State v. Antonio Anderson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Antonio Anderson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001257

Appeal From Marlboro County
Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-393
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed November 26, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Jessica M. Saxon, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Brian Hollis Gibbs, both of Columbia;
and Solicitor William Benjamin Rogers, Jr., of
Bennettsville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Antonio Anderson appeals his convictions for voluntary
manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime and his concurrent sentences of twenty-one years' imprisonment and five
years' imprisonment. On appeal, Anderson argues the trial court abused its
discretion by not instructing the jury on self-defense. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the record contains no
evidence Anderson had no probable means of escape other than to shoot the
victim. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Anderson, we
find the record showed that Anderson had multiple opportunities to escape the fatal
confrontation—he could have driven away on three separate occasions, which he
admitted at trial, or he could have walked through the open parking lot where no
one and nothing blocked his path. See State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d
827, 829 (2001) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law
only."); id. at 6, 545 S.E.2d at 829 ("[The appellate court is] bound by the trial
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."); State v. Gaines, 380
S.C. 23, 31, 667 S.E.2d 728, 732 (2008) ("To warrant reversal, a trial court's
refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to
the defendant."); State v. Williams, 400 S.C. 308, 314, 733 S.E.2d 605, 608-09 (Ct.
App. 2012) ("When reviewing the [trial] court's refusal to deliver a requested jury
instruction, appellate courts must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to
the defendant."); State v. Light, 378 S.C. 641, 649, 664 S.E.2d 465, 469 (2008) ("A
self-defense charge is not required unless it is supported by the evidence."); id. at
650, 664 S.E.2d at 469 ("If there is any evidence in the record from which it could
reasonably be inferred that the defendant acted in self-defense, the defendant is
entitled to instructions on the defense, and the trial [court's] refusal to do so is
reversible error."); State v. Slater, 373 S.C. 66, 69-70, 644 S.E.2d 50, 52 (2007)
("To establish self-defense in South Carolina, four elements must be present: (1)
the defendant must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) the defendant
must have been in actual imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious
bodily injury, or he must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of
losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury; (3) if his defense is based upon
his belief of imminent danger, defendant must show that a reasonably prudent
person of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the belief that he
was actually in imminent danger and that the circumstances were such as would
warrant a person of ordinary prudence, firmness, and courage to strike the fatal
blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or the loss of his life; and
(4) the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger."); State v.
Bixby, 388 S.C. 528, 554, 698 S.E.2d 572, 586 (2010) ("It is an axiomatic principle
of law that [self-]defense has not been established if any one element is
disproven."); State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 161, 634 S.E.2d 23, 27-28 (Ct. App.
2006) (ruling the defendant failed to establish self-defense because he had other
means of avoiding the danger such as retreating from the unarmed victim or
closing a trunk containing the gun).

AFFIRMED.1

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.