Taylor Chasey Robertson v. SCDPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Taylor Chasey Robertson, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Public Safety, South
Carolina Highway Patrol, and Trooper Patrick J.
Goshorn, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001360

Appeal From Spartanburg County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-047
Submitted January 29, 2026 – Filed February 4, 2026

AFFIRMED

C. Austin McDaniel, of C. Austin McDaniel, Attorney at
Law, of Anderson; and Nicolas Jensen Baughman, of
Nicolas J. Baughman, Attorney at Law, LLC, of
Anderson, both for Appellant.

Russell W. Harter, Jr., of Chapman, Harter & Harter,
P.A., of Greenville; and Stephanie Holmes Burton, of
Gibbes Burton, LLC, of Spartanburg, both for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Taylor Chasey Robertson appeals the circuit court's order
dismissing her claims against the South Carolina Department of Public Safety
(SCDPS), the South Carolina Highway Patrol (SCHP), and Trooper Patrick J.
Goshorn. On appeal, Robertson argues the circuit court erred in (1) dismissing her
claims against SCDPS and SCHP for improper service of process because she
sufficiently complied with the rules on service when she served the complaint on
an agency sharing an address with SCDPS and (2) dismissing her claims against
Goshorn because the complaint alleged facts showing he was not entitled to
immunity under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA). We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err in dismissing Robertson's claims against
SCDPS and SCHP because she failed to serve her complaint properly, which
rendered her action barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Graham L.
Firm, P.A. v. Makawi, 396 S.C. 290, 294-95, 721 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2012) ("The
trial court's findings of fact regarding validity of service of process are reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard."); Bakala v. Bakala, 352 S.C. 612, 629, 576
S.E.2d 156, 165 (2003) ("When service is challenged, the record must
affirmatively show that service of process was correctly made."); McClurg v.
Deaton, 380 S.C. 563, 579, 671 S.E.2d 87, 96 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[I]n order to
establish that service has been properly effected, the plaintiff need only show
compliance with the civil rules on service of process.") aff'd, 395 S.C. 85, 716
S.E.2d 887 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-100(a) (2005) ("[A]n action for
damages under this chapter may be instituted at any time within two years after the
loss was or should have been discovered."); Rule 3(a), SCRCP ("A civil action is
commenced when the summons and complaint are filed with the clerk of court if:
(1) the summons and complaint are served within the statute of limitations in any
manner prescribed by law; or (2) if not served within the statute of limitations,
actual service must be accomplished not later than one hundred twenty days after
filing."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-20(B) (2005) ("A civil action is commenced when
the summons and complaint are filed with the clerk of court if actual service is
accomplished within one hundred twenty days after filing."); Rule 4(d)(5), SCRCP
(stating service is properly made upon an agency "by delivering a copy of the
summons and complaint to such . . . agency and by sending a copy of the summons
and complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General at
Columbia"). The incident giving rise to this appeal occurred on May 9, 2020, and
Robertson filed her complaint exactly two years after that date. Pursuant to Rule
3(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, she had an additional 120 days
to effect service of the complaint. On the last day of that period, Robertson
attempted to serve SCDPS; however, the process server served an employee of the
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, an agency that shared an address
with SCDPS. Accordingly, service was not effected within 120 days and the
circuit court properly dismissed Robertson's claims against SCDPS and SCHP as
untimely.

2. We hold the circuit court did not err in dismissing Robertson's claims against
Goshorn because he is immune from individual liability under the SCTCA. See
Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009) ("On appeal from
the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) [of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure], an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the trial
court."); Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP (stating an action may be dismissed if the
complaint fails "to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action"); Bergstrom
v. Palmetto Health All., 358 S.C. 388, 395, 596 S.E.2d 42, 45 (2004) ("In deciding
whether [a circuit] court properly granted [a] motion to dismiss, the appellate court
must consider whether the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, states any valid claim for relief."); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-70(a)-(b)
(2005) (stating an "employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while
acting within the scope of his official duty is not liable" except when "the
employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it
constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral
turpitude"). In her complaint, Robertson alleged that at all times during the
incident, Goshorn was acting "within the course and scope of his employment" and
she failed to allege that Goshorn's conduct constituted actual fraud, actual malice,
intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude. See Postal v. Mann, 308 S.C.
385, 387, 418 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct. App. 1992) ("It is well settled that parties are
judicially bound by their pleadings unless withdrawn, altered or stricken by
amendment or otherwise."); id. ("The allegations, statements, or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader and a party cannot
subsequently take a position contradictory of, or inconsistent with, his pleadings
and the facts which are admitted by the pleadings are taken as true against the
pleader for the purpose of the action."). Therefore, we hold that Robertson's
complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
Goshorn.

We also hold Robertson's argument that the court erred in denying her motion to
amend her complaint is not preserved because it was not presented in the statement
of issues on appeal. See Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Ordinarily, no point will be
considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on appeal.").
AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.