Joe Bryan v. THI of South Carolina at Charleston, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Joe Bryan, Respondent,

v.

THI of South Carolina at Charleston, LLC d/b/a
Riverside Health and Rehab, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2025-000237

Appeal From Charleston County
Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge,

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-261
Submitted May 21, 2026 – Filed June 3, 2026

AFFIRMED

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines, James
D. Gandy, III, Donald Jay Davis, Jr., and Ted Ashton
Phillips, III, all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston,
for Appellant.

Bert Glenn Utsey, III, Christina Rae Fargnoli, Laura Kell
Wilkes-D'Amato, all of Clawson Fargnoli Utsey, LLC,
and Samuel Richard Clawson, Jr., all of Charleston, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: THI of South Carolina at Charleston, LLC d/b/a Riverside
Health and Rehab (the Facility) appeals the circuit court's order denying its motion
to compel to arbitration the claims of Joe Bryan. On appeal, the Facility argues the
circuit court erred by denying its motion to compel arbitration. We affirm pursuant
to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

First, we hold the circuit court did not err in denying the Facility's motion to
compel arbitration because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration
Agreement did not merge. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580,
596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an
issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope
Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1,
3 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is
subject to de novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10,
571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings
will not be overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them.");
MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Christianson, 377 S.C. 210, 214, 659 S.E.2d 209, 211
(Ct. App. 2008) ("[W]e apply South Carolina law to the initial determination of
arbitrability but look to federal law for additional guidance."); Wilson v. Willis, 426
S.C. 326, 335, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019) ("Whether an arbitration agreement
may be enforced against a nonsignatory to the agreement is a matter subject to de
novo review by an appellate court."); Est. of Solesbee by Bayne v. Fundamental
Clinical & Operational Servs., LLC, 438 S.C. 638, 648-49, 885 S.E.2d 144, 149
(Ct. App. 2023) (finding the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did
not merge after considering (1) the admission agreement provided it was governed
by South Carolina law and the arbitration agreement provided it was governed by
federal law, (2) the arbitration agreement recognized the two documents were
separate by stating the arbitration agreement "shall survive any termination or
breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement," (3) the documents were
separately paginated and had their own signature pages, and (4) signing the
arbitration agreement was not a precondition to admission); Coleman v. Mariner
Health Care, Inc., 407 S.C. 346, 355, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (concluding that
by the documents' own terms, language in the admission agreement that
"recognize[d] the 'separatedness' of [the arbitration agreement] and the admission
agreement" and a clause allowing the arbitration agreement to "be disclaimed
within thirty days of signing while the admission agreement could not" indicated
the parties' intention "that the common law doctrine of merger not apply"); Hodge
v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg, LLC, 422 S.C. 544, 562-63, 813 S.E.2d
292, 302 (Ct. App. 2018) (determining an admissions agreement and arbitration
agreement did not merge because the fact "the [a]dmissions [a]greement indicated
it was governed by South Carolina law, whereas the [a]rbitration [a]greement
stated it was governed by federal law[,]" "each document was separately paginated
and had its own signature page[,]" and "the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated signing
it was not a precondition to admission" evidenced the parties' intention that the
documents be construed as separate instruments). Here, as in Solesbee and Hodge,
(1) the two agreements were governed by different bodies of law because the
Admission Agreement was governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement
was governed by federal law; (2) each document was separately labeled,
numbered, and contained its own signature page; (3) the Arbitration Agreement
recognized the two documents were separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement
"shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the Admission
Agreement"; and (4) the Facility acknowledged that signing the Arbitration
Agreement was not a prerequisite to admission to the Facility. Thus, the
Admission Agreement and Arbitration Agreement did not merge.

Second, because we find the agreements did not merge—a controlling
consideration in whether the Arbitration Agreement bound Bryan—we decline to
reach the Facility's remaining arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior
issue is dispositive); Est. of Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 649, 885 S.E.2d at 149
(determining that because the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did
not merge, the equitable estoppel argument was properly denied); Coleman, 407
S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since there was no merger here, appellants'
equitable estoppel argument was properly denied by the circuit court."); Hodge,
422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (concluding "equitable estoppel would only
apply if documents were merged").

AFFIRMED.1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.