State v. Bryan P. Cooper

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Bryan Preston Cooper, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000231

Appeal From Laurens County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-429
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed December 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Gary Howard Johnson, II, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds
Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew
Stumbo, of Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Bryan Preston Cooper appeals his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine (third or subsequent offense) and sentence of six years'
imprisonment. On appeal, Cooper argues the trial court erred by failing to
suppress the evidence seized from a warrantless search of his vehicle during a
traffic stop because the officer did not have reasonable grounds to ask him to exit
his vehicle during the stop. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We believe the trial court did not err in finding the officer had reasonable suspicion
that Cooper was an armed threat which justified the officer opening the door to
Cooper's vehicle and ordering him to exit.1 See State v. Alston, 422 S.C. 270, 279,
811 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2018) ("On appeal from a motion to suppress on Fourth
Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review
and will reverse only if there is clear error." (quoting Robinson v. State, 407 S.C.
169, 180-81, 754 S.E.2d 862, 868 (2014))); id. ("[T]his deference does not bar [the
appellate court] from conducting its own review of the record to determine whether
the trial [court]'s decision [was] supported by the evidence." (quoting State v.
Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521, 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); Milledge v. State, 422
S.C. 366, 375, 811 S.E.2d 796, 801 (2018) ("In conjunction with a valid
automobile stop for a traffic violation, an officer may conduct a Terry frisk for his
own safety after forming a reasonable conclusion 'that the person whom he ha[s]
legitimately stopped might be armed and presently dangerous.'" (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977))); id. at 376, 811 S.E.2d at
801 ("In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to perform an
investigative stop and frisk without infringing upon an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances.");
McHam v. State, 404 S.C. 465, 481, 746 S.E.2d 41, 50 (2013) ("[O]fficer safety
can justify the opening of a door to an occupied vehicle under reasonable
circumstances."), abrogated on other grounds by Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174,
810 S.E.2d 836 (2018). The officer observed suspicious movement from Cooper
after initiating the stop, Cooper's responses to the officer's questions were
inconsistent with the officer's observations, the officer was by himself, and Cooper
did not initially comply with the officer's instructions. See Milledge, 422 S.C. at
376, 811 S.E.2d at 801 ("In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to
perform an investigative stop and frisk without infringing upon an individual's

1
We note Cooper argues Article I, Section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution
provides greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United
Staes Constitution in the context of officers ordering vehicle occupants to exit the
vehicle during a lawful traffic stop. However, we need not address this argument
because we hold the officer had reasonable suspicion justifying the search. See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when
its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
Fourth Amendment rights, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances."); McHam, 404 S.C. at 480-81, 746 S.E.2d at 49-50 (finding
reasonable circumstances for an officer to open the passenger-side door when a
vehicle's occupants made several movements inconsistent with their alleged
attempts to locate vehicle registration and insurance, the traffic stop occurred in
"dimly-lit" conditions, multiple people were in the vehicle, the officer was by
himself, and the officer opened the car door to ensure the occupants were not
holding any weapons).

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.