Christine Tedder v. Harris Teeter, Employer

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Christine Tedder, Claimant, Appellant,

v.

Harris Teeter, Employer, and Ace American Insurance
Co., Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001685

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-176
Submitted April 1, 2026 – Filed April 15, 2026

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Andrew Nathan Safran, of Andrew N. Safran, LLC, of
Columbia; and Robert Clyde Limehouse, III, of
Christmas Law Firm, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, both for
Appellant.

Johnnie W. Baxley, III, and William H. Lyon, both of
Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, P.A., of North
Charleston, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Christine Tedder appeals the Appellate Panel of the South
Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's (Appellate Panel's) order reversing
the single commissioner's award of disability compensation and medical benefits
arising from her claim against Harris Teeter and Ace American Insurance Co.
(collectively, Respondents). On appeal, Tedder argues the Appellate Panel erred in
(1) vacating Findings of Fact 4, 6, and 7 because Respondents failed to properly
preserve them for review by the Appellate Panel; (2) finding her injury did not
arise out of the course and scope of her employment at Harris Teeter, despite
Harris Teeter directing her to park in designated areas of the parking lot, which
brought that parking area within the implied requirements of her job and scope of
her employment; and (3) finding her injury did not arise out of the course and
scope of her employment at Harris Teeter despite the parking lot being within the
reasonable margin of time and space of her employment. We reverse the order of
the Appellate Panel, reinstate the order of the single commissioner, and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the Appellate Panel erred in reviewing Findings of Fact 4, 6, and 7
because Respondents failed to raise specific, individual exceptions to these
findings by the single commissioner, and thus they were not preserved for
appellate review. See Hilton v. Flakeboard Am. Ltd., 418 S.C. 245, 249, 791
S.E.2d 719, 721 (2016) ("Only issues raised to the Commission within the
application for review of the single commissioner's order are preserved for
review."); S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-701(A)(3), (A)(3)(a) (2012) (providing that to
request Appellate Panel review of a single commissioner's decision, "[t]he grounds
for appeal must be set out in detail on the Form 30 in the form of questions
presented" and "[e]ach question presented must be concise and concern one finding
of fact, conclusion of law, or other proposition the appellant believes is in error");
Holston v. Allied Corp., 300 S.C. 174, 176, 386 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ct. App. 1989)
(noting that to be preserved for appellate review, an issue raised within an
exception must be reasonably clear and ruled upon by the single commissioner); id.
(finding an employee's broad exception was preserved for the appellate panel's
review because the specific exception "was reasonably clear from the employee's
arguments and was ruled on by the single [c]ommissioner"); Hilton, 418 S.C. at
250, 791 S.E.2d at 722 ("[The supreme court] has also held that general exceptions,
such as 'the commission erred in making an award,' are too ambiguous to fulfill the
notice requirements of due process and do not preserve an issue for review.").

2. We hold the Appellate Panel erred in finding Tedder's injuries did not arise out
of and in the scope of her employment because Finding of Fact 4—Harris Teeter
directed Tedder and other employees to park in designated areas so customers
could use the spaces closest to the entrance—and Finding of Fact 7—Respondents'
argument that Tedder could have parked anywhere in the parking lot was not
persuasive—are the law of the case and established that, although Tedder was
injured off Harris Teeter's premises, the parking lot where she was injured was
brought within the scope of her employment by Harris Teeter's express
requirement that employees park there.1 See Lockridge v. Santens of Am., Inc., 344
S.C. 511, 515, 544 S.E.2d 842, 844 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The Administrative
Procedures Act establishes the standard of review for decisions by the South
Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission."); id. ("Any review of the
commission's factual findings is governed by the substantial evidence standard.");
id. ("Substantial evidence is evidence that, in viewing the record as a whole, would
allow reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion that the full commission
reached."); id. ("Furthermore, neither this court nor the circuit court may substitute
its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact but may reverse if the decision is affected by an error of law."); Williams v.
S.C. State Hosp., 245 S.C. 377, 380, 140 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1965) ("To sustain an
award under the [Worker's] Compensation Act, it must appear that the injury
resulted from an accident which both 'arose out of' and 'in the course of' the
employment."); Howell v. Pac. Columbia Mills, 291 S.C. 469, 471, 354 S.E.2d
384, 385 (1987) ("The general rule in South Carolina is that an injury sustained by
an employee away from the employer's premises while on his way to or from work
does not arise out of and in the course of employment."); Sola v. Sunny Slope
Farms, 244 S.C. 6, 14, 135 S.E.2d 321, 326 (1964) (finding that exceptions to the
coming and going rule including: "[t]hat such injury incurred by a workman in the
course of his travel to his place of work and not on the premises of his employer
but in close proximity thereto is not compensable unless the place of injury was
brought within the scope of employment by an express or implied requirement in
the contract of employment of its use by the servant in going to and coming from
his work").

REVERSED AND REMANDED.2

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
Because the resolution of this issue is dispositive, we need not address the
remaining issue on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (finding an appellate court need not
address remaining issues when the decision of a prior issue is dispositive).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.