. By contrast, the OTCs argue
that the appellate court has the discretion to divide up the
costs as it deems appropriate and that a district court cannot
alter that allocation. The OTCs have the better of the
argument.
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The text of subdivision (a) cuts decisively in their favor.
That
provision states that the court of appeals need not fol-
low the default rules, which allocate costs based on the out-
come of the appeal, but can “orde[r] otherwise.” This broad
language does not limit the ways in which the court of ap-
peals can depart from the default rules, and it certainly does
not suggest that the court of appeals may not divide up costs.
On the contrary, the authority of a court of appeals to do
just that is strongly supported by the relationship between
the default rules and the court of appeals' authority to “order
otherwise.” For example, under Rule 39(a)(4), if a district
court judgment is affrmed in part and reversed in part,
“costs are taxed only as the court [of appeals] orders.” The
most natural meaning of this provision is that a court of ap-
peals may apportion costs in accordance with the parties'
relative success, so that if, for example, the appellant wins
what is essentially a 75% victory, the appellant can be
awarded 75% of its costs.
3
It would be strange to read this
provision to mean that the court of appeals' only option
where a reversal is not complete is to award the appellant
all its costs or no costs at all. Similarly, in cases that fall
under subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3), where the default rules
allocate 100% of the costs to the winning party, it is natural
to understand the court of appeals' authority to “order other-
wise” to include the authority to make a different allocation.
Subdivision (e), which concerns appellate costs that are
taxed in the district court, points in the same direction. It
refers to “the party entitled to costs under this rule.” Rule
3
Both parties recognize the familiar practice of awarding some propor-
tion of the costs to the winning party. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15, 44, 76; see,
e. g., Massachusetts Eye & Ear In frmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc.,
552 F. 3d 47, 75 (CA1 2009); In re New Times Securities Servs., Inc., 371
F. 3d 68, 88 (CA2 2004); Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F. 3d 951, 957
(CA9 1999); Quaker Action Group v. Andrus, 559 F. 2d 716, 719 (CADC
1977) (per curiam).
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ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.
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39(e) (emphasis added). Thus, if a party is awarded costs
under
subdivision (a), it is “entitled” to those costs—i. e., has
a right to obtain them and not merely to seek them—when
a proper application is made in the district court. See
Black's Law Dictionary 626 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“In its usual
sense, to entitle is to give a right or title”); see also Estate
of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 477 (1992)
(“Both in legal and general usage, the normal meaning of
entitlement includes a right or beneft for which a person
qualifes”).
Read properly, then, Rule 39 gives discretion over the allo-
cation of appellate costs to the courts of appeals. With that
settled, it is easy to see why district courts cannot exercise
a second layer of discretion. Suppose that a court of ap-
peals, in a case in which the district court's judgment is af-
frmed, awards the prevailing appellee 70% of its costs. If
the district court, in an exercise of its own discretion, later
reduced those costs by half, the appellee would receive only
35% of its costs—in direct violation of the court of appeals'
directions. Or suppose that the court of appeals, believing
that the decision below was plainly wrong, awards the pre-
vailing appellant 100% of its costs. It would subvert that
allocation if the district court declined to tax costs or sub-
stantially reduced them because it thought that there was at
least a very strong argument in favor of the decision that
the court of appeals had reversed—which, of course, was the
district court's own decision. In short, the court of appeals'
determination that a party is “entitled” to costs would mean
little if, as San Antonio believes, the district court could take
a second look at the equities.
San Antonio nonetheless maintains that the plain text of
subdivision (e) vests district courts with discretion over cost
allocations. That provision lists costs that “are taxable in
the district court for the beneft of the party entitled to costs
under this rule.” Rule 39(e) (emphasis added). As San An-
tonio notes, the word “taxable” can be used to describe some-

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thing that may, but need not necessarily, be taxed. See,
e.
g., Random House Dictionary of the English Language
1947 (2d ed. 1987) (defning “taxable” as “capable of being
taxed”); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2345
(1976) (same). And San Antonio argues that the use of this
“permissive” term shows that the district court has discre-
tion to refuse to award costs on equitable grounds. Brief
for Petitioner 15.
San Antonio reads too much into the term “taxable.” The
use of that term does suggest that the costs in question are
not automatically or necessarily taxed when the case returns
to the district court, but that may mean no more than that
the party seeking those costs will not get them unless it sub-
mits a bill of costs with the verifcation specifed by statute
and complies with any other procedural requirements that
the local rules of the court in question impose. See 28
U. S. C. §§ 1920, 1924.
This modest understanding of the use of the term “tax-
able” is reinforced by the circumstances under which the
term was added to Rule 39. Before 1998, subdivision (e) did
not provide that the listed costs “are taxable in the district
court,” but instead stated that those costs “shall be taxed in
the district court.” Rule 39(e) (1994). The language of
Rule 39 was changed in 1998 as part of a general “restyling ”
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note stated that the changes made as part of this
project were “intended to be stylistic only.” 28 U. S. C.
App., p. 804 (1994 ed., Supp. IV); see a lso C. Wr ight,
A. Miller, & C. Struve, Federal Practice and Procedure, In-
troduction, § 3946.1 (5th ed. Supp. 2021) (1998 restyling was
“not intended to make substantive changes”).
The real work done by the phrase “taxable in the district
court” is the specifcation of the court in which these costs
are to be taxed—that is, in the district court. Assigning
this work to the district court makes good sense. Under
Rule 39, costs incurred in the court of appeals, such as the
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ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.
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fee for docketing the case in that court and the cost of print-
i
ng the party's briefs and appendices, are taxed in the court
of appeals. See Rule 39(d). And the costs incurred in the
district court—that is, the costs listed in subdivision (e)—are
taxed in the district court. These are the costs attributable
to “the preparation and transmission of the record,” “the re-
porter's transcript, if needed to determine the appeal,” “pre-
miums paid for a bond or other security to preserve rights
pending appeal,” and “the fee for fling the notice of appeal.”
The nature of these costs makes it ftting for them to be
taxed in the district court. The frst enumerated cost—the
cost of “the preparation and transmission of the record”—
relates to the district court clerk, who has the responsibility
of per for mi ng those t asks. See Fed. Ru le App. Proc.
11(b)(2). The second category, the cost of “the reporter's
transcript,” concerns work done in the district court. See
Rule 10(b). The third category, “premiums paid for a bond
or other security to preserve rights pending appeal,” relates
to a matter previously approved by the district court. See
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 62(b). And the last category, “the fee
for fling the notice of appeal,” is an amount that was paid to
the district court clerk. See 28 U. S. C. § 1917.
For the reasons set out above, we hold that courts of ap-
peals have the discretion to apportion all the appellate costs
covered by Rule 39 and that district courts cannot alter
that allocation.
B
San Antonio offers a variety of practical arguments why
district courts should have the discretion to alter the alloca-
tion of appellate costs, but each of these arguments falls
away upon inspection.
First, San Antonio argues that any limits on a district
court's discretion are incompatible with the equitable discre-
tion district courts exercise with respect to certain costs in-
curred in the district court. Those costs are customarily
taxed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which
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“gives courts the discretion to award costs to prevailing
par
ties.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pacifc Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S.
560, 565 (2012); see also 28 U. S. C. § 1920 (“A judge or clerk
of any court of the United States may tax as costs the follow-
ing . . . ” (emphasis added)).
4
In San Antonio's view, it will
create confusion if a district court acting under Appellate
Rule 39(e) lacks the discretion it exercises under Civil Proce-
dure Rule 54(d).
We do not see why our interpretation will lead to confu-
sion. District courts have discretion in awarding costs in-
curred prior to appeal, but when they tax appellate costs,
they perform a different function. This interpretation quite
sensibly gives federal courts at each level primary discretion
over costs relating to their own proceedings. See th is
Court's Rule 43; Fed. Rule App. Proc. 39; Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 54.
Second, San Antonio contends that appellate courts are not
well-positioned to make cost allocations under Rule 39(a).
In its view, decisions about appellate costs might turn on
factual disputes that district courts are better able to re-
solve. For example, a party might suggest that taxing costs
against it would be unjust because of its precarious fnancial
position, and an opposing party might dispute that conten-
tion on factual grounds. San Antonio also contends that it
will be diffcult to allocate appellate costs equitably before
the amount of those costs is known.
These concerns are overblown. Most appellate costs are
readily estimable, rarely disputed, and frankly not large
4
As the United States points out, see Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 19, n. 4, we have interpreted Rule 54(d) to provide for taxing only
the costs already made taxable by statute, namely, 28 U. S. C. § 1920. See
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437, 441–442 (1987).
Supersedeas bond premiums, despite being referenced in Appellate Rule
39(e)(3), are not listed as taxable costs in § 1920. San Antonio has not
raised any argument that Rule 39 is inconsistent with § 1920 in this re-
spect. We accordingly do not consider this issue.
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ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.
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enough to engender contentious litigation in the great major-
ity
of cases. We recognize that supersedeas bond premiums
are a bit of an outlier in that they can grow quite large. See,
e. g., The Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 568 F. 3d 1077
(CA9 2009) (more than $60 million). But the underlying su-
persedeas bonds will often have been negotiated by the par-
ties, as happened here. They will in any event have been
approved by the district court, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 62(b),
and their premiums will have been paid by one of the parties
to the appeal. There is no reason to think that litigants and
courts will be forced to operate without any sense of the
magnitude of the costs at issue. Indeed, San Antonio admits
that it was largely aware of the costs of the bonds in this
case when they were approved, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 18.
Nor is there reason to think that factual disputes will
pose a recurring problem. Experience proves the point.
Rule 39's basic structure has been in place for more than 50
years. Compare Fed. Rule App. Proc. 39 with Rule 39
(1968). And the courts of appeals resolve tens of thousands
of cases each year. Admin. Offce of the U. S. Courts, Statis-
tical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, Table B–1 (Dec. 31,
2020) (counting 46,788 appeals terminated in 2020). Yet San
Antonio has not identifed any substantial number of cases
where cost allocations under Rule 39(a) have imposed real
diffculties. In sum, we see no evidence that appellate
courts have struggled to allocate costs in the past, and we
have no reason to anticipate new problems in the future.
In all events, if a court of appeals thinks that a district
court is better suited to allocate the appellate costs listed in
Rule 39(e), the court of appeals may delegate that responsi-
bility to the district court, as several Courts of Appeals have
done in the past. See, e. g., Emmenegger v. Bull Moose
Tube Co., 324 F. 3d 616, 626 (CA8 2003); Guse v. J. C. Penney
Co., 570 F. 2d 679, 681–682 (CA7 1978). The parties agree
that this pragmatic approach is permitted. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 15, 44. And nothing we say here should be read to cast
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doubt on it. See Rule 39(a) (imposing no direct limitations
on
the court's ability to “orde[r] otherwise”); Rule 41(a) (the
mandate includes “any direction about costs”).
Third, San Antonio contends that there would be no reason
for Rule 39(e) costs to be taxed in the district court, as op-
posed to the court of appeals, if the district court was sim-
ply required to enter “a ministerial order.” Brief for Peti-
tioner 17. But it makes sense for these costs to be taxed in
the district court because they relate to events in that court,
and the district court's responsibility is not ministerial. The
district court will ensure that the amount requested for the
appellate costs in question is “correct.” 28 U. S. C. § 1924.
In addition, the district court will consider whether the costs
were “necessarily” incurred, § 1924, to the extent that the
costs in question are taxable only if they were needed for
the appeal or to stay the district court's judgment pending
appeal. See Rule 39(e)(2) (cost of reporter's transcript tax-
able only “if needed to determine the appeal”). Other costs
taxable in the district court under Rule 39(e) are either fxed
(subdivision (e)(4): the fee for fling the notice of appeal); cal-
culated by the district court clerk (subdivision (e)(1): pre-
paration and transmission of the record); or concern a
matter already approved by the district court (subdivi-
sion (e)(3): supersedeas bond premiums; see Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 62(b)).
San Antonio, however, asked the District Court to do much
more. It implored the court to exercise a free-ranging form
of equitable discretion that would directly confict with the
equitable discretion of the Court of Appeals. See Brief for
Petitioner 20, n. 5 (outlining a wide range of equitable consid-
erations). And it invited the District Court to deny or re-
duce for equitable reasons the bona fde costs that the OTCs
had paid as premiums for supersedeas bonds that were
known and negotiated by San Antonio and were approved by
the District Court without objection under Rule 62. The
lower courts were correct to hold that the District Court

344 SAN
ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.
Opinion of the Court
lacked the authority to entertain San Antonio's broad, equi-
t
able arguments.
Finally, San Antonio worries that parties will be unable to
obtain review of their objections to Rule 39(e) costs if the
district court cannot provide relief after the matter returns
to that court. We agree that the current Rules and the rele-
vant statutes could specify more clearly the procedure that
such a party should follow to bring their arguments to the
court of appeals, but this does not lead to the conclusion that
a district court can reallocate those costs.
Rule 27 sets forth a generally applicable procedure for
seeking relief in a court of appeals, and a simple motion “for
an order” under Rule 27 should suffce to seek an order
under Rule 39(a). Compare Fed. Rule App. Proc. 39(a)
(“The following rules apply unless . . . the court orders other-
wise”) with Rule 27(a) (“An application for an order . . . is
made by motion unless these rules prescribe another form”).
The OTCs also identify instances where parties have raised
their arguments through other procedural vehicles, including
merits briefng, see Rule 28, objections to a bill of costs, see
Rule 39(d)(2), and petitions for rehearing, see Rule 40.
Brief for Respondents 42, nn. 9–11. We do not foreclose liti-
gants from raising their arguments in any manner consistent
with the relevant federal and local Rules.
In short, we are not persuaded that applying the plain text
of Rule 39 will create the practical problems that San Anto-
nio envisions.
***
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
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