Malia Santiago v. Ashley Hoggard

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Malia Santiago, Appellant,

v.

Ashley Hoggard, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001987

Appeal From York County
Daniel Dewitt Hall, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-073
Submitted January 2, 2026 – Filed February 18, 2026

AFFIRMED

Jerry Andrew Meehan, Jr., of Crantford Meehan,
Attorneys at Law, LLC, of Summerville, for Appellant.

Matthew Clark LaFave, of LaFave Bagley, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Malia Santiago appeals the circuit court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of Ashley Hoggard. On appeal, Santiago argues the
circuit court erred by granting summary judgment because she was not provided a
full and fair opportunity to complete discovery. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.
We hold the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of
Hoggard because Santiago had a full and fair opportunity to depose Buster
Patterson, Jr., Santiago's uncle. Patterson was identified, at the latest, during
Santiago's June 8, 2023 deposition, and the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment was held on September 21, 2023—providing Santiago at least three
months to depose Patterson. See Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C.
456, 459, 892 S.E.2d 297, 299 (2023) ("Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment 'if
the [evidence before the court] show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP)); Nelson v. Piggly
Wiggly Cent., Inc., 390 S.C. 382, 388, 701 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In
determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party."); Dawkins v. Fields, 354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 S.E.2d 433, 439 (2003)
("Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must not be granted until the
opposing party has had a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery.");
Guinan v. Tenet Healthsystems of Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 48, 54-55, 677
S.E.2d 32, 36 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A party claiming summary judgment is premature
because they have not been provided a full and fair opportunity to conduct
discovery must advance a good reason why the time was insufficient under the
facts of the case, and why further discovery would uncover additional relevant
evidence and create a genuine issue of material fact.").

AFFIRMED.1

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.