Christopher Shockey v. Dana Ohler

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Christopher Shockey, Appellant,

v.

Dana Ohler, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2025-000741

Appeal From Horry County
Melissa M. Frazier, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-169
Submitted March 2, 2026 – Filed April 8, 2026

AFFIRMED

Heather Smith von Herrmann, of Von Herrmann Law
Firm, of Conway, for Appellant.

Gregory Samuel Forman, of Gregory S. Forman, PC, of
Charleston; and Marci Nicole Gattis, of Winslow Law,
LLC, of Pawleys Island, both for Respondent.

Heather Marie Moore, of Axelrod & Associates, PA, of
Myrtle Beach, as the Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Christopher Shockey (Father) appeals the family court's order
approving the settlement agreement between Father and Dana Ohler (Mother)
concerning the custody of their minor child (Child) and declining to change Child's
surname to Shockey. On appeal, Father argues the family court abused its
discretion in declining to grant Child Father's surname or, in the alternative, a
hyphenated surname. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

First, we hold the issue of whether the family court erred in failing to grant Child a
hyphenated surname is not preserved for appellate review because Father never
raised the hyphenated surname argument to the family court, and the court never
ruled on the matter. See Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 375-76, 631 S.E.2d 317, 330
(Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must
have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family court] to be preserved for
appellate review.").

Second, we hold Father failed to prove the preponderance of the evidence was
against the family court's finding that Father did not show it was in Child's best
interest to change Child's surname. See Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414,
709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) (stating that on appeal from the family court, the
appellate court reviews factual and legal issues de novo); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C.
381, 384, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651 (2011) ("[Therefore], the appellate court has
jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the
evidence." (quoting Eason v. Eason, 384 S.C. 473, 479, 682 S.E.2d 804, 807
(2009))); Tomlinson v. Melton, 428 S.C. 607, 611, 837 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ct. App.
2019) ("However, this broad scope of review does not require the appellate court to
disregard the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in
a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
testimony."); id. at 611-12, 837 S.E.2d at 232 ("[T]he appellant bears the burden of
convincing the appellate court that the family court committed error or that the
preponderance of the evidence is against the court's findings."). In considering
whether changing Child's surname was in his best interest, many factors were
neutral: Child was young and could not express a preference for a surname and
both parents wished for Child to have their surname and both had overlapping
reasons for their desires. See Mazzone v. Miles, 341 S.C. 203, 210, 532 S.E.2d
890, 893 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In deciding whether to allow a change in the child's
surname, the family court should grant the request only if the change promotes the
child's best interests and welfare."); id. ("The parent seeking to change the child's
surname has the burden of proving that the change will further the child's best
interests."); id. at 211-12, 532 S.E.2d at 894 ("[B]oth parents have an equal interest
in the child bearing their respective surname."); id. at 210-11, 532 S.E.2d at 893-94
(listing the following non-exhaustive factors to consider when determining whether
the change of a surname is in a child's best interests: "(1) the length of time that the
child has used the present surname; (2) the effect of the change on the preservation
and development of the child's relationship with each parent; (3) the identification
of the child as part of a family unit; (4) the wishes of the parents; (5) the stated
reason for the proposed change; (6) the motive of the parents and the possibility
that the use of a different name will cause insecurity or a lack of identity; (7) the
difficulty, harassment, or embarrassment that the child may experience when the
child bears a surname different from the custodial parent; (8) the preference of the
child if the child is of an age and maturity to express a meaningful preference; and
(9) the degree of community respect associated with the present and proposed
surname"). However, the remaining evidence weighed in favor of Mother: Mother
had primary physical custody and final decision-making authority and Child
primarily lived with Mother, Mother's parents, and Child's half-sibling, all of
whom shared Mother's surname, whereas Father lived alone with much of his
family residing out of state. Accordingly, we hold Father has not shown that
changing Child's surname was in Child's best interest.

AFFIRMED.1

MCDONALD, VINSON, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.