Guam v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 593 U. S. Part 2
Pages 310–320
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 24, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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310 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
TERRITORY OF GUAM v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 20–382. Argued April 26, 2021—Decided May 24, 2021
Guam and the United States dispute liability for environmental hazards at
the Ordot Dump, a site constructed on the island by the Navy in the
1940s and into which both parties allegedly have deposited waste over
the decades. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Guam
entered into a consent decree in 2004 that resolved litigation fled by
the EPA alleging violations of the Clean Water Act. The decree in
relevant part required Guam to pay a civil penalty and to take certain
actions at the dump, and also stated that Guam's compliance would con-
stitute full settlement and satisfaction of the civil claims of the United
States as alleged in the EPA's complaint (i. e., claims under the Clean
Water Act). More than a decade later, Guam sued the United States
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), alleging that the United States' use of
the dump exposed it to two possible actions under the Act. The frst
was a “cost-recovery” action under § 107(a), which allows recovery of
the costs of a “removal or remedial action” from “any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facil-
ity at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.” The second
was a “contribution” action under § 113(f ), which provides that a party
that “has resolved its liability to the United States . . . for some or all
of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in [a]
settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not [already]
party to a [qualifying] settlement.” § 113(f )(3)(B). The D. C. Circuit
rejected Guam's CERCLA claims against the United States. The court
determined that although Guam had once possessed a CERCLA contri-
bution claim based on the 2004 consent decree that suffciently “resolved
Guam's liability” for the dump, that claim was time barred. The court
further held that a party eligible to pursue a contribution claim under
§ 113(f ) cannot assert a cost-recovery claim under § 107(a), leaving Guam
no CERCLA remedy. As relevant here, Guam now contends that the
2004 consent decree did not give rise to a viable CERCLA contribution
claim, leaving Guam free to pursue a cost-recovery action. The case
turns on whether CERCLA authorizes a contribution claim only when
a party resolves a CERCLA-specifc liability or whether settlement of
environmental liabilities under other laws will do.

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311
Syllabus
Held: A settlement of environmental liabilities must resolve a CERCLA-
speci
fc liability to give rise to a contribution action under § 113(f )(3)(B).
The Court interprets § 113(f )(3)(B) in light of its text and place within
CERCLA's comprehensive statutory scheme. Section 113(f )'s inter-
locking provisions governing the scope of a contribution claim, taken
together and in sequence, anticipate a predicate CERCLA liability.
See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. –––, –––. Section 113(f )'s
anchor provision—entitled “contribution”—explains the scope of contri-
bution actions with reference to CERCLA's other provisions, allowing
contribution “during or following any civil action under [§] 106 of this
title or under [§] 107” of this title. § 113(f )(1). The provision at issue
here—recognizing a statutory right to contribution in the specifc cir-
cumstance where a person “has resolved its liability” via “settlement,”
§ 113(f )(3)(B)—exists within “ `the specifc context' ” of § 113(f ), which
outlines the broader workings of CERCLA contribution. Merit Man-
agement Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U. S. 366, 378. Section
113(f )(3)(B)'s opening clause further ties itself to the CERCLA regime
by permitting contribution after a party “has resolved its liability . . .
for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of
such action.” (Emphasis added.) The anchor provision also discusses
allocation of “response costs,” and the phrase “response action” appears
dozens of times throughout the Act. That remedial measures under
different environmental statutes might functionally overlap with a
CERCLA response action does not justify reinterpreting § 113(f )(3)(B)'s
phrase “resolved its liability . . . for some or all of a response action” to
instead mean “settled an environmental liability that might have been
actionable under CERCLA.” Interpreting § 113(f )(3)(B) to authorize a
contribution right for a host of environmental liabilities arising under
other laws would stretch the statute beyond Congress' actual language.
And because the word “resolve” conveys certainty and fnality, it would
be odd to interpret § 113(f )(3)(B) as referring to a party that has “re-
solved its liability” if that party remains vulnerable to a CERCLA suit.
The most natural reading of § 113(f )(3)(B) is that a party may seek con-
tribution under CERCLA only after settling a CERCLA-specifc liabil-
ity, as opposed to resolving environmental liability under some other
law. The Government's contrary arguments fail given § 113(f )(3)(B)'s
place in CERCLA's comprehensive statutory scheme. Pp. 315–320.
950 F. 3d 104, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Leevin T. Camacho, Attorney General

312 GU
AM v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
of Guam, James L. Canto II, Deputy Attorney General,
Ro
man Martinez, Bezalel Stern, John D. S. Gilmour, and
William J. Jackson.
Vivek Suri argued the cause for the United States. With
him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Prelogar,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Williams, Deputy Solic-
itor General Stewart, Jennifer Scheller Neumann, Evelyn
Ying, and Rachel Heron.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sati on, and Liabi l ity Ac t of 1980, commonly known as
CERCLA, establishes a complex statutory scheme for re-
sponding to certain environmental hazards. 94 Stat. 2767,
as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 9601 et seq. Several of its provi-
sions address what is often the crucial question in a remedial
action: Who pays?
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands et al. by Edward E. Manibusan,
Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands, Lillian A. Tenorio,
Deputy Attorney General, J. Robert Glass, Jr., Chief Solicitor, Alison M.
Nelson, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph S. Diedrich, Eric M. McLeod,
and David A. Lopez, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
jurisdictions as follows: Treg R. Taylor of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge of Ar-
kansas, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Karl A. Racine of the District of
Columbia, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho,
Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller
of Iowa, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana
Nessel of Michigan, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Aaron D. Ford of
Nevada, Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Balderas of New Mexico,
Wayne Steneh jem of North Dakota, David A. Yost of Ohio, Ellen F. Rosen-
blum of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Jason R. Ravnsborg
of South Dakota, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Mark R. Herring of Virginia,
Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; and for
ConservAmerica Inc. by John A. Sheehan.
Shannon Wells Stevenson, Kenzo S. Kawanabe, Elisabeth S. Theodore,
and Stephen K. Wirth fled a brief for Atlantic Richfeld Co. as amicus
curiae.
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Opinion of the Court
Today's case involves § 113(f )(3)(B) of the Act,
1
wh
ich
allows “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United
States or a State” in a settlement to seek “contribution”—
that is, money from another responsible individual. The
question is whether a party must resolve a CERCLA-specifc
liability in order to trigger this right, or whether a broader
array of settlements involving environmental liability will
do. We hold that CERCLA contribution requires resolution
of a CERCLA-specifc liability.
I
Guam and the United States are engaged in a long-running
dispute over the Ordot Dump, a “ `280-foot mountain of
trash' ” near the center of the island. 950 F. 3d 104, 109
(CADC 2020). The Navy constructed the dump in the
1940s, and then allegedly deposited toxic military waste
there for several decades. The United States later ceded
control of the site to Guam, which itself used the dump as a
public landfll. But that did not end the Federal Govern-
ment's involvement. In the late 20th century, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that the dump
posed an ecological hazard. After Guam allegedly failed to
comply with agency directives to remediate the site, the
EPA sued under the Clean Water Act, asserting that Guam
was “ `discharging pollutants . . . into waters of the United
States without obtaining a permit.' ” Ibid.
That litigation ended in 2004, when Guam and the EPA
entered into a consent decree. The decree required Guam,
among other things, to pay a civil penalty and to close and
cover the dump. Guam's compliance would, in turn, be “in
full settlement and satisfaction of the civil judicial claims of
the United States . . . as alleged in the Complaint”—that is,
1
For the sake of simplicity, we cite CERCLA's provisions as they appear
in the Act itself. The most relevant corresponding sections of Title 42
of the U. S. Code are § 9607 (§ 107 of CERCLA) and § 9613 (§ 113 of
CERCLA).

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AM v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
claims under the Clean Water Act. Id., at 116. But Guam
was
not completely free. As the agreement explained, “the
United States d[id] not waive any rights or remedies avail-
able to it for any violation by the Government of Guam of
federal and territorial laws and regulations,” “[e]xcept as
specifcally provided [i]n [the decree].” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 166a.
Thirteen years later, it was Guam's turn to sue—this
time under CERCLA. According to Guam's complaint, the
United States' earlier use of the dump exposed it to liability
on two fronts. The frst was a cost-recovery action under
§ 107(a), which allows a State (or here, a Territory), to re-
cover “all costs of [a] removal or remedial action” from “any
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazard-
ous substances were disposed of.” See also § 101(27). The
second was a § 113(f ) “contribution” action. Under that pro-
vision, a “person who has resolved its liability to the United
States . . . for some or all of a response action or for some
or all of the costs of such action in [a] settlement may seek
contribution from any person who is not [already] party to a
[qualifying] settlement.” § 113(f )(3)(B).
Rather than increase Guam's odds of recovery, however,
the second legal theory led to the dismissal of its complaint.
According to the D. C. Circuit, if a party can assert a contri-
bution claim under § 113(f ), it cannot assert a cost-recovery
claim under § 107(a). See 950 F. 3d, at 111. The court then
determined that Guam possessed a contribution claim—at
least at one point—because the remedial measures and con-
ditional release in the Clean Water Act decree suffciently
“ `resolved Guam's liability' ” for the dump. Id., at 114–117
(brackets omitted). But because the 2004 decree had trig-
gered the since-expired 3-year statute of limitations for
contribution actions, Guam had no remedy at all. Id., at
107, 117; see also § 113(g)(3). We granted certiorari. 592
U. S. ––– (2021).

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Opinion of the Court
II
Guam
now attacks two links in this chain of reasoning:
First, Guam retreats from its complaint and argues that it
never had a viable contribution claim under § 113(f ), leaving
it free to pursue a cost-recovery action under § 107(a). The
reason, argues Guam, is that a contribution claim arises only
if a settlement resolves liability under CERCLA, and not
under some other law such as the Clean Water Act. Second,
Guam contends that even if resolution of a non-CERCLA
liability is enough, the decree did not adequately “resolve”
any sort of liability because Guam did not formally admit
responsibility and because the agreement left Guam open to
future enforcement action.
We need only address the frst point to decide this case.
2
A settlement must resolve a CERCLA liability to trigger a
contribution action under § 113(f )(3)(B).
Our analysis focuses on the totality of subsection 113(f ),
which governs the scope of a “contribution” claim under
CERCLA. This subsection begins with an anchor provi-
sion—entitled “contribution”—that allows “[a]ny person [to]
seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 107(a) of [CERCLA], dur-
ing or following any civil action under section 106 of
[CERCLA] or under sec ti on 107(a) of [CERCLA]. ”
§ 113(f )(1). It next describes how parties can insulate them-
selves from contribution, explaining that “[a] person who has
resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be
liable for claims for contribution regarding matters ad-
dressed in the settlement.” § 113(f )(2). And fnally, it dis-
cusses the treatment of “[p]ersons not party to [a] settle-
ment.” § 113(f )(3). Most relevant here, “[a] person who has
resolved its liability to the United States . . . for some or all
2
Guam has not challenged other portions of the lower court's reasoning,
so we express no opinion on them.
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AM v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such
ac
tion in an administrative or judicially approved settlement
may seek contribution from any person who is not party to
a settlement referred to in [§ 113(f )(2)].” § 113(f )(3)(B).
That this subsection centers on and is entitled “contribu-
tion” is the frst clue that it is concerned only with the distri-
bution of CERCLA liability. A contribution suit does not
exist in a vacuum, but rather is a tool for apportioning the
burdens of a predicate “common liability” among the respon-
sible parties. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551
U. S. 128, 138–139 (2007); see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 86–87 (1981). The most
obvious place to look for that threshold liability is CERCLA's
reticulated statutory matrix of environmental duties and lia-
bilities. Cf. Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States,
556 U. S. 599, 610 (2009) (“[Section 107(a)(3)] liability may
not extend beyond the limits of the statute itself ”). After
all, “[s]tatutes must `be read as a whole,' ” Atlantic Research,
551 U. S., at 135—an especially salient approach in this case
given that CERCLA's very title reinforces that it is a “Com-
prehensive” Act.
Remaining within the bounds of CERCLA is also consist-
ent with the familiar principle that a federal contribution
action is virtually always a creature of a specifc statutory
regime. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U. S., at 90–91, 95–97
(noting a “narrow exception” for admiralty cases). In fact,
there is no “general federal right to contribution” whatso-
ever. Id., at 96; cf. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 13–15 (1981)
(refusing to “assum[e] that Congress intended to authorize
by implication additional judicial remedies for private citi-
zens suing under [two environmental statutes]”). That mod-
est understanding is diffcult to reconcile with the United
States' invitation to treat § 113(f )(3)(B) as a free-roving con-
tribution right for a host of environmental liabilities arising
under other laws.
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The interlocking language and structure of the relevant
text
confrm this understanding. The provision at issue
here—§ 113(f )(3)(B)—recognizes a statutory right to contri-
bution in the specifc circumstance where a person “has
resolved its liability” via “settlement.” But as explained
above, this entitlement to postsettlement contribution does
not stand alone. On the contrary, § 113(f )(3)(B) exists within
“ `the specifc context' ” of subsection (f ), which outlines the
broader workings of CERCLA contribution. Merit Man-
agemen t G ro up, LP v. FTI Co n sul t ing, Inc., 583 U. S.
366, 378 (2018).
This § 113(f ) family of contribution provisions anticipates
a predicate CERCLA liability, especially when properly read
in “sequenc[e]” as “ `integral parts of a whole.' ” New Prime
Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019); see also Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 167
(2004) (looking to “the whole of § 113”). The § 113(f )(1) an-
chor provision is especially clear on this point, allowing con-
tribution “during or following any civil action under [§] 106
of this title or under [§] 107 of this title.” See also 543 U. S.,
at 166 (“The natural meaning of [§ 113(f )(1)] is that contribu-
tion may only be sought . . . `during or following ' a specifed
civil action”). And though §§ 113(f )(2) and 113(f )(3) are not
quite as explicit, their phrasing and context still presume
that a CERCLA liability is necessary to trigger contribution.
Section 113(f )(2), for example, explains that a settlement
by one party “does not discharge any of the other potentially
liable persons unless its terms so provide.” (Emphasis
added.) The highlighted phrase is a “natural referent” to
the text of the anchor provision, United States v. Briggs,
592 U. S. –––, ––– (2020), which creates a CERCLA-specifc
contribution right against “any other person who is liable
or potentially liable under [§] 107 of [CERCLA],” § 113(f )(1)
(emphasis added).
Section 113(f )(3)(B)—the provision at issue here—also has
language that is best “understood only with reference” to the

318 GU
AM v. UNITED STATES
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CERCLA regime. Atlantic Research, 551 U. S., at 135; see
a
lso Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U. S. 424, 438 (2016). The provi-
sion's fnal clause explains that contribution is available
“from any person who is not party to a settlement refer-
red to in [§ 113(f )(2)].” As discussed above, § 113(f )(2) in
turn mirrors the § 113(f )(1) anchor provision that requires a
predicate CERCLA liability. Section 113(f )(3)(B)'s opening
clause separately ties itself to the CERCLA regime by per-
mitting contribution after a party “has resolved its liability
. . . for some or all of a response action or for some or all of
the costs of such action.” (Emphasis added.) Not only
does the anchor provision also discuss allocation of “re-
sponse costs,” § 113(f )(1), but the phrase “response action”
is a familiar CERCLA phrase that appears dozens of times
throughout the Act. E. g., § 101 (12 appearances); § 107 (17
appearances).
To be sure, as the Government points out, remedial meas-
ures that a party takes under another environmental statute
might resemble steps taken in a formal CERCLA “response
action.” But relying on that functional overlap to reinter-
pret the phrase “resolved its liability . . . for some or all of a
response action” to mean “settled an environmental liability
that might have been actionable under CERCLA” would
stretch the statute beyond Congress' actual language.
Perhaps more important, the Government's interpretation
would place undue stress on the word “resolve.” This term
conveys certainty and fnality. See Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1933 (1986) (“make clear or cer-
tain”); American Heritage Dictionary 1107 (1981) (“remove
or dispel (doubts); . . . bring to a conclusion”).
3
It would be
3
See also § 113(f )(2) (“A person who has resolved its liability [in a] set-
tlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters
addressed in the settlement” (emphasis added)); United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp., 551 U. S. 128, 141 (2007) (“[S]ettlement [under § 113(f )(2)]
carries the inherent beneft of fnally resolving liability as to the United
States or a State” (emphasis added)).
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Opinion of the Court
rather odd to say that a party has “resolved its liability” if
that
party remains vulnerable to a CERCLA suit. All the
more so given that it will not always be clear whether the
substance of a prior environmental settlement was suff-
ciently similar to a quasi-CERCLA “response action.” As
even the Government admits, “ `response action' is, indeed, a
broad term, [but] it is not an unlimited term [that covers]
everything under the sun.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 39–40; cf. 950
F. 3d, at 116 (comparing Guam's obligations under the Clean
Water Act decree to CERCLA's “defnition of a `remedial
action' ”). Rather than requiring parties and courts to
estimate whether a prior settlement was close enough to
CERCLA, the far simpler approach is to ask whether a set-
tlement expressly discharged a CERCLA liability.
4
No more persuasive are the United States' efforts to em-
phasize the differences among § 113(f )'s provisions. The
Gover nment observes that § 113(f )(3)(B)—unl ike the
§ 113(f )(1) anchor provision—does not expressly demand a
predicate CERCLA action. That distinction, so the argu-
ment goes, implies that a broader range of environmental
liabilities can trigger § 113(f )(3)(B). See Russello v. United
States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“ `[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the dis-
parate inclusion or exclusion' ”). But this effort to tear
§ 113(f )(3)(B) away from its companions based on a negative
implication falters in light of the other strong textual links
among them. See Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S.
4
This straightforward inquiry has the additional “beneft” of “provid-
[ing] clarity” for the 3-year statute of limitations. United States v.
Briggs, 592 U. S. –––, ––– (2020). If a broad, textually undefned set of
environmental settlements could start the clock on a § 113(f )(3)(B) contri-
bution action, a party who did not realize that his non-CERCLA settle-
ment overlaps with a hypothetical CERCLA response action might fail to
sue in time.
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AM v. UNITED STATES
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371, 381 (2013); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U. S.
208,
222 (2009). Section 113(f )(3)(B)'s use of the familiar
phrase “response action,” express cross-reference to another
CERCLA provision, and placement in the statutory scheme
prevent us from so easily severing it from the larger Act.
Similarly unavailing is the Government's theory that a
tightly unifed interpretation of these provisions would cre-
ate surplusage problems. The United States argues, for
example, that a reading of § 113(f )(3)(B) that does nothing
more than allow a party to seek contribution after settling a
CERCLA liability would be redundant with § 113(f )(1),
which already permits contribution “during or following any
civil action under [§§ 106 and 107].” But there is legitimate
reason for separate provisions, even if both allow contribu-
tion only for a CERCLA liability. For example, § 113(f )
(3)(B) specifes the consequences of a particular type of reso-
lution (i. e., settlement), explaining that an “administrative
or judicially approved settlement” is suffcient and reinforc-
ing that a contribution claim will not extend to parties who
have already settled. This sort of belt-and-suspenders ap-
proach hardly compels an all-encompassing reading of
§ 113(f )(3)(B). Cf. Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.,
586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (“We have recognized that some
redundancy is hardly unusual in statutes addressing costs”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather than try “to
avoid surplusage at all costs,” Atlantic Research, 551 U. S.,
at 137, we interpret § 113(f )(3)(B) in light of its text and place
within a comprehensive statutory scheme.
***
The most natural reading of § 113(f )(3)(B) is that a party
may seek contribution under CERCLA only after settling a
CERCLA-specifc liability. We thus reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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