State v. JeJauncey Harrington

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

JeJauncey Fernando Harrington, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000305

Appeal From Marlboro County
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6132
Heard October 16, 2025 – Filed January 21, 2026

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART

Senior Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Senior
Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Paul Michael Burch, Jr., of
Chesterfield, all for Respondent.

GEATHERS, J.: Appellant JeJauncey Harrington appeals his convictions for two
counts of murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, use of a motor vehicle without the
owner's consent, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime. Harrington argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his
DNA profile and by admitting expert testimony on footwear impressions.
Harrington also argues the trial court violated section 16-23-490(A) of the South
Carolina Code (2015) by sentencing him to five years for possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime because he was sentenced to life without
parole for murder. We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress DNA
evidence and admission of the expert testimony; however, we vacate the five-year
sentence for the weapon conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case began with the tragic murder of Ella Lowery and the kidnapping
and murder of her eight-year-old daughter (Child). In 2017, Ella and her two
children lived with Ella's mother, Delores Lowery. Delores, who worked at night,
left Ella and the children at home around 11:30 p.m. on May 4, 2017, and returned
shortly before 8:30 a.m. the next morning. As she was walking inside, she noticed
a cigarette butt on the top step leading to the door, which struck her as unusual
because no one in her family smoked and she did not allow smoking in or around
her home. When she entered the kitchen, she found Ella lying face down in a puddle
of blood. Hearing Delores screaming, Ella's ten-year-old son ran out of his bedroom,
but Delores could not find Child.

Delores called 911, and the Marlboro County Sheriff's Office (MCSO)
responded. After confirming that Child did not get on the school bus on the morning
of May 5, the search for her began. MCSO requested assistance from the South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and the FBI. Law enforcement
collected evidence from the scene, which included the cigarette butt Delores noticed
on the steps and cuttings from the linoleum floor in the kitchen that contained shoe
impressions; they also took photographs of a footprint made in suspected blood
under the carport.

On May 7, FBI agents interviewed Jamie Campbell, a close friend of Ella's.
Among other questions, the agents asked Campbell if she recognized a phone
number that appeared on Ella's phone records because Ella's phone received several
text messages from this number in the hours before her death and the number was
also the recipient of Ella's last outgoing text. Cell site location information (CSLI)
from this number also placed the associated cell phone in the area around Ella's home
in the early hours of the morning of her death. Campbell identified the number as
Harrington's.

Meanwhile, Adrienne Hefney, a DNA analysist at SLED, developed a DNA
profile from the cigarette butt but was unable to identify the profile. Hefney told
Lieutenant Roxanne Love, the SLED agent supervising the investigation, to notify
her of any persons of interest so she could look in SLED's databases for a profile
that matched the cigarette butt. On May 8, Love mentioned Harrington's name to
Hefney because Harrington had become a suspect when Campbell provided his
name to the FBI. Hefney found Harrington's DNA profile in a SLED database and
matched it to the profile from the cigarette butt. Hefney then told Love she needed
a known DNA standard1 from Harrington to compare to the cigarette butt and that a
known standard existed as an exhibit maintained by MCSO from a prior murder
case.2

Love reached out to Sandy Wilkes, the MCSO evidence custodian, and asked
about evidence related to the 2005 murder investigation. Wilkes located the
evidence in storage, and Love obtained Harrington's known blood standard from the
evidence. The known standard was delivered to Hefney on May 9. Hefney
developed a DNA profile from the known standard and determined it matched the
DNA profile from the cigarette butt.

Separately, on May 9, MCSO obtained an arrest warrant for Harrington for
the use of a vehicle without the owner's consent after Campbell told the FBI the
registration and insurance for the 1998 Mitsubishi Eclipse Harrington had been
driving were in her name and Harrington did not have permission to drive it.
Harrington was arrested two days later, on May 11, in Charlotte, North Carolina,
after a license plate reader alerted the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
(CMPD) of the whereabouts of the vehicle. Following his arrest, Harrington
voluntarily consented to the taking of a buccal swab and signed a voluntary consent
to search form.

CMPD towed the Eclipse to a secure location, and SLED investigators
processed it after obtaining a search warrant. Swabs were taken from the lock
mechanism on the interior latch of the trunk, the bottom of the trunk, and the
floorboard of the passenger seat and analyzed for DNA. SLED developed a DNA

1
A known standard is a DNA sample (e.g., a blood sample or buccal swab) collected
from a person by consent or pursuant to a court order for evidence comparison
purposes as opposed to one collected for databasing purposes. While a match to a
database profile may provide an investigative lead, a match to a known standard is
required for DNA evidence to be admissible in court.
2
Harrington was charged with murder in the prior case in 2005, but a jury acquitted
him of the charge in 2007.
profile from the trunk latch that matched Child's DNA profile. Investigators also
found Harrington's DNA in several places inside the car. Harrington was charged
with Ella's murder on May 12, 2017.3

At that point, Child had not been found. On May 13, Richard LaBean, a
Marlboro County resident who knew Harrington, learned that Harrington had been
arrested and charged with Ella's murder. Harrington grew up in a house across from
LaBean's house that had since been abandoned. LaBean had seen Harrington at the
abandoned house once or twice, so he decided to check his personal surveillance
cameras for footage from the morning of Ella's death. The footage showed a car
arriving at the property shortly after midnight and driving to the back of the
abandoned house, and about two hours later, a car leaving the abandoned house with
its lights off. LaBean called 911, and investigators responded to confirm what the
footage showed.

Based on this footage investigators obtained a warrant and searched the
property, including the abandoned house. On the morning of May 14, investigators
found Ella's debit card and a receipt with her name on it on the ground near the
abandoned house. Shortly after, investigators found the body of a small female child
in a nearby swamp, later determined to be Child. Harrington was subsequently
charged with Child's kidnapping and murder. On May 31, 2017, the State moved
for a Schmerber4 order to obtain an additional sample of Harrington's DNA, which
the trial court granted.

A grand jury indicted Harrington on September 12, 2017, for two counts of
murder as well as kidnapping, armed robbery, use of a motor vehicle without the
owner's consent, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime. During pretrial hearings, Harrington moved to suppress DNA evidence and
to exclude expert testimony from SLED expert Melinda Worley regarding footwear
impressions. The trial court deferred ruling on the motions but ultimately denied
both.5

3
A clear motive has never been established.
4
A Schmerber order refers to a court order that permits the government to conduct
a search that involves a bodily intrusion such as the collection of a buccal swab. See
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
5
As to Worley's testimony, the trial court found her qualified to testify as an expert
but reserved the decision on whether her testimony was admissible.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on February 9, 2023, after Harrington
agreed to waive his right to a jury trial and the State agreed to withdraw its notice of
intent to seek the death penalty. Relevant to this appeal, the State presented evidence
that Harrington's DNA profile matched the DNA profile developed from the
cigarette butt found at the crime scene. The State did not present the initial match
between the 2005 known blood standard and the cigarette butt as evidence at trial.
Rather, it presented as evidence the match between the cigarette butt and the DNA
profiles developed from the voluntary buccal swab and the Schmerber swab.

Additionally, the State proffered Worley as an expert in the field of outer sole
footwear impression comparison analysis. After hearing her proposed testimony in
camera, the trial court found her testimony to be admissible. Worley testified she
followed the ACE-V6 procedure to compare known shoe impressions with the
impressions found at the crime scene. This process involved creating inked
impressions of two known shoes—size 12 Nike Air Force 1s7 belonging to a former
suspect in this case and Harrington's size 13 Nike Air Force 1s, which he was
wearing when he was arrested in Charlotte—and comparing them to photographs of
the impression found under the carport and cuttings of the kitchen linoleum that
contained impressions. When asked, in her expert opinion, what size shoe made the
unknown impressions, she responded "Some of them[;] I couldn't tell a difference
between the 12 and the 13. I couldn't rule one out; so I included both of them. And
others I determined that they were corresponding in combined class characteristics
of the size 13 shoe more so than the size 12."

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court convicted Harrington as indicted
and sentenced him to life imprisonment for each count of murder, thirty years for
kidnapping, thirty years for armed robbery, five years for use of a motor vehicle
without owner's consent, and five years for the weapon offense, all set to run
concurrently. This appeal followed.

6
ACE-V is an acronym used by forensic footwear analysis that stands for Analysis,
Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification.
7
Early in the investigation, police arrested Ella's former boyfriend, who had an
altercation with Ella the night of May 3 into the early morning of May 4 and who
had been wearing these size 12 Air Force 1s at the time. He was eventually released
because Ella was still alive on the evening of May 4 and because phone records and
local surveillance revealed he was not near Ella's home when she died.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Whether the trial court erred by denying Harrington's motion to suppress his
DNA profile developed in part from a known blood standard obtained during
an unrelated murder investigation for which Harrington was charged in 2005
and acquitted by a jury in 2007.

II. Whether the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony on footwear
impression analysis under Rule 702, SCRE, and Rule 403, SCRE.

III. Whether the trial court erred by sentencing Harrington to five years for
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime when he
was sentenced to life without parole for murder in violation of section
16-23-490(A).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. DNA Profile

Harrington argues MCSO violated section 17-1-40 of the South Carolina
Code (Supp. 2025) because it failed to destroy his known blood standard after he
was acquitted of a murder charge in 2007. According to Harrington, the trial court
erred by denying his motion to suppress DNA evidence because the DNA profile
developed from this known blood standard tainted the investigation. We disagree.

Initially, we question whether section 17-1-40, as it existed at the time of
Harrington's acquittal, required destruction of the known blood standard. But even
if it did, law enforcement independently obtained a DNA profile for Harrington, first
from a sample he voluntarily provided after being arrested for use of a motor vehicle
without the owner's consent and then from a sample collected pursuant to a
Schmerber hearing. Harrington does not challenge the taking of either of these
samples on appeal. Thus, even if the known blood standard was retained in violation
of section 17-1-40, we hold the trial court did not err by denying Harrington's motion
to suppress DNA evidence under the independent source exception. See State v.
Moore, 429 S.C. 465, 479, 839 S.E.2d 882, 889 (2020) ("[E]vidence is admissible if
it was obtained from a lawful source independent of [any] illegal conduct. (quoting
State v. Copeland, 321 S.C. 318, 323, 468 S.E.2d 620, 624 (1996))).

A. Standard of Review
In evaluating the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this court reviews
the factual findings for any evidentiary support, "but the ultimate legal
conclusion . . . is a question of law subject to de novo review." State v. Frasier, 437
S.C. 625, 633–34, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022).

B. Section 17-1-40 of the South Carolina Code

In 2007, when Harrington was acquitted by a jury of a murder charge, section
17-1-40 stated as follows:

Any person who after being charged with a criminal
offense . . . is found to be innocent of such charge[,] the
arrest and booking record, files, mug shots, and
fingerprints of such person shall be destroyed[,] and no
evidence of such record pertaining to such charge shall be
retained by any municipal, county[,] or [s]tate law
enforcement agency.

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-1-40 (2007) (amended 2016). Harrington argues that a known
blood standard is equivalent to a mugshot or fingerprint card, and therefore under
the statute, MCSO should have destroyed the known blood standard it obtained from
Harrington during the 2005 murder investigation after he was acquitted of this
charge. We disagree.

A DNA sample collected for evidentiary or investigative purposes differs
from a DNA sample collected for identification or databasing purposes. See Ming
W. Chin, et al., Forensic DNA Evidence: Science and the Law § 3:2 (2025) ("Even
if probable cause exists to arrest a subject, a DNA reference sample for case
investigation purposes—as distinguished from mandatory DNA samples for DNA
database purposes—should be obtained pursuant to warrant or valid consent, as is
consistent with Fourth Amendment principles."). The distinction derives from the
function of the sample rather than the method of collection.8

8
We do note, however, that DNA collection kits provided by SLED for the taking
of database samples differ from collection kits provided for the taking of samples
pursuant to consent or court order. According to SLED's guidelines, DNA database
collection kits, which are processed by the DNA Database Department, can only be
used to collect DNA samples for entry into the state DNA database under section
23-3-620 of the South Carolina Code (2025). S.C. State L. Enf't Div., DNA
Database FAQs, https://www.sled.sc.gov/forms/forensics/DNAdatabase/FAQs_
In South Carolina, section 23-3-620 of the State Deoxyribonucleic Acid
Identification Record Database Act (DNA Database Act) requires the collection of
a DNA sample for inclusion in the state DNA database following a lawful custodial
arrest for a felony. See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-620 (2025); cf. Maryland v. King,
569 U.S. 435, 449–56 (2013) (holding it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
to collect and analyze arrestees' DNA to "process and identify" them following an
arrest for a serious offense). However, these samples may be used only for
databasing purposes. See S.C. State L. Enf't Div., DNA Database, https://
www.sled.sc.gov/DNAdatabase. A DNA profile developed from a database sample
is not considered evidence itself, and while a match between crime scene evidence
and a database profile can provide an investigative lead, a direct comparison cannot
be performed between an evidence profile and a database profile. Id. Instead, an
evidence profile can only be directly compared to a known standard collected
pursuant to consent or court order and in accordance with statutory and constitutional
guidelines. See id.; State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 53–55, 625 S.E.2d 222–23 (2006)
(noting that in the absence of consent, a blood sample may only be procured pursuant
to a search warrant or court order and a finding of probable cause); State v. Chisholm,
395 S.C. 259, 267, 717 S.E.2d 614, 618 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Considerations for
determining whether or not there exists probable cause to permit the acquisition of
[DNA] evidence include the following elements: (1) probable cause to believe the
suspect has committed the crime; (2) a clear indication that relevant material
evidence will be found; and (3) the method used to secure it is safe and reliable.");
Chin et al., Forensic DNA Evidence: Science and the Law § 3:2 ("Should
investigators desire a DNA sample from an arrestee for direct comparison to crime
scene evidence in that case or an unrelated case, ordinary principles governing
searches apply. Most often a sample will be obtained by search warrant or
consent.").

When Harrington was arrested and charged in 2005 and then acquitted in
2007, the DNA Database Act permitted DNA samples to be taken for databasing
purposes only after a conviction. S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-620 (2007) (amended
2008). The legislature did not amend the statute to require database samples to be
taken following lawful custodial arrests until 2008. Act No. 413, 2008 S.C. Acts
4037, 4055. Notably, this means the blood standard in MCSO's possession must
have been a sample taken pursuant to consent or court order for evidence comparison

Document.pdf. Alternatively, investigators must use suspect collection kits, which
are provided by SLED's Evidence Control Department and processed by the DNA
Casework Department, when a sample is taken by consent or following a court order.
Id.
purposes and not a database sample taken upon Harrington's arrest. With this context
in mind, we hold that the known blood standard in this case does not fall within the
purview of section 17-1-40 because it was not collected for identification purposes
as part of a standard booking procedure. See King, 569 U.S. at 465–66 ("When
officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and
they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing
a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a
legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.").9 Thus, law enforcement did not violate section 17-1-40 by retaining
Harrington's known blood standard following his acquittal in 2007, and the trial
court did not err by failing to suppress Harrington's DNA profile for this reason.10
Cf. State v. Glynn, 166 P.3d 1075, 1083 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) ("[A]ll the authorities
we have located conclude that once law enforcement has lawfully obtained a blood
sample and DNA therefrom, a defendant has no additional constitutional protected

9
This reasoning, of course, implies that a database sample collected as part of the
standard booking procedure would fall within the "arrest and booking record, files,
mug shots, and fingerprints" contemplated by section 17-1-40. The DNA Database
Act requires these samples to be "submitted to SLED as directed by SLED."
§ 23-3-620(A). Additionally, the DNA Database Act requires SLED to expunge a
person's DNA database record and profile—including the underlying sample—upon
request if the person has been found not guilty and follows the proper procedure. Id.
S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-660 (2025); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-615(A) (2025).
Further, the session law that authorized the collection of database samples following
custodial arrests required any law enforcement agency with a database sample in its
possession to immediately destroy and dispose of the sample in accordance with
section 23-3-640 of the South Carolina Code (2025). Act No. 413, 2008 S.C. Acts
4037, 4055. Thus, the retention by county law enforcement of a database sample
collected incident to an arrest could violate sections 23-3-620 and 23-3-640, not
section 17-1-40.
10
While not the question presented to this court, we note an absence of clear statutory
authority requiring law enforcement to destroy known blood standards following
acquittals. Presumably, though the expungement process outlined in section
23-3-660 sits within the DNA Database Act, the spirit of this law—which requires
SLED to destroy a person's database sample when it expunges their database record
and profile—would also require SLED to destroy any known standards in its
possession as part of the expungement process. However, it is less clear whether
this expungement process would extend to the law enforcement agency that
collected the known standard to the extent it remained in that agency's possession.
privacy in that evidence and it may be used in the investigation of other crimes for
identification purposes without the necessity of a separate warrant.").

C. Independent Source

Even if MCSO violated section 17-1-40 by failing to destroy Harrington's
known blood standard, the trial court nevertheless did not err by denying
Harrington's motion to suppress DNA evidence because law enforcement obtained
his DNA profile from a lawful independent source.

Under the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule,

[E]vidence must be excluded if it would not have come to
light but for the illegal actions of the police, and the
evidence has been obtained by the exploitation of that
illegality. However, the challenged evidence is admissible
if it was obtained from a lawful source independent of the
illegal conduct.

Moore, 429 S.C. at 478–79, 839 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting Copeland, 321 S.C. at 323,
468 S.E.2d at 624); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) ("The
independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered
by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.").

Harrington argues all DNA evidence must be suppressed because the
investigation relied on a match between the DNA profile from the cigarette butt and
Harrington's DNA profile from a known blood standard retained illegally, and that
this match tainted the investigation. We disagree.

On May 7, 2017, Campbell identified the last phone number to contact Ella
as belonging to Harrington, making him a person of interest in the case. SLED
retrieved his known blood standard from MCSO to compare to the cigarette butt on
May 9. Also on May 9, MCSO obtained an arrest warrant for Harrington for use of
a vehicle without the owner's consent; this arrest warrant had nothing to do with any
of the DNA evidence and rather was based on information Campbell provided to
FBI agents. CMPD arrested Harrington on May 11, and he did not challenge this
arrest.

Harrington consented to a buccal swab after this arrest. Later, the State
requested a DNA sample pursuant to court order "out of an abundance of caution."
The trial court granted the State's motion to obtain an additional buccal swab to
"make sure we have a swab that's taken with no controversy." On appeal, Harrington
challenges neither the voluntariness of the initial swab nor the validity of the second.

We hold the investigative trail described above—which began with
Campbell's interview, led to Harrington's arrest, and resulted in two uncontested
buccal swabs—remains untainted by the testing of the known blood standard from
the 2005 case. Even if that sample never existed, MCSO would still have obtained
the arrest warrant for use of a vehicle without the owner's consent, and the remainder
of the investigation—which included the independent collection of two uncontested
DNA samples—would have unfolded in the same manner. In other words, even if
Harrington's known blood standard from the 2005 case was illegally retained and
tested, Harrington's DNA profile was "obtained from a lawful source independent of
[any] illegal conduct" and was therefore admissible. See Moore, 429 S.C. at 479,
839 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting Copeland, 321 S.C. at 323, 468 S.E.2d at 624); cf. State
v. Patterson, 425 S.C. 500, 508–09, 823 S.E.2d 217, 222 (Ct. App. 2019) (finding
no abuse of discretion in admitting DNA evidence even though a "perfect chain of
custody was not shown" for the sample used for the initial match because the
authenticity of the DNA results were "nevertheless established through the
independent testing" of the defendant's DNA profile developed from a sample taken
after his arrest).

In sum, we hold the trial court did not err by denying Harrington's motion to
suppress DNA evidence because section 17-1-40 does not apply to known blood
standards collected by law enforcement for evidentiary purposes. However, even if
MCSO did retain Harrington's known blood standard in violation of section 17-1-40,
suppression was still unwarranted because law enforcement obtained Harrington's
DNA profile from a lawful source independent of this violation by collecting two
uncontested known standards.

II. Expert Testimony

A. Standard of Review

"The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 557,
564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of
the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."
State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006). Further, "[t]o
warrant reversal based on the wrongful admission of evidence, the complaining party
must prove resulting prejudice." State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 444, 710 S.E.2d 55,
58 (2011). Because this was a bench trial, this court's assessment of prejudice "must
be viewed from the posture of a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial." State v. Inman,
395 S.C. 539, 565, 720 S.E.2d 31, 45 (2011). "It is well-established that it is a near
insurmountable burden for a defendant to prove prejudice in the context of a bench
trial as a judge is presumed to disregard prejudicial or inadmissible evidence." Id.;
see also Cole v. Commonwealth, 428 S.E.2d 303, 305 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) ("This is
not to say that the admission of improper evidence in a bench trial may never result
in reversible error. Where the record makes clear that the judge considered such
inadmissible evidence in adjudicating the merits of the case, reversal would be
appropriate.").

B. Reliability

Harrington argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Worley's
testimony because it was unreliable. We disagree.

"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Rule 702, SCRE. "Before admitting expert
testimony, trial courts, as the gatekeepers of evidence, must ensure the proffered
evidence is beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury; the witness has the skill,
training, education, and experience required of an expert in his field; and the
testimony is reliable." State v. Warner, 430 S.C. 76, 85, 842 S.E.2d 361, 365 (Ct.
App. 2020), aff'd in part and remanded, 436 S.C. 395, 872 S.E.2d 638 (2022).

When assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony, the trial court
must consider four factors, as outlined in State v. Council:

(1) the publications and peer review of the technique; (2)
prior application of the method to the type of evidence
involved in the case; (3) the quality control procedures
used to ensure reliability; and (4) the consistency of the
method with recognized scientific laws and procedures.

335 S.C. 1, 19, 515 S.E.2d 508, 517 (1999).

Harrington claims Worley's "testimony and conclusions were unreliable and
should have been excluded" because she admitted "she did not follow best practices
during her analysis." Harrington points out that Worley testified she "no longer
uses" the method she used in this case to create test impressions11 and that her
laboratory does not follow the protocol outlined in a specific book12 considered to
be the "gold standard" for forensic footwear analysis. Harrington further notes that
Worley admitted her test impressions for this case "weren't the best," that it is
"notoriously hard" to differentiate between sizes of Nike Air Force 1s, and that she
measured test impressions with a ruler—something she would not normally do—to
identify a size difference between the test impressions.

The upshot of Harrington's argument is that Worley's testimony was
unreliable because she did not follow the best method available for footwear
impression analysis. This argument mischaracterizes the law. Experts are not
required to employ the best method, only a "reliable method faithfully and reliably
applied." See Warner, 430 S.C. at 86–87, 842 S.E.2d at 366 ("The substance of an
expert's testimony is reliable if it adheres to the rigors of the method. As long as the
trial court is satisfied the expert's testimony consists of a reliable method faithfully
and reliably applied, the gate of admissibility should be opened." (citation omitted)).

Here, Worley testified that she used the ACE-V method for footwear
impressions, which was the procedure required by SLED and the one she learned in
her training. The trial court, in exercising its gate-keeping function, confirmed that
Worley's method had achieved widespread acceptance in the scientific and law
enforcement community, that SLED followed existing guidelines and standards
controlling the procedure, and that the technique had been analyzed and tested in
scientific publications. Worley also testified that her process was peer-reviewed by
her supervisor and that her analysis and conclusions were reviewed by two qualified
examiners.

We hold the trial court considered the Council factors and properly
determined the expert testimony was sufficiently reliable. See Council, 335 S.C. at
19, 515 S.E.2d at 517 ("In considering the admissibility of scientific evidence[, the
trial court] looks at several factors, including: (1) the publications and peer review

11
Worley explained that, in this case, she applied ink to the shoe and had someone
who wore a similar size put on the shoe and step directly onto the transparency. She
now has the wearer step onto card stock paper and then reprints the test impression
onto the transparency because the transparency can be slippery. However, she
testified both processes are considered acceptable methods.
12
See William J. Bodziak, Forensic Footwear Evidence (2d ed. 2016).
of the technique; (2) prior application of the method to the type of evidence involved
in the case; (3) the quality control procedures used to ensure reliability; and (4) the
consistency of the method with recognized scientific laws and procedures."). Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Worley's testimony.13

III. Five-Year Sentence

Harrington argues the trial court violated section 16-23-490(A) of the South
Carolina Code by sentencing him to five years' imprisonment for possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime because he was sentenced to life
without parole for murder. The State agrees, and we thus vacate the sentence.

Section 16-23-490(A) states:

If a person is in possession of a firearm or visibly displays
what appears to be a firearm or visibly displays a knife
during the commission of a violent crime and is convicted
of committing or attempting to commit a violent
crime[,] . . . he must be imprisoned five years, in addition
to the punishment provided for the principal crime. This
five-year sentence does not apply in cases where the death
penalty or a life sentence without parole is imposed for the
violent crime.

The text unambiguously provides that the mandatory five-year sentence for
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime must not be
imposed if the defendant has been sentenced to life without parole for the violent
crime. See State v. Palmer, 415 S.C. 502, 525, 783 S.E.2d 823, 835 (Ct. App. 2016)
(vacating the appellant's sentence for possession of a weapon during the commission
of a violent crime "because [section 16-23-490(A)] provides the five-year sentence
is inapplicable when a court imposes a life without parole sentence"); State v. Owens,
346 S.C. 637, 666–67, 552 S.E.2d 745, 760 (2001) (vacating the five-year sentence
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime because the

13
Harrington also argues the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under Rule
403, SCRE, because Worley's conclusions were unreliable and therefore had no
probative value. We hold the testimony was reliable and its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Rule 403, SCRE
("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .").
appellant was sentenced to death), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry,
363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005). Because Harrington was sentenced to life
without parole for murder—the violent crime associated with the possession of a
weapon charge—the trial court erred in imposing this sentence and we thus vacate
it.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.