State v. Phillip F. Derrick

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Phillip Franklin Derrick, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001156

Appeal From Greenwood County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-300
Heard February 4, 2026 – Filed June 17, 2026

AFFIRMED

William G. Yarborough, III and Lauren C. Hobbis, both
of William G. Yarborough III, Attorney at Law, LLC, of
Greenville, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Phillip Franklin Derrick appeals his conviction for trafficking
methamphetamine of more than twenty-eight grams. He contends the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search by law
enforcement. He argues the search warrant was defective for failing to sufficiently
describe the location that law enforcement searched that produced the evidence.
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v.
Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 633, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022) ("[A]ppellate review of a
motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment involves a two-step
analysis."); id. at 633-34, 879 S.E.2d at 766 ("This dual inquiry means we review
the trial court's factual findings for any evidentiary support, but the ultimate legal
conclusion . . . is a question of law subject to de novo review."); State v. Crummey,
443 S.C. 94, 107, 902 S.E.2d 391, 398 (Ct. App. 2024) ("A search or seizure is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when it is authorized by a warrant that is
supported by probable cause." (quoting State v. Dill, 423 S.C. 534, 542, 816 S.E.2d
557, 562 (2018))); State v. Thompson, 363 S.C. 192, 199, 609 S.E.2d 556, 560 (Ct.
App. 2005) ("[S]earch warrants may not be issued except 'upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation,' and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized." (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV;
S.C. Const. art. I, §10)); id. at 200, 609 S.E.2d at 560 ("The magistrate issuing the
search warrant must 'make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" (omission
in original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))); id. ("The
specific requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the person, place,
or thing to be searched 'is aimed at preventing general warrants—those authorizing
a general, exploratory rummaging in a person[']s belongings.'" (quoting State v.
Williams, 297 S.C. 404, 407, 377 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1989))); id. at 200, 609 S.E.2d
at 560-61 ("By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things
for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search
will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of
the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." (quoting
Williams, 297 S.C. at 407, 377 S.E.2d at 310)); Williams, 297 S.C. at 406-07, 377
S.E.2d at 309-10 (determining a description of the property subject to seizure as
"any illegal drugs" stated with sufficient particularity the property to be seized thus
meeting the requirements of section 17-13-140 of the South Carolina Code (2014)
and the federal and state constitutions); United States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462, 463
(4th Cir. 1988) ("The particularity requirement prohibits general, exploratory
searches. A warrant meets the particularity requirement 'if the description is such
that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Steele v. United States,
267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925))); State v. Ellis, 263 S.C. 12, 19, 207 S.E.2d 408, 411
(1974) ("Search warrants directed against multioccupancy structures have been
held valid despite the fact that no particular sub-unit was specified, where it
appeared that the entire premises rather than a particular sub-unit was under
suspicion of illegal activity."), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Adams, 291
S.C. 132, 352 S.E.2d 483 (1987), overruled in part by State v. Stewart, 433 S.C.
382, 858 S.E.2d 808 (2021); id. at 18, 207 S.E.2d at 411 (determining "[t]he
description in the caption of the warrant taken in connection with the affidavit was
enough to sustain the warrant as against the attack that it was constitutionally
deficient for not particularly describing the place to be searched"); Williams, 297
S.C. at 406, 377 S.E.2d at 309 ("[A] warrant may be read in connection with the
supporting affidavit to satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements of
particularity in the description of the place to be searched."); State v. Cheeks, 400
S.C. 329, 339, 733 S.E.2d 611, 616 (Ct. App. 2012) ("[A] search warrant will be
considered sufficient if it either incorporates a supporting document by reference
which provides the requisite particularity, or if such supporting document is
attached to the warrant itself."), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 408 S.C. 198,
758 S.E.2d 715 (2014) (per curiam); State v. Robinson, 410 S.C. 519, 527-28, 765
S.E.2d 564, 568-69 (2014) ("A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and
seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of
a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment
rights infringed." (emphasis added) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134
(1978))).

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.