Alfredo Rocha v. Harold J. Murdaugh, Jr.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Alfredo Rocha, Appellant,

v.

Harold J. Murdaugh Jr., Respondent,

AND

Graciela Rocha, Appellant,

v.

Harold J. Murdaugh Jr., Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001298

Appeal From Dorchester County
Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-161
Submitted March 2, 2026 – Filed April 1, 2026

AFFIRMED

Gedney M. Howe, IV, and Michael Andrew Monastra,
both of Gedney M. Howe III, PA, of Charleston, both for
Appellants.
Michelle N. Endemann and Jeffrey Michael Crudup, both
of Clarkson Walsh & Coulter, of Charleston, both for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Alfredo and Graciela Rocha (the Rochas) appeal the circuit
court's denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or
in the alternative for a new trial absolute. On appeal, the Rochas argue the court
erred in denying their motion as to proximate cause and damages because the jury
drew an unreasonable inference when it found Harold J. Murdaugh, Jr. (Murdaugh)
negligent but concluded his negligence was not the proximate cause of Alfredo's
injuries. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Murdaugh, we hold the circuit
court did not err in denying the Rochas' motion for JNOV or a new trial in the
alternative because evidence supported the jury's findings. See Burns v. Universal
Health Servs., Inc., 361 S.C. 221, 232, 603 S.E.2d 605, 611 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The
appellate court will reverse the [circuit] court's ruling on a JNOV motion only
when there is no evidence to support the ruling or where the ruling is controlled by
an error of law."); Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 18, 640 S.E.2d 486, 495 (Ct. App.
2006) ("When reviewing a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, an appellate court
must employ the same standard as the [circuit] court."); Gastineau v. Murphy, 331
S.C. 565, 568, 503 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1998) ("A motion for JNOV may be granted
only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict."); id. ("In
deciding a motion for JNOV, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; if more than one
inference can be drawn, the case must be submitted to the jury."); Becker v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 339 S.C. 629, 635, 529 S.E.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 2000)
("The decision to grant a new trial absolute based on the excessiveness of a verdict
rests in the sound discretion of the [circuit] court and ordinarily will not be
disturbed on appeal."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs if the [circuit]court's
findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are
controlled by an error of law."); id. at 635-36, 529 S.E.2d at 761-62 ("In deciding
whether to assess error when a new trial motion is denied, the appellate court must
consider the testimony and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party."); Trivelas v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 357 S.C.
545, 551, 593 S.E.2d 504, 507 (Ct. App. 2004) ("South Carolina's thirteenth juror
doctrine allows the circuit court . . . to grant a new trial absolute when the [court]
finds the evidence does not justify the verdict."); Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389,
404, 477 S.E.2d 715, 723 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The [circuit court] must grant a new
trial absolute if the amount of the verdict is grossly inadequate or excessive so as to
shock the conscience of the court and clearly indicates the figure reached was the
result of passion, caprice, prejudice, partiality, corruption[,] or some other
improper motives."); id. ("The jury's determination of damages, however, is
entitled to substantial deference."); Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 422, 529
S.E.2d 710, 712 (2000) ("To establish a cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff
must prove the following three elements: (1) a duty of care owed by defendant to
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage
proximately resulting from the breach of duty."); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2745
(2018) (stating that drivers exiting a driveway must stop before entering the
roadway); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-3810(a) (2018) ("No driver shall back a vehicle
unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other
traffic."); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-3230 (2018) ("Notwithstanding other provisions
of any local ordinance, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid
colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered vehicle
and shall give an audible signal when necessary and shall exercise proper
precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated[,] or
intoxicated person."); Wise v. Broadway, 315 S.C. 273, 276-77, 433 S.E.2d 857,
859 (1993) (finding that violation of a driving safety statute constitutes negligence
per se); Trivelas v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 348 S.C. 125, 134, 558 S.E.2d 271, 275
(Ct. App. 2001) ("The finding of a statutory violation, however, does not
automatically lead to the recovery of damages. The plaintiff must prove the
violation proximately caused the injury complained of by the injured party."
(citation omitted)); Hughes v. Child.'s Clinic, P.A., 269 S.C. 389, 398, 237 S.E.2d
753, 757 (1977) ("Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the
injuries, and it may be deemed a proximate cause only when without such
negligence the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided.");
Bramlette v. Charter-Med.-Columbia, 302 S.C. 68, 72, 393 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1990)
("Proximate cause requires proof of (1) causation in fact and (2) legal cause."); id.
("Causation in fact is proved by establishing the injury would not have occurred
'but for' the defendant's negligence.").

AFFIRMED.1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.