State v. Kenneth Lamont Robinson, Jr.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Kenneth Lamont Robinson, Jr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001269

Appeal From Charleston County
Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5960
Heard March 17, 2022 – Filed January 11, 2023

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED

John H. Blume, III, of Cornell Law School, of Ithaca,
New York; Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of
Columbia; and Public Defender Megan Sara Ehrlich, of
Charleston; all for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Assistant
Attorney General Tommy Evans, Jr., all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Scarlett A. Wilson, of Charleston; all for
Respondent.
WILLIAMS, C.J.: In this criminal appeal, Kenneth L. Robinson, a juvenile,
appeals his convictions for murder and attempted murder. Specifically, Robinson
argues the trial court erred in (1) refusing to remand jurisdiction to the family
court, (2) admitting gang-related evidence throughout trial, (3) failing to instruct
the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, (4) failing to
instruct the jury to consider Robinson's age during its deliberations, and (5)
sentencing Robinson to fifty years' imprisonment. We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Shortly after midnight, in the early morning hours of May 10, 2015, Richard
Simmons contacted the North Charleston Police Department to report gunshots.
While Simmons was talking to Robinson, Kelly Green, and Latrell Hamilton
outside of Robinson's home, a moving vehicle fired at the group. None of the men
were wounded, but Simmons's car was damaged. An officer responded to the
scene, collected evidence, and then left not long after he arrived. Simmons,
Robinson, Green, and Hamilton then began calling their friends, whom they knew
had guns, to come to Robinson's house to prepare for another shooting should one
occur. At trial, Simmons testified that Keon Anderson, Robinson's uncle,
Derrontae Holmes, and two other men responded to their calls and showed up with
guns.

At roughly 1:30 A.M., while the men stood in Robinson's yard conversing,
occupants of another car shot in close proximity to the men; 1 however, according
to Simmons, the shots were not fired directly at them. All the men jumped into
three separate cars to chase their assailants. Simmons, Robinson, and Anderson all
got into the same car, a Honda CR-V, and all three were armed. Simmons drove,
Robinson was in the front passenger seat, and Anderson was in the right rear
passenger seat.

While patrolling the neighborhood, the posse spotted an unfamiliar Chrysler 300,
and someone shot at the vehicle. A car chase ensued as the Chrysler 300 attempted

1
There is confusion in the record as to whether the second shooting was a drive-by
or whether the assailants were on foot. Simmons testified the shots came from a
vehicle, but he did not see the vehicle. Others testified that the shooters were on
foot.
to escape. The chase lasted roughly ten and a half miles,2 and two of the vehicles
dropped out of the chase because the Chrysler 300 was much faster. After losing
sight of the Chrysler 300 and searching for a short time, Simmons pulled up beside
an identical Chrysler 300 stopped at a traffic light. Over objection from Robinson
and Anderson, Simmons shot several times into the driver's side door of the
Chrysler. Simmons even stated he had to push Robinson out of the way to fire the
gun. Although Simmons fired his own weapon at the car, he had to retrieve it from
Robinson who was using it because Robinson's gun was out of bullets. Inside the
mistaken Chrysler was Kedena Brown (Victim). She died from two gunshot
wounds—one to the left side of her head and one to the left side of her throat.
Police arrested Robinson for the murder several days later.

As a juvenile, the family court initially held jurisdiction over Robinson, but the
State moved to transfer jurisdiction to Charleston County General Sessions court.
After a hearing, the family court issued an order that determined it was in the best
interest of Robinson and the public that he be tried as an adult. In the court's order,
it evaluated Robinson's case under the Kent 3 factors and determined the factors
militated towards a transfer of jurisdiction. After the transfer, a Charleston County
grand jury indicted Robinson for murder and four counts of attempted murder.

Thereafter, Simmons, who was adamant Robinson was the shooter throughout the
investigation of Victim's death, confessed he was the triggerman. Robinson,
arguing this was newly-discovered evidence, filed a motion with the trial court
seeking a transfer of jurisdiction back to the family court. Robinson claimed that
because he was not the shooter, his culpability in Victim's murder was diminished.
He argued this critical fact was in dispute when the family court made its decision,
and had this fact been known to the family court, it would have been more likely to
retain jurisdiction over his case. The trial court refused to transfer jurisdiction,
finding the family court's transfer order articulated all the relevant Kent factors and
that this new fact alone was insufficient evidence to warrant a transfer.

Prior to his trial, Robinson argued to suppress all evidence that associated him with
a gang pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE. The State's theory for introducing such

2
It was disputed whether the occupants of the Chrysler were shooting back at the
three cars during the chase. Simmons claimed he never saw shots fired from the
Chrysler. Anderson testified to the contrary. The Chrysler was pulled over shortly
after the chase and no guns were found in the car, but two of the Chrysler's
occupants tested positive for gunshot residue several hours after their arrest.
3
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966).
evidence was that the shootings at Robinson's home, provoking Victim's murder,
were the product of a gang war in Robinson's neighborhood. The State intended to
prove Robinson was a member of the Young Gunnas, a rival gang of Loud Pack,
and that the gang war served as motive and intent for Victim's murder. The court
denied Robinson's motion, stating the gang evidence was relevant, the State could
prove his involvement in the gang by clear and convincing evidence, and the
documented shootings between the gangs were admissible to prove motive, intent,
or a common scheme. The court also found that although the introduction of the
evidence created a genuine risk of unfair prejudice, it did not violate Rule 403,
SCRE.

At trial, through sixteen of its thirty-two witnesses, the State elicited testimony
regarding the supposed gang war. The State questioned witnesses about their
affiliations with the two gangs, Robinson's affiliation with the Young Gunnas, two
other murders that occurred in Robinson's neighborhood, and several other
shootings in the neighborhood. At the outset of trial, the State questioned the four
men who occupied the Chrysler 300 during the car chase. All four men testified
they did not know the nine men chasing them, except for Robinson and Simmons,
and that the posse had no reason to shoot at them. The men also testified they did
not know what caused friction between the Young Gunnas and Loud Pack or if
tension even existed. They also stated they were not members of Loud Pack and
that they did not know if Robinson was a Young Gunna.

Simmons, Anderson, Green, and Leroy Manigault also testified about the gangs.
Simmons testified that he knew of the gangs but was not a member of the Young
Gunnas. He stated, however, that he was associated with the gang because his
friends were members. When asked if Robinson was a member of the gang,
Simmons first stated "I don't think so" but then admitted Robinson was a member
after further questioning. He also stated he thought it was Loud Pack members that
shot at him but that he did not think the men who occupied the Chrysler 300 were
in that gang. Simmons further testified he was not sure what caused the friction
between the two gangs but noted the "streets were saying" Robinson's cousin, who
was the head of the Young Gunnas, killed a member of Loud Pack. Anderson
stated he knew of the gangs and their conflicts but it was "street talk, nothing that
[he] knew for sure." Like Simmons, Anderson did not know the men identified in
the Chrysler 300 or why they would target his group. He also said he had heard
Robinson was a Young Gunna but that the gang was not active in 2015.

Manigault, a participant in the car chase and the supplier of Robinson's weapon,
testified he thought the men in the Chrysler 300 were in Loud Pack and that they
were the shooters. He talked about Loud Pack and how people said Robinson's
cousin shot a member of the gang but that it was not true. He also discussed two
other shootings that he participated in several days after Victim's death. Manigault
believed the target of one of the subsequent shootings was involved in the
shootings at Robinson's home. He also stated Robinson and his uncle were both
Young Gunnas. On cross-examination, Manigault admitted he had no firsthand
knowledge concerning the two gangs and their tumultuous relations and that he
was not a member of the Young Gunnas. Green, on the other hand, admitted he
was a member of the Young Gunnas and stated that Robinson was a member too.
He testified the occupants of the Chrysler 300 were members of a gang but not
Loud Pack and that those two gangs were not associated. He did not think Loud
Pack was responsible for the drive-by shootings at Robinson's home. Green also
discussed the strain between the two gangs, claiming "the streets" said members
from both sides were killing each other and that Robinson's cousin—again,
according to the streets—killed a rival gang member. He admitted he had no
firsthand knowledge and that it was all based on rumor.

The State also elicited testimony regarding Robinson wearing an ankle monitor at
the time of the shooting and the charges that were pending against him that forced
him to wear the monitor. The GPS within Robinson's ankle monitor placed him at
the crime scene on the night of the murder. This fact was undisputed at trial. The
State also proved Simmons's presence at the crime scene through cell phone data.
The State then introduced evidence through several witnesses regarding spent shell
casings found around Robinson's neighborhood during investigations of other
shootings. The inference from the shells was that all of the shootings were
connected and proved a gang war that Robinson was involved in through his uncle.

Detective Jerome Desheers, who the court refused to qualify as an expert, testified
he was a member of an FBI taskforce called Safe Streets. His duties included
identifying gangs, their activities, and their members. Desheers testified about the
killings that had taken place in Robinson's neighborhood and identified the
members of each gang who were suspected to be the killers. Based on his
knowledge surrounding the shootings and the individuals involved, Desheers
opined "there is an ongoing battle between" the Young Gunnas and Loud Pack
with both sides "shooting back and forth." On cross-examination, Desheers
admitted no member of either gang had been charged with the murders he
suspected caused the gang war. He also admitted he had not interviewed any
participants in the gang war regarding Victim's death.
Prior to the jury charge, Robinson requested the trial court instruct the jury on
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. The trial court
refused, stating no evidence suggested Simmons acted out of a heat of passion.
The jury found Robinson guilty as indicted, and after holding an individualized
sentencing hearing pursuant to Aiken v. Byars, 4 the trial court sentenced Robinson
to concurrent terms of fifty years' imprisonment for murder and ten years'
imprisonment for each count of attempted murder. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts sit to review only errors of law in criminal cases and are limited to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Miller, 433 S.C.
613, 625, 861 S.E.2d 373, 379 (Ct. App. 2021). An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or when there is no
evidentiary support for its factual conclusions. Id. Review of a trial court's factual
findings is prohibited unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Rios, 388 S.C.
335, 337, 696 S.E.2d 608, 610 (Ct. App. 2010).

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the trial court err in refusing to transfer jurisdiction to the family court for
reassessment of Robinson's initial waiver determination?

II. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of Robinson's gang affiliation to
prove motive or intent in Victim's murder?

III. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter
as a lesser-included offense of murder?

IV. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury to consider Robinson's age
during its charge on the hand of one, hand of all doctrine?

V. Did the trial court violate Robinson's constitutional rights in sentencing him to
fifty years' imprisonment and in failing to grant him a new sentencing
hearing?

LAW/ANALYSIS

4
410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014).
I. Remand to Family Court

Robinson argues the trial court erred in refusing to remand his case back to the
family court. Robinson asserts the family court's use of Simmons's original
statement claiming Robinson was the shooter in its transfer order was "a
fundamental misapprehension of the facts of the case" and that Simmons's
admission of guilt was sufficient to warrant another waiver hearing by the family
court. He asserts South Carolina should allow juveniles a remedy when newly
discovered evidence arises after the original transfer hearing.5 We disagree and
affirm on this issue.

Waiver of jurisdiction over a juvenile by the family court is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 559, 647 S.E.2d
144, 161 (2007). Family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over any
action concerning a child living within the geographical limits of its jurisdiction
who allegedly violated a state law. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-510(A)(1)(d) (Supp.
2022). Family courts may transfer cases involving a fifteen-year-old child to a trial
court if the child is charged with an offense that, if committed by an adult, would
be a Class A, B, C, or D felony or a felony that provides for a maximum term of
imprisonment of fifteen years or more. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1210(5) (Supp.
2022). Upon a motion to transfer jurisdiction, the family court must determine,
after conducting a full investigation and hearing, if it is in the best interest of the
child and the public to grant a transfer request. § 63-19-1210 (5); State v. Kelsey,
331 S.C. 50, 64, 502 S.E.2d 63, 70 (1998).

Under Kent, to transfer jurisdiction, a family court must consider eight factors and
make sufficient findings demonstrating careful consideration of the factors. 6 383

5
Robinson proposes a standard similar to the one Wisconsin utilizes. For a trial
court to reconsider a family court's transfer order in Wisconsin, a juvenile must
present new, compelling grounds, not considered at the waiver hearing, that (1)
were not in existence at the time of the waiver hearing or was unknowingly
overlooked, (2) are highly relevant to the criteria for waiver, and (3) are likely to
have affected the family court's transfer determination. In re Vairin M., 647
N.W.2d 208, 219 (Wis. 2002).
6
The factors include (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) whether the offense was
committed in an aggressive, premeditated, violent, or willful manner; (3) whether
the alleged offense was perpetrated against persons or property, greater weight
being given to offenses against a person, especially if injury resulted; (4) the merit
of the complaint; (5) judicial economy; (6) the juvenile's sophistication and
U.S. at 566–68. The serious nature of the offense is a major factor in the family
court's decision. Sanders v. State, 281 S.C. 53, 56, 314 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1984).

In the present case, the family court did an excellent job summarizing the facts and
outlining its reasons for waiving jurisdiction in a fourteen-page transfer order. The
family court weighed all the Kent factors and found that transfer was proper
because (1) murder and attempted murder are the most serious criminal offenses;
(2) the offenses were committed against an innocent civilian and culminated in her
death; (3) the offenses were committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, and
willful manner; (4) ample evidence existed to allow a grand jury to return
indictments on all charges; (5) Robinson had an extensive, violent criminal
history7; and (6) the abysmal failure of the South Carolina Department of Juvenile
Justice (DJJ) in monitoring Robinson while he was under house arrest created a
concern for adequate public protection (records show Robinson left his home 260
times without detection, despite DJJ receiving daily tracking reports).

The family court also considered the conclusions and recommendations of the two
doctors that performed Robinson's prewaiver evaluations. Despite acknowledging
that Robinson appeared amenable to DJJ services and that he "flourished" in a
secure and structured environment, the family court determined the structure of
South Carolina's juvenile commitment laws did not adequately protect the public

maturity as defined by his home life, environmental situation, emotional attitude,
and pattern of living; (7) the juvenile's criminal history, including probation; and
(8) the prospects for adequate public protection and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation if the juvenile is found guilty of the alleged offense. 383 U.S. at
566–67.
7
In the court's factual recitation, it listed Robinson's extensive criminal history. At
twelve years old, Robinson was charged with disorderly conduct. At fourteen
years old, after police conducted a drug raid on his grandmother's home, he was
charged with trafficking cocaine (an officer testified Robinson was laughing as he
claimed ownership of the cocaine); possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
(PWID) within proximity of a school; PWID marijuana; PWID marijuana within
proximity of a school; possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number;
possession of a stolen firearm; and possession of a handgun by a minor. While
awaiting adjudication of these charges, Robinson was charged with attempted
murder (amended to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature),
possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, attempted armed
robbery, and unlawful carrying of a handgun by a minor. Robinson cut off his
electric GPS ankle monitor on the way to commit the robbery.
from Robinson. The court reasoned that the statutory scheme did not guarantee
Robinson would remain in DJJ until his twenty-first birthday, divested the family
court of authority to ensure Robinson stayed in DJJ until his twenty-first birthday,
and mandated his release upon his twenty-first birthday unconditionally without
any supervision.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to transfer Robinson's
case back to family court. First, the family court accorded appropriate weight to
the conflicting statements from Robinson and Simmons, concluding that under the
circumstances, the judicial economy of trying Robinson and his codefendants in
one court was desirable. The family court's reasoning is appropriate, even
considering Simmons's confession, because there was no dispute that Robinson
was in the car when Simmons fired the lethal bullets or that Robinson shot the
murder weapon from the moving vehicle before handing it to Simmons to shoot at
Victim's car.

Second, although Robinson argues otherwise, Simmons's confession does not
diminish the seriousness of the offenses for which Robinson was charged or his
culpability in those crimes. Both murder and attempted murder are serious
offenses, regardless of the means the State uses to prosecute the charges. Robinson
admitted at the pretrial motions hearing that despite Simmons's admission, the
family court's review under the other Kent factors would not change and that
Simmons's admission did not change the State's theory of the case, i.e., the hand of
one is the hand of all. Under this theory, murder and attempted murder carry the
same weight as if Robinson had pulled the trigger himself.

Finally, even if the trial court remanded jurisdiction to the family court to
reevaluate its transfer determination, the limited, new evidence would not affect
the family court's decision.8 Much of the court's findings dealt with the aggressive
and violent nature in which Victim's murder was perpetrated; Robinson's extensive
and violent criminal history; and his lack of compliance with previous home

8
Thus, even if this court were to conclude the trial court abused its discretion and
should have remanded the case to family court, Robinson would fail under his own
proposed standard. See In re Vairin M., 647 N.W.2d 208, 219 (Wis. 2002) ("As
grounds for the [motion to remand jurisdiction], the juvenile must allege a new
factor that . . . likely would have affected the [family] court's determination that it
would be contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public for the
[family] court to hear the case.").
detention orders, which resulted "in him committing more egregious criminal
offenses." Because the new evidence did not diminish the seriousness of the
offense, it did not lower Robinson's culpability in the murder, and it would not
have changed the outcome of the family court's transfer determination, we find the
trial court had reasonable factual support to deny Robinson's motion to transfer
jurisdiction. See State v. Cory D., 339 S.C. 107, 118, 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000).
("The term 'abuse of discretion' has no opprobrious implication and may be found
if the conclusions reached by the [trial] court are without reasonable factual
support."). Therefore, we affirm on this issue.

II. Gang-related Evidence

Pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE, Robinson argues the trial court erred in admitting
evidence related to his gang affiliation. We agree and reverse on this issue.

Typically, evidence of a person's character is not admissible to prove the person
acted "in conformity therewith on a particular occasion." Rule 404(a), SCRE.
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a person's "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" are
inadmissible to prove a person's general character "in order to show action in
conformity therewith." However, prior bad acts may be admissible to show motive
or intent. Rule 404(b). The proponent of prior bad act evidence must demonstrate
it has a legitimate purpose, "i.e., the evidence does something more than prove a
person has propensity to commit crimes." Johnson v. State, 433 S.C. 550, 555, 860
S.E.2d 696, 699 (Ct. App. 2021).

In a criminal case, the State must convince the trial court
that the prior bad act evidence is logically relevant to a
material fact at issue in the case: "If it is logically
pertinent in that it reasonably tends to prove a material
fact in issue, it is not to be rejected merely because it
incidentally proves the defendant guilty of another
crime."

Id. (quoting State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 417, 118 S.E. 803, 807 (1923)). Trial
courts are to apply the logical relevancy test with "rigid scrutiny." Id. at 556, 803
S.E.2d at 699. If the court concludes the prior bad act evidence serves a purpose
other than to show the defendant's proclivity for criminal conduct and the purpose
is one listed under Rule 404(b), then such evidence is admissible unless its
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."
Rule 403, SCRE; see Johnson, 433 S.C. at 556, 803 S.E.2d at 699. If the prior bad
act did not result in a prior conviction the state must prove the prior bad act by
clear and convincing evidence. Johnson, 433 S.C. at 556, 803 S.E.2d at 699.

Johnson is instructive in this case as it is the only case in South Carolina to address
whether gang-related evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove motive
and intent. In that case, the defendant, a leader of a gang, ordered a hit on an
individual after the defendant's gang and a rival gang were in a gunfight. Id.
Before his trial, the defendant objected to the presentation of any gang-related
evidence on the grounds it constituted inadmissible evidence of other crimes or bad
acts and was unduly prejudicial. Id. at 553–54, 860 S.E.2d at 699. The trial court
overruled the objection, stating the evidence was relevant and did not violate Rule
403. Id. At trial, a detective and a SLED agent were qualified as experts and
testified to the defendant's gang's structure, rituals, characteristics, and the
defendant's role as a leader in the gang. Id. at 555, 860 S.E.2d at 699. A former
member of the gang testified as well and explained the defendant's power over the
gang, including promotions, demotions, and discipline. Id. Two other gang
members charged for the same shooting testified about their gang's rules, the
defendant's firm leadership, the confrontation with the rival gang on the date of the
shooting, and the defendant's order to his subordinates to execute the hit that
resulted in the victim's murder. Id.

The court found the evidence constituted prior bad act evidence and that proof of a
defendant's gang affiliation, without more, "generally proves nothing of
consequence at a criminal trial and may even implicate First Amendment rights."
Id. at 556–57, 860 S.E.2d at 700. However, the evidence presented against the
defendant was probative—if not essential—to explain the motive and intent behind
the otherwise senseless shooting of an innocent victim. 9 Id. at 557, 860 S.E.2d at
700.

We find the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to Robinson's gang
affiliation. Without doubt, the testimony regarding Robinson's gang affiliation
constituted prior bad act evidence. The question this court must answer is whether
or not such evidence was logically relevant to Robinson's involvement in the

9
The Johnson court cautioned the bar, however, stating "cases where prior bad act
evidence of gang affiliation may be admitted to prove 'motive' or 'intent' will be
uncommon, and these terms 'are not magic passwords whose mere incantation will
open wide the courtroom doors to whatever evidence may be offered in their
names.'" Id. at 558, 860 S.E.2d 700–01 (quoting United State v. Goodwin, 492
F.2d 1141, 1155 (5th Cir. 1974)).
crimes for which he was charged and proved motive or intent to commit such a
crime. See id. at 556, 860 S.E.2d at 699 ("In a criminal case, the State must
convince the trial court that the prior bad act evidence is logically relevant to a
material fact at issue in the case."); State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 31, 842 S.E.2d 654,
657 (2020) ("The question of a trial court, [appellate courts reviewing a defendant's
conviction], is whether the evidence also serves some legitimate purpose that is not
prohibited by Rule 404(b)."). We find the gang-related evidence was not logically
relevant to any material fact at issue. The witnesses that testified to participating in
the car chase admitted the two prior shootings in front of Robinson's home
provoked their actions. Simmons testified that he was upset someone had
vandalized his car and wanted retaliation for being shot at twice. He ultimately
admitted on the stand to shooting Victim.

Drawing comparisons to Johnson, in which motive and intent were critical in
connecting the defendant to the crime, here, such evidence was unnecessary to
show why Simmons shot at Victim. In Johnson, the gang evidence was essential
to explain the motive and intent behind the otherwise senseless shooting of the
innocent victim and was logically relevant to prove the charges against the
defendant—criminal conspiracy and accessory to murder after the fact. In this
case, the State proffered testimony from sixteen witnesses regarding gang
evidence; only one definitively stated he and Robinson were members of Young
Gunnas. Others ultimately stated Robinson was "associated" with the gang or that
they "heard" he was in the gang, but no one else that made these speculative
statements admitted to being in the gang, testified to knowing the Chrysler was in
fact occupied by members of Loud Pack, or testified to personal knowledge of the
conflict between the gangs. Unlike the circumstances in Johnson, in which it was
undisputed the killing occurred after an altercation between rival gangs and the
defendant was not present at the crime scene but ordered the hit, here, it was
unrefuted that Robinson was in the car when Simmons shot Victim and fired his
own weapon from the car after two shootings at his home.

Further, we find the State failed to clear the hurdle provided by Rule 403, making
such evidence inadmissible regardless of the Rule 404(b) analysis. "In criminal
cases, the term 'unfair prejudice' 'speaks to the capacity of some concededly
relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different
from proof specific to the offense charged.'" Johnson, 433 S.C. at 558–59, 860
S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)).
"Evidence of gang affiliation demands careful handling because of its power to
distract the fact finder from its rational task of deciding the facts from objective
evidence, luring their attention to the lurid, raising the risk that they will decide the
case on an improper or subjective . . . basis." Id.

In this case, the State presented much evidence that was substantially prejudicial to
Robinson's case and confusing to the jury. For instance, the State continued to
question witnesses about two murders and various shootings that occurred in
Robinson's neighborhood in an attempt to prove an ongoing gang war in the
neighborhood. The State presented testimony from detectives and SLED agents
that investigated the prior crimes; introduced photographs from those crimes; and
proffered forensics of shell casings found at those crime scenes. However, none of
the evidence clearly connected Robinson or Simmons to the prior shootings or to
the two shootings that provoked the extended car chase resulting in Victim's
murder. The risk of unfair prejudice and confusion raised by the evidence related
to a gang war and Robinson being a member of the Young Gunnas substantially
outweighed the scant probative value such evidence brought to the table.

While the State argues any error in admitting the gang-related evidence was
harmless, we find it hard to reconcile this contention with the fact the State
questioned half of its witnesses about gang-related evidence and repeatedly spoke
to gang characteristics and gang violence in its opening and closing arguments.
The State, through eliciting such a large quantity of gang-related evidence,
essentially put Robinson on trial for being a member of a gang and the gang
activity in his neighborhood. This type of prior bad act evidence is precisely what
Rules 403 and 404(b), seek to exclude from trials. See Johnson, 433 S.C. at 559,
860 S.E.2d at 701 ("The rules of evidence recognize verdicts are still rendered by
human hands, not the artificial workings of algorithms, and emotion has its place.
Rule 403 ensures emotion stays in its place."); id. at 556–57, 433 S.E.2d at 700
("Rule 404(b) bars the use of prior bad act evidence to prove character, deeming it
useless to the factfinder, for such use does not make any legitimate fact at issue
more or less probable. Proof that a defendant was a member of a gang, without
more, generally proves nothing of consequence at a criminal trial and may even
implicate First Amendment rights."). The purpose of the rules of evidence is to
facilitate fair proceedings that bring forth the truth, not the whole truth, from its
shroud of smoke and mirrors in a manner that will secure fair and just outcomes at
trial. See Rule 102, SCRE. Because the gang-related evidence presented at
Robinson's trial was not slight, was not logically relevant to prove any motive or
intent behind Victim's murder, and the dangers of unfair prejudice and confusion it
produced substantially outweighed any probative value, we find the trial court
erred in denying Robinson's motion to suppress such evidence. Therefore, we
reverse on this issue.10

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial.

VINSON, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

10
Because our holding on this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we need not
address the remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing appellate courts are not
required to address remaining issues after the resolution of a dispositive one).