State v. Chad L. Simmons

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Chad Lavictor Simmons, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001729

Appeal From Charleston County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-407
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed December 10, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Sarah Elizabeth Shipe, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds
Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne
Wilson, of Charleston, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Chad Lavictor Simmons appeals his conviction for assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN) and sentence of fourteen years'
imprisonment. On appeal, Simmons argues the trial court erred in admitting (1)
recordings of his interviews with law enforcement because his statements were not
given knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and (2) two portions of a recording
of the victim's 911 call because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed any probative value. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the trial court did not err in admitting recordings of Simmons's
interviews with law enforcement. See State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200, 391
S.E.2d 244, 247 (1990) ("On appeal, the conclusion of the trial [court] on issues of
fact as to the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless so
manifestly erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion."); State v. Miller, 441 S.C.
106, 119, 893 S.E.2d 306, 313 (2023) ("[W]e . . . review the trial court's factual
findings regarding voluntariness for any evidentiary support. However, the
ultimate legal conclusion—whether, based on those facts, a statement was
voluntarily made—is a question of law subject to de novo review."). We hold that
under the totality of the circumstances, Simmons voluntarily waived his Miranda 1
rights and spoke with law enforcement during both interviews. He was offered
food and drinks at the onset of his interviews, was informed of his rights and
verbally indicated he understood said rights, signed a form indicating he
understood his rights, agreed to speak with law enforcement, and reinitiated
conversation with law enforcement on both occasions, and both interviews only
lasted approximately two to three hours. See State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551
S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) ("If a defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, but
nevertheless chose to make a statement, the 'burden is on the State to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that his rights were voluntarily waived.'" (quoting
State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54, 55, 370 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1988))); id. ("The trial
[court]'s determination of the voluntariness of a statement must be made on the
basis of the totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused."); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 386, 652 S.E.2d 444,
452 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[A]ppropriate factors to consider in the
totality-of-circumstances analysis include: background, experience, and conduct of
the accused; age; length of custody; police misrepresentations; isolation of a minor
from his or her parent; threats of violence; and promises of leniency."). Further,
the fact that the officer did not inform Simmons of the reason for his interrogation
did not render his statement involuntary, and although the officer told Simmons
she knew he was at the scene of the crime, these suggestions did not amount to
threats or coercion. See State v. Crawley, 349 S.C. 459, 464, 562 S.E.2d 683, 686
(Ct. App. 2002) ("[A] valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed
of all information 'useful' in making his decision . . . ." (quoting Colorado v.

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 (1987))); id. (finding the defendant's "ignorance
regarding the subject does not make her confession inadmissible"); Rochester, 301
S.C. at 200, 391 S.E.2d at 246 ("[T]he confession may not be 'extracted by any sort
of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, [or] by the exertion of improper influence.'" (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976))).

2. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting two portions of
the recording of the victim's 911 call because the probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Pagan,
369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is
within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion."); Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000)
("An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of
law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support.");
State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 172, 508 S.E.2d 870, 876 (1998) ("[I]n order for this
[c]ourt to reverse a case based on the erroneous admission or exclusion of
evidence, prejudice must be shown."); State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 444, 710
S.E.2d 55, 58 (2011) ("Prejudice occurs when there is reasonable probability the
wrongly admitted evidence influenced the jury's verdict."); Rule 403, SCRE
("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . ."). The two
portions of the recording had probative value in corroborating the victim's and
other witnesses' testimonies and served as a real time account of the events, even if
the primary defense was not to discredit the witnesses. See State v. Gray, 408 S.C.
601, 610, 759 S.E.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2014) ("'Probative value' is the measure of
the importance of that tendency to the outcome of a case. It is the weight that a
piece of relevant evidence will carry in helping the trier of fact decide the issues.").
Furthermore, although the recording contained the victim's screams and cries
throughout its duration, her reaction was not unexpected of someone strangled in
the night and, although prejudicial, it was not unfairly prejudicial such that it
suggested a decision on an improper basis. See State v. Wiles, 383 S.C. 151, 158,
679 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2009) ("Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis."); State v. Davis-Kocsis, 443 S.C. 127, 136,
903 S.E.2d 491, 495 (2024) (finding there was a very low danger of unfair
prejudice in the admission of the recording of a 911 call in which the caller
recently watched her friend die because, although emotional, it was not so
provocative that it amounted to unfair prejudice and it "would be of no surprise to
the jury" that someone in such a position would be emotional).
AFFIRMED.2

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.