Michael L. Woods v. Wyman Jean Woods, Jr.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Michael L. Woods, Appellant,

v.

Wyman Jean Woods, Jr., Trustee of the Wyman and
Marguerite Woods Family Trust utd 01/16/98,
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000867

Appeal From Berkeley County
Dale Edward Van Slambrook, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-436
Heard October 16, 2025 – Filed December 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Andrew T. Shepherd, of Shepherd Law Firm, LLC, of
Summerville, for Appellant.

John Samuel West, of West Law Firm, P.A., of Moncks
Corner, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Michael L. Woods appeals the master-in-equity's order affirming
the probate court's denial of his motion to alter or amend the accounting of his
father's trust. On appeal, Michael argues the probate court incorrectly concluded
(1) the joint accounts held by himself and his father were trust assets and (2) the
counterclaims for setoff from the jointly held accounts were claims belonging to
his father's trust. We affirm.

1. We hold Michael failed to rebut the statutory presumption that during the
lifetime of his father, the funds in the joint accounts belonged to the owners in
proportion to their contributions. See Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v.
Mallon, 381 S.C. 417, 427, 673 S.E.2d 448, 453 (2009) ("An action for an
accounting sounds in equity. Therefore, [the appellate court] may review the
record and make findings in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of
the evidence."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-6-201(A) (2022) ("During the lifetime of all
parties, an account belongs to the parties in proportion to the net contribution of
each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a
different intent."). Both parties agree their father contributed all the funds to the
joint accounts. We hold the master and probate court correctly determined
Michael did not meet his burden of establishing clear and convincing evidence of a
different intent.1 See Vaughn v. Bernhardt, 345 S.C. 196, 200, 547 S.E.2d 869,
871 (2001) ("[A]ccounts with right of survivorship provisions are often set up to
allow caretakers to assist elderly people with the management of their finances.
Their financial protection can best be honored by adhering to the statutory
presumption."); cf. Kemp v. Rawlings, 358 S.C. 28, 37, 594 S.E.2d 845, 850 (2004)
(finding a provision in a will gifting the disputed joint account to the other account
holder was evidence of decedent's "intent for appellant to receive those funds
regardless of whether she withdrew them prior to his death"). Thus, the master did
not err in affirming the probate court's determination that the joint accounts were
trust assets.

2. We hold Michael abandoned his argument on appeal that the counterclaims did
not properly belong to the trust.2 Because only conclusory statements support the
argument and Michael cites no authority to support the position, the issue is
abandoned on appeal. See Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 20, 640 S.E.2d 486, 497

1
Michael argued his father demonstrated a contrary intent through (1) the language
of the signature card agreement establishing the joint accounts as the "property of
each co-owner and payable to either co-owner" and (2) his father's conduct in
removing Wyman Jean Woods, Jr. as power of attorney and subsequently naming
Michael.
2
Michael asserted in his statement of issues on appeal that the claims did not
belong to the trust. The remainder of the brief did not address ownership of the
counterclaims. At oral argument, Michael clarified his position was that the
counterclaims could belong only to the personal representative of the estate.
(Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue raised on appeal but not argued in the brief is deemed
abandoned and will not be considered by the appellate court." (quoting Fields v.
Melrose Ltd. P'ship, 312 S.C. 102, 106, 439 S.E.2d 283, 284 (Ct. App. 1993))); R
& G Constr., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg'l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424, 437, 540
S.E.2d 113, 120 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An issue is deemed abandoned if the argument
in the brief is only conclusory."); see also Med. Univ. of S.C. v. Arnaud, 360 S.C.
615, 620, 602 S.E.2d 747, 750 (2004) (noting issues are deemed abandoned when
the arguments on those issues are conclusory); First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314
S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (finding the failure to provide
arguments or supporting authority for an issue renders it abandoned); State v. Colf,
332 S.C. 313, 322, 504 S.E.2d 360, 364 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding a conclusory,
two-paragraph argument that cited no authority other than an evidentiary rule was
abandoned), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 337 S.C. 622, 525 S.E.2d 246
(2000).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.