State v. Nyasia M. Grant

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Nyasia Marie Grant, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000696

Appeal From Charleston County
Thomas W. Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-353
Submitted October 1, 2025 – Filed October 22, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Gary Howard Johnson, II, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of
Charleston, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Nyasia Marie Grant appeals her convictions for assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN) and possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime and concurrent sentences of five years'
imprisonment. On appeal, Grant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion
for a directed verdict because the State failed to present evidence that Victim's
"minor" stab wound on her upper arm was "great bodily injury." We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the trial court did not err in denying Grant's motion for a directed verdict
because the evidence showed Grant unlawfully injured Victim by stabbing her with
a large, serrated knife, which we hold is a means likely to produce death or great
bodily injury. See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006)
("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with
the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("A defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the
offense charged."); id. (providing that when reviewing a denial of a directed
verdict motion, an appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the State); id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("If there
is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to
prove the guilt of the accused, the [c]ourt must find the case was properly
submitted to the jury."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(B)(1) (2015) ("A person
commits the offense of [ABHAN] if the person unlawfully injures another person,
and: (a) great bodily injury to another person results; or (b) the act is accomplished
by means likely to produce death or great bodily injury." (emphasis added)); S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-3-600(A)(1) (2015) ("'Great bodily injury' means bodily injury
which causes a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member
or organ."). We also hold Grant's argument on the ambiguity of the statute was not
preserved for appellate review because Grant did not raise it as a basis for her
directed verdict motion to the trial court and the court did not rule on it. See State
v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an
issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the trial [court]. Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not
be considered on appeal."); id. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 694 ("A party may not argue
one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.").

AFFIRMED.1

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.