State v. Desmond L. Green

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Desmond Lamar Green, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000119

Appeal From Beaufort County
Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-368
Submitted October 23, 2025 – Filed November 5, 2025

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Attorney for Capital Appeals David
Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of
Bluffton, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Desmond Lamar Green appeals his conviction for first-degree
domestic violence and sentence of ten years' imprisonment, suspended upon the
service of five years' imprisonment and five years' probation. On appeal, Green
argues the trial court erred in denying his request to bifurcate his trial in order
prevent the unfairly prejudicial effect of the jury learning of his prior convictions
for domestic violence. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the trial court did not err in refusing to bifurcate Green's trial because
although there is stigma associated with prior convictions for domestic violence,
the State was required to prove Green had "two or more prior convictions of
domestic violence within ten years of the current offense" in order for the jury to
convict him of first-degree domestic violence and the stigma associated with
domestic violence does not equate to that associated with a prior conviction for a
sexual offense. See State v. Cross, 427 S.C. 465, 473, 832 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2019)
("In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only."); id. ("The
appellate court reviews a trial [court's] ruling on admissibility of evidence pursuant
to an abuse of discretion standard and gives great deference to the trial court."
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Torres, 390 S.C. 618, 625, 703 S.E.2d 226,
230 (2010))); State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("An
abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack
evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); Cross, 427 S.C. at 473,
832 S.E.2d at 285 ("[T]he conduct of a trial is largely within the discretion of the
presiding judge, to the end that a fair and impartial trial may be had." (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Heath, 232 S.C. 384, 391, 102 S.E.2d 268, 272 (1958)));
State v. Gleaton, 444 S.C. 394, 406, 906 S.E.2d 630, 637 (Ct. App. 2024)
("Generally, 'a bifurcated proceeding is not required in a non-capital case.'"
(quoting Chubb v. State, 303 S.C. 395, 397, 401 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1991))); State v.
Bennett, 256 S.C. 234, 242, 182 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1971) (indicating a bifurcated
trial "is not required by either the common law, the statutory law, or the
constitution of this [s]tate"); Rule 403, SCRE (stating relevant evidence "may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice"); Rule 611(a), SCRE (providing the "court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of" presenting evidence in order to make the
"presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth"); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-25-20(B)(3) (Supp. 2025) ("[A] person commits the offense of domestic
violence in the first degree if the person violates the provisions of subsection (A)
and . . . has two or more prior convictions of domestic violence within ten years of
the current offense . . . ."); Cross, 427 S.C. at 477-78, 832 S.E.2d at 287-88
(finding evidence of Cross's prior conviction for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC) with a minor "had insurmountable probative value in proving the
prior conviction element of first-degree CSC with a minor" but concluding the
prior conviction was not probative of whether he committed the underlying sexual
battery and the "danger of unfair prejudice arising from the admission of the [prior]
conviction at th[at] stage of the trial was exceedingly high, as Cross was standing
trial on charges of first-degree CSC with a minor and committing a lewd act on a
minor"); id. at 478, 832 S.E.2d at 288 (distinguishing Cross's case "from the
first-degree burglary cases because of the inherently prejudicial stigma a prior
sex-related offense undoubtedly carrie[d]"); Gleaton, 444 S.C. at 409-11, 906
S.E.2d at 637-39 (concluding the trial court did not err in denying Gleaton's motion
to bifurcate his charge for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime
of violence from other charges in part because Gleaton's prior arson conviction did
not carry "inherently prejudicial stigma"; therefore, the danger of unfair prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the prior unspecified
conviction (quoting Cross, 427 S.C. at 478, 832 S.E.2d at 288)); State v. Benton,
338 S.C. 151, 155-56, 526 S.E.2d 228, 230 (2000) (concluding evidence of
Benton's two prior burglary convictions were probative to prove an element of
first-degree burglary and was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice);
id. at 156, 526 S.E.2d at 230-31 (providing that in a first-degree burglary case
based on prior convictions, the trial court should not admit specific information
regarding the prior crimes and upon request, should "instruct the jury on the
limited purpose for which the prior crime evidence [could] be considered"
(emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and VINSON and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.