Caniglia v. Strom

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1
Pages 194–208
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 17, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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194 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
CANIGLIA v. STROM et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the rst circuit
No. 20–157. Argued March 24, 2021—Decided May 17, 2021
During an argument with his wife, petitioner Edward Caniglia placed a
handgun on the dining room table and asked his wife to “shoot [him]
and get it over with.” His wife instead left the home and spent the
night at a hotel. The next morning, she was unable to reach her hus-
band by phone, so she called the police to request a welfare check. The
responding offcers accompanied Caniglia's wife to the home, where they
encountered Caniglia on the porch. The offcers called an ambulance
based on the belief that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Ca-
niglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation on the
condition that the offcers not confscate his frearms. But once Caniglia
left, the offcers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claim-
ing that the offcers had entered his home and seized him and his fre-
arms without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
District Court granted summary judgment to the offcers. The First
Circuit affrmed, extrapolating from the Court's decision in Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, a theory that the offcers' removal of Canig-
lia and his frearms from his home was justifed by a “community care-
taking exception” to the warrant requirement.
Held: Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justifes such warrantless
searches and seizures in the home. Cady held that a warrantless search
of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured frearm did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
the offcers who patrol the “public highways” are often called to dis-
charge noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” such as respond-
ing to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. 413 U. S., at 441.
But searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different, as the
Cady opinion repeatedly stressed. Id., at 439, 440–442. The very core
of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee is the right of a person to retreat
into his or her home and “there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6. A recognition of the
existence of “community caretaking ” tasks, like rendering aid to motor-
ists in disabled vehicles, is not an open-ended license to perform them
anywhere. Pp. 197–199.
953 F. 3d 112, vacated and remanded.

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Cite
as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021)
195
Syllabus
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Roberts,
C
. J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 199.
Alito, J., post, p. 200, and Kavanaugh, J., post, p. 204, fled concurring
opinions.
Shay Dvoretzky argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Jonathan L. Marcus, Emily J. Ken-
nedy, Thomas W. Lyons, and Rhiannon S. Huffman.
Marc DeSisto argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Michael A. DeSisto, Rebecca Tedford
Partington, Kathleen M. Daniels, and Jonathan A. Herstoff.
Morgan L. Ratner argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With her on the brief
were Acting Solicitor General Prelogar, Acting Assistant
Attorney General McQuaid, Deputy Solicitor General Fei-
gin, and Ross B. Goldman.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Association of Suicidology by Christopher S. Gontarz and Kelly M. Fra-
cassa; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Lisa S. Blatt,
Charles L. McCloud, Clark M. Neily III, Ilya Shapiro, David D. Cole,
Ezekiel Edwards, and Lynette Labinger; for the Constitutional Account-
ability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, David H. Gans,
and Brian R. Frazelle; for the Firearms Policy Coalition et al. by Joseph
G. S. Greenlee and David B. Kopel; for Gun Owners of America, Inc., et al.
by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, and Herbert
W. Titus; for the Institute for Justice by Joshua Windham and Robert
Frommer; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.
by Joshua L. Dratel; for The Rutherford Institute by Michael J. Lockerby,
George E. Quillin, and John W. Whitehead; for the Second Amendment
Foundation by Donald E. J. Kilmer, Jr.; and for the Second Amendment
Law Center, Inc., et al. by Stephen P. Halbrook, C. D. Michel, Anna M.
Barvir, and Matthew D. Cubeiro.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Iowa et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Melissa Holyoak,
Solicitor General, Thomas B. Brunker, Deputy Solicitor General, David
Simpson, Assistant Solicitor General, and Jeffrey S. Gray, and by the At-
torneys General for their respective States as follows: Thomas J. Miller
of Iowa, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Austin

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196 CANIGLIA
v. STROM
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
D
ecades ago, this Court held that a warrantless search of
an impounded vehicle for an unsecured frearm did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U. S. 433 (1973). In reaching this conclusion, the Court ob-
served that police offcers who patrol the “public highways”
are often called to discharge noncriminal “community care-
taking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles or
investigating accidents. Id., at 441. The question today is
whether Cady's acknowledgment of these “caretaking ” du-
ties creates a standalone doctrine that justifes warrantless
searches and seizures in the home. It does not.
I
During an argument with his wife at their Rhode Island
home, Edward Caniglia (petitioner) retrieved a handgun
from the bedroom, put it on the dining room table, and asked
his wife to “shoot [him] now and get it over with.” She de-
clined, and instead left to spend the night at a hotel. The
next morning, when petitioner's wife discovered that she
could not reach him by telephone, she called the police (re-
spondents) to request a welfare check.
Respondents accompanied petitioner's wife to the home,
where they encountered petitioner on the porch. Petitioner
spoke with respondents and confrmed his wife's account of
the argument, but denied that he was suicidal. Respond-
ents, however, thought that petitioner posed a risk to himself
or others. They called an ambulance, and petitioner agreed
Knudsen of Montana, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South
Carolina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, and Ken Paxton of Texas;
and for the National Association of Counties et al. by John J. Korzen and
Lisa Soronen.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Pacifc Legal Foundation by
Daniel Woislaw and Steven M. Simpson; and for the Project for Privacy &
Surveillance Accountability et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, Han-
nah C. Smith, Kathryn E. Tarbert, Scott D. Goodwin, and Mahesha
P. Subbaraman.

Cite
as: 593 U. S. 194 (2021)
197
Opinion of the Court
to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation—but only
af
ter respondents allegedly promised not to confscate his
frearms. Once the ambulance had taken petitioner away,
however, respondents seized the weapons. Guided by pe-
titioner's wife—whom they allegedly misinformed about
his wishes—respondents entered the home and took two
handguns.
Petitioner sued, claiming that respondents violated the
Fourth Amendment when they entered his home and seized
him and his frearms without a warrant. The District Court
granted summary judgment to respondents, and the First
Circuit affrmed solely on the ground that the decision to
remove petitioner and his frearms from the premises fell
within a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant
requirement. 953 F. 3d 112, 121–123, 131, and nn. 5, 9 (2020).
Citing this Court's statement in Cady that police offcers
often have noncriminal reasons to interact with motorists on
“public highways,” 413 U. S., at 441, the First Circuit extrap-
olated a freestanding community-caretaking exception that
applies to both cars and homes. 953 F. 3d, at 124 (“Threats
to individual and community safety are not confned to the
highways”). Accordingly, the First Circuit saw no need to
consider whether anyone had consented to respondents' ac-
tions; whether these actions were justifed by “exigent cir-
cumstances”; or whether any state law permitted this kind
of mental-health intervention. Id., at 122–123. All that
mattered was that respondents' efforts to protect petitioner
and those around him were “distinct from `the normal work
of criminal investigation,' ” fell “within the realm of reason,”
and generally tracked what the court viewed to be “sound
police procedure.” Id., at 123–128, 132–133. We granted
certiorari. 592 U. S. ––– (2020).
II
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
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198 CANIGLIA
v. STROM
Opinion of the Court
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The “ `very
core'
” of this guarantee is “ `the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion.' ” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6
(2013).
To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all
unwelcome intrusions “on private property,” ibid.—only “un-
reasonable” ones. We have thus recognized a few permissi-
ble invasions of the home and its curtilage. Perhaps most
familiar, for example, are searches and seizures pursuant
to a valid warrant. See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S.
–––, ––– – ––– (2018). We have also held that law enforce-
ment offcers may enter private property without a warrant
when certain exigent circumstances exist, including the need
to “ `render emergency assistance to an injured occupant
or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.' ” Ken-
tucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 470 (2011); see also Brig-
ham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403–404 (2006) (listing
other examples of exigent circumstances). And, of course,
offcers may generally take actions that “ `any private citi-
zen might do' ” without fear of liability. E. g., Jardines, 569
U. S., at 8 (approaching a home and knocking on the front
door).
The First Circuit's “community caretaking ” rule, however,
goes beyond anything this Court has recognized. The deci-
sion below assumed that respondents lacked a warrant or
consent, and it expressly disclaimed the possibility that they
were reacting to a crime. The court also declined to con-
sider whether any recognized exigent circumstances were
present because respondents had forfeited the point. Nor
did it fnd that respondents' actions were akin to what a pri-
vate citizen might have had authority to do if petitioner's
wife had approached a neighbor for assistance instead of
the police.
Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justifed that ap-
proach. True, Cady also involved a warrantless search for
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199
Roberts, C. J., concurring
a frearm. But the location of that search was an impounded
veh
icle—not a home—“ `a constitutional difference' ” that the
opinion repeatedly stressed. 413 U. S., at 439; see also id.,
at 440–442. In fact, Cady expressly contrasted its treat-
ment of a vehicle already under police control with a search
of a car “parked adjacent to the dwelling place of the owner.”
Id., at 446–448 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S.
443 (1971)).
Cady's unmistakable distinction between vehicles and
homes also places into proper context its reference to “com-
munity caretaking.” This quote comes from a portion of the
opinion explaining that the “frequency with which . . . vehi-
cle[s] can become disabled or involved in . . . accident[s] on
public highways” often requires police to perform noncrimi-
nal “community caretaking functions,” such as providing aid
to motorists. 413 U. S., at 441. But, this recognition that
police offcers perform many civic tasks in modern society
was just that—a recognition that these tasks exist, and not
an open-ended license to perform them anywhere.
***
What is reasonable for vehicles is different from what is
reasonable for homes. Cady acknowledged as much, and
this Court has repeatedly “declined to expand the scope of
. . . exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit war-
rantless entry into the home.” Collins, 584 U. S., at
–––. We thus vacate the judgment below and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Breyer
joins, concurring.
Fifteen years ago, this Court unanimously recognized that
“[t]he role of a peace offcer includes preventing violence and
restoring order, not simply rendering frst aid to casualties.”
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200 CANIGLIA
v. STROM
Alito, J., concurring
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 406 (2006). A war-
rant
to enter a home is not required, we explained, when
there is a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured
or threatened with such injury.” Id., at 403; see also Michi-
gan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam) (warrant-
less entry justifed where “there was an objectively reason-
able basis for believing that medical assistance was needed,
or persons were in danger” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Nothing in today's opinion is to the contrary, and I
join it on that basis.
Justice Alito, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to ex-
plain my understanding of the Court's holding and to high-
light some important questions that the Court does not
decide.
1. The Court holds—and I entirely agree—that there is
no special Fourth Amendment rule for a broad category of
cases involving “community caretaking.” As I understand
the term, it describes the many police tasks that go beyond
criminal law enforcement. These tasks vary widely, and
there is no clear limit on how far they might extend in the
future. The category potentia l ly i ncludes any non-
law-enforcement work that a community chooses to assign,
and because of the breadth of activities that may be de-
scribed as community caretaking, we should not assume that
the Fourth Amendment's command of reasonableness applies
in the same way to everything that might be viewed as fall-
ing into this broad category.
The Court's decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433
(1973), did not recognize any such “freestanding ” Fourth
Amendment category. See ante, at 197, 199. The opinion
merely used the phrase “community caretaking ” in passing.
413 U. S., at 441.
2. While there is no overarching “community caretaking ”
doctrine, it does not follow that all searches and seizures
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201
Alito, J., concurring
conducted for non-law-enforcement purposes must be ana-
lyzed
under precisely the same Fourth Amendment rules de-
veloped in criminal cases. Those rules may or may not be
appropriate for use in various non-criminal-law-enforcement
contexts. We do not decide that issue today.
3. This case falls within one important category of cases
that could be viewed as involving community caretaking:
conducting a search or seizure for the purpose of preventing
a person from committing suicide. Assuming that petitioner
did not voluntarily consent to go with the offcers for a psy-
chological assessment,
1
he was seized and thus subjected to
a serious deprivation of liberty. But was this warrantless
seizure “reasonable”? We have addressed the standards re-
quired by due process for involuntary commitment to a men-
tal treatment facility, see Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418,
427 (1979); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563,
574–576 (1975); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 75–77, 83
(1992), but we have not addressed Fourth Amendment re-
strictions on seizures like the one that we must assume oc-
curred here, i. e., a short-term seizure conducted for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether a person presents an imminent
risk of suicide. Every State has laws allowing emergency
seizures for psychiatric treatment, observation, or stabiliza-
tion, but these laws vary in many respects, including the
categories of persons who may request the emergency ac-
tion, the reasons that can justify the action, the necessity
of a judicial proceeding, and the nature of the proceeding.
2
Mentioning these laws only in passing, petitioner asked us to
1
The Court of Appeals assumed petitioner's consent was not voluntary
because the police allegedly promised that they would not seize his
g uns i f he went for a psycholog ica l eva luati on. 953 F. 3d 112, 121
(CA1 2020). The Court does not decide whether this assumption was
justifed.
2
See Brief for Petitioner 38–39, n. 4 (gathering state authorities); L.
Hedman et al., State Laws on Emergency Holds for Mental Health Stabili-
zation, 67 Psychiatric Servs. 579 (2016).

202 CANIGLIA
v. STROM
Alito, J., concurring
render a decision that could call features of these laws into
questi
on. The Court appropriately refrains from doing so.
4. This case also implicates another body of law that peti-
tioner glossed over: the so-called “red fag ” laws that some
States are now enacting. These laws enable the police to
seize guns pursuant to a court order to prevent their use for
suicide or the infiction of harm on innocent persons. See,
e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 18125–18148 (West Cum. Supp.
2021); Fla. Stat. § 790.401(4) (Cum. Supp. 2021); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann., ch. 140, § 131T (2021). They typically specify
the standard that must be met and the procedures that must
be followed before frearms may be seized. Provisions of
red fag laws may be challenged under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and those cases may come before us. Our decision
today does not address those issues.
5. One additional category of cases should be noted: those
involving warrantless, nonconsensual searches of a home for
the purpose of ascertaining whether a resident is in urgent
need of medical attention and cannot summon help. At oral
argument, The Chief Justice posed a question that high-
lighted this problem. He imagined a situation in which
neighbors of an elderly woman call the police and express
concern because the woman had agreed to come over for din-
ner at 6 p.m., but by 8 p.m., had not appeared or called even
though she was never late for anything. The woman had
not been seen leaving her home, and she was not answering
the phone. Nor could the neighbors reach her relatives by
phone. If the police entered the home without a warrant to
see if she needed help, would that violate the Fourth Amend-
ment? Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–8.
Petitioner's answer was that it would. Indeed, he argued,
even if 24 hours went by, the police still could not lawfully
enter without a warrant. If the situation remained un-
changed for several days, he suggested, the police might be
able to enter after obtaining “a warrant for a missing per-
son.” Id., at 9.
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203
Alito, J., concurring
The Chief Justice's question concerns an important
rea
l-world problem. Today, more than ever, many people,
including many elderly persons, live alone.
3
Many elderly
men and women fall in their homes,
4
or become incapacitated
for other reasons, and unfortunately, there are many cases
in which such persons cannot call for assistance. In those
cases, the chances for a good recovery may fade with each
passing hour.
5
So in The Chief Justice's imaginary case,
if the elderly woman was seriously hurt or sick and the po-
lice heeded petitioner's suggestion about what the Fourth
Amendment demands, there is a fair chance she would not
be found alive. This imaginary woman may have regarded
her house as her castle, but it is doubtful that she would have
wanted it to be the place where she died alone and in agony.
Our current precedents do not address situations like this.
We have held that the police may enter a home without a
warrant when there are “exigent circumstances.” Payton
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 590 (1980). But circumstances
are exigent only when there is not enough time to get a war-
rant, see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. 141, 149 (2013);
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978), and warrants
are not typically granted for the purpose of checking on a
person's medical condition. Perhaps States should institute
procedures for the issuance of such warrants, but in the
meantime, courts may be required to grapple with the basic
Fourth Amendment question of reasonableness.
3
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, The Rise of Living Alone,
Fig. HH– 4 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ library/
visualizations/time-series/demo/families-and-households/ hh-4.pdf; Ortiz-
Ospina, The Rise of Living Alone (Dec. 10, 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/
living-alone; Smith, Cities With the Most Adults Living Alone (May 4, 2020),
https://www.self.inc/ blog/adults-living-alone.
4
See B. Moreland, R. Kakara, & A. Henry, Trends in Nonfatal Falls and
Fall-Related Injuries Among Adults Aged ≥65 Years—United States,
2012–2018, 69 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 875 (2020).
5
See, e. g., J. Gurley, N. Lum, M. Sande, B. Lo, & M. Katz, Persons Found
in Their Homes Helpless or Dead, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1710 (1996).

204 CANIGLIA
v. STROM
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
6. The three categories of cases discussed above are sim-
ply
illustrative. Searches and seizures conducted for other
non-law-enforcement purposes may arise and may present
their own Fourth Amendment issues. Today's decision does
not settle those questions.
***
In sum, the Court properly rejects the broad “community
caretaking ” theory on which the decision below was based.
The Court's decision goes no further, and on that under-
standing, I join the opinion in full.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to
underscore and elaborate on The Chief Justice's point that
the Court's decision does not prevent police offcers from tak-
ing reasonable steps to assist those who are inside a home
and in need of aid. See ante, at 199–200 (Roberts, C. J.,
concurring). For example, as I will explain, police offcers
may enter a home without a warrant in circumstances where
they are reasonably trying to prevent a potential suicide or
to help an elderly person who has been out of contact and
may have fallen and suffered a serious injury.
Ratifed in 1791 and made applicable to the States in 1868,
the Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” As the consti-
tutional text establishes, the “ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Riley v. Califor-
nia, 573 U. S. 373, 381 (2014) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The Court has said that a warrant supported by prob-
able cause is ordinarily required for law enforcement offcers
to enter a home. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. But drawing
on common-law analogies and a commonsense appraisal of
what is “reasonable,” the Court has recognized various situa-
tions where a warrant is not required. For example, the
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring
exigent circumstances doctrine allows offcers to enter a
home
without a warrant in certain situations, including: to
fght a fre and investigate its cause; to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence; to engage in hot pursuit of a feeing
felon or prevent a suspect's escape; to address a threat to the
safety of law enforcement offcers or the general public; to
render emergency assistance to an injured occupant; or to
protect an occupant who is threatened with serious injury.
See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (plurality
opinion); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575
U. S. 600, 612 (2015); Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460,
462 (2011); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 47 (2009) (per
curiam); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006);
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91, 100 (1990); Michigan v.
Clifford, 464 U. S. 287, 293, and n. 4 (1984) (plurality opinion);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 392–394 (1978); Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509–510 (1978); United States v. San-
tana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary
v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298–299 (1967); Ker v. California,
374 U. S. 23, 40–41 (1963) (plurality opinion).
Over the years, many courts, like the First Circuit in this
case, have relied on what they have labeled a “community
caretaking ” doctrine to allow warrantless entries into the
home for a non-investigatory purpose, such as to prevent a
suicide or to conduct a welfare check on an older individual
who has been out of contact. But as the Court today ex-
plains, any such standalone community caretaking doctrine
was primarily devised for searches of cars, not homes.
Ante, at 197–199; see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433,
447–448 (1973).
That said, this Fourth Amendment issue is more labeling
than substance. The Court's Fourth Amendment case law
a lready recog nizes the exigent circumstances doctr ine,
which allows an offcer to enter a home without a warrant if
the “exigencies of the situation make the needs of law en-
forcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objec-
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tively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Brigham
Ci
ty, 547 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also ante, at 198. As relevant here, one such recognized
“exigency” is the “need to assist persons who are seriously
injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547
U. S., at 403; see also ante, at 199–200 (Roberts, C. J., con-
curring). The Fourth Amendment allows offcers to enter a
home if they have “an objectively reasonable basis for believ-
ing ” that such help is needed, and if the offcers' actions in-
side the home are reasonable under the circumstances.
Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 406; see also Michigan v. Fisher,
558 U. S., at 47–48.
This case does not require us to explore all the contours of
the exigent circumstances doctrine as applied to emergency-
aid situations because the offcers here disclaimed reliance
on that doctrine. But to avoid any confusion going forward,
I think it important to briefy describe how the doctrine ap-
plies to some heartland emergency-aid situations.
As Chief Judge Livingston has cogently explained, al-
though this doctrinal area does not draw much attention
from courts or scholars, “municipal police spend a good deal
of time responding to calls about missing persons, sick neigh-
bors, and premises left open at night.” Livingston, Police,
Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998
U. Chi. Leg. Forum 261, 263 (1998). And as she aptly noted,
“the responsibility of police offcers to search for missing per-
sons, to mediate disputes, and to aid the ill or injured has
never been the subject of serious debate; nor has” the “re-
sponsibility of police to provide services in an emergency.”
Id., at 302.
Consistent with that reality, the Court's exigency prece-
dents, as I read them, permit warrantless entries when po-
lice offcers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe
that there is a current, ongoing crisis for which it is reason-
able to act now. See, e. g., Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 612; Michi-
gan v. Fisher, 558 U. S., at 48–49; Brigham City, 547 U. S.,
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at 406–407. The offcers do not need to show that the harm
has
already occurred or is mere moments away, because
knowing that will often be diffcult if not impossible in cases
involving, for example, a person who is currently suicidal or
an elderly person who has been out of contact and may have
fallen. If someone is at risk of serious harm and it is reason-
able for offcers to intervene now, that is enough for the off-
cers to enter.
A few (non-exhaustive) examples illustrate the point.
Suppose that a woman calls a healthcare hotline or 911 and
says that she is contemplating suicide, that she has frearms
in her home, and that she might as well die. The operator
alerts the police, and two offcers respond by driving to the
woman's home. They knock on the door but do not receive
a response. May the offcers enter the home? Of course.
The exigent circumstances doctrine applies because the of-
fcers have an “objectively reasonable basis” for believing
that an occupant is “seriously injured or threatened with
such injury.” Id., at 400, 403; cf. Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 612
(offcers could enter the room of a mentally ill person who
had locked herself inside with a knife). After all, a suicidal
individual in such a scenario could kill herself at any mo-
ment. The Fourth Amendment does not require offcers to
stand idly outside as the suicide takes place.
1
Consider another example. Suppose that an elderly man
is uncharacteristically absent from Sunday church services
and repeatedly fails to answer his phone throughout the day
and night. A concerned relative calls the police and asks
the offcers to perform a wellness check. Two offcers drive
1
In 2019 in the United States, 47,511 people committed suicide. That
number is more than double the number of annual homicides. See Dept.
of Health and Human Servs., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
D. Stone, C. Jones, & K. Mack, Changes in Suicide Rates––United States,
2018–2019, 70 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 261, 263 (2021)
(MMWR); Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform
Crime Report, Crime in the United States, 2019, p. 2 (2020).
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208 CANIGLIA
v. STROM
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
to the man's home. They knock but receive no response.
May
the offcers enter the home? Of course.
Again, the offcers have an “objectively reasonable basis”
for believing that an occupant is “seriously injured or threat-
ened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 400,
403. Among other possibilities, the elderly man may have
fallen and hurt himself, a common cause of death or serious
injury for older individuals. The Fourth Amendment does
not prevent the offcers from entering the home and checking
on the man's well-being.
2
To be sure, courts, police departments, and police offcers
alike must take care that offcers' actions in those kinds of
cases are reasonable under the circumstances. But both of
those examples and others as well, such as cases involving
unattended young children inside a home, illustrate the kinds
of warrantless entries that are perfectly constitutional under
the exigent circumstances doctrine, in my view.
With those observations, I join the Court's opinion in full.
2
In 2018 in the United States, approximately 32,000 older adults died
from falls. Falls are also the leading cause of injury for older adults. B.
Moreland, R. Kakara, & A. Henry, Trends in Nonfatal Falls and Fall-
Related Injuries Among Adults Aged ≥ 65 Years––United States, 2012–
2018, 69 MMWR 875 (2020).
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