Daniel Hayden v. Riverside Transport, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Daniel Hayden, Claimant, Appellant,

v.

Riverside Transport, Inc., Employer, and First Liberty
Insurance Corporation, Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001437

Appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-413
Heard October 7, 2025 – Filed December 10, 2025

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART

Frank Anthony Barton, of Lexington, for Appellant.

David Alan Westerlund, Jr., of Willson Jones Carter &
Baxley, P.A., of North Charleston, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation action filed by Daniel P. Hayden
(Claimant) against Riverside Transport, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
(Respondents), Claimant appeals, arguing the South Carolina Workers'
Compensation Commission (the Commission) erred in (1) admitting evidence that
was hearsay and uncorroborated, and (2) finding he failed to present sufficient
evidence of a compression fracture of his spine. We affirm in part and reverse and
remand in part.

1. Claimant argues the Commission erred in finding Exhibit B was admissible.
We disagree. The documents in Exhibit B that Claimant argues were inadmissible
are the following: (1) an e-mail from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation
Commission case manager to Wayne Floyd questioning whether he is authorized to
practice law in Arkansas; (2) an Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission
"Report of Compensation Paid/Suspension of Payments," which indicated
Claimant was paid a total of $42,998.32 in compensation; and (3) a report by
Medical Consultants Network (MCN) after its review of Claimant's Arkansas file
that concluded Claimant suffered a 7% impairment to the whole person. Claimant
maintains the evidence was uncorroborated, the MCN report was prepared by
someone who never saw or treated him but was instead prepared by a company
hired by the insurance carrier, and Claimant was unable to confirm the
compensation reported in the Arkansas report.

The admissibility of evidence in workers' compensation cases is primarily
governed by South Carolina Code Section 1-23-330, which provides that "[i]n
contested cases: (1) [i]rrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence shall be
excluded." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-330(1) (2005). But see Michau v. Georgetown
County ex rel. S.C. Cntys. Workers Comp. Tr., 396 S.C. 589, 594, 723 S.E.2d 805,
807 (2012) (noting "section 1-23-330 establishes a minimum standard [for the
admissibility of evidence] that applies generally, but not exclusively" and
explaining the statutory "heightened standard for repetitive trauma injury cases").
Furthermore, "the South Carolina Rules of Evidence do not apply in proceedings
before the Workers' Compensation Commission." Hamilton v. Bob Bennett Ford,
339 S.C. 68, 70, 528 S.E.2d 667, 668 (2000).

As to the first two documents, exhibits regarding the Arkansas claim, we find any
error in their admission was harmless because the Commission found Claimant
was not precluded from filing a claim in South Carolina based on filing a claim in
Arkansas. See Sligh v. Newberry Elec. Coop., Inc., 216 S.C. 401, 420, 58 S.E.2d
675, 684 (1950) (suggesting that erroneously admitted evidence that does not
constitute the basis of the Commission's award is harmless error). As to the MCN
report indicating Claimant suffered a 7% impairment to the whole person, we find
no error in its admission. Respondents noticed Claimant of Exhibit B in their
submission dated December 22, 2021. In Gadson v. Mikasa Corp., 368 S.C. 214,
226-27, 628 S.E.2d 262, 269 (Ct. App. 2006), this court found that an expert
report, properly filed and served, was admissible. The employer in Gadson had the
opportunity to request a deposition; made no attempt to depose the expert; and did
not attempt to subpoena the expert to the hearing. Id. Thus, this court found the
report was admissible. Id. We likewise find Claimant was properly served, made
no attempt to depose or subpoena the MCN doctor, and the report was admissible.

2. Claimant argues the Commission erred in denying compensation, first
arguing the only evidence in the record indicates that he suffered a compression
fracture as a result of his August 20, 2018, accident and there is no evidence to
contradict it. Claimant next argues he did not claim aggravation of a pre-existing
injury and the Commission erred in denying compensation based on his failure to
prove it.

"A work-related accident which aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing condition,
infirmity, or disease is compensable." Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276,
295, 599 S.E.2d 604, 613-14 (Ct. App. 2004). "The claimant's right to
compensation for aggravation of a pre-existing condition arises when the claimant
has a dormant condition that becomes disabling because of the aggravating injury."
Murphy v. Owens Corning, 393 S.C. 77, 86, 710 S.E.2d 454, 458 (Ct. App. 2011).
"We review the Commission's factual findings of whether a claimant is entitled to
compensation for aggravation of a pre-existing condition under the substantial
evidence standard of review." Id.

South Carolina Code Section 42-9-35 provides in part:

(A) The employee shall establish by a preponderance of
the evidence, including medical evidence, that:
(1) the subsequent injury aggravated the pre[-]existing
condition or permanent physical impairment; or
(2) the pre[-]existing condition or the permanent physical
impairment aggravates the subsequent injury.
(B) The commission may award compensation benefits to
an employee who has a permanent physical impairment
or pre[-]existing condition and who incurs a subsequent
disability from an injury arising out of and in the course
of his employment for the resulting disability of the
permanent physical impairment or pre[-]existing
condition and the subsequent injury.
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-35 (2015); see Rummage v. BGF Indus., 434 S.C. 441, 458,
865 S.E.2d 380, 389 (Ct. App. 2021) (stating that in a case "under section 42-9-35,
the burden is on the claimant to produce medical evidence to establish a claim for
the exacerbation of a pre[-]existing condition").

"[T]here is no requirement that the pre-existing condition aggravated the work
injury or that the work injury aggravated the pre-existing condition; rather, the
question to be considered [is] whether the combined effects of the condition and
the workplace injury resulted in a greater disability than would otherwise have
existed." Bartley v. Allendale Cnty. Sch. Dist., 392 S.C. 300, 308, 709 S.E.2d 619,
623 (2011). In Bartley, our supreme court reversed and remanded to the
Commission to make additional findings of fact based on its failure to properly
analyze the claim. Id. at 310, 709 S.E.2d at 624.

The Commission's order in this case summarily finds "[t]here is insufficient
evidence regarding an aggravation of a pre-existing condition as the Claimant did
not request benefits pursuant to the status and there is not enough medical evidence
regarding the Claimant's 2016 back injury. Additionally, the Claimant was able to
return to work following his 2016 back injury."

The evidence in the record regarding the 2016 injury indicates Claimant sought
treatment after the injury, and the limited medical records are sparse because
Claimant returned to work and sought no further treatment. The records also
indicate Claimant visited the emergency room "and had imaging of all injured
areas[,] which did not show any significant injuries." Claimant admitted the 2016
injury, but testified he thereafter had no back problems preventing him from
working.

Although Claimant did not request benefits as an aggravation of a pre-existing
condition, Respondents raised the issue by submitting medical records prior to the
single commissioner's hearing, including treatment reports following the 2016
accident. At the hearing, Claimant argued "something that happened . . . about two
years eal[ier] might be raised . . . . [W]e'll let the testimony take care of that."
Claimant then testified he injured his back in 2016 when he fell off a porch.
Respondents argued Claimant was "picked up by EMS. Saw his primary care
physician on November 28, 2016, reporting low back pain. And so he had a
history of an injury to his lower back." 1

1
Respondents also argued the x-rays taken after the 2018 accident note, "[l]ack of
paraspinal straining suggests subacute to older age," and "[a]ge-indeterminate
As to the Commission's denial of compensation based on its finding that Claimant
did not request benefits for the aggravation of a pre-existing condition, we
recognize "the burden is on the claimant to produce medical evidence to establish a
claim for the exacerbation of a pre[-]existing condition." Rummage, 434 S.C. at
458, 865 S.E.2d at 389 (citing § 42-9-35(A)). However, the issue may be raised by
the defendants. In Frampton v. South Carolina Department of Natural Resources,
this court found that "'pre[-]existing condition,' '§ 42-9-35,' and 'burden of proof'
are not special or affirmative defenses that must be raised in a Form 51 or be
forever lost." 432 S.C. 247, 259, 851 S.E.2d 714, 720 (Ct. App. 2020). Rather, the
court found where the employer raised a pre-existing condition, the burden
remained on "the claimant to prove 'by a preponderance of the evidence, including
medical evidence, that . . . the subsequent injury aggravated the pre[-]existing
condition or permanent physical impairment; or . . . the pre[-]existing condition or
the permanent physical impairment aggravates the subsequent injury' in order to be
eligible for compensation for that injury." Id. at 259, 851 S.E.2d at 720-21
(omissions in original) (quoting § 42-9-35).

As to the Commission's other findings—that there was not enough medical
evidence regarding the 2016 injury and that Claimant was thereafter able to return
to work—they indicate the Commission found that although there was a prior
injury, there was insufficient evidence of a pre-existing condition. In that case, the
Commission would be required to solely review the 2018 injury for
compensability. To the extent the Commission's findings indicate there was a pre-
existing condition and Claimant failed to prove aggravation of it, the Commission
was required to review the issue under Bartley, which mandates the Commission to
focus not solely on the pre-existing condition but to consider whether the
combined effects of it and the 2018 workplace injury resulted in a greater disability
than would otherwise have existed. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the
Commission to make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law according to
this opinion. See Smith v. NCCI, Inc., 369 S.C. 236, 252, 631 S.E.2d 268, 276-77
(Ct. App. 2006) ("When an administrative agency acts without first making the

compression fracture . . . ." Respondents thus argued the fracture was sustained
prior to the 2018 accident and Claimant had a pre-existing lumbar spine condition.
Respondents next argued there was no opinion in the record that Claimant
sustained an aggravation of a pre-existing condition; thus, Claimant failed to
satisfy his burden under the requirements of section 42-9-35.
proper factual findings required by law, the proper procedure is to remand the case
and allow the agency the opportunity to make those findings.").

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.