Sunset Lodge, LLC v. Town of Pawleys Island

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Sunset Lodge, LLC,

and

Franklin D. Beattie, as trustee of The Franklin D. Beattie
Preservation Trust,

and

M. Baron Stanton, Plaintiffs,

v.

Town of Pawleys Island, Defendant,

Of which Sunset Lodge, LLC and Franklin D. Beattie, as
trustee of the Franklin D. Beattie Preservation Trust are
the Appellants,

and

Town of Pawleys Island is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000291

Appeal From Georgetown County
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-274
Heard March 4, 2025 – Filed June 3, 2026
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

M. Baron Stanton, of Stanton Law Offices, P.A. of
Columbia, for Appellants.

Norwood David DuRant, Sr. and Norwood David
Durant, Jr., of Law Offices of N. David DuRant &
Assoc., of Surfside Beach, and William Clayton Dillard,
Jr. of Belser Law Firm, PA, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

MCDONALD, J.: The issues in this appeal arise from a successful action by
Franklin D. Beattie; Sunset Lodge, LLC; and M. Baron Stanton (collectively,
Landowners) to quash the initial set of three condemnation notices pursued by the
Town of Pawleys Island. Landowners argue the circuit court erred in finding their
requested attorney's fees were unreasonable and in calculating the fee award based
upon a considerably reduced number of hours, which they contend resulted in an
87% difference between the fees requested for the hours claimed and the fees
awarded for hours the circuit court deemed reasonable. Although we agree with
the circuit court that Appellants' fee petitions claimed far too many hours worked
considering the length and difficulty of the underlying cases, we find the circuit
discounted the claimed hours too steeply. Thus, we affirm as modified.

Factual and Procedural Background

This case began with the Town's attempts to obtain easements allegedly necessary
for a beach renourishment project. The Town began seeking easements from
affected landowners in February 2019, but its discussions with Landowners were
unsuccessful due to the broad terms and scope of the easements the Town
proposed. Initial easement proposals sought to subject an affected lot to overly
broad public access and to grant the Town an apparently unfettered ability to
remove undefined "obstructions" from the proposed easements. Perhaps of
greatest concern, the easements as proposed would have included the entire lots
and dwellings. Under later proposals, "the subject part" for the proposed
easements was defined as "the part running from the owner's eastern property
boundary shown on the plat prepared by the Town (the mean high watermark on
the ocean) west (landward) to two feet from the main supports of the main house."

During the course of the project, the Town obtained easements from the majority
of affected property owners, but some, including Landowners, stood firm. In May
2020, the Town adopted a resolution authorizing condemnation of the remaining
easements, erroneously claiming the Town's project with the Army Corps of
Engineers could not proceed without them. The proposed easements again
subjected the private land affected to wildly broad "public use and access." And,
although the Town obtained appraisals for the proposed easements, it curiously—
and in violation of the applicable statute—served the condemnation notices
without providing these appraisals.

The three Landowners filed separate actions challenging any condemnation of their
properties; voluminous motions and memoranda followed. Ultimately, the circuit
court granted summary judgment to Landowners.

In its formal order, the circuit court explained that the grant of summary judgment
was based upon the Town's failure to comply with both its own resolution
"describing the easement to be condemned" and the applicable condemnation
statutes. The circuit court noted the Town "sought to condemn an easement of
greater scope than authorized by Town Council, and [of] greater scope than
appraised, but to pay an amount for the easement based on a different description."
The circuit court further recognized the Town had included a provision—
purportedly through the power of condemnation but contrary to its prior
representations—for an easement "together with the right of public use and
access." The condemnation notices described the interests in the properties
differently than the appraisals described them, and the Town then failed to provide
Landowners with appraisal reports before serving the condemnation notices. The
circuit court noted Landowners had executed easement deeds and provided them to
the Town with terms allowing for the renourishment activities, but the Town
inexplicably rejected them. Detailing the Town's inconsistent representations and
providing other examples of its municipal overreach, the circuit court granted
Landowners' motions for summary judgment, quashed the three condemnation
notices, and declared each matter "ended without prejudice in the respect described
above." The Town filed Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motions requesting that the circuit
reconsider the grants of summary judgment.

Landowners subsequently filed fee petitions, with supporting affidavits, claiming
attorney's fees of $131,625.14. They requested that each be awarded one-third of
the total fee award based upon their fee-sharing agreement. Stanton later clarified
that he sought only the $1,082.66 in costs associated with his action, which would
have reduced the Town's overall fee burden by one-third.

The Town filed an "Initial Reply" opposing the motion for fees and expenses and
requesting itemized fee statements. Landowners responded with a memo
discussing what had already been provided in support of the fee requests and
offering to submit supplemental documentation subject to a protective order.
Landowners then filed a lengthy brief addressing matters scheduled for "discussion
with" the circuit court and again requested a protective order allowing them to
produce redacted bills to the Town and unredacted bills to the court under seal.
The Town likewise sought a protective order with its own memo addressing the
production of documents relevant to the fee petitions. Landowners objected to the
circuit court's hearing of the Town's latest motion, arguing it was filed too late;
they also noticed the deposition of Ryan Fabbri, the Town Administrator. In
response, the Town filed a motion for a "protective order regarding discovery,"
arguing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment rendered moot the Town's
further participation, and sought an order quashing Fabbri's deposition notice.
Landowners responded to this filing with a forty-three-page brief and protective
order proposal.

The circuit court ordered Landowners to produce redacted fee statements to the
Town's counsel and unredacted fee statements to the court. The circuit court also
denied the Town's Rule 59(e) motions but substituted an amended summary
judgment order clarifying a reference to the beach renourishment project. The
circuit court later ordered Landowners to produce revised redacted fee statements
to the Town based upon the court's amendments to their initial redactions.

A third amended fee affidavit followed, presenting a total claim of $175,895 in
attorney's fees and $5,700 in expenses; an erratum later corrected the amount
requested per owner to $61,112.02.

The Town responded to Landowners' lengthy fee petition filings with an opposing
memo accompanied by several exhibits. This packet included the affidavit of the
Town's expert witness, David Pagliarini, who opined Landowners' request for
attorney's fees was unreasonable. Based on a rough computation, Pagliarini
believed 125 hours was a reasonable and fair fee amount for an attorney to devote
to these three cases. The Town also attached an affidavit from William Dillard, its
new attorney and appellate counsel, who calculated 127 hours to be reasonable.
Following a hearing, the circuit court held the fees Landowners claimed were
unreasonable based upon the scope and complexity of the three cases. Accepting
the hourly figure proposed in the Pagliarini affidavit, the circuit court found an
award calculated upon 125 hours of work was appropriate, awarding fees and costs
of $8,913.33 each to Beattie and Sunset Lodge and costs of $819.33 to Stanton.
Appellants timely filed Rule 59(e) motions, which the circuit court denied.

Standard of Review

"Decisions as to the amount of attorneys' fees should ordinarily be made by trial
courts. When a trial court's decision is made on a sound evidentiary basis and is
adequately explained with specific findings—as the law requires—we defer to the
trial court's discretion." Horton v. Jasper Cnty. Sch. Dist., 423 S.C. 325, 331, 815
S.E.2d 442, 445 (2018). "The decision to award or deny attorneys' fees under a
state statute will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." S.C.
Dep't of Transp. v. Revels, 411 S.C. 1, 8, 766 S.E.2d 700, 703 (2014) (quoting
Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 382 S.C. 8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445
(2009)). "Similarly, the specific amount of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to a
statute authorizing reasonable attorneys' fees is left to the discretion of the trial
judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Id. at 8, 766 S.E.2d
at 703–04 (quoting Kiriakides, 382 S.C. at 20, 675 S.E.2d at 445). "An abuse of
discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by an
error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions." Id. at 8, 766 S.E.2d
at 703 (quoting Kiriakides, 382 S.C. at 20, 675 S.E.2d at 445). "However, where
the issue of the amount of attorneys' fees awarded depends on the Court's
interpretation of 'reasonable' attorneys' fees as contained in the [Eminent Domain
Procedure] Act, the interpretation of the statute is a question of law that the Court
reviews de novo." Id. at 8, 766 S.E.2d at 704.

Calculation of Attorney's Fees

"Although the circuit court has discretion in deciding the 'specific amount of . . .
reasonable attorneys' fees,' its decision must not be 'based on unsupported factual
conclusions.'" Horton, 423 S.C. at 331, 815 S.E.2d at 445 (2018) (first quoting
Kiriakides, 382 S.C. at 20, 675 S.E.2d at 445; and then quoting Sloan v. Friends of
the Hunley, Inc., 393 S.C. 152, 156, 711 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2011)). The Eminent
Domain Procedure Act (the Act) contains a fee-shifting provision allowing
landowners who successfully challenge a municipality's efforts to condemn their
property to recover reasonable costs and litigation expenses. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 28-2-510 (2007). Section 28-2-510(A) provides, "If, in the action challenging
the condemnor's right to take, the court determines that the condemnor has no right
to take all or part of any landowner's property, the landowner's reasonable costs
and litigation expenses incurred therein must be awarded to the landowner."
(Emphasis added). Under the Act:

"Litigation expenses" means the reasonable fees, charges,
disbursements, and expenses necessarily incurred from
and after service of the Condemnation Notice, including,
but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees, appraisal
fees, engineering fees, deposition costs, and other expert
witness fees necessary for preparation or participation in
condemnation actions and the actual cost of transporting
the court and jury to view the premises.

S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-30(14) (2007). In interpreting section 28-2-510, our
supreme court has concluded that the General Assembly intended for attorneys'
fees to be awarded based on a "constellation of factors." Revels, 411 S.C. at 10–
11, 766 S.E.2d at 705. As to the reasonableness of fees generally:

When determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees
under a statute mandating the award of attorney fees, the
contract between the client and his counsel does not
control the determination of a reasonable hourly rate.
Instead, the court should consider the following six
factors when determining a reasonable attorney's fee: (1)
the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time
necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing
of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5)
beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees
for similar services.

Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 308, 486 S.E.2d 750, 759–60 (1997) (citations
omitted).1

After amending the fee petitions multiple times, Landowners ultimately claimed
$175,895 in attorney's fees incurred and estimated another $5,700 would be

1
Our supreme court has emphasized that "a Jackson evaluation is neither required
nor forbidden under section 28-2-510." Revels, 411 S.C. at 13, 766 S.E.2d at 706.
required to close their cases. They requested $61,093.33 each, equal to their
associated costs and 1/3 of the total attorney's fees. They claimed counsel spent
774.3 hours on the case from August 2020 through March 2021, and 146.2 hours
from March 2021 through September 2021; Stanton further estimated he would
spend an additional thirty hours to conclude the cases, for a total of 950 hours.

We agree with the circuit court that Appellants' request for a fee award calculated
on 950 claimed hours was unreasonable. Yet, based upon the circumstances of
these cases—specifically the Town's problematic behavior and the irreconcilable
inconsistencies between the summary judgment order and findings in the fee
order—the circuit court erred in relying solely on the Pagliarini affidavit to make a
finding of reasonable hours worked on the three challenge cases. Initially, we note
our concerns with the fee order's statements regarding "non-prevailing claims."
We are perplexed as to how some of the fee order's findings could be reached in
light of the discovery blocked by the Town before all of Landowners' claims could
properly be considered on the merits.

Contrary to the Town's assertions, the circuit court's grant of summary judgment
some six months after the three actions were filed was based on much more than
the mere procedural defects in the Town's first set of condemnation notices. At the
outset, the Town engaged in troubling conduct by seeking unreasonable easements
exceeding the scope of those authorized by Town Council (or required by the
Army Corps of Engineers). The Town's rejection of the easements Landowners
prepared and proposed—for reasons the Town cannot or will not explain—
undoubtedly increased the difficulty (and costs) of the litigation. Because the
Town's continued behavior increased the attorney time necessarily devoted to these
cases, it was error for the circuit court to so severely discount the fees deemed
"reasonable." Yet, while the Town's behavior certainly made the proceedings more
difficult, such did not warrant the excessive hours Stanton asserts he devoted to
these three cases.2

2
We recognize the Town's position that Landowners' acrimony and approach may
have led to some of the Town's behavior. But it is difficult to discern the "chicken
and the egg" here in light of the Town's ongoing heavy-handed approach to these
three proposed easements. Indeed, a second set of faulty and similarly overbroad
condemnation notices was swiftly withdrawn after Landowners (again) challenged
them. The appeal of the circuit court's order on the fee petitions arising from these
later condemnation notices is addressed in Sunset Lodge v. Town of Pawleys
Island, Op. No. 2026-UP-275 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed June 3, 2026). And, despite
arguing before the circuit court that the later challenge cases were moot due to its
We further agree with the circuit court that Stanton's "block billing" makes it
difficult to determine the time allotted to specific tasks, particularly because
Stanton billed time by the day, with a few exceptions. For example, on January 25,
2021, Stanton billed 12.2 hours for "Continue review of various authorities and
preparation of fee affidavit" and 7.6 hours for "Continue work on fee affidavit;
Prepare motion, proposed order and Form 4; Electronically file; Memo to Judge
Nettles; Confer by telephone with [redacted]; Memo to Mr. Durant." Stanton's
claim that he billed 19.8 hours in one day obviously requires scrutiny, and he
devoted an extreme amount of time to preparing the fee affidavits and supporting
materials.

Although the twenty hours claimed for one day's work is perhaps the most obvious,
other entries in the record support the circuit court's finding that some of the fees
requested were unreasonable in relation to the complexity of these matters. For
example, in another instance, Stanton billed 6.1 hours as "Receive and respond to
emails with Mr. Dillard and Mr. Smith." And, over a six-day period, he claims to
have worked between 8.1 and 11.7 hours per day to draft the complaint and
complete other tasks.

Thus, while the circuit court correctly found the total hours claimed were
unreasonably excessive, it erred to the extent it simply accepted the 125-hour
figure provided in the Pagliarini affidavit. Pagliarini's opinion must be considered

withdrawal of the second set of notices, the Town continues to assert that it may
pursue further easement condemnation efforts. This contention is accompanied by
the Town's steadfast refusal to accept responsibility for its own problematic
conduct—and the degree to which the Town's behavior may have led to counsel
devoting more time to these cases than the Town's fee expert, Pagliarini, believed
necessary. Pagliarini's affidavit understandably declines to reference his client's
poor behavior, but his statement that "summary judgment was granted solely on
the procedural violations" ignores that Landowners were forced to litigate more
here than mere "procedural violations." Indeed, Judge Nettles' amended summary
judgment order sagely recognizes that certain representations made by the Town
do not square with the Town's actions or reasoning regarding the scope of the
easements it sought to condemn. The Town's problematic behavior undoubtedly
increased the attorney time Landowners' counsel believed was needed to counter
the Town's repeated—and, as recognized in the summary judgment order,
apparently unnecessary— intrusions on their private property rights.
through the filter of this case and a review of this record. See, e.g., Revels, 411
S.C. at 15, 766 S.E.2d at 707 (discussing the "constellation of factors" the trial
court must consider in calculating a fee award).

We find attorney's fees of $47,500—based upon 250 hours worked at an hourly
rate of $190—to be reasonable for these three now-consolidated matters.
Calculating the award based upon 250 hours worked produces a reasonable
attorney's fee award more in line with "customary legal fees for similar services."
Jackson, 326 S.C. at 308, 486 S.E.2d at 760. Accordingly, we modify the circuit
court's award to $47,500 in attorney's fees and $913.33 in costs and note the
awards are to be shared among the appellant Landowners pursuant to their fee
sharing agreement.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's order awarding attorney's fees is

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.