AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1
Pages 67–82
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 22, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
67
Syllabus
AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al. v.
FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 19–508. Argued January 13, 2021—Decided April 22, 2021
The Federal Trade Commission fled a complaint against Scott Tucker and
his companies alleging deceptive payday lending practices in violation
of § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The District Court
granted the Commission's request pursuant to § 13(b) of the Act for a
permanent injunction to prevent Tucker from committing future viola-
tions of the Act, and relied on the same authority to direct Tucker to
pay $1.27 billion in restitution and disgorgement. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Tucker's argument that § 13(b) does not authorize the
award of equitable monetary relief.
Held: Section 13(b) does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court
to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement.
Pp. 71–82.
(a) Congress granted the Commission authority to enforce the Act's
prohibitions on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” 15 U. S. C.
§§ 45(a)(1)–(2), by commencing administrative proceedings pursuant to
§ 5 of the Act. Section 5(l) of the Act authorizes the Commission, fol-
lowing completion of the administrative process and the issuance of a
fnal cease and desist order, to seek civil penalties, and permits district
courts to “grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further equi-
table relief as they deem appropriate in the enforcement of such fnal
orders of the Commission.” § 45(l). Section 19 of the Act further au-
thorizes district courts (subject to various conditions and limitations)
to grant “such relief as the court fnds necessary to redress injury to
consumers,” § 57b(b), in cases where someone has engaged in unfair or
deceptive conduct with respect to which the Commission has issued a
fnal cease and desist order applicable to that person, see § 57b(a)(2).
Here, the Commission responded to Tucker's payday lending practices
by seeking equitable monetary relief directly in district court under
§ 13(b)'s authorization to seek a “permanent injunction.” In doing so,
the Commission acted in accordance with its increasing tendency to use
§ 13(b) to seek monetary awards without prior use of the Commission's
traditional administrative proceedings. The desirability of the Com-
mission's practice aside, the question is whether Congress, by enacting
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68 AMG
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
Syllabus
§ 13(b) and using the words “permanent injunction,” granted the Com-
missi
on authority to obtain monetary relief directly from courts and
effectively bypass the requirements of the administrative process.
Pp. 71–74.
(b) Section 13(b) does not explicitly authorize the Commission to ob-
tain court-ordered monetary relief, and such relief is foreclosed by the
structure and history of the Act. Section 13(b) provides that the “Com-
mission may seek . . . a permanent injunction.” § 53(b). By its terms,
this provision concerns prospective injunctive relief, not retrospective
monetary relief. Section 13(b) allows the Commission to go directly
to district court when the Commission seeks injunctive relief pending
administrative proceedings or when it seeks only a permanent injunc-
tion. Other statutory provisions, in particular the conditioned and lim-
ited monetary relief authorized in § 19, confrm this conclusion. It is
highly unlikely that Congress, without mentioning the matter, would
grant the Commission authority to circumvent its traditional § 5 admin-
istrative proceedings. Pp. 75–78.
(c) The Commission's contrary arguments are unavailing. First,
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, and Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288, did not adopt a universal rule that
statutory authority to grant an injunction automatically encompasses
the power to grant equitable monetary remedies. Instead, the text and
structure of the particular statutory scheme at issue can limit a court's
jurisdiction in equity. Second, in enacting § 19 two years after § 13(b),
Congress did not simply create an alternative enforcement path with
similar remedies. The Court does not believe Congress would have
enacted § 19's provisions expressly authorizing monetary relief if § 13(b)
already implicitly allowed the Commission to obtain that same monetary
relief without satisfying § 19's conditions and limitations. Third, § 19's
saving clauses—preserving “any authority of the Commission under any
other provision of law” and “any other remedy or right of action pro-
vided by State or Federal law,” § 57b(e)—do not help answer whether
§ 13(b) gave the Commission the authority to obtain equitable monetary
relief directly in court in the frst place. Fourth, the Act's 1994 and
2006 amendments, which did not modify the specifc language at issue
here, do not demonstrate congressional acquiescence to lower court rul-
ings that favor the Commission's interpretation of § 13(b). Fifth, policy
arguments that § 5 and § 19 are inadequate to provide redress to con-
sumers should be addressed to Congress. Pp. 78–82.
910 F. 3d 417, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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69
Syllabus
Michael G. Pattillo, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners.
W
ith him on the briefs were Jeffrey A. Lamken, Sarah J.
Newman, and Paul C. Ray.
Joel R. Marcus argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Alden F. Abbott, Michael Bergman,
Theodore Metzler, and Matthew M. Hoffman.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Americans for
Prosperity Foundation by Cynthia Fleming Crawford and Michael Pep-
son; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al.
by Ilana H. Eisenstein and Daryl Joseffer; for the New Civil Liberties
Alliance by John J. Vecchione and Richard Samp; for the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America by John D. Graubert, Melissa B.
Kimmel, and David E. Korn; for Surescripts, LLC, by Roman Martinez,
Amanda P. Reeves, and Al fred C. Pfeiffer, Jr.; for TechFreedom by
Asheesh Agarwal and Corbin K. Barthold; and for the Washington Legal
Foundation et al. by Cory L. Andrews.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Illinois
et al. by Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, Jane Elinor Notz, So-
licitor General, Sarah A. Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General, and Carson R.
Griffs, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective jurisdictions as follows: Clyde Sniffen, Jr., of Alaska, Xavier Be-
cerra of California, Phil Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut,
Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia,
Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller
of Iowa, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura
Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Min-
nesota, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Gurbir
S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, Letitia James of
New York, Joshua H. Stein of North Carolina, Dave Yost of Ohio, Ellen F.
Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of
Rhode Island, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Thomas J. Donovan,
Jr., of Vermont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, Robert W. Ferguson of
Washington, and Josh Kaul of Wisconsin; for the American Antitrust Insti-
tute by Jennifer D. Bennett, Matthew W. H. Wessler, and Randy M. Stutz;
for Former Federal Trade Commission Offcials by David C. Vladeck and
Rachel L. Fried; for the National Consumer Law Center et al. by Stuart T.
Rossman, Jonathan Marshall, Jeffrey Gentes, J. L. Pottenger, Jr., and Seth
E. Mermin; for Public Citizen by Nandan M. Joshi, Scott L. Nelson, and Al-
lison M. Zieve; for Remedies Law Scholars et al. by Phillip R. Malone; and
for Truth in Advertising, Inc., by David T. Goldberg and Bonnie L. Patten.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Open Markets Institute by Jay
L. Himes; and for SBH A&I by Daryl M. Williams.

70 AMG
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Sec
tion 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act author-
izes the Commission to obtain, “in proper cases,” a “perma-
nent injunction” in federal court against “any person, part-
nership, or corporation” that it believes “is violating, or is
about to violate, any provision of law” that the Commission
enforces. 87 Stat. 592, 15 U. S. C. § 53(b). The question
presented is whether this statutory language authorizes the
Commission to seek, and a court to award, equitable mone-
tary relief such as restitution or disgorgement. We con-
clude that it does not.
I
Petitioner Scott Tucker controlled several companies that
provided borrowers with short-term payday loans. The com-
panies, operating online, would show a potential customer a
loan's essential terms. When the companies explained those
terms, they misled many customers. The companies' writ-
ten explanations seemed to say that customers could nor-
mally repay a loan by making a single payment. And that
payment would cost a person who, for example, borrowed
$300 an extra $90. (The customer would likely repay a total
of $390.) But in fne print the explanations said that the
loan would be automatically renewed unless the customer
took affrmative steps to opt out. Thus, unless the customer
who borrowed $300 was aware of the fne print and actively
prevented the loan's automatic renewal, he or she could end
up having to pay $975, not $390. Between 2008 and 2012,
Tucker's businesses made more than 5 million payday loans,
amounting to more than $1.3 billion in deceptive charges.
In 2012 the Federal Trade Commission fled suit and
claimed that Tucker and his companies were engaging in
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce,” in violation of § 5(a) of the Act. 15 U. S. C. § 45(a)(1).
(We shall refer to all of the defendants collectively as
Tucker.) In asserting that Tucker's practices were likely to
mislead consumers, the Commission did not frst use its own
administrative proceedings. Rather, the Commission fled
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Opinion of the Court
a complaint against Tucker directly in federal court. The
Commissi
on, relying upon § 13(b), asked the court to issue
a permanent injunction to prevent Tucker from committing
future violations of the Act. Relying on the same provision,
the Commission also asked the court to order monetary re-
lief, in particular, restitution and disgorgement. The Com-
mission moved for summary judgment.
The District Court granted the Commission's summary
judgment motion. The court also granted the Commission's
request for an injunction and directed Tucker to pay $1.27
billion in restitution and disgorgement. The court ordered
the Commission to use these funds frst to provide “direct re-
dress to consumers” and then to provide “other equitable re-
lief ” reasonably related to Tucker's alleged business practices.
Finally, the court ordered the Commission to deposit any re-
maining funds in the United States Treasury as disgorgement.
On appeal, Tucker argued that § 13(b) does not authorize
the monetary relief the District Court had granted. The
Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker's claim. 910 F. 3d 417 (2018).
It pointed to Circuit precedent that had interpreted § 13(b)
as “empower[ing] district courts to grant any ancillary relief
necessary to accomplish complete justice, including restitu-
tion.” FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F. 3d 593, 598
(2016); see also FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F. 2d 1107,
1113 (CA9 1982). Two judges, while recognizing that prece-
dent in many Circuits supported that use of § 13(b), ex-
pressed doubt as to the correctness of that precedent.
Tucker then sought certiorari in this Court. In light of
recent differences that have emerged among the Circuits as
to the scope of § 13(b), we granted his petition.
II
The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits, and author-
izes the Commission to prevent, “[u]nfair methods of compe-
tition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 15
U. S. C. §§ 45(a)(1)–(2). The Act permits the Commission to
use both its own administrative proceedings (set forth in § 5

72 AMG
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Opinion of the Court
of the Act) and court actions in exercising this authority. In
constr
uing § 13(b), it is helpful to understand how the Com-
mission's authority (and its interpretation of that authority)
has evolved over time.
Ever since the Commission's creation in 1914, it has been
authorized to enforce the Act through its own administrative
proceedings. Section 5 of the Act describes the relevant ad-
ministrative proceedings in some detail. If the Commission
has “reason to believe” that a party “has been or is using
any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act
or practice,” it can fle a complaint against the claimed vio-
lator and adjudicate its claim before an Administrative
Law Judge. § 45(b). The ALJ then conducts a hearing and
writes a report setting forth fndings of fact and reaching a
legal conclusion. Ibid. If the ALJ concludes that the con-
duct at issue was unfair or misleading, the ALJ will issue an
order requiring the party to cease and desist from engaging
in the unlawful conduct. Ibid. The party may then seek
review before the Commission and eventually in a court of
appeals, where the “fndings of the Commission as to the
facts” (if supported by the evidence) “shall be conclusive.”
§ 45(c). If judicial review favors the Commission (or if the
time to seek judicial review expires), the Commission's order
normally becomes fnal (and enforceable). § 45(g).
In the 1970s Congress authorized the Commission to seek
additi ona l remedies in cour t. In 1973 Congress added
§ 13(b), the provision at issue here. That provision permits
the Commission to proceed directly to court (prior to issuing
a cease and desist order) to obtain a “temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction,” and also allows the Com-
mission, “in proper cases,” to obtain a court-ordered “perma-
nent injunction.” 15 U. S. C. § 53(b). In the same legisla-
tion, Congress also amended § 5(l) of the Act to authorize
district courts to award civil penalties against respondents
who violate fnal cease and desist orders, and to “grant man-
datory injunctions and such other and further equitable
relief as they deem appropriate in the enforcement of such
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fnal orders of the Commission.” § 45(l). Two years later,
Congress
enacted § 19 of the Act, which authorizes district
courts to grant “such relief as the court fnds necessary to
redress injury to consumers,” including through the “refund
of money or return of property.” § 57b(b). However, Con-
gress specifed that the consumer redress available under
§ 19 could be sought only (as relevant here, and subject to
various conditions and limitations) against those who have
“engage[d] in any unfair or deceptive act or practice . . . with
respect to which the Commission has issued a fnal cease and
desist order which is applicable to such person.” § 57b(a)(2).
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Commission began to use
§ 13(b), and in particular the words “permanent injunction,”
to obtain court orders for redress of various kinds in con-
sumer protection cases—without prior use of the administra-
tive proceedings in § 5. See, e. g., FTC v. Virginia Homes
Mfg. Corp., 509 F. Supp. 51, 59 (Md. 1981) (relying on § 13(b)
to order the defendant to notify past customers of their war-
ranty rights); see also D. FitzGerald, The Genesis of Con-
sumer Protection Remedies Under Section 13(b) of the FTC
Act 1–2, Paper at FTC 90th Anniversary Symposium, Sept.
23, 2004 (FitzGerald); Beales & Muris, Striking the Proper
Balance: Redress Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 79
Antitrust L. J. 1, 3–4 (2013). The Commission used this au-
thority to seek and win restitution and other forms of equita-
ble monetary relief directly in court.
Similarly, in the late 1990s the Commission began to use
§ 13(b)'s “permanent injunction” authority in antitrust cases
to seek monetary awards, such as restitution and disgorge-
ment—again without prior use of traditional administrative
proceedings. See Complaint in FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc.,
No. 98–3114 (DC); Complaint in FTC v. The Hearst Trust,
No. 01–734 (DC). In 2003 the Commission issued guidance
that limited its use of § 13(b) to obtain monetary relief to
“exceptional cases” involving a “[c]lear [v]iolation” of the
antitrust laws. Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable
Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. 45821 (empha-
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Opinion of the Court
sis deleted). But in 2012 the Commission withdrew its
pol
icy statement and the limitations it imposed. See
Withdrawal of the Commission Policy Statement on Mon-
etary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 77 Fed.
Reg. 47071.
The result is that the Commission presently uses § 13(b) to
win equitable monetary relief directly in court with great
frequency. The Commission tells us that “the agency [now]
brings dozens of [§ 13(b)] cases every year seeking a perma-
nent injunction and the return of illegally obtained funds.”
Brief for Respondent 8; see also, e. g., Ohlhausen, Dollars,
Doctrine, and Damage Control: How Disgorgement Affects
the FTC's Antitrust Mission 7, Speech at Dechert LLP, NY,
Apr. 20, 2016 (Commission sought disgorgement in antitrust
cases four times between 2012 and 2016, which is “as many
times as the [Commission] pursued such relief in the prior
twenty years”). With respect to consumer protection cases,
the Commission adds that “there's no question that the
agency brings far more cases in court than it does in the
administrative process.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. In fscal year
2019, for example, the Commission fled 49 complaints in
federal court and obtained 81 permanent injunctions and
orders, resulting in $723.2 million in consumer redress or
disgorgement. See FTC, Fiscal Year 2021 Congressional
Budget Justificati on 5 (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.f tc.
gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2021-congressional-
budget-justifcation/fy_2021_cbj_fnal.pdf. In the same pe-
riod, the Commission issued only 21 new administrative com-
plaints and 21 fnal administrative orders.
Our task here is not to decide whether this substitution
of § 13(b) for the administrative procedure contained in § 5
and the consumer redress available under § 19 is desirable.
Rather, it is to answer a more purely legal question: Did
Congress, by enacting § 13(b)'s words, “permanent injunc-
tion,” grant the Commission authority to obtain monetary
relief directly from courts, thereby effectively bypassing the
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III
Se
veral considerations, taken together, convince us that
§ 13(b)'s “permanent injunction” language does not authorize
the Commission directly to obtain court-ordered monetary
relief. For one thing, the language refers only to injunc-
tions. It says, “in proper cases the Commission may seek,
and after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent
injunction.” 15 U. S. C. § 53(b) (emphasis added). An “in-
junction” is not the same as an award of equitable monetary
relief. Compare, e. g., United States v. Oregon State Medi-
cal Soc., 343 U. S. 326, 333 (1952) (injunction typically offers
prospective relief against ongoing or future harm), with, e. g.,
1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1(1) (2d ed. 1993) (restitu-
tion typically offers retrospective relief to redress past harm).
We have, however, sometimes interpreted similar language
as authorizing judges to order equitable monetary relief.
See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395 (1946);
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288 (1960).
But if this language alone is not enough, there is more.
The language and structure of § 13(b), taken as a whole, indi-
cate that the words “permanent injunction” have a limited
purpose—a purpose that does not extend to the grant of
monetary relief. Those words are buried in a lengthy provi-
sion that focuses upon purely injunctive, not monetary, relief.
It says (in relevant part):
“Whenever the Commission has reason to believe—
“(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is
violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law en-
forced by the Federal Trade Commission, and
“(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a
complaint by the Commission and until such complaint is
dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on
review, or until the order of the Commission made thereon
has become fnal, would be in the interest of the public—
“the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by
it for such purpose may bring suit in a district court of
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Opinion of the Court
the United States to enjoin any such act or practice.
Upon
a proper showing that, weighing the equities and
considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate suc-
cess, such action would be in the public interest, and
after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction may be granted with-
out bond: Provided, however, That if a complaint is not
fled within such period (not exceeding 20 days) as may
be specifed by the court after issuance of the temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, the order or
injunction shall be dissolved by the court and be of
no further force and effect: Provided further, That
in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after
proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunc-
tion.” 15 U. S. C. § 53(b) (fnal emphasis added).
Taken as a whole, the provision focuses upon relief that is
prospective, not retrospective. Consider the words “is vio-
lating ” and “is about to violate” (not “has violated”) setting
forth when the Commission may request injunctive relief.
Consider too the words “pending the issuance of a com-
plaint,” “until such complaint is dismissed,” “temporary re-
straining order,” “preliminary injunction,” and so forth in
the frst half of the section. These words refect that the
provision addresses a specifc problem, namely, that of stop-
ping seemingly unfair practices from taking place while the
Commission determines their lawfulness. Cf. § 53(a) (pro-
viding similar provisional relief where false advertising re-
garding food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics is at issue). And
the appearance of the words “permanent injunction” (as a
proviso) suggests that those words are directly related to a
previously issued preliminary injunction. They might also
be read, for example, as granting authority for the Commis-
sion to go one step beyond the provisional and (“in proper
cases”) dispense with administrative proceedings to seek
what the words literally say (namely, an injunction). But
to read those words as allowing what they do not say,
namely, as allowing the Commission to dispense with admin-
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Opinion of the Court
istrative proceedings to obtain monetary relief as well, is to
read
the words as going well beyond the provision's subject
matter. In light of the historical importance of administra-
tive proceedings, that reading would allow a small statutory
tail to wag a very large dog.
Further, the structure of the Act beyond § 13(b) confrms
this conclusion. Congress in § 5(l) and § 19 gave district
courts the authority to impose limited monetary penalties
and to award monetary relief in cases where the Commission
has issued cease and desist orders, i. e., where the Commis-
sion has engaged in administrative proceedings. Since in
these provisions Congress explicitly provided for “other and
further equitable relief,” 15 U. S. C. § 45(l), and for the “re-
fund of money or return of property,” § 57b(b), it likely did
not intend for § 13(b)'s more cabined “permanent injunction”
language to have similarly broad scope.
More than that, the latter provision (§ 19) comes with cer-
tain important limitations that are absent in § 13(b). As rel-
evant here, § 19 applies only where the Commission begins
its § 5 process within three years of the underlying violation
and seeks monetary relief within one year of any resulting
fnal cease and desist order. 15 U. S. C. § 57b(d). And it ap-
plies only where “a reasonable man would have known under
the circumstances” that the conduct at issue was “dishonest
or fraudulent.” § 57b(a)(2); see also § 45(m)(1)(B)(2) (provid-
ing court-ordered monetary penalties against anyone who
engages in conduct previously identifed as prohibited in a
fnal cease and desist order, but only if the violator acted
with “actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair
or deceptive”). In addition, Congress enacted these other,
more limited, monetary relief provisions at the same time as,
or a few years after, it enacted § 13(b) in 1973.
It is highly unlikely that Congress would have enacted
provisions expressly authorizing conditioned and limited
monetary relief if the Act, via § 13(b), had already implicitly
allowed the Commission to obtain that same monetary relief
and more without satisfying those conditions and limitations.
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Opinion of the Court
Nor is it likely that Congress, without mentioning the mat-
ter
, would have granted the Commission authority so readily
to circumvent its traditional § 5 administrative proceedings.
See FitzGerald 1 (arguing that, in the mid-1970s, “no one
imagined that Section 13(b) of the [FTC] Act would become
an important part of the Commission's consumer protection
program” (footnote omitted)).
At the same time, to read § 13(b) to mean what it says, as
authorizing injunctive but not monetary relief, produces a
coherent enforcement scheme: The Commission may obtain
monetary relief by frst invoking its administrative proce-
dures and then § 19's redress provisions (which include limi-
tations). And the Commission may use § 13(b) to obtain in-
junctive relief while administrative proceedings are foreseen
or in progress, or when it seeks only injunctive relief. By
contrast, the Commission's broad reading would allow it to
use § 13(b) as a substitute for § 5 and § 19. For the reasons
we have just stated, that could not have been Congress' in-
tent. Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531
U. S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not . . . hide ele-
phants in mouseholes”).
IV
The Commission makes several arguments to the contrary.
First, the Commission points to traditional equitable practice
and to two previous cases where we interpreted provisions
authorizing injunctive relief to authorize equitable monetary
relief as well. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S.
395 (1946); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361
U. S. 288 (1960). In Porter we said that “[n]othing is more
clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an injunction
than the recovery of that which has been illegally acquired
and which has given rise to the necessity for injunctive re-
lief.” 328 U. S., at 399. In Mitchell we said that, “[w]hen
Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of pro-
hibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be
taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity
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361 U. S., at 291–292. The Commission argues that these
cases
consequently support the proposition that the tradi-
tional equitable “authority to grant an `injunction' includes
the power to grant restorative monetary remedies.” Brief
for Respondent 21.
The problem for the Commission is that we did not in these
two cases purport to set forth a universal rule of interpreta-
tion. And both cases involved different statutes. See Por-
ter, 328 U. S., at 397 (Emergency Price Control Act provision
authorizing courts to issue “ `a permanent or temporary in-
junction, restraining order, or other order' ”); Mitchell, 361
U. S., at 289 (Fair Labor Standards Act provision authorizing
courts to “ `restrain violations' ” of the Act's antiretaliation
ban). In both cases, we recognized that the text and struc-
ture of the statutory scheme at issue can, “in so many words,
or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restric[t] the
court's jurisdiction in equity.” Porter, 328 U. S., at 398;
Mitchell, 361 U. S., at 291. Thus in Porter we examined
“other provision[s] of the [Emergency Price Control] Act” to
determine whether they “expressly or impliedly preclud[e] a
court from ordering restitution in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.” 328 U. S., at 403. And in Mitchell we exam-
ined other provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act before
concluding that there was “no indication in the language”
that the statute precluded equitable relief in the form of lost
wages. 361 U. S., at 294.
Moreover, more recently, we have held, based on our read-
ing of a statutory scheme as a whole, that a provision's grant
of an “injunction” or other equitable powers does not auto-
matica lly author ize a cour t to provide monetary relief.
Rather, we have said, the scope of equitable relief that a
provision authorizes “remains a question of interpretation in
each case.” Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 257
(1993). Our decision in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516
U. S. 479 (1996), is instructive. There, we considered a pro-
vision in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that
authorizes district courts “to restrain any person who has con-
tributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling,
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storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid
or
hazardous waste,” and “to order such person to take such
other action as may be necessary, or both.” 98 Stat. 3268,
42 U. S. C. § 6972(a). The question was whether this lan-
guage permits courts to award restitution in the form of
past cleanup costs. We concluded that, despite Porter, the
provision's grant of equitable authority does not authorize
past cleanup costs because the relevant statutory scheme (as
here) contained other “ `elaborate enforcement provisions,' ”
including (as here) provisions that explicitly provide for that
form of relief. Meghrig, 516 U. S., at 487. Here, the infer-
ence against § 13(b)'s authorization of monetary relief is strong
and fol lows from the i nter pretive approach we took i n
Meghrig.
Second, the Commission argues that Congress simply cre-
ated two enforcement avenues, one administrative and the
other judicial, leaving the Commission the power to decide
which of the two “separate, parallel enforcement paths” to
take. Brief for Respondent 41. To the extent that § 19 au-
thorizes “similar relief ” as § 13(b), the Commission continues,
that refects only the fact that each pathway is an alternative
route to “similar endpoints.” Id., at 41–42. This statement,
however, does not overcome the interpretive diffculties we
have set forth, for example permitting the Commission to
avoid the conditions and limitations laid out in § 19. We can-
not believe that Congress merely intended to enact a more
onerous alternative to § 13(b) when it enacted § 19 two
years later.
Third, the Commission points to saving clauses in § 19,
which, it says, save its ability to use § 13(b) to obtain mone-
tary relief. See id., at 42. Those clauses preserve “any au-
thority of the Commission under any other provision of law”
and preserve “any other remedy or right of action provided
by State or Federal law.” 15 U. S. C. § 57b(e). Here, how-
ever, the question is not one of preserving pre-existing reme-
dies given by other statutory provisions. The question is
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as: 593 U. S. 67 (2021)
81
Opinion of the Court
whether those other provisions (namely, § 13(b)) gave that
remedy
in the frst place.
Fourth, the Commission points out that the courts of ap-
peals have, until recently, consistently accepted its interpre-
tation, and that Congress has in effect twice ratifed that
interpretation in subsequent amendments to the Act. See,
e. g., Brief for Respondent 8, and n. 3 (citing the similar con-
clusions of eight Circuits). But see FTC v. Credit Bureau
Center, LLC, 937 F. 3d 764 (CA7 2019); FTC v. AbbVie Inc.,
976 F. 3d 327 (CA3 2020). We have held that Congress' ac-
quiescence to a settled judicial interpretation can suggest
adoption of that interpretation. See, e. g., Monessen South-
western R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U. S. 330, 338 (1988). We
have also said, however, that when “Congress has not com-
prehensively revised a statutory scheme but has made only
isolated amendments . . . [i]t is impossible to assert with any
degree of assurance that congressional failure to act repre-
sents affrmative congressional approval of [a court's] statu-
tory interpretation.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275,
292 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). We fnd this
latter statement the more relevant here.
The two examples of acquiescence to which the Commis-
sion refers do not convince us that Congress acquiesced in
the lower courts' interpretation. The Commission frst
points to amendments that Congress made to the Act in 1994.
See § 10, 108 Stat. 1695–1696. Those two amendments, how-
ever, simply revised § 13(b)'s venue, joinder, and service
rules, not its remedial provisions. They tell us nothing
about the words “permanent injunction” in § 13(b).
The Commission also points to amendments made to the
Act in 2006. Those amendments modifed the scope of § 5 so
that, where certain conduct in foreign commerce is involved,
§ 5 authorizes “ `[a]ll remedies available to the Commission,' ”
including “ `restituti on. ' ” See § 3, 120 Stat. 3372. We
agree, however, that restitution is available, for example,
when the Commission uses its administrative process. See,
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e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 57b(b). That being so, these amendments
a
lso tell us nothing about the scope of § 13(b).
Fifth, the Commission and its amici emphasize the policy-
related importance of allowing the Commission to use § 13(b)
to obtain monetary relief. They suggest that it is undesir-
able simply to enjoin those who violate the Act while leaving
them with profts earned at the unjustifed expense of con-
sumers. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 8–9; Brief for Truth
in Advertising, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 7–13; Brief for Amer-
ican Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae 9–21; Brief for
National Consumer Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 10–
20; Brief for Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae 5–11. They point
to the billions of dollars that the Commission has returned
to consumers as a result of the Commission's § 13(b) efforts.
See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 8–9; Brief for Illinois et al.
as Amici Curiae 5.
Nothing we say today, however, prohibits the Commission
from using its authority under § 5 and § 19 to obtain restitu-
tion on behalf of consumers. If the Commission believes
that authority too cumbersome or otherwise inadequate, it
is, of course, free to ask Congress to grant it further remedial
authority. Indeed, the Commission has recently asked Con-
gress for that very authority, see Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on
Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission, Prepared State-
ment of the FTC, 116th Cong., 2d Sess., 3–5 (2020), and Con-
gress has considered at least one bill that would do so, see
S. 4626, 116th Cong., 2d Sess., § 403 (2020) (revising § 13
to expressly authorize restitution and disgorgement). We
must conclude, however, that § 13(b) as currently written
does not grant the Commission authority to obtain equitable
monetary relief.
***
For these reasons, we reverse the Ninth Circuit's judg-
ment, and we remand the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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