Mays v. Hines

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 592 U. S. Part 2
Pages 385–394
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 29, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
385
Syllabus
MAYS, WARDEN v. HINES
on
petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 20–507. Decided March 29, 2021
A Tennessee jury found Anthony Hines guilty of murdering Katherine
Jenkins at the motel where she worked. Overwhelming evidence sup-
ported the conviction. Hines traveled to the motel with a hunting
knife, and he checked in on the same day that Jenkins' body was found
in one of the rooms with multiple knife wounds. He stole Jenkins
money and car keys, and fed the scene in her vehicle. Not long after,
travelers found Hines on the road next to Jenkins' broken-down car.
They testifed that Hines had dried blood on his shirt. Hines told his
family that he had stabbed a male motel employee that day, but not
Jenkins. And though he initially volunteered to the sheriff that he took
Jenkins' car but did not kill her, he later offered to confess to the murder
if the death penalty could be guaranteed. The jury also heard testi-
mony from Kenneth Jones, the man who discovered Jenkins' body.
Hines' counsel cast doubt on Jones' explanation of why he was at the
hotel, which was vague. But after hearing all this evidence and more,
the jury found Hines guilty. Hines later sought postconviction relief,
claiming his counsel was ineffective for not arguing that Jones could
have killed Jenkins. In a new statement, Jones admitted that he had
lied at Hines' trial about the reason he was at the motel—he actually
was there with a woman who was not his wife. Apparently Hines'
attorney had known of Jones' affair, but decided not to pursue the mat-
ter aggressively at trial. Although Hines insisted that this choice
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, the Tennessee postconvic-
tion court found no prejudice. Hines v. State, 2004 WL 1567120, *8,
*22, *27–*28 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2004). Sixteen years later, a
divided panel of the Sixth Circuit disagreed and granted habeas
relief.
Held: The Sixth Circuit erred in granting a writ of federal habeas corpus
because the Tennessee court reasonably rejected Hines' ineffective as-
sistance of counsel theory. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). A federal court may
intrude on a State's sovereign power to punish offenders only when a
decision “was so lacking in justifcation . . . beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103.
The Sixth Circuit focused on the reasons Jones might have been a viable

386 MA
YS v. HINES
Per Curiam
alternative suspect, but the appropriate question on federal habeas re-
v
iew was whether the Tennessee court, notwithstanding its substantial
“latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not [shown prej-
udice],” reached a result as to which every fairminded jurist would dis-
agree. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. 111, 123. Here the Tennes-
see court reasonably reviewed “the strength of proof against [Hines],”
and dismissed as “ `farfetched' ” that trial counsel should have accused
Jones of committing (and self-reporting) a grisly crime in a public place
where he was “known by the staff.” Hines, 2004 WL 1567120, *27.
The emergence of a new corroborating witness— Jones' companion—fur-
ther undermined any suggestion that Jones was the culprit, and the
court reasoned that Jones' true purpose for being at the motel had little
relevance to Hines' conviction or sentence. Id., at *28. Despite the
Tennessee court's straightforward analysis, the Sixth Circuit disre-
garded the overwhelming evidence of guilt that supported the Tennes-
see court's conclusion. In doing so, it violated Congress' prohibition on
disturbing state-court judgments on federal habeas review absent an
error that lies “ `beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.' ”
Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U. S. 111, 112 (per curiam); § 2254(d). The petition
for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed in forma
pauperis are granted; the decision below is reversed.
Certiorari granted; 814 Fed. Appx. 898, reversed.
Per Curiam.
A Tennessee jury found Anthony Hines guilty of murder-
ing Katherine Jenkins at a motel. Witnesses saw Hines
feeing in the victim's car and wearing a bloody shirt, and his
family members heard him admit to stabbing someone at the
motel. But almost 35 years later, the Sixth Circuit held that
Hines was entitled to a new trial and sentence because his
attorney should have tried harder to blame another man. In
reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit disregarded the
overwhelming evidence of guilt that supported the contrary
conclusion of a Tennessee court. This approach plainly vio-
lated Congress' prohibition on disturbing state-court judg-
ments on federal habeas review absent an error that lies
“ `beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. ' ”
Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U. S. 111, 112 (2020) (per curiam); 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d). We now reverse.
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387
Per Curiam
I
On
March 1, 1985, Hines boarded a bus traveling from
Raleigh, North Carolina, to Bowling Green, Kentucky. His
girlfriend and her mother had given him the bus ticket and
$20. Hines also carried with him a hunting knife concealed
beneath his shirt. When the mother asked about the knife,
Hines explained: “ `I never go anywhere naked.' ” “ `I al-
ways have my blade.' ” Record in Hines v. Carpenter,
No. 3:05–cv–00002 (MD Tenn.), Doc. 173–4, p. 112.
Hines' travels brought him to the outskirts of Nashville,
where he checked into the CeBon Motel. Jenkins worked
there as a maid. A few hours after Hines' arrival, the man-
ager put Jenkins in charge of the motel and provided her
with a bag of money to make change for departing guests.
In the early afternoon, another visitor found Jenkins' body
in one of the rooms. She was wrapped in a bloody bedsheet,
and an autopsy later revealed several knife wounds that
included deep punctures to her chest and genitalia. Her
money, wallet, and car keys were missing, as was her vehicle.
Around the same time, another employee saw a man leaving
the motel in Jenkins' car. The employee tried to follow the
vehicle, but it sped away.
Later that afternoon, a group of travelers found Hines and
the car—now broken down—along the side of the road, and
they offered to drive him toward his sister's home in Bowling
Green. During the trip, the travelers observed that Hines
had dried blood on his shirt and was carrying a folded-up
jacket. They also noticed that Hines “seemed real ner-
vous,” “ke[pt] contradicting himself,” and “talked a lot,” at
one point claiming that he had purchased the car from an
“old lady for $300 or $400.” Id., Doc. 173–2, at 33, 56; id.,
Doc. 173–3, at 34–35.
Hines told a different story to his family. His sister no-
ticed the blood, and Hines admitted that he had stabbed
somebody at the motel—although he described the victim as
a male employee who had assaulted him. For good measure,
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388 MA
YS v. HINES
Per Curiam
Hines physically demonstrated how he had knifed the sup-
posed
assailant. Despite his inability to pay for a bus ticket
just a few days earlier, Hines purchased a barbecue grill and
informed his sister that he had acquired a substantial sum of
money. Family members also noticed that he had the keys
to Jenkins' car, which were on a distinctive keychain. Ac-
cording to Hines, he had taken the keys in a struggle with
yet another man who had tried to rob him.
Hines altered his tale again when he surrendered to law
enforcement. Before the sheriff started questioning him,
Hines volunteered that “he took the automobile but he didn't
murder the woman.” Id., at 54–55, 57. But Hines later
changed his mind and offered to confess to the murder if
the sheriff “could guarantee him the death penalty.” Id.,
Doc. 173–4, at 72.
The investigation turned up other physical evidence con-
necting Hines to the crime. Police found Jenkins' wallet
where Hines had abandoned her car. And a search of his
motel room revealed stab marks on the walls that were simi-
lar in size to the wounds on Jenkins' body. When an investi-
gator asked Hines about the damage, he identifed the holes
as “ `knife marks.' ” Id., at 83–84.
The jury heard all of this evidence at trial. It also heard
testimony from the man—Kenneth Jones—who had discov-
ered Jenkins' body. According to Jones, he knew the owners
of the motel and had stopped by on the afternoon of the mur-
der. Finding no one in the offce, Jones had lingered outside
before realizing that he needed to use the bathroom. He
returned to the offce, took a key, and entered the room.
Hines' counsel stressed to the jury this oddly fortuitous se-
quence of events, noting that “Jones was fooling around at
that motel that Sunday afternoon”; that Jones seemed “ner-
vous”; and that Jones just happened to be present when
“[t]here was a lot of something going on.” Id., Doc. 173–6,
at 72–73. The jury also heard discrepancies between Jones'

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389
Per Curiam
account of fnding the body and the timeline given by frst
responders.
But it found Hines guilty.
The full truth came out several years later when Hines
sought postconviction review in the Tennessee courts. In a
new statement, Jones admitted that he was at the motel nei-
ther by happenstance nor by himself, but rather in the com-
pany of a woman other than his wife. The duo had rendez-
voused at the motel nearly every Sunday for at least two
years, and Jones was well known to the staff. But when
Jones and his companion arrived on the day of the murder,
they found no one to greet them. After waiting for a while,
frst at the motel and then at a nearby restaurant, Jones be-
came impatient and helped himself to a room key from the
offce. Upon fnding the body, he quickly returned to his
vehicle—a fact confrmed by his companion who watched
through the room's open curtains as Jones entered and left.
Jones then called the authorities, drove his companion home,
and returned to the motel to meet the sheriff.
The postconviction proceedings also revealed that Hines'
attorney was generally aware of Jones' affair from the out-
set, yet had decided to spare him the embarrassment of ag-
gressively pursuing the matter. Hines v. State, 2004 WL
1567120, *8 (Tenn. Crim. App., July 14, 2004). But despite
Hines' current insistence that this choice amounted to inef-
fective assistance of counsel, the Tennessee postconviction
court found no prejudice. Id., at *22, *27–*28; see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) (“[T]he
defendant must show that . . . counsel's errors were so seri-
ous as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial”). The court
stressed “the strength of proof against [Hines],” and it dis-
missed as “ `farfetched' ” that trial counsel should have ac-
cused Jones of committing (and self-reporting) a grisly crime
in a public place where he was “known by the staff.” Hines,
2004 WL 1567120, *27. Such an argument, the court ex-
plained, “could have resulted in a loss of credibility for the
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YS v. HINES
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defense.” Ibid. The court also observed that the emer-
gence
of a new corroborating witness—Jones' companion—
further undermined any suggestion that he was the culprit.
Id., at *28. And though Jones' evolving story deprived the
jury of all the facts, the court reasoned that his “true pur-
pose for being at the [m]otel” had little relevance to Hines'
conviction or sentence. Ibid.
Sixteen years later, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit
disagreed. 814 Fed. Appx. 898 (2020). According to the
majority, a better investigation “could have helped the de-
fense to credibly cast Jones as an alternative suspect, or at
the very least seriously undermine his testimony.” Id., at
938. For example, trial counsel could have claimed that
Jones killed Jenkins to cover up his affair. Counsel might
also have highlighted that Jones was planning to rent a room
from Jenkins on the day of the crime. Id., at 938–939. Or
counsel might have better stressed potential faws in Jones'
version of events, such as discrepancies about the exact time
he reported the murder. Id., at 940. The majority further
surmised that Hines had “no clear motive” for the murder,
and it noted the absence of “DNA or fngerprint evidence.”
Id., at 939.
Missing from this analysis, however, was the voluminous
evidence of Hines' guilt. Among many other things, the ma-
jority disregarded Hines' fight in a bloodstained shirt, his
theft of the vehicle and money, and his ever-changing stories
about stabbing and robbing various people on the day of the
crime. See generally id., at 937–942.
Judge Kethledge dissented. In his view, the majority
“ `nowhere g[ave] deference to the state courts, nowhere ex-
plain[ed] why their application of Strickland was unreason-
able rather than merely (in the majority's view) incorrect,
and nowhere explain[ed] why fairminded jurists could view
[Hines'] claim only the same way the majority d[id].' ” Id.,
at 942. Judge Kethledge then reviewed all of the evidence
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391
Per Curiam
ignored by the majority. He found “zero reason to think
that,
after investigation, counsel could have presented Jones
as the `real killer.' ” Id., at 944. And he explained that im-
peaching Jones “would have been a waste of time” because
Jones had “offered no testimony regarding Hine[s'] guilt.”
Ibid.
II
Hines' legal theory is straightforward: A competent attor-
ney would have presented the full truth about Jones' affair
and blamed him for the crime. According to Hines, this
strategy would have defected so much suspicion—or at least
so undermined Jones' credibility—that counsel's omission
created a “ `substantial' ” risk of “a different result.” Cullen
v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, 189 (2011). In fact, Hines rea-
sons that, “had [he] not been found with Mrs. Jenkins' car,
Jones would have been the primary suspect.” Brief in Op-
position 17 (emphasis added).
Our analysis is straightforward too. Because a Tennessee
court considered and rejected Hines' theory, a federal court
“shall not” grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the earlier
decision took an “unreasonable” view of the facts or law.
§ 2254(d). This “standard is diffcult to meet.” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102 (2011). The term “unreason-
able” refers not to “ordinary error” or even to circumstances
where the petitioner offers “a strong case for relief,” but
rather to “ `extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
syste[m].' ” Ibid. In other words, a federal court may in-
trude on a State's “ `sovereign power to punish offenders' ”
only when a decision “was so lacking in justifcation . . . be-
yond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id.,
at 103.
If this rule means anything, it is that a federal court must
carefully consider all the reasons and evidence supporting
the state court's decision. After all, there is no way to hold
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YS v. HINES
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that a decision was “lacking in justifcation” without identify-
i
ng—let alone rebutting—all of the justifcations. Ibid.
Any other approach would allow a federal court to “ `essen-
tially evaluat[e] the merits de novo' ” by omitting inconve-
nient details from its analysis. Shinn, 592 U. S., at 119; see
also Richter, 562 U. S., at 102–103.
The Sixth Circuit did precisely that. Nowhere in its 10-
page discussion of Hines' theory did the majority consider
the substantial evidence linking him to the crime: His fight
in a bloody shirt; his possession of the victim's keys, wallet,
and car; his recurring association with knives; or his ever-
changing stories about tussling with imaginary assailants.
814 Fed. Appx., at 933–942. The court instead focused on
all the reasons why it thought Jones “could have” been
a viable alternative suspect. E. g., id., at 938–942. And
rather than engage with the “dissent['s] recount[ing of] th[e]
evidence” against Hines, the majority simply promised that
it had “carefully considered” this proof before summarily dis-
missing it as “not overwhelming.” Id., at 939.
Had the Sixth Circuit properly considered the entire
record, it would have had little trouble deferring to the Ten-
nessee court's conclusion that Hines suffered no prejudice
regarding his conviction or sentence. Again, the critical
question was not whether the Sixth Circuit itself could see
a “ `substantial' . . . likelihood of a different result” had Hines'
attorney taken a different approach. Cullen, 563 U. S., at
189. All that mattered was whether the Tennessee court,
notwithstanding its substantial “latitude to reasonably de-
termine that a defendant has not [shown prejudice],” still
managed to blunder so badly that every fairminded jurist
would disagree. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. 111, 123
(2009).
It did not. The Tennessee court reasonably looked to
the substantial evidence of Hines' guilt. Hines, 2004 WL
1567120, *27–*28. And it reasonably rejected the “ `far-
fetched' ” possibility that Jones committed and self-reported
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a gruesome murder, in the presence of a witness, at a place
where
he was well known to the staff. Ibid. In light of
this straightforward, commonsense analysis, the Sixth Cir-
cuit had no license to hypothesize an alternative theory of
the crime in which Jones became a suspect 35 years after the
fact—much less rely on that fanciful theory to grant relief.*
Similarly untenable was the Sixth Circuit's backstop the-
ory that a more aggressive attorney could have changed the
result by casting doubt on Jones' credibility. 814 Fed.
Appx., at 940. As an initial matter, this conjecture ignores
that Jones' brief testimony about discovering the body did
not indicate that Hines was the culprit. Ample other evi-
dence was what did that. Perhaps in light of this obvious
disjuncture, the Sixth Circuit's analysis of why an attack on
Jones' credibility would have been productive ultimately cir-
cled back to the majority's main assumption “that Jones was
a viable alternative suspect.” Id., at 941. Regardless, to
the extent Jones' credibility actually mattered, the jury al-
ready had several good reasons to be skeptical—for example,
his peculiar tale of discovering the body; the insinuations of
Hines' attorney; and the discrepancies between Jones' exact
description of fnding the body and the account of the frst
responders. None of these made a difference.
III
The Sixth Circuit had no reason to revisit the decision of
the Tennessee court, much less ignore the ample evidence
supporting that court's conclusion. We grant the petition
*Even on its own terms, there is little merit to the Sixth Circuit's specu-
lation that a jury who heard Jones' full story might have blamed him in-
stead of Hines. After all, the story Jones told at trial was in many ways
more suspicious than the truth. According to his initial account, Jones
fortuitously stopped by the motel, hung around outside, and then stumbled
upon the body. All without a witness to verify his actions. The jury
heard this tale—and Hines' attorney stressed its oddities—yet found that
Hines was the murderer. A federal court cannot now claim that the truth
would have made a difference.
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394 MA
YS v. HINES
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for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed
in
forma pauperis, and we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor dissents.
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