Bernard Bagley v. SCDPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Bernard Bagley, #175851, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and
Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000110

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Crystal Rookard, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-268
Submitted May 1, 2026 – Filed June 3, 2026

AFFIRMED

Bernard Bagley, pro se.

General Counsel Matthew C. Buchanan, of the South
Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon
Services, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Bernard Bagley appeals an order of the Administrative Law
Court (ALC) affirming an order of the South Carolina Department of Probation,
Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS) which denied him parole after concluding
that the parole board (the Board) followed proper procedure and none of the issues
he raised fell within its limited review authority. On appeal, Bagley argues (1)
SCDPPPS erred when, pursuant to section 24-21-610 of the South Carolina Code
(2025), it failed to present a report on his mental condition and ability to adjust to
life outside the prison from a duly qualified psychiatrist or psychologist and (2) the
Board erred by failing to consider such a report, which was required for
consideration of parole for someone like Bagley who had served a total of ten
consecutive years or more in prison pursuant to section 24-21-610. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(c), SCACR.1

Because all of Bagley's issues on appeal stem from his claim that the ALC erred in
affirming the Board's denial of parole, we consider the issues together. We hold
substantial evidence supports the ALC's order affirming the Board's denial of
parole. See Major v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 384 S.C. 457,
464, 682 S.E.2d 795, 799 (2009) ("The ALC's order should be affirmed if
supported by substantial evidence in the record."); id. ("The decision of the ALC
should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or
controlled by some error of law."); Tennant v. Beaufort Cnty. Sch. Dist., 381 S.C.
617, 620, 674 S.E.2d 488, 490 (2009) ("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla
of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached."). The ALC
affirmed the Board's denial of parole after it concluded that the Board's decision to
deny Bagley parole constituted a routine denial of parole and none of the issues
Bagley raised fell within the ALC's "limited review authority." The Board
indicated in its notice of rejection that it considered the factors outlined in section
24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code (2025) and factors published in Department
Form 1212; therefore, Bagley's denial of parole constituted a routine denial of
parole. See Cooper v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 377 S.C. 489,
500, 661 S.E.2d 106, 112 (2008) (stating that if the Board's decision to deny parole
is a "routine denial of parole," then the ALC's authority is limited to determining
whether the Board followed proper procedure), abrogated on other grounds by
Allen v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 439 S.C. 164, 886 S.E.2d 671 (2023); id. (stating a
denial of parole is routine if the Board "clearly states in its order denying parole

1
In his brief, Bagley expresses concern that this court will find his issues on appeal
are moot. We note the issues in this appeal are not rendered moot by any
subsequent denial of parole because the Board's alleged failure to use required
information in making parole determinations is capable of repetition but evading
review. See Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 568, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001) ("[A]n
appellate court can take jurisdiction, despite mootness, if the issue is capable of
repetition but evading review.").
that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 and the fifteen factors
published in its parole form"); Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon
Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479, 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (holding an order that
denied parole and stated that the SCDPPPS considered all statutory and
departmental criteria was sufficient to support a denial of parole); Rule 220(c),
SCACR ("The appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, decision or judgment
upon any ground(s) appearing in the [r]ecord on [a]ppeal.").

Further, Bagley misreads section 24-21-610 in arguing SCDPPPS must present and
the Board must receive a report on his mental condition and ability to adjust to life
outside the prison from a duly qualified psychiatrist or psychologist prior to
determining whether to deny parole. Section 24-21-610 requires the Board receive
a report prior to granting parole; it does not require the Board receive or consider a
report prior to denying parole. See Cooper, 377 S.C. at 496, 661 S.E.2d at 110 ("In
interpreting statutes, [an appellate court] look[s] to the plain meaning of the statute
and the intent of the Legislature."); id. ("Because the statute is penal in nature, the
[c]ourt must construe it strictly in favor of the defendant and against the State.");
§ 24-21-610 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or of law, no
prisoner who has served a total of ten consecutive years or more in prison may be
paroled until the Board has first received a report as to his mental condition and his
ability to adjust to life outside the prison from a duly qualified psychiatrist or
psychologist." (emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED.2

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.