Mare Baracco v. Charleston Area Convention

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mare Baracco, Appellant,

v.

Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau,
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001116

Appeal From Charleston County
George M. McFaddin, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-417
Submitted November 3, 2025 – Filed December 10, 2025

AFFIRMED

Taylor Meriwether Smith, IV, of Meriwether Law, LLC,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Robert E. Tyson, Jr., and La'Jessica M. Stringfellow,
both of Robinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Mare Baracco appeals the circuit court's order granting summary
judgment to the Charleston Area Convention and Visitors Bureau. The bureau
serves as a designated marketing organization for Charleston County and several
other local governments under the accommodations tax, or "A-Tax," statutory
scheme. Baracco sent a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the bureau
seeking information on its expenditure of the county's A-Tax funds. Based on our
supreme court's decision in DomainsNewMedia.com, LLC v. Hilton Head
Island-Bluffton Chamber of Commerce, 423 S.C. 295, 814 S.E.2d 513 (2018), the
circuit court found the bureau's status as a designated marketing organization did not
subject it to FOIA. We agree and affirm.

In DomainsNewMedia.com, our supreme court held that the legislature did not
intend for a chamber of commerce's status as a designated marketing organization to
subject the chamber to FOIA. Id. at 297, 814 S.E.2d at 514 (holding the legislature
did not intend for the chamber of commerce to be considered a public body under
FOIA based on its receipt and expenditure of A-Tax funds as a designated marketing
organization). We see no plausible way to separate that holding from this case. The
bureau is operating under the same statute and in the same capacity as the chamber
was there. Id. at 298, 814 S.E.2d at 515. Here, as there, the issue is whether FOIA
applies to a designated marketing organization based on its role in spending A-Tax
funds. Id. at 297, 814 S.E.2d at 514.

Baracco attempts to distinguish DomainsNewMedia.com by arguing she was "denied
an opportunity to any—much less fruitful—discovery" of what funds the bureau
expends and how the bureau is organized. She contends this leaves a genuine dispute
as to whether the bureau is subject to FOIA. We respectfully disagree.

First, it is difficult to understand Baracco's contention that it is unclear what funds
are involved in this case when her FOIA request specifically and exclusively
referenced the expenditure of A-Tax funds. The only way the bureau receives these
funds is through its undisputed status as a designated marketing organization, which,
again, under DomainsNewMedia.com, does not subject the bureau to FOIA. See id.

Second, we cannot agree with Baracco's argument that the lack of information on
the bureau's corporate structure separates this case from DomainsNewMedia.com.
Though that opinion discussed the chamber's structure, we read that discussion as
secondary to the central point that the A-Tax statute, not FOIA, applies to designated
marketing organizations. Id. at 307, 814 S.E.2d at 519 (discussing the General
Assembly's later enactment of "the more narrow and targeted A-Tax statute" that
"provide[s] what it determined were the necessary accountability safeguards with
regard to the expenditure of these specific funds"); id. at 304, 814 S.E.2d at 518
("The presence of the specific A-Tax statute . . . play[s] the lead role in our
disposition of this case."); id. at 302, 814 S.E.2d at 517 ("The reporting and
accountability provisions directly governing the expenditure of [A-Tax] funds
control the disposition of this appeal."); see also Davis v. S.C. Educ. Credit for
Exceptional Needs Child. Fund, 441 S.C. 187, 203–07 ,893 S.E.2d 330, 338–41 (Ct.
App. 2023) (finding DomainsNewMedia.com controlling in determining a
legislatively created fund was not subject to FOIA because like the A-Tax statute,
the legislative enactment regarding the fund had "independent reporting and
accountability requirements"). This argument is also undermined by the fact that
Baracco's discovery requests did not pursue information about how the bureau is
organized.

Therefore, the order on summary judgment is affirmed. See Peterson v. W. Am. Ins.
Co., 336 S.C. 89, 94, 518 S.E.2d 608, 610 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining summary
judgment is proper "when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" (citing Rule 56(c),
SCRCP)).

Because we agree with the circuit court that summary judgment was warranted, we
also agree that Baracco's motion to compel discovery is moot. See Mathis v. S.C.
State Highway Dep't, 260 S.C. 344, 346, 195 S.E.2d 713, 714–15 (1973) (discussing
mootness).

AFFIRMED.1

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.